Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

sequences flowing therefrom.” 22 The battle was over
the heart of the Russian military—which side would
be favored: nuclear weapons as favored by Sergeyev
or conventional forces as favored by Kvashnin? The
former maintained that, given Russia’s weak conventional
forces, Moscow’s only alternative was to
develop its nuclear capabilities to the point where
no other state or organization would consider attacking
Russia. Kvashnin, on the other hand, maintained
that Russia was already faced with threats that could
only be handled by conventional forces. After all, one
could not seriously consider using nuclear weapons in
Chechnya or Bosnia. The military had to have modern
conventional weapons to meet these challenges.
For his part, Sergeyev made the familiar argument
that all of the conventional forces in the world
would not protect Russia in the face of an opponent
who had nuclear weapons and the will to use them.
To quote Arbatov: “Russia’s nuclear arsenal should
be sufficient to inflict pre-set damage to any aggressor
under any circumstances.” 23 However, according
to Federov, an analysis of Moscow’s nuclear capabilities
at that time led to “the major conclusion that Russia’s
nuclear weapons cannot perform the mission of
deterrence against the hypothetical aggression at the
regional level.” 24 The obvious problem, as pointed out
by Alexandr Golts, is that “nuclear weapons are less
capable against terrorism than any other.” 25
The simple fact is that “Moscow lacks a coherent
military strategy. In particular, the Military Doctrine
of the Russian Federation was approved only in April
2000, while the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation
was approved in July 2001. Programs and plans of
military construction were out of proportion to Russia’s
economic capabilities.” 26 To make matters worse,
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