Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

out as to whether it will be able to cover that gap. It is
clear that efforts will continue, in particular because
nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as unusable
and thus not very relevant for security policy.
4. Nuclear posture has seen rather radical changes
in the first half of this decade following a fundamental
revision of long-term plans in 2000 and then a series
of partial revisions to new policy. Currently, Russia
seems to be moving toward a posture that can be
characterized as a balanced dyad—a relatively equal
(60 to 40 percent) distribution of nuclear warheads between
the land and the sea legs. The air leg remains
part of the nuclear triad, but only formally—the main
mission of long-range aircraft is increasingly conventional
and, furthermore, its nuclear assets are subject
to the least modernization.
5. The Russian nuclear force remains old—the bulk
of delivery systems are still those produced in the Soviet
Union. The rate of production and deployment
of new weapons is below what production capability
can sustain. More importantly, production capability
gradually decreases as well, and the Russian government
does not appear interested in sustaining ability
to expand production. This strongly suggests that the
overall size of the nuclear force will gradually decline
and that delivery vehicles will carry the maximum
load of warheads.
6. Contrary to common perception, short-range nuclear
assets (nonstrategic nuclear weapons [NSNW])
do not appear to play a significant role in Russia’s
security policy, and there are no discernible missions
assigned to them with the exception of naval assets.
Continued Russian resistance to arms control measures
with regard to NSNW is primarily explained by
the alignment of domestic politics.
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