Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

CHAPTER 5
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Nikolai Sokov
Speaking on November 11, 2009, during a visit
to the oldest Russian nuclear weapons laboratory
at Sarov, Patriarch Kirill, head of Russian Orthodox
Church, endorsed nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.
Calling the closure of the St. Seraphim monastery
at the place of the nuclear lab by Soviet authorities
a “sinful act,” he also congratulated the lab
employees who, “at the home of St. Seraphim [developed]
a weapon of deterrence that prevented World
War III.” “We must strive for a world without nuclear
weapons,” he emphasized, “but in a manner that does
not hurt our country.” 1
This statement, which stands in stark contrast to
the position advocated by the majority of church leaders
in the West, is in tune with the dominant view
among the Russian public. Nuclear weapons are widely
regarded as a symbol and a guarantee of Russia’s
influence, independence, and security—the ultimate
unbeatable card in global power politics. The world
is regarded as a dangerous place, full of potential or
actual enemies that would attack or subjugate Russia
any moment if it is unable to crush the attacker; the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) as a whole (and, more rarely, China) top
the list of threats.
Self-reliance and especially reliance on the nation’s
own military power has deep roots in the Russian
psyche. Even a casual visitor to many Russian
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