Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

cause Russia can respond with nuclear weapons. This
is a guarantee against a threat that, for all intents and
purposes, does not exist. As a result, nuclear weapons
are often portrayed as a “just-in-case” deterrence
for the unlikely situation when, some time in the indefinite
future, the United States or another powerful
country or coalition becomes hostile to Russia.
At a deeper psychological level, reliance on nuclear
deterrence reflects uncertainty about the unpredictable
international environment and the lack of
confidence in Russia’s power and influence. Nuclear
weapons played a similar role during the Cold War—
a prop for a country that more or less acutely sensed
that the enemy, the United States and the Western
community in general, were too powerful. The trauma
of the 1990s, when Russia suddenly found itself weak
and vulnerable, reinforced the psychological need for
the ultimate security guarantee. The need for that prop
should disappear if the place of Russia in the emerging
international system becomes clearer and, especially if
the country becomes more deeply integrated into the
global economy.
The latter process has been developing quite well
where relations between Russia and the European
Union (EU) are concerned: even today not only are
many EU states (in particular the “Old Europe”) reluctant
to enter into a conflict with Russia, but Moscow
is equally reluctant to enter into a conflict with them.
The U.S.-Russian relationship, unfortunately, does
not have a solid economic foundation yet, and consequently
political and security relations lack stability.
The need for stronger interdependence is further reinforced
by the belief of Russian leaders (particularly
strong among the Putin and Medvedev generation)
that economic interdependence is central to coop-
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