Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

the expanded uses of nuclear weapons. As early as
October 2003 the military top brass, President Vladimir
Putin, administration officials, ministers, security
chiefs, Duma deputies, and journalists gathered in the
Defense Ministry to hear Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
present a document titled the “Public Part of the
Military Doctrine.” 80
News on the preparation of a new version of the
Russian Military Doctrine that was supposed to “concretize”
Russian threat perceptions and strategy began
to circulate with particular intensity around mid-2006,
at a time when U.S.-Russia relations were at their lowest
ebb in years. 81 According to media reports, the new
document was intended not only to directly identify
the United States and NATO as Russia’s key “potential
adversaries,” but also equate threats from Western
sources to the threat of terrorism. 82
On January 20, 2007, at the “Military-and-Scientific
Conference” of the Academy of Military Sciences, the
leadership of the RF Armed Forces formally reviewed
the structure and the content of the new version of
the Doctrine. According to the report of the conference
proceedings by the Academy’s President, Army
General Makhmud Gareev, nuclear issues occupied
a special place in the discussions. 83 The Doctrine was
reported to stress the reemergence of the “existential
nuclear threat” to the RF. As emphasized by General
Gareev, “nuclear weapons of all states that possess
them are ultimately aimed at Russia.” In particular,
as seen by the Russian military, “NATO is engaged in
creation of powerful groupings of armed forces that
are dramatically changing the military balance” in Europe
and globally. 84 Not surprisingly, in light of such
dire assessments, the proposed new military doctrinal
document was expected to call for “augmenting the
[Russian] nuclear potential” in the future. 85
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