Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

ery vehicles is apparently below the optimal level (the
lowest cost per unit) and research and development
(R&D) programs remain underfunded or, at best,
funded at bare minimum. Effectively, the government
can be said to take a “minimalist” attitude toward
its nuclear capability. While this pattern began during
the time of relative financial scarcity, it continued
through the more financially favorable period almost
without change and remains the same today. There is
no indication that Moscow plans to radically increase
funding for either production or modernization of its
nuclear arsenal. The question remains open whether
limited funding reflects a relatively skeptical view of
the possible role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security.
This chapter will address the following issues
relevant to the understanding of the future of the Russian
nuclear capability:
• The role of nuclear weapons in security policy.
While the public profile of nuclear weapons is
enormous, of greater relevance are the missions
assigned to nuclear weapons and their evolution
in the last 20 years. Of special interest are
the roles, if any, of tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear
weapons, which are increasingly visible in
international debates.
• Modernization programs. What are the reasons
for the apparent gap between the high public
profile of nuclear weapons and the relatively
limited funding? How are modernization programs
related to nuclear missions?
• What are the prospects for transition from nuclear
to conventional capability? This has been
a stated goal of the Russian government, but
can Russia actually implement it? This section
will also tackle debates about abrogation of the
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