Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

• It is assumed that if Russia can deter the United
States, it can deter any other state or a coalition
of states. The United States, in effect, serves as
a benchmark.
• Finally, many among the Russian elite, and
especially among the military, still view the
United States with unease and suspicion. Only
a few years ago, one could hear talk about the
intent of undisclosed countries (some directly
mentioned the United States) to partition Russia.
One element of strategic deterrence conceptualization
that has experienced considerable change in
the post-Soviet period is the criterion, “how much
is enough,” to deter the potential adversary. During
the Soviet period (including late 1980s), the goal was
assured delivery of 500 warheads to U.S. territory;
in the 1990s, the figure apparently decreased to 150-
200; recently one can hear an even lower figure—assured
delivery of about 50 warheads. The reduction
of this all-important criterion is consistent with the
acknowledgment in the 1993 and subsequent Military
Doctrines of very low probability of a global war, and
reflects a fundamental change in the international
system after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the
lower criterion reduces pressure for creating an assured
second-strike capability as well as requirements
for nuclear posture and modernization programs. Basically,
it means that Russia can be reasonably relaxed
with regard to the future of its strategic arsenal and
can afford limiting spending and resources necessary
to maintain and modernize its strategic force.
Adherence to traditional views on strategic deterrence
dictates Russia’s negative or, at least, very
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