Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

as WMD nonproliferation, global and regional security
systems, etc. 68 Director of the Russian Institute for
Strategic Studies Yevgenii Kozhokhin described Russian
“self-interest” in arms control in connection with
the signing of SORT and other bilateral agreements in
Moscow in May 2002:
Russia does not conceal its vested interest in the agreements
that have been signed. It looks like Moscow is
primarily motivated by the desire to enshrine in the
agreement equality in the relations with the U.S. and,
if possible, to maintain at least a seeming parity in
strategic arms. A factor of no less importance is Russia’s
hope that it will be able to put an emphasis on
the principle of interdependence between strategic
offensive and defensive weapons. These must be the
reasons why Moscow insisted on a legally binding
character of the future agreement. From Russia’s point
of view, no other document could help it achieve these
goals. 69
SORT was particularly welcome for Moscow, especially
since it came at a time when the structure of
traditional arms control was shattered by the disappearance
of the ABMT of 1972, which was long considered
by the Russians to represent the cornerstone
of the entire bilateral strategic arms control. 70
By consenting to a significantly less structured
arms control and the abandonment of the direct qualitative
and quantitative parity in offensive and defensive
capabilities, the Kremlin appeared to have not
only accepted the unavoidable, but also untied its own
hands in pursuing modernization of nuclear forces in
line with internal economic and political exigencies.
The Russians took advantage of the relatively improved
strategic relations with the United States to
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