Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

mobilization. 11 It is possible to speculate that Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who has never pretended
to have a grasp of high strategic matters, opted for
this goal as one of the easiest in implementation, since
those empty shells of regiments performed no useful
role. However, even if abandoning a strategic model
(dating back to World War I) was not intentional, the
swift implementation of the disbandment order means
that under no circumstances would Russia be able to
deploy even a dozen of cadre divisions by calling reservists.
This also means that no minimally meaningful
conventional defense could be built in the Far East
in case of a confrontation with China. 12
One implicit reflection on this shift in the Military
Doctrine is the proposition that:
Despite the diminishing probability of launching a
large-scale war against the Russian Federation with
conventional and nuclear weapons, in several directions
military dangers for the Russian Federation are
increasing (Article 7).
This guideline remains open to interpretation, but it
is possible to suggest that a June 22-type conventional
offensive from NATO is now perceived as a negligible
threat, not least due to unwinnable but inescapable
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. What is assessed
as a real and high-impact threat (demonstrated
in the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999) is a series
of surgical strikes with long-range high-precision
weapon systems against which Russia has no effective
defense and cannot respond in kind. 13
The only conceivable, even if unthinkable, option
for countering such a threat is escalation to the nuclear
level, and this option needs to be credible in order to
prevent the execution of punishing strikes. This credi-
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