Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

7. The current trends will make Russia interested
in further reductions of nuclear weapons, perhaps to
the level of around 1,000 strategic warheads. It seems
that Russia will probably want to pause at about that
point. Reaching new agreements will not be easy,
however, due to the multiplicity of divisive issues that
have emerged in the last 20 years and especially during
this decade. Post-New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) negotiations are likely to be difficult
and time-consuming.
8. The urgency of the missile defense issue has receded
rather considerably in the last year, although
public statements do not reflect that. The greatest concern
is not about the current or the short-term American
capability, but rather about the capability that
might emerge by the end of this decade. This leaves
considerable margin of opportunity to further discuss
this issue and perhaps develop a set of predictability
and transparency measures that might help alleviate
the controversy. Cooperation in missile defense
remains possible and could be the “real” long-term
answer.
9. On the surface, the trajectory of Russian strategy
is similar to what the United States has been doing
in the last 2 decades—emphasis is gradually shifting
toward long-range high-precision conventional capability,
Russia actively develops missile defense capability,
etc. This similarity is misleading, however, and
will hardly make arms control negotiations any easier
because there is an important asymmetry between the
two countries. Whereas the United States, for reasons
of its geographical location, needs strategic capability
in both conventional and defense assets, Russia emphasizes
theater-range assets. Consequently, it will remain
highly suspicious about U.S. plans to the extent
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