Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Andrei Kokoshin, who at the time of the Reagan-
Gorbachev summits worked as Deputy Director of the
U.S. and Canada Studies Institute, was a member of
the Gorbachev-appointed interagency group to study
Soviet asymmetrical responses to the United States.
The SDI program confirmed years later that the Kremlin
had indeed agreed on a variety of efficient and
cost-effective counteractions to the U.S. strategic defenses
if and when they would turn into reality. 21 This
more or less rejects the argument of those Russian
analysts who claim that the Soviets overreacted in a
massive way to the U.S. SDI and that it was enormous
appropriations for fighting the “terrifying” American
program that finally broke the backbone of the Soviet
economy. 22
Gorbachev continued to press for spectacular new
agreements with the United States. By December 1987
when the Soviet leader arrived in Washington for his
new summit with Reagan, both sides were prepared
to sign a treaty banning intermediate range missiles in
Europe (the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF]
Treaty). However, during that summit Gorbachev
again did not fail to refer to the U.S. SDI as a stumbling
block and reaffirmed the link between offensive
and defense weapons.
Finally, a preliminary compromise was reached.
Both sides would commit themselves to the ABM
Treaty as signed in 1972. Research and development
(R&D) and testing would not be contrary to the Treaty.
The Soviet Union and the United States would
not withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period
of time yet to be determined. 23 During his May 1988
visit to Moscow, Reagan confirmed that understanding.
This cleared the way for further discussions on
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