Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

don the INF Treaty, particularly since the production
line at its only missile plant in Votkinsk is busy with
the orders from strategic forces. The only possible controversy
involves the Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) mobile
tactical missile currently deployed in replacement of
the Tochka (SS-21 Scarab B); its range is officially reported
at 400 km, but may in fact exceed 500 km—so
the missile is capable of performing effectively the
tasks of the Oka (SS-23) missile destroyed in 1988-90.
This controversy could be focused on the Kaliningrad
exclave, but its strategic vulnerability cannot be reduced
by deploying the Iskander-M missiles there (as
Medvedev briefly ordered in early 2009), so it is plausible
that Moscow could agree on a self-imposed commitment
to withdraw all nuclear weapons from this
region. Much would depend upon NATO’s position
on the U.S. nuclear assets in Europe, which at present
are practically unusable.
THINGS THAT MIGHT GO WRONG
This evaluation of evolving Russian perceptions of
strategic relations with the United States and Europe
cannot lead to an informed conclusion about their further
evolution because they not only remain seriously
incoherent, but primarily because their connection
with reality is rather ambivalent. The mix of risingpower
ambitions and declining-power fears requires
psychological diagnostics rather than rational choice
analysis, but there is nevertheless a common denominator
in this pragmatic-schizophrenic worldview. The
present Russian leadership takes for an absolute imperative
the preservation of its monopolistic control
over the political system, even if the experimental and
somewhat unnatural construct of Putin-Medvedev
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