Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

approximate equality of capabilities with the United
States.
It is with this quasi-parity in nuclear potentials in
mind, and emboldened by the progress in reconstructing
Russia’s economic and military potential as the result
of favorably changing global prices for energy raw
materials, that in early 2007 the Kremlin stepped up
efforts to reclaim greater political equality with Washington
in global and regional affairs. In a landmark
presentation at the “Munich Conference on Security
Policy” (February 10, 2007), President Vladimir Putin
declared Russian rejection of American unilateralism
in international affairs. 117
The RF President accused the United States of
“overstepping its national borders in every way”
and essentially declared Moscow’s determination to
oppose Washington’s “unilateral and frequently illegitimate
actions.” 118 Mr. Putin reiterated Russia’s
intensely negative reactions to NATO’s advancement
towards its borders, U.S. BMD-related deployments
in Eastern Europe, and “space militarization” and reasserted
that his government is prepared to provide
“asymmetric responses” to these perceived “threats to
Russian security.” 119 Importantly, Dmitrii Medvedev,
while slightly toning down the anti-American rhetoric
of his predecessor in his public statements, essentially
continued the critique of American global policies after
becoming the RF President. 120
Liberal Russian politicians and experts were
thrilled to hear from the new U.S. Administration
that it plans “to stop the development of new nuclear
weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian
ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; and seek dramatic
reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of
nuclear weapons and material.” 121 In line with these
140