Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

come up with a new National Security Concept. It was
completed on May 7, 1997, and enacted by presidential
decree on December 17, 1997. 17 While the Concept
laid the basis for a revision of military doctrine, it was
far too broad and ambiguous when it came to setting
priorities, national interests, and responsibilities.
Meanwhile, in an effort to make structural changes,
Sergeyev sought and achieved permission to recreate
the SDF. The purpose was to establish a force
that combined the strategic nuclear capabilities of the
Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force,
as well as other units having responsibility for early
warning command and control units. Additionally,
the country’s reconnaissance satellites would be subordinated
to the SDF.
Finally on March 15, 1999, Yelstin approved a
document called “Main Provisions of Russia’s Nuclear
Deterrence Policy.” The document made it clear
that Russia’s nuclear forces were the guarantor of the
country’s national security. 18 The problem with the
Concept was that it did not bring about the stability
and predictability (stabil’nost’ i predvidenie) that is so
much a part of military thinking the world over. Generals
and admirals cannot plan for the future if they
do not know what kind of a conflict they are preparing
for, or if they do not know what kind of weapons systems
and personnel they will have at their disposal. If
there were two words that would describe the 1990s
from the generals’ and admirals’ point of view, they
were confusion and chaos. It was clearly time for a
new military doctrine.
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