Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

future international system as based on a consensus
of key players—countries with the greatest economic
and military power. In that conceptualization, Russia
is accorded the place of one of the pillars of the emerging
system—a state with special rights and responsibilities.
Although Moscow recognizes—and welcomes—the
rise of new centers of power beyond the
five permanent members of the UNSC (such as India,
Germany, Japan, Brazil, etc.), it is also keen on preserving
certain special privileges. For example, Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov recently described India
as a potential new permanent member of the UNSC,
but cautioned that only “old” permanent UNSC members
should have the right of veto. 4
The prospect of nuclear disarmament puts Russian
leaders into a rather awkward situation. On the one
hand, they cannot question the legal (under Article VI
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]) or the
moral obligation to disarm. On the other hand, elimination
of nuclear weapons would deprive Russia of
one of its key status symbols. Speaking in February
2008 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,
Lavrov endorsed the nuclear disarmament initiatives
of George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger,
and Sam Nunn, but in a rather half-hearted manner
and referred to it as a very long-term prospect. 5 In
December 2008, at a meeting with the Association of
European Businesses in Russia, Lavrov characterized
nuclear disarmament as an “uncertain” goal whose solution
is hampered by multiple “unresolved issues.” 6
The apparent contradiction is resolved, it seems, by
postponing the final solution into a distant future.
2. “Existential deterrence” refers to a general, vague
notion that no rational country or alliance, including
the United States and NATO, will attack Russia be-
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