Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

1970s had long-term effects on later Soviet and current
Russian thinking. They suggested to the Kremlin that:
• Arms control is an extremely valuable means
of equalizing capabilities of nuclear adversaries
if one of them lags in levels of armaments and
technological prowess.
• Success in negotiations is possible as the result
of subtle and deceptive moves, as in the game
of chess.
• The linkage between strategic offensive and defensive
systems is quintessential in preventing
unilateral advantages and creating balance in
strategic relations.
Soviet nuclear strategy and doctrine were evolving
together with the changing balance of strategic forces
and progress in arms control negotiations:
Since the second half of the 1960s, the leadership of the
Armed Forces and the state experienced a transformation
of views on the possible nature of the world war.
The Soviet military doctrine began to take into account
the possible initial stage of a military conflict with the
sole use of conventional weapons. There began to
emerge doubts about the possibility of gaining victory
after a massive exchange of nuclear strikes. Since this
time, the Soviet leadership began to seek the conclusion
of treaties with the U.S. on banning or limiting
strategic nuclear weapons. . . . Beginning in the early-
1970s, the main concept of developing Soviet strategic
weapons was the concept that could be described as
“strategic sufficiency.” It defined the quantitative and
qualitative composition of carriers, their distribution
among the Strategic Missile Troops, the Navy and the
Air Force, with due account of potential use under different
conditions. They established scientifically the
optimal ratio of the number of carriers and warheads
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