Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

States (CIS). For a number of reasons, by the beginning
of 1992, it was clear that the CIS option was dead
on delivery. 4 Indeed, by the middle of 1992, the key
question was how to withdraw the nuclear weapons
from CIS countries—how to get them back to Russia.
New countries like Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus
wanted no part of the nuclear force. However, the
process of withdrawing and re-stationing these missiles
on Russian soil undermined whatever progress
had been made in coordinating the actions of the three
legs. To make matters worse, budgetary allocations
were insufficient just to maintain these systems, let
alone modernize them.
NUKES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN
THE 1990s
The 1990s were a difficult time for the SDF. For example,
Moscow’s nuclear arsenal fell to a level 4-4.5
times below its once impressive figure. The reason was
simple: the collapse of the Russian economy made it
increasingly difficult for Russia to purchase and maintain
its nuclear stockpiles. In 2002, one Russian source
claimed that since 1991, “Russia has no resources to
maintain the previous nuclear force of about 10 thousand
on strategic delivery vehicles and about 20 thousand
of sub-strategic nukes.” 5
The situation confronting Moscow’s conventional
forces was dismal at best. Consequently, Russia’s generals
had to watch American conventional forces roll
unopposed through Iraqi troops during Operation
DESERT STORM in 1991. They realized that Russia’s
chances for keeping up with the West were dimming
quickly. This was obvious in the area of procurement,
which fell by more than 80 percent between 1991 and
3