Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

nents into protracted bargaining and to eventually
reach compromise by demonstrating flexibility while
lowering the original excessive demands. 4
Khrushchev’s bold peace initiatives were clearly
predicated on the rapid progress of the Soviet nuclear
and missile programs. As the result of intense efforts,
the Soviets had by October 1957 already put into orbit
the first artificial satellite with a clear implication that
Soviet missiles were now able to hit U.S. territory by
flying through space.
Even during periods of relative relaxation of tensions
in U.S.-USSR relations, Soviet perspectives on
bilateral arms control were heavily tinted by ideological
preconceptions. The Soviets invariably believed
that the American side sought unilateral advantages
for themselves. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
recalled in his memoirs:
For Carter, as all other American Presidents—his
predecessors, the paramount goal had always consisted
in limiting the Soviet nuclear potential, while
keeping the main U.S. strike forces intact. Only with
great effort, and under the influence of the irrefutable
arguments and the constructive line of the USSR that
enjoyed wide support in the world, he would deviate
from his position aimed at achieving unilateral advantages
for the United States. 5
A real breakthrough for the Soviets in the pursuit
of equilibrium in strategic relations with the United
States began to emerge by the late-1960s when the
United States took note of Soviet efforts to develop
a strategic antiballistic missile (ABM) system that
eventually became the foundation for the Moscow
ABM system. 6 The United States apparently became
concerned with the prospect of an arms race in ABM
systems. 7
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