Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

cautious attitude toward missile defense. At its core,
Russian strategy still rests on the theorems of the late
1960-early 1970s embodied in the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty: (1) offensive and defensive weapons
are inextricably linked, (2) robust defense can vastly
complicate the calculation of strategic stability (i.e., it
becomes difficult to predict how many warheads will
reach the adversary in a response strike), and (3) uncontrolled
missile defense developments can irreparably
upset strategic stability and will result in an arms
race. Russia’s preferred response has traditionally
been in the area of offensive weapons, which are more
cost-effective, although in the 1980s, the Soviet Union
actively explored strategic missile defense options,
i.e., simultaneously pursued both symmetric and
asymmetric response. For Russia, symmetric response
(development of its own advance strategic missile defense
system) has been out of the reach for financial
and technological reasons. As a result, it has pursued
both political options (through arms control negotiations,
mobilization of international community, close
cooperation with China, etc.) and the defense penetration
capability of new strategic delivery systems.
2000-10.
The 2000 Military Doctrine rather radically changed
the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security
strategy by introducing a new mission—that of
limited nuclear use in response to a limited conventional
attack, i.e., one that did not threaten the survival
and sovereignty of Russia, but still was beyond the
capability of Russian conventional forces. According
to the new document, in addition to “the use of nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction”
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