Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

eady developing the theory of strategic non-nuclear
deterrence… Actual use of nuclear weapons… puts an
end to any deterrence because it results in irreversible
processes. In contrast, strategic high-precision nonnuclear
weapons may be used both for deterrence and
punishment. This is why in America. . . . they are now
seriously looking at strategic non-nuclear deterrence
that offers significantly more flexible capabilities for
use and punishment of any aggressor specifically for
purposes of deterrence. 111
Importantly, since the collapse of the bipolar
world, Russian policymakers no longer base their military
and foreign policy decisions only on the analysis
of the state of relations with the United States and
NATO. Currently, Russian leaders recognize the existence
and growth of multiple sources of threats and
challenges to their country in proximity to Russian
borders and across the world. It is highly doubtful
that, even if bilateral U.S.-Russian relations miraculously
evolved into a strategic partnership in the near
future, Moscow would be prepared to give up nuclear
weapons as an ultimate guarantee of Russian security.
In view of the persistently negative Russian threat
assessments, it is highly questionable that the Russian
military-political leadership would make drastic
changes to their country’s doctrines and strategies in
the foreseeable future, let alone relinquish instruments
of power painstakingly restored in recent years, particularly
the Strategic Nuclear Forces. A more probable
development would be the inclusion into Russian
doctrinal documents of certain abstract statements on
benign Russian intentions that would be attractive to
the general public but totally unbinding for policymakers.
In effect, this is exactly the way Soviet policies
were presented to the outside world as compendiums
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