Full text - Faculty of Social Sciences - Université d'Ottawa

Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité
Institute for the Prevention of Crime
Faculté des sciences sociales / Faculty of Social Sciences
Université d’Ottawa / University of Ottawa
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5 Canada
613-562-5798
IPC@uOttawa.ca
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
ISSN 1913-1941
Revue de l’ IPC Review March / mars 2009 • volume 3
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
volume 3
Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité
Institute for the Prevention of Crime

L’Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité (IPC) a pour mission de rassembler
les meilleures connaissances scientifiques provenant des sources les plus réputées
afin que les Canadiens puissent bénéficier des taux de criminalité et de victimisation
les plus bas. L’Institut s’efforce de rendre accessibles toutes ces connaissances aux
responsables des politiques, aux universités, aux médias et aux intervenants sur le
terrain. Il vise à développer la capacité des Canadiennes et Canadiens d’avoir recours
aux approches préventives reconnues efficaces. L’Institut collabore avec tous les ordres
de gouvernement, la société civile et les praticiens afin de prévenir la criminalité de
manière abordable, responsable et durable.
La Revue de l’IPC fournit aux responsables des politiques une analyse pointue des
connaissances canadiennes et internationales sur ce qui s’avère efficace à réduire la
criminalité et sur comment mettre en œuvre ces approches.
La Revue de l’IPC est disponible gratuitement et peut aussi être téléchargée à partir
de notre site Web à l’adresse www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
The Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) seeks to bring together the best
scientific knowledge from the most authoritative sources so that Canadians will enjoy
the lowest rates of crime and victimization possible. It strives to make this knowledge
accessible to policy makers, practitioners, universities and the media, and to develop
the capacity of Canadians to use evidence based crime prevention. It collaborates
with all orders of government, civil society and practitioners to prevent crime in an
affordable, responsible and sustainable way.
The IPC Review provides state of the art reviews on what works to reduce crime and
how to deliver it successfully. Canadian and foreign academics and experts bring
together the latest knowledge on a variety of crime prevention topics aimed specifically
at policy makers.
The IPC Review is available free of charge, and can also be downloaded from our
website at www.ipc.uOttawa.ca

Volume 3 Revue de L’
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca IPC
© IPC 2009 R E V I E W
La prévention de la criminalité :
poursuivre sur sa lancée
Crime Prevention:
Sustaining the Momentum
Sous la direction de / Edited by: Ross Hastings & Melanie Bania
Remerciements / Acknowledgements........................................................iii
La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins.............................1
Ross Hastings
Crime Prevention at a Crossroads..............................................................7
Ross Hastings
BUILDING A C A NA DI A N CR IME PR EV ENTION
STRATEGY: LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention
from Recent International Experience...................................................... 13
Peter Homel
New Labour and Crime Prevention
in England and Wales: What Worked?.................................................... 41
Enver Solomon
Commentary from the Co-chairs of the National
Municipal Network for Crime Prevention................................................ 67
Christiane Sadeler & Patrice Allard
Commentary from the Provincial/Territorial Perspective......................... 71
Beth Ulrich

Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention:
The National Crime Prevention Strategy................................................. 75
Daniel Sansfaçon & Lucie Léonard
Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention:
Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities...................................................... 81
Margaret Shaw
YOUTH AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults:
(Dis)Affiliation and the Potential for Prevention...................................... 89
Melanie Bania
La violence dans l’univers des gangs : du besoin de
protection à la construction identitaire masculine...................................117
Patrice Corriveau
Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement
in Canada: Quality Prevention Strategies............................................... 135
Mark Totten
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Laying the Foundation for Effective Collaboration
and Problem Solving Partnerships.......................................................... 159
Julie Pehar & Christine Sevigny
Protocole montréalais de collaboration intersectorielle
pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale :
évaluation du projet pilote d’implantation............................................. 179
Myriam Dubé & Raymonde Boisvert
Remerciements
Nous tenons à exprimer nos remerciements à Sécurité publique Canada (SP)
dont le soutien financier a rendu possible la préparation, la publication et la
distribution de ce volume de la Revue de l’Institut pour la prévention de la
criminalité (RIPC). Toutes les opinions exprimées dans cette Revue sont celles
des auteurs et n’engagent aucunement SP ou ses représentants.
Acknowledgements
We wish to express our appreciation for the support of Public Safety Canada
(PS) in the preparation, publication and distribution of this volume of
the Institute for the Prevention of Crime Review (IPCR). The financial
contribution of PS has made this initiative possible. All the opinions
expressed herein are those of the authors of the articles and in no way reflect
the positions of PS or its representatives.
Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women........... 201
Holly Johnson & Jennifer Fraser

Volume 3: pages 1–5
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
La prévention de la criminalité
à la croisée des chemins
Ross Hastings
Département de criminologie et Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité
Université d’Ottawa
Si près et si loin à la fois…
Ces mots peuvent évoquer bien des images différentes; toutefois, dans le cas qui
nous occupe, ils font référence à la prévention de la criminalité au Canada.
Si près… De prime abord, la prévention de la criminalité à grandement
progressé au Canada. Pour bien des gens, certains tournants ont revêtu une
importance majeure : la Conférence européenne et nord-américaine sur la sécurité
et la prévention de la criminalité en milieu urbain, qui s’est tenue à Montréal en
1989; ce qu’on a désigné comme le Rapport Horner, de 1993; peut-être aussi
le lancement de la phase I de la Stratégie nationale pour la prévention du crime
(SNPC), incluant la fondation du Conseil national de prévention du crime en
1994. Dans les premiers temps, la promesse que portait la prévention suscitait
une grande énergie et beaucoup de fébrilité, mais les ressources et les appuis se
faisaient rares. En lançant la phase II de la SNPC, on a tenté de s’attaquer à ce
problème en investissant plus de 30 millions de dollars par année pour soutenir
des initiatives de prévention; cette somme a plus que doublé depuis. Et on a
connu certaines réussites. On a réalisé beaucoup de choses et tous les ordres de
gouvernement tiennent maintenant compte de la prévention de la criminalité
dans l’élaboration de leurs politiques et pratiques; celle-ci jouit en outre d’un
appui populaire et politique appréciable.
Et si loin à la fois… Il existe un sentiment préoccupant voulant que la
prévention soit parvenue à la croisée des chemins et que son avenir soit loin
d’être assuré. Les signes abondent. Au niveau fédéral, le financement du Centre

2 Revue de l’IPC 3 La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins
3
national de prévention du crime (CNPC) a été majoré considérablement et le
Centre a lancé son Plan d’action visant à diminuer efficacement la criminalité
(2007), qui l’aidera à explorer de nouvelles orientations dans nombre de
secteurs. Mais le Centre semble en proie à une crise de croissance, dont l’une
des manifestations, et non la moindre, est son incapacité d’allouer tous ses
fonds (au cours d’un récent exercice, près de la moitié des fonds du CNCP
n’a pas pu être reportée). Quelques provinces et territoires sont à élaborer des
politiques coordonnées de prévention de la criminalité et de nombreuses villes
investissent beaucoup d’argent et de ressources dans la conception d’initiatives
de prévention. Mais ces efforts ne sont pas entre liés et il n’existe aucune stratégie
nationale réelle qui intègre les efforts de tous les ordres de gouvernement dans
une approche globale et durable de gouvernance et de gestion de la prévention
de la criminalité et de la sécurité communautaire au Canada.
La prévention se heurte aussi à certaines sources importantes de résistance. Une
certaine incertitude persiste quant aux résultats escomptés de la prévention
et quant aux moyens de les mesurer. Le manque de ressources adéquates et
durables a des incidences encore plus importantes : on semble croire que la
prévention est l’approche la plus économique et la plus rentable, mais il y a peu
de signes d’une volonté de développer et de financer la prévention au même titre
que les trois autres piliers du système de justice (la police, les tribunaux et les
services correctionnels). En dernier lieu, il se pourrait que les vents politiques
aient tourné : la crise financière qui sévit actuellement rend tout le monde
plus résistant à des changements qui pourraient menacer leurs intérêts et plus
prudent en ce qui a trait à l’allocation permanente de ressources considérables
à de nouvelles initiatives. En définitive, la prévention de la criminalité figure à
l’ordre du jour, mais elle n’occupe pas une place de pouvoir ou d’influence. La
promesse que portait la prévention ne s’est pas suffisamment traduite en des
initiatives efficaces et durables, et l’avenir pourrait ne pas être aussi rose qu’on
le souhaiterait.
Cela s’explique en bonne partie par le fait que nous n’avons toujours pas
affronté ni surmonté trois obstacles importants à la mise en œuvre et à la
durabilité d’une approche globale et intégrée de prévention de la criminalité
et de sécurité communautaire. Les articles et commentaires contenus dans ce
numéro traitent tous de ces obstacles d’une façon ou d’une autre.
Un premier obstacle qui se dresse est le défi de l’imagination. Le problème
ici est lié à notre incapacité de concevoir un langage commun entourant les
buts et les indicateurs de succès, ou de recueillir les données nécessaires pour
évaluer la nature et l’importance des problèmes, de cibler nos initiatives et d’en
évaluer les incidences. Plusieurs des articles contenus dans ce numéro abordent
ce thème. Le texte de Holly Johnson et de Jennifer Fraser met l’accent sur le
défaut trop fréquent de tenir compte des différences entre les sexes dans la
planification et la mise en œuvre des activités de prévention. Elles avancent qu’il
nous faut améliorer notre capacité de composer avec les réalités de la violence
faite aux femmes et d’apprécier comment les femmes vivent leur victimisation
dans différents contextes sociaux. Elles soutiennent qu’il faut qu’on s’engage à
intégrer la dimension genre et de faire en sorte que les besoins et le vécu des
femmes soient au cœur de la planification et de la mise en œuvre des activités
de prévention.
Trois autres articles s’intéressent au rapport existant entre la violence chez les
jeunes et les gangs; ils insistent sur l’importance de situer ces phénomènes dans
leur contexte social particulier, de même que dans un système social et structurel
plus large. Mélanie Bania se penche sur les répercussions de la désaffiliation
sociale et du sentiment d’exclusion; Patrice Corriveau décrit comment les gangs
et la violence chez les jeunes sont liés à un désir de protection et d’inclusion
ainsi qu’aux efforts déployés par les jeunes pour se forger une identité et un
concept de soi positif; quant à Mark Trotten, il examine la crise associée à la
violence chez les jeunes autochtones membres de gangs. Il existe un commun
dénominateur, en l’occurrence une conviction selon laquelle, pour certains
jeunes, l’adhésion à un gang peut être perçue comme une solution à leurs
problèmes, alors que la violence pourrait jouer un rôle clé pour rehausser leur
prestige et renforcer leur position. Cela sous-entend que même la répression
criminelle la plus efficace et des approches concertées visant à agir sur les
facteurs de risque sur le plan individuel ne suffiront pas pour s’attaquer au
problème de la violence au sein des gangs de jeunes – une approche globale
exigerait qu’on se penche sur les origines sociales de ce phénomène. Il n’est pas
possible de le faire dans les limites du système de justice pénale ou au moyen
de projets à court terme axés sur des individus.
Le prochain obstacle est le défi de la collaboration. Dans les faits, il nous faudra
concevoir des solutions qui sont aussi complexes que le sont les causes de la
criminalité, de la victimisation et de l’insécurité. Aucune organisation, même
une organisation aussi bien financée que les piliers du système de justice pénale,
n’a le mandat ou les ressources requises pour s’attaquer à cette tâche à elle
seule. Il faut travailler en partenariat et la capacité de collaborer constitue la
composante de base de la réussite à ce chapitre. Cela dépendra par ricochet de
notre capacité d’adopter un langage commun, de parvenir à s’entendre sur les
buts et stratégies, et de concevoir une approche commune de l’évaluation et de
la reddition de comptes. En outre, pour que les partenariats soient couronnés

4 Revue de l’IPC 3 La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins
5
de succès, il doit exister des structures de gouvernance et d’administration qui
permettent aux participants de s’acquitter de leur tâche de manière efficiente
et efficace, et il doit y avoir en place un processus de reddition de comptes
permettant de reconnaître le mérite des gens, le cas échéant, et d’attribuer la
responsabilité, si les choses ne se déroulent pas comme prévu.
L’article de Julie Pehar et Christine Sévigny ainsi que celui de Myriam Dubé
et Raymonde Boisvert portent sur cette question. Pehar et Sévigny décrivent
leur expérience liée aux efforts déployés par deux groupes de concertation
communautaires en vue d’enchâsser l’intégration de la dimension de genre
dans la planification des activités gouvernementales dans la Région de Peel.
Quant à Dubé et Boisvert, elles décrivent l’expérience liée à l’élaboration
et à la mise en œuvre d’un protocole interorganismes visant à orienter la
collaboration dans la prestation de services à l’intention des femmes victimes
de violence et des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale. Les deux articles
traitent éloquemment des difficultés de travailler en collaboration ainsi que
de certaines des sources de résistance auxquelles on a été confronté en tentant
d’aller de l’avant. Essentiellement, il ne s’agit pas d’un travail facile, mais
certaines avancées sont possibles.
Le dernier obstacle est l’obstacle de la mise en œuvre. Il est généralement
convenu que la planification en matière de prévention devrait s’appuyer sur
une démarche de résolution de problèmes. Il émerge aussi une appréciation
de l’importance de centres de responsabilité pour guider et diriger ce travail
et faciliter la collaboration entre tous les participants. Le problème est que la
prévention de la criminalité demeure le parent pauvre du système de justice
pénale. Tenter de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre une stratégie globale de
prévention et d’en évaluer l’efficience et l’efficacité, c’est une chose, mais c’est
une tout autre chose de tenter de le faire à bon marché.
Nous avons tenté d’amorcer une discussion de ce genre en invitant des
représentants des ordres de gouvernement fédéral, provincial et territorial, et
municipal à réfléchir à ce que les travaux de Homel et Solomon pourraient
signifier pour le Canada. Nous avons également demandé à Margaret Shaw du
Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité d’évaluer s’il existe
un rapport entre ce travail et les leçons apprises d’autres pays. Leurs réponses
ont été provocantes et ont suscité certaines inquiétudes à savoir si le Canada
s’en va dans la bonne direction.
En fin de compte, même après plus de vingt années d’attachement et
d’engagement à la cause de la prévention, il semble qu’on soit encore loin de
tirer profit de la promesse qu’elle porte. Nous espérons que les articles présentés
dans ce numéro vont contribuer à alimenter des discussions et des débats
publics et inclusifs sur les moyens qui nous permettraient de progresser vers
une stratégie de prévention de la criminalité qui soit efficace et responsable.
Une telle stratégie se devrait de concentrer nos énergies et nos ressources là où
elles seraient le plus nécessaires, de faire en sorte qu’on dispose de ressources
adéquates et durables pour assurer que le travail se fait, et d’amener la population
à contribuer à la réalisation de cette tâche.
Nous espérons que nous y parviendrons avant que la prévention ne soit
définitivement reléguée en marge des politiques et des pratiques sociales et
pénales et avant que la promesse qu’elle porte ne soit anéantie par une vague
de zèle excessif en faveur des approches réactives envers la criminalité et de
la victimisation.
Heureusement, il existe une somme croissante de connaissances et de leçons
tirées des expériences menées ailleurs. Deux des articles dans ce numéro, ceux
de Peter Homel et d’Enver Solomon, font le point sur les expériences récentes
vécues en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, en Australie, en Nouvelle-Zélande et
aux États-Unis. Les deux auteurs jettent un éclairage sur ce qu’il faut faire et ne
pas faire. Ni l’un ni l’autre ne présumerait qu’un programme peut facilement
être transféré d’un endroit à un autre. Toutefois, compte tenu de l’influence
que certaines initiatives menées dans ces pays ont pu avoir au Canada
(particulièrement celles menées en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles), il faudrait
se pencher attentivement sur les leçons qui s’en dégagent et sur les mises en
garde qu’ils soulèvent par rapport à l’adoption d’une démarche semblable.

Volume 3: pages 7–10
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
IPC
Revue de L’
R E V I E W
Sustaining the Momentum:
Crime Prevention at a Crossroads
Ross Hastings
Department of Criminology & Institute for the Prevention of Crime
University of Ottawa
So near, and yet so far…
These words can conjure up a number of different images; in this case though,
the reference is to crime prevention in Canada.
So near…On the surface, crime prevention in Canada has come a long way.
For many, the major turning points were the European and North-American
Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention in Montreal in 1989, or
the so-called Horner Report in 1993, or perhaps the launch of phase I of the
National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), including the founding of the
National Crime Prevention Council in 1994. In those early days, there was a
great deal of energy and excitement about the promise of prevention, but little
in the way of resources and supports. The launch of phase II of the NCPS tried
to address that problem by investing over $30 million per year in support of
prevention initiatives, an amount that has since more than doubled. And there
have been some successes. Much has been accomplished and crime prevention
has become an aspect of the policies and practices of all orders of government,
and has considerable popular and political support.
And yet, so far…There is a disquieting sense that crime prevention is now at a
crossroads, and that its future is far from assured. The signs are numerous. At
the federal level, the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) has received
significantly increased funding and has launched its new Blueprint for Effective
Crime Prevention (2007) that will help it move in new directions in a number
of areas. But there seem to be some growing pains, not the least of which
is an inability to allocate all its funding (the NCPC lapsed close to half its

8 IPC Review 3
Sustaining the Momentum: Crime Prevention at a Crossroads
9
funds in a recent fiscal year). Some Provinces and Territories are developing
coordinated crime prevention policies, and a number of cities are investing
significant time and resources in the development of prevention initiatives.
But, there is no real national strategy that integrates the approaches of all
orders of government into a comprehensive and sustainable approach to the
governance and administration of crime prevention and community safety
in Canada.
Prevention is also running up against some significant sources of resistance.
There continues to be an uncertainty about what prevention is meant to
accomplish and about how this could be measured. More important is the
lack of adequate and sustained resources – there seems to be a sense that crime
prevention is a cheaper and more cost-effective way to go, but there is little
indication of a willingness to develop and fund prevention in the same manner
as we do with the other three pillars of the justice system (the police, the courts
and the correctional system). Finally, the political winds may have shifted:
the current economic crisis is making everyone more resistant to changes that
might threaten their interests, and more cautious about committing significant
permanent resources to new initiatives. The bottom line is that crime prevention
is on the agenda, but not in a position of power and influence. The promise of
prevention has not been sufficiently translated into effective and sustainable
initiatives, and the future may not be as rosy as we hope.
A good part of the reason for this is that we still have not confronted and
resolved three major challenges to the implementation and sustainability of a
comprehensive and integrated approach to crime prevention and community
safety. The papers and comments in this volume all address these challenges
in one way or another.
The first hurdle is what I would call the challenge of imagination. The
problem here is our inability to develop a common language around goals and
indicators or to provide the data necessary to assess the nature and prevalence
of problems, target our initiatives, and assess their impact. A number of the
articles in this issue address this theme. The contribution of Holly Johnson
and Jennifer Fraser focuses on the all too frequent failure to include a gender
perspective in prevention planning and activities. They argue that we need
to improve our ability to come to grips with the realities of violence against
women and to appreciate women’s experiences of victimization in different
social contexts. They argue that we need to start with a commitment to gender
mainstreaming in order to assure that the needs and experiences of women are
central to all prevention planning and activities.
Three other articles focus on the relationship of youth violence and gangs,
and insist on the importance of locating these phenomena within their social
contexts and wider social and structural arrangements. Melanie Bania focuses
on the impact of social disaffiliation and the perception of being excluded;
Patrice Corriveau describes how gangs and youth violence are linked to the
desire for protection and inclusion and the attempt of youth to construct a
positive identity and self-concept; and Mark Totten addresses the crisis of
violence among aboriginal youth gang members. The common thread is a
conviction that for some youth, gang membership can be viewed as a solution
to problems, and violence can be instrumental in advancing one’s status and
position. The implication is that even the most effective enforcement and
concerted approach to addressing risk factors at the individual level will not be
sufficient to deal with the problem of youth gang violence – a comprehensive
approach also requires that we address the social origins of the phenomenon.
This cannot be done within the confines of the criminal justice system or
through short-term projects aimed at individuals.
The next hurdle is the challenge of collaboration. The fact is that the solutions we
come up with will have to be as complex and complicated as are the causes of
crime, victimization and insecurity. No organization, even if it is as well financed
as the pillars of the criminal justice system, has the mandate or the resources
necessary to take on the task all by itself. Partnerships are necessary, and the
capacity to collaborate is the fundamental building block of success in this area.
This in turn will depend on our ability to establish a common language, to
come to agreement on goals and strategies, and to devise a common approach
to evaluation and accountability. In addition, successful partnerships require
governance and administrative structures that allow participants to get the job
done efficiently and effectively, and an accountability process that gives people
credit when due and assigns responsibility when things don’t go as expected.
The articles by Julie Pehar and Christine Sevigny, as well as by Myriam Dubé
and Raymonde Boisvert focus on this area. Pehar and Sevigny describe their
experience with the attempts of two community collaboratives to enshrine
gender mainstreaming in the planning activities of the government in Peel
Region. Dubé and Boisvert describe the experience related to the development
and implementation of an inter-agency protocol to guide collaboration in the
provision of services to women who are victims of violence and to children
who are exposed to conjugal violence. Both are eloquent about the challenges
of working collaboratively, and about some of the sources of resistance that
were faced in attempting to move forward. The bottom line is that this work
is not easy, but progress can be achieved.

10 IPC Review 3
The final hurdle is the challenge of implementation. There is general agreement
that prevention planning should adopt a problem-solving approach. There is
also an emerging appreciation for the importance of responsibility centres in
guiding and directing this work and facilitating the collaboration of all the
participants. The problem is that crime prevention remains very much the
“poor cousin” of the criminal justice system. It is one thing to set out to design
and implement a comprehensive prevention strategy and to assess its efficiency
and its effectiveness – it is an altogether different thing to try to do this “on
the cheap”.
Fortunately, there is a growing body of knowledge and lessons that has emerged
as a result of experiences elsewhere. Two of the articles in this issue, those by
Peter Homel and by Enver Solomon, review recent experiences in England and
Wales, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Both authors provide
insights on what to do and what not to do. Neither would assume that the
programs from one place can be easily transferred to another. However, given
the influence that initiatives in these countries have had in Canada (especially
in the case of England and Wales), careful consideration should be given to
the lessons they have learned and to the cautions they raise about going in the
same directions.
We have attempted to launch such a discussion by inviting representatives from
the federal, provincial and territorial, and municipal orders of government to
reflect on what the work of Homel and Solomon might mean for Canada. We
have also asked Margaret Shaw from the International Centre for the Prevention
of Crime to asses how this work relates to what has been learned from other
countries. Their replies are provocative, and they raise some concerns about
whether Canada is going in the right direction.
BUILDING A
CANADIAN CRIME
PR EV ENTION
STR ATEGY:
LE A R NING FROM
OTHER COUNTRIES
In the end, and in spite of over twenty years of commitment and engagement in
prevention, the potential for delivering on its promise still seems far away. Our
hope is that the articles in this issue will contribute to more public and inclusive
discussions and debates about how we can move forward toward an effective
and accountable national crime prevention strategy. Such a strategy must
concentrate our energy and resources where they are the most needed, provide
adequate and sustainable resources to assure the work gets done, and engage
the public in this work. Our hope is also that we do this before prevention gets
permanently relegated to the fringes of social and justice policies and practices,
and its promise gets swallowed by an over-zealous commitment to reactive
approaches to crime and victimization.

Volume 3: pages 13–39
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Lessons for Canadian Crime
Prevention from Recent
International Experience
Peter Homel
Research Manager for Crime Reduction and Review, Australian Institute
of Criminology 1 & Professor, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and
Governance, Griffith University
Résumé
Cet article identifie huit principaux éléments de la pratique contemporaine
de la prévention du crime qui semblent être associés à la baisse
ininterrompue de la criminalité dans la plupart des pays développés de
l’Ouest et examine leur pertinence pour le Canada. Parmi ceux-ci, nous
trouvons : la collaboration intersectorielle pour mettre en place des
interventions multiples et intégrées; un accent sur l’approche de résolution
de problèmes; des stratégies fondées sur des données probantes; et des
initiatives dirigées par le niveau central mais mises en œuvre au niveau
local. La conclusion est que le succès des initiatives canadiennes courantes
exigera un leadership national, un cadre d’analyse cohérent et flexible
fondé sur la recherche et des pratiques ciblant des résultats qui sont
surveillées et communiquées de manière transparente. Tout ceci devra être
appuyé par des ressources adéquates et stables, par le développement
organisationnel et la formation professionnelle, par la dissémination
de pratiques efficaces et une stratégie pour promouvoir l’engagement
du public.
1 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the AIC or the Australian
Government.

14 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 15
Abstract
This article identifies eight key aspects of contemporary crime prevention
practice which appear to be associated with the continuing declines
in crime in most of the Western developed world and examines their
relevance to Canada. These characteristics include: collaborative multiagency
partnerships using multiple linked interventions, problem focused
analysis, evidence-based strategies with a strong outcome focus, and
an emphasis on centrally driven initiatives that are delivered locally.
Using examples from the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand, these
features are examined for their relevance for Canada. It is concluded that
the success of Canada’s current crime prevention initiatives will require a
committed national leadership, a coherent and flexible policy framework
based on evidence, and results-oriented practices that are efficiently
monitored and openly reported on. In addition, there must be responsive
partnership arrangements with governance mechanisms respectful of
specific communities, priorities and experience. These must be supported
by long term adequate resourcing informed by good data about problems
and strategically appropriate responses. Workforce and organizational
development, the active dissemination of good practice knowledge
and a strategy for promoting an active and engaged community are
also required.
Introduction
Canada is experiencing continuing declines in its crime rates. In fact, the
most recent figures indicate that the 2007 national crime rate is the lowest in
30 years; there was a 7% decline over the previous year, making it the third
consecutive annual decrease (Dauvergne, 2008). The experience in Canada
mirrors that of most other countries of the Western developed world. A similar
pattern has been observed in England and Wales where crime rates have fallen
by 42% since a peak in 1995 – the risk of being a victim of crime is now
24% compared to 40% recorded in 1995 (Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker,
2008). In Australia, recent figures confirm a continuing decline with a drop
of around 10% in most categories of crime from 2006 to 2007 (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2008). The overall victimization rate in 2005 was 6%
compared with 9% in 2002 (ABS, 2006). Significantly, the rates for a range
of property crimes in Australia are now at their lowest levels since records were
first collected (ABS, 2008).
Due to changes in data collection methodologies used for the National Crime
Victimization Survey, it is more difficult to make definitive statements about
the most recent crime trends in the United States of America. However, it
appears that violent and property crime rates in urban and suburban areas of
the USA remained stable between 2005 and 2006 (Rand & Catalano, 2007).
Previously, the percentage of households experiencing one or more crime had
dropped from 25% in 1994 to 14% in 2004 (Catalano, 2005).
The most recent International Criminal Victimization Survey (ICVS)
conducted during 2004-05 shows that the level of victimization for the 15
major developed countries peaked halfway through the 1990s and has since
shown a slow but steady decline (van Djik, van Kestern, & Smit, 2007). The
victimization rates of nearly all individual countries show the same curve-linear
trend over the past 15 years. The drops are most pronounced in property crimes
such as vehicle-related crimes (bicycle theft, thefts from cars and joyriding)
and burglary. In most countries, crime levels in 2004 were back at the level of
the late 1980s. The USA has acted as trendsetter with levels of victimization
already declining in the second sweep of the ICVS in 1992.
While it is never hard to find someone willing to take the credit for improvements
in crime rates, it is quite difficult to isolate definitive explanations for why these
changes have occurred so consistently over such a sustained period of time.
However, it is noteworthy that these declines in crime have coincided with a
significant and steady growth in the sophistication and scale of investment in
crime prevention efforts in each of these countries.
Canada has a long history of investing in crime prevention work at both the
national and the provincial/territorial levels. During the 1990s, the former
National Crime Prevention Council played an important role in promoting
and supporting innovative crime prevention policy and practice across Canada.
More recently, the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) within Public
Safety Canada has developed a national strategic plan for crime prevention
action across Canada, known as A Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention
(NCPC, 2007), which draws on some of the principles of the United Nations’
Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN ECOSOC, 1995 and 2002).
The current Canadian national strategy is designed as a four-year program of
targeted initiatives to be implemented jointly with the Provinces. It places an
emphasis on reducing victimization and re-offending, whereas the previous
strategy focused on addressing underlying structural causes of crime. It is
built on the principles of integration; evidence-led efforts; focused action

16 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 17
and measurable results. These principles have been interpreted into a series of
“priorities for focused action” that include (NCPC, 2007):
• Early risk factors among vulnerable families and children and youth
at risk;
• A response to priority crime issues;
• Youth gangs;
• Drug related crime;
• Recidivism among high-risk groups; and
• Prevention in Aboriginal communities.
The current national strategy and program of work appears to be a substantial
and well-managed initiative. Furthermore, it seems to be soundly based in
current crime prevention theory and practice, particularly through the
working relationship with the Institute for the Prevention of Crime at the
University of Ottawa, and to build on the many years of previous Canadian
crime prevention experience. So what lessons could Canada possibly need to
learn from other countries?
Providing some answers to this question is the purpose of this article. It is in
part informed by a brief visit to Canada in early 2008 for discussions with
some of those involved in guiding the national strategy’s implementation
process as well as those actually doing it. However, it is also informed by an
analysis of the experience of developing and implementing crime prevention
initiatives in various parts of the world over the past decade, including detailed
reviews of programs in the UK (Homel, Nutley, Tilley, & Webb, 2004) and
in Australia (Anderson & Homel, 2005 and 2006; Anderson & Tresidder,
2008; Homel, 2006; Homel, Morgan, Behm, & Makkai, 2007) as well as
close observation of a number of recent crime prevention initiatives in the USA
and New Zealand.
On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to identify a series of key
characteristics that are common to most modern crime prevention programs.
These are summarised below and discussed in detail in the next sections.
Common Features of Modern Crime Prevention Programs
Most contemporary crime prevention initiatives around the world tend, to a
greater or lesser extent, to be:
1. Built on collaborative multi-agency based action variously known as:
• “whole of government/community” (Australia);
• “networked government” (USA); or
• “joined-up government” (UK).
2. Problem-oriented (e.g., using Problem-Oriented Policing strategies).
3. Built on the use of multiple interventions to address linked problems.
4. Evidence-based, or at least “evidence-informed” (Nutley, Jung, &
Walter, 2008).
5. Outcome-focused (i.e., measures performance and effectiveness).
6. Centrally developed and driven but locally delivered.
7. Built on partnerships and shared outcomes.
8. Focused on principles of inclusiveness and participation.
While this list is not exhaustive, it offers a set of commonly identifiable features
to consider when thinking about how well a strategy is constructed, how a
program is performing, and ultimately how effective and efficient it is.
1. Collaborative Multi-Agency Action
Generally speaking, crime prevention strategies and programs are built on the
idea of collaborative multi-agency action. This is because of the near universal
acceptance these days that neither the criminal justice system nor human
service agencies alone are able to adequately address the complex array of causes
of crime. As a result of developing a better understanding of these causes, it has
been possible to improve our appreciation of the type and mix of measures that
can be used to bring about a sustained reduction in crime. We have also come
to recognize that the interventions that make up these new programs are likely
to have a greater chance of success if they are designed and undertaken as a
package of closely linked and coordinated measures. In this way, the sometimes
perverse or contradictory effects of separate single measures can be planned for
and designed out prior to implementation. For example, consider the probable
interactions and possibly contradictory results arising from promoting a drug
treatment service in an area, and at the same time launching a drug supply
suppression intervention in that same area. While both may be needed, they
will be more effective if managed conjointly.
At another level, this will frequently also mean the establishment of
new governance arrangements for crime prevention policy and program
management that are quite complex. For example, the UK’s Crime Reduction
Programme during the 1990s was managed through a series of inter-agency
committees linked to a Cabinet sub-Committee at one end and regional and
local committees at the other, such as the local Crime and Disorder Reduction

18 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 19
Partnerships (Homel et al., 2004). In Australia, crime prevention activity in
the states of New South Wales and Western Australia is managed through
similar Cabinet level committees linked to an advisory council and central,
regional and local inter-agency forums (Anderson & Homel, 2005; Anderson
& Tresidder, 2008; Homel, 2004) as indeed it was previously in the state of
Victoria (Cherney, 2004). Similar structures can be found in New Zealand
(NZ Ministry of Justice, 2003) and are recommended in principle in the UN
crime prevention guidelines (UN ECOSOC, 2002).
This collaborative approach is not unique to crime prevention. Rather, it
is an example of a more general shift in public administration away from a
command and control model of governance towards governance through
multiple stakeholders working together to deliver integrated solutions to social
problems across sectors and tiers of government. Within Australia, this sort of
approach is most commonly described as the “whole of government” or “whole
of community” approach to crime prevention. In parts of the USA, it is known
as “networked government” while in the UK the approach is popularly known
as “joined-up government” (Lee & Woodward, 2002).
This innovative multi-agency model is not without challenges. Some of these
include the need for a high level of policy, program and organizational integration
to the point of joint or collective action, and shared or mutual responsibility for
performance and outcomes. In a report on some of the early experiences of
implementing these models in a number of sectors in Australia, the Institute
of Public Affairs Australia (IPAA, 2002) identified a number of significant
practical implications for how normal business needs to be transacted:
• Processes such as pooled budgets need to be established.
• Partnership arrangements need to be negotiated and established; they do
not just happen automatically.
• Relationships between the service provider and client will often need to
be revised. “Whole of community” models generally seek to establish a
relationship with the client that sees them defining priorities for action and
resource deployment.
• The need to co-ordinate service delivery and tendering with partner criteria.
Partnership models recognize the economic value in different agencies
coming together to coordinate and share the delivery of services that might,
for example, be directed to a single family unit or community as a way of
improving both effectiveness and efficiency.
• The need for integrated planning and triple bottom line analysis (i.e.,
assessing economic, environmental and social impacts). A simple example
is the use of a measure designed to improve natural surveillance by
clearing foliage and vegetation. However, while crime prevention may be
achieved, the attractiveness and the environmental qualities of a location
may be degraded.
• The undertaking of innovative community consultation, engagement and
joint management arrangements.
• The development and implementation of joint databases and customer
intake and referral mechanisms.
• The development of viable and meaningful joint performance measures
and indicators.
These requirements are challenging but evidence suggests that where they
are applied effectively, the results can be impressive. A classic example is the
experience of significantly reducing gun-related homicides by young people
involved in gangs in South Boston in the late 1990s (Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl,
2001). This initiative exemplifies the manner in which these principles can be
applied by practitioners using a problem-solving approach which is focused on
achieving a clearly defined set of shared outcomes, in this case the reduction of
gun-related youth homicides among a specific population.
2. Problem-Oriented Analysis and Intervention Design
Contemporary crime prevention is built around the systematic use of analytical
tools for developing a more precise understanding of crime problems and a
strategic application of appropriate responses. One of the best known techniques,
which was deployed to great effect in Boston, is the Problem-Oriented Policing
(POP) approach first developed by Herman Goldstein during the 1970s and
early 1980s. POP was originally developed as a method for improving police
effectiveness through examining and acting on the underlying conditions that
give rise to community problems. Responses emphasize prevention, go beyond
the criminal justice system alone, and engage with other public agencies, the
community and the private sector, where practical.
POP is based on the understanding that incidents that come to the attention
of police are rarely random: police often find that they return repeatedly to the
same place or are dealing with the same individual or groups. Further, not all
incidents are directly crime-related or amenable to enforcement action (e.g.,
racial harassment or anti-social behaviour). Analyzing these patterns is the key
to POP (Goldstein & Scott, 2001).

20 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 21
The methods and techniques pioneered through Goldstein’s POP model are
now in widespread use in the development of crime prevention interventions.
For example, Ekblom’s (2000) Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO)
theory has built extensively on some of the key POP steps in order to develop
a model for crime prevention interventions that is more purposeful and
comprehensive than the basic POP model.
3. Multiple Interventions to Address Linked Problems
Ekblom’s (2000) CCO model attempts to address the fact that crime prevention
programs will frequently contain a number of different initiatives using varying
mechanisms or types of interventions that are implemented simultaneously
or at least contemporaneously. A classic example of this was the UK’s Crime
Reduction Programme (CRP) from the early 1990s which, by the time it was
fully implemented, involved more than 1500 individual interventions across
twenty different program areas under five key strategic themes (Homel et
al., 2004).
Costing around £400 million over four years, the CRP was developed as a
series of specific, but linked, initiatives of varying scale organized around the
five broad themes of:
1. Working with families, children and schools to prevent young people
becoming offenders of the future.
2. Tackling crime in communities, particularly high volume crime such as
domestic burglary.
3. Developing products and systems that are resistant to crime.
4. Identifying more effective sentencing practices.
5. Working with offenders to ensure that they do not re-offend.
The 1500 on-the-ground projects dealt with issues of community concern
(e.g., violence against women, youth inclusion), specific types of crime such as
burglary, and special and difficult populations such as repeat offenders.
The objectives of the CRP were to achieve a sustained reduction in crime,
improve and mainstream knowledge of best practice, and maximize the
implementation of cost-effective crime reduction activity. The program was
thus intended to contribute to crime reduction by ensuring that resources
were allocated to where they would achieve greatest impact (Nutley &
Homel, 2006). Targets were set in relation to the crime reduction goal of
the program, and although combining knowledge development aims with the
need to achieve crime reduction targets proved to be an ongoing problem for
the CRP, it did help the program secure significant funds from the Treasury
(Maguire, 2004).
What the CRP experience demonstrated very clearly was that implementing
such an ambitious agenda was extremely difficult. In practice, the task of
managing the progressive implementation of such a large number of initiatives
created major difficulties and degraded the CRP’s overall effectiveness quite
significantly. In its first three years, the CRP experienced major implementation
delays – at least one of the five major streams had not commenced by the end
of the second year. In addition, some of the streams that had commenced
were showing implementation failure rates of between 25% and 50%.
“Implementation failure” in this context was defined as a project for which
funds had been “expended” and little or no project related activity had
occurred. In addition, by the end of the first year only 13% of the anticipated
annual expenditure for that year had been expended. By the end of the third
year, when the CRP was originally intended to have finished, this expenditure
rate had risen to only 83% (Homel et al., 2004).
Essentially, the difficulties that the CRP experienced proved to be a function
of four specific and closely related issues (Homel et al., 2004):
1. Ongoing difficulties recruiting suitably qualified and skilled staff.
2. High staff turnover, particularly as a result of competition for the few
highly skilled staff available.
3. Generally inadequate technical and strategic advice from the central
agency guiding implementation as well as intermediate agencies.
4. Inadequate levels of project management competency and skill,
particularly around the management of finances.
However, many of the lessons arising from dealing with these practical matters
appear to have been learned by subsequent initiatives. For example, the most
recent national crime prevention program in Australia, the National Community
Crime Prevention Programme (NCCPP) put significant effort into building
good lines of support and communication with funded projects and making
resources and other assistance available to potential applicants, particularly
in the form of tip sheets and public forums for those considering applying for
funds. As a result, the NCCPP achieved a very high level of implementation
performance as well as good working relations between the funding agency and
those implementing projects (Homel et al., 2007). This pattern of successful
project implementation is also being demonstrated by the Western Australian

22 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 23
Office of Crime Prevention (OCP) through its current Safer Community and
Crime Prevention Program which is being undertaken in partnership with local
government authorities (Anderson & Tresidder, 2008).
4. Evidence-Based Policy and Programs
A further feature of most contemporary crime prevention programs is a strong
reliance on evidence-based policy and practice. In their basic form, evidencebased
policy programs are usually about learning “what works” to meet
specified policy goals or needs (Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2002). In practice,
it has been suggested that an evidence-based policy program will need to be
much more complex, having to address four key requirements for maximizing
the evidence use (Nutley, Davies, & Walter, 2002, p. 3):
1. Agreement as to the nature of “evidence”;
2. A strategic approach to the creation of evidence, together with the
development of a cumulative knowledge base;
3. Effective dissemination of knowledge, together with the development of
effective means of access to knowledge; and
4. Initiatives to increase uptake of evidence in both policy and practice.
The evidence-based policy approach attempts to build public policy, strategies
and interventions based on the best available research and evaluation findings
(Davies, 2004). That this approach has been attractive to the crime prevention
field is hardly surprising when you consider the potential it presents for moving
past the reactive ideological arguments that are typical of the field.
The UK’s Crime Reduction Programme was also one of the earliest examples of
trying to use the principles and process of evidence-based policy and programs
within modern crime prevention – at least in principle and as far as political and
practical realities permit. The CRP was meant to accumulate the best available
research-based evidence for “what works” from any area that might contribute
to the achievement of crime reduction outcomes. This knowledge was to be
organized in terms of whether the initiatives were: (a) promising but so far
unproven; (b) based on stronger evidence, but confined to limited research
settings or derived from non-criminal justice areas (e.g., health or education);
or (c) proven in terms of small-scale initiatives and therefore ready for larger
scale implementation. On the basis of this knowledge, a portfolio of viable
evidence-based initiatives was to be developed. It was intended that initiatives
would be reviewed, refined and further developed during implementation
using program evaluation feedback. The overall learning from the initial
(three-year) implementation phase would be accumulated and disseminated,
with successful initiatives moved into mainstream funding while unsupported
or cost-ineffective strategies would be withdrawn.
This program logic meant that the CRP was attempting to implement and
review a complex array of initiatives with varying levels of research evidence
to support them. Further, it was seeking to determine which initiatives were
individually strong and cost-effective as well as assessing the best mix of
strategies for maximizing crime reduction impacts. It was also aiming to learn
about sustainability, both in terms of the impact of initiatives and how they
might be transferred to mainstream programs and continued over time. While
some projects within the CRP were centred on making better use of routine
internal data (Stanko, 2004), the predominant concern of the CRP was the
deployment and development of research and evaluation evidence.
Other more recent crime prevention programs have placed less emphasis on
the generation of evidence and looked to the practical application of available
research and evaluation findings to the development and implementation of
specific initiatives. Indeed, this is a feature of the current Canadian program
and also can be seen in the recent NCCPP initiative in Australia. In doing
so, these programs are avoiding a number of the overheads associated with
generating new knowledge. However, at the same time they are also confronting
a number of typical barriers for getting research information into practice. Key
among these are:
• The inconclusive nature of most research.
• The fact that research may not be as timely or relevant to practice.
• The fact that research findings frequently are communicated only within
narrow channels (e.g., conferences and journals) and in a language that may
not be accessible to practitioners.
• The practical implications of many research findings are not always clear
and may only become so over time.
• The day to day business of policy and program management frequently
mitigates against being able to adequately engage with the research process
and give the findings adequate priority.
• Findings from research (formal knowledge) are just one source of knowledge
about good practice. Informal knowledge (such as that embedded in many
systems and procedures, which shapes how an organization functions,
communicates and analyses situations), tacit knowledge (arising from the
capabilities of people, particularly the skills that they have developed over
time), and cultural knowledge (relating to customs, values and relationships

24 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 25
with clients and other stakeholders) are also powerful influences on people’s
professional practices (Nutley & Davies, 2001).
• Individual and organizational resistance to the application of research-based
knowledge to policy and program development and implementation.
Some have argued that these practical barriers to the application of an evidencebased
approach for crime prevention are so great that it represents a false and
unachievable goal (Cherney & Sutton, 2007). However, as Welsh (2007)
has succinctly observed, “evidence-based crime prevention ensures that the
best available evidence is considered in the decision to implement a program
designed to prevent crime” (p. 1).
5. Outcome-Focused with Performance
and Effectiveness Measures
Crime prevention also strives to be outcome (product) focused rather than
simply output and process (or activity) focused. This is largely a function of
adopting a problem analysis and evidence-based approach to the design of
programs and interventions. It is also an efficient method for dealing with the
complex governance arrangements that are needed to manage the multiple
partners participating in a crime prevention intervention and the different
inputs they provide. In other words, if the accountability mechanisms are set
up in such a way as to focus on the results or outcomes of the intervention
rather than merely accounting for the inputs such as money and staff, it is
easier to assess whether an intervention was worth the investment it required
(Friedman, n.d.; Schacter, 2002).
There are two basic tools for measuring the effectiveness of any policy or
program: performance measurement and evaluation. Both work from some
common data sources, and both take as their fundamental point of reference the
logic model that underlies any policy or program. However, they differ in their
time horizons, their assumptions and their particular uses. Evaluation reflects on
the design and implementation of a program to determine whether the chosen
strategy has achieved its stated objectives by assessing intended and unintended
outcomes. Evaluation also explores alternative explanations for these outcomes.
Furthermore, evaluation will normally attempt to explain why a policy or
program has or has not achieved its objectives in terms of both internal and
external causes, and recommend strategies to improve performance.
Performance measurement can provide insight into whether a policy or program
is actually likely to achieve its objectives by enabling ongoing monitoring of
key performance information. Evaluation feeds into higher-level decisions
about the choice and design of policies and programs, while performance
measurement is used mainly for day-to-day management and accountability.
The performance measurement system represents an ongoing learning tool to
identify what practices are going well and what needs to be fixed, changed or
even abandoned in the light of changing circumstances, new problems and
improved practice.
Current Australian experience is making it clear that it is realistic to look
upon the performance measurement process as a vital building block for
encouraging more systematic program appraisal processes by project managers
(Homel et al., 2007; Willis & Homel, 2008). That project and policy
managers are increasingly seeing the benefit of the efficient collection and flow
of performance measurement data is laying down a basis for more systematic
and integrated evaluation work. The major point of leverage here is that policy
and program managers get to see continuous information flows about project
performance and no longer see the data collection process as a burdensome
task providing only long-term feedback on effectiveness. At the same time,
program evaluators begin to gain access to a richer and more diverse range of
higher quality data suitable for inclusion in evaluation studies.
There are a small number of important crime prevention evaluations that have
demonstrated the effectiveness of a combined evaluation and performance
measurement approach. One of these is the seminal Operation Ceasefire
project directed at reducing youth gang homicides in Boston in the late
1990s (Kennedy et al., 2001). In Australia, the Pathways to Prevention project
(Homel, R. et al., 2006) is an example of how this combined approach is being
applied to evaluation. The evaluation of this program represents the most
comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of an early intervention project to
date in Australia.
The Pathways to Prevention project is a service delivery and policy development
initiative that was designed to overcome the long-term and often entrenched
patterns of inter-generational involvement in crime and victimization in a
disadvantaged urban community with a mixed demographic profile. Pathways
began in Brisbane, Queensland in 2001 with the aim of involving family,
school and community in a broad set of planned interventions to prevent antisocial
behaviour among young children as they progress into adolescence.
The program targets four to six year olds who are in transition to school and
focuses on enhancing their communication and social skills and empowering
their families, schools and communities to provide supportive environments

26 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 27
for positive development. There is growing evidence that developmental
prevention programs can open up opportunities for children and young people
and reduce their involvement in crime, especially if they live in disadvantaged
communities (Homel, 2005a). Early results from the project are demonstrating
important positive results and offer significant opportunity for sustained
improvements (Homel, R. et al., 2006).
The approach taken for the evaluation of the Pathways project was designed to
improve practice and guide future policy development through a mix of “realtime”
research, performance measurement processes and outcome evaluation.
The service delivery function is conducted through collaboration between a
non-government organization and a university, with considerable support from
a range of key stakeholders. Policy development and research is conducted
by a team of researchers actively engaged with the service delivery aspects of
the initiative.
The long-term focus of developmental crime prevention makes demonstrating
positive outcomes difficult. However, using a series of economic simulation
studies to assess the longer term impact of the Pathways interventions in the
areas studied, the project demonstrated a potential cost reduction to juvenile
justice services of AUD$415,000 alone over three years, based on a projected
21 percent reduction in offending in the target community.
This work has had considerable influence both nationally and internationally,
shaping government policy in relation to not only crime prevention, but child
protection, health, education and other areas, and informing the development
and implementation of national and state and territory programs (Pathways to
Prevention, 2007).
6. Centrally Developed and Driven with Local Delivery
While the focus of crime prevention is generally on reducing crime problems
within local communities, the processes for promoting and implementing
those goals are frequently centrally driven. To some extent, this is a function
of the fact that criminal justice services and related data systems are centrally
managed while many day-to-day crime problems are very local in nature.
It is also a practical example of the principle of “subsidiarity”, which is
typical of the manner in which modern states are organized. While crime
prevention activity takes place at different levels (i.e., local, sub-national,
national, and international), the division of tasks and resources is structured
in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, meaning that the investment of
authority with ensuing resources and responsibilities is at the local (municipal/
town) level.
Organizing centrally for regional and local crime prevention program delivery
has a history of significant implementation problems (Homel, 2006) that are
common across borders and in different systems of government (i.e., between
federal systems such as Australia, Canada and the USA, or unitary systems
such as in the UK and New Zealand).
For example, the review of the UK’s Crime Reduction Programme highlighted
numerous difficulties associated with the relationship between the central
agency responsible for the program (i.e., the Home Office) and the bodies
undertaking local coordination and implementation (i.e., the Local Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Regional Government Offices). The
experience of implementing the CRP showed that to achieve effective local
management, the central agency must be an active part of a delivery process: a
process that treats all layers of the delivery stream as a single integrated system
(Homel et al., 2004).
This means that the centre itself must be appropriately staffed and adequately
resourced if it is to usefully contribute to the delivery process. Similarly,
any regional offices must be staffed with technically competent and policyliterate
staff capable of providing direct support (such as analytical and project
management guidance and training) to individual projects, as well as assisting
to ensure a high level of coherence between other companion initiatives
operating across the region and at a local level. The regions must also be capable
of assisting the centre to remain actively informed of progress towards agreed
outcomes, and where and in what form strategic and technical assistance is
required to address emerging deficits.
A policy review of one of the key aspects of the New Zealand crime prevention
program at the time, the Safer Community Council (SCC) Network, found
that in spite of a ten-year implementation experience, “there is no discernible
evidence that the SCCs are making a strong contribution to reducing crime
in local communities” (NZ Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 4). The explanation
for this apparent failure was a lack of specific crime prevention expertise at
the local level, inappropriate local co-ordination, and a breakdown of the
relationship between central government and local stakeholders.
The report’s recommendations for improving the effectiveness of crime
prevention delivery at the local level parallel many of the findings from the

28 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 29
CRP implementation review. In particular, the report recommended that the
NZ Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) should be able to offer communities the
following services (NZ Ministry of Justice, 2003, p. 7):
• Leadership – by setting the national crime prevention policy direction and
effectively managing partnerships;
• Operational support – including facilitating access to appropriate crime
prevention training, coaching, and contract management;
• Resources – funding, expertise, knowledge transfer and capacity building
in the areas of crime prevention program management and governance;
• Information – provision of timely, accurate and relevant information
on policy [through the Crime Reduction Strategy], crime data analysis,
problem identification, program planning, and best practices; and
• Marketing – advocacy to [Government] Ministers on behalf of SCCs.
The Australia experience of crime prevention implementation has been similar
with a strong central policy driven agenda and an expectation of mainly local
delivery. However, unlike New Zealand and Britain, Australia’s federal system
has meant that the bulk of program delivery has been the responsibility of state
and territory governments.
The existence of this third layer of government, between the national and
local government structures, has had an impact on the development and
delivery of crime prevention work in Australia. It has shortened the distance
between the policy and program development process being undertaken by the
central agencies and the local delivery agencies, which are typically regional
branches of government authorities or community-based agencies. However,
in practice much of this potential benefit has been significantly blunted by
the existence of overly complex bureaucratic processes and a lack of consistent
policy and strategic direction, both at the state/territory and federal level
(Homel, 2005b).
For example, in a review of the Safer Cities and Shires Program developed and
implemented by the Victorian state government during the late 1990s, Cherney
(2004) attributes many of the program’s implementation flaws to a lack of
commitment by the central agencies responsible for leading the initiative to
establish adequate support and collaborative program delivery mechanisms.
He also identified as a key problem a lack of consistent leadership and an
unwillingness to devolve resources, authority and decision-making powers to
the local inter-agency partnerships responsible for actually implementing the
local level initiatives.
More recent experience shows that these problems can be overcome. Ongoing
work by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) in partnership with
the Western Australian Office of Crime Prevention (OCP) shows that while
problems are very likely to recur when a centrally driven initiative seeks to
promote local delivery, a process of continuous engagement and effective twoway
communication can overcome the worst of these difficulties (Anderson
& Homel, 2005; Anderson & Tresidder, 2008). Even when confronted with
vast distances and a dispersed population, often in isolated communities, the
Western Australian OCP is demonstrating that careful attention to effective
ongoing communication with stakeholders and a commitment to the provision
of strategic support can overcome many of the barriers to delivering centrallydriven
initiatives at a local level.
7. Partnership and Shared Outcomes
The use of “partnership” arrangements is frequently seen as an integral
component of the operation of multi-agency approaches. As already explained,
under the partnership model service provision is not viewed in terms of the
core functions and responsibilities of separate agencies and interest groups,
but in terms of how to best organize and run services to achieve those goals,
regardless of where the service is sourced from, in order to achieve shared
goals outcomes.
However, there is a great deal of confusion over what the term “partnership”
means in practice. The term is used widely to describe local structures such
as those for planning, coordinating and delivering local crime prevention
initiatives. But there is no one form that is seen as being most effective or
appropriate in all circumstances (Joseph Rountree Foundation, 2003).
Based on an extensive analysis of the operation of crime prevention partnerships
in the UK, Gilling (2005) has suggested that the following characteristics are
required to make a crime prevention partnership work:
• A clear mission or purpose for the partnership, together with agreement on
intended outcomes.
• A solid level of trust between partner agencies.
• Leadership, including resources from senior managers to enable
partnerships to function.
• Clear lines of communication and accountability at all levels, both across
and within agencies.

30 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 31
• Management that is focused on strategic as well as operational or
project outcomes.
• Partnership structures that are relatively small, businesslike and focused
on crime prevention.
• Expertise to ensure access to a good problem oriented knowledge of
crime prevention.
• Continuity in partner representation and participation, including
good documentation.
• Staff with enough time away from agency core business to provide input
to the partnership.
Effective partnerships can be hindered by differential power relationships
between partner agencies. For example, there can be different reasons for
participating in partnerships, with accompanying differences in resources and
access to information. In a true partnership, information needs to be shared
and used to enable all agencies to work together to develop crime prevention
strategies relevant for a specific local community. This power differential
between agencies on the ground can be counterproductive and lead to
partnership in name only – rather than a useful and creative approach to crime
prevention on a local level amongst equal partners (Homel, 2005a).
8. Principles of Inclusiveness and Participation
This final common feature, the focus on principles of inclusiveness and
participation, is one that is slightly contentious. For the most part, communitybased
crime prevention, built around the use of social developmental approaches,
will be characterized by principles of inclusiveness and participation. These
principles are explicit in the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN
ECOSOC, 2002) and can be found in most other national and territory
level crime prevention strategies. However, it is arguable that some crime
prevention measures are in fact exclusionary (e.g., gated communities, some
other forms of public security measures), even though the need to operate
through partnerships and collaborative arrangements necessarily means that
inclusiveness needs to be embraced.
For example, Walsh (2008) describes the increasing use by local government
authorities and other custodians of public space in the UK of a device called
The Mosquito, a sonic repellent that is being used in a bid to drive teenagers out
of public spaces and reduce the incidence of anti-social behaviour. Without
going into the details of how this device works or of its ethical and legal basis,
it is abundantly clear that its adoption as a strategy for dealing with incidents
of anti-social behaviour is clearly not based on principles of inclusiveness
and participation.
There are other examples where these principles can fail, producing quite
unforeseen and unintended consequences. For example, when a team of
researchers from the RAND Corporation in the USA attempted to undertake
a replication of the Boston youth gun violence reduction initiative (Kennedy
et al., 2001) in South Central Los Angeles, a large number of unexpected
problems led to its ultimate failure. In the words of the RAND researchers:
…the intervention was not implemented as designed, and it never
developed dynamically or in response to changing needs. Part of the
reason stems from the reorganization of the LAPD gang crime units
in response to a scandal involving some gang unit officers who planted
evidence and used excessive force. Also, the project did not succeed in
getting working group participants, who referred to it as the ‘RAND
study’ or the ‘RAND project’, to view it as their own and seek to
continue it. No single agency emerged to take charge of the project and
carry it forward, perhaps because of limited resources for the work. (Tita
et al., 2003, p. 12)
In other words, it seems as though there was a reluctance to own a new initiative
that was not really seen as locally appropriate or developed. Further, there was
evidence that the systemic changes that were required to implement such an
innovative program were not supported, either politically or financially. In this
sense, the RAND initiative failed to encourage inclusiveness and participation
in the same way that the original Boston initiative had done. In many respects,
the original Boston project could be described as an organically developed
theory driven strategy rooted heavily in the local community in which it
was implemented. The RAND replication appears to have failed to take into
account the distinctive differences (both physical and demographic) between
the original setting and the replication site. Key among these characteristics
would seem to have been the principles of participation and inclusiveness.
Some Conclusions and Suggested Lessons for Canada
Having identified a number of features common to crime prevention programs
across the world and discussed some examples of good and bad practice in
relation to their application, it is worth summarizing some of preconditions
for an effective crime prevention program before considering what may be
relevant to the Canadian crime prevention experience.

32 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 33
It is suggested that there are essentially six conditions for good crime prevention
action. These are:
1. A practical grasp of crime prevention theory.
2. Strong and consistent leadership and supportive governance structures.
3. A capacity to manage collaborative multi-agency action.
4. Outcome focused performance measurement systems.
5. An applied commitment to evidence-based practice and
research/evaluation.
6. Effective communication processes designed to promote engagement
and sustainability.
Hopefully, most of these items should be self-explanatory when viewed
from the context of the preceding observations, but some require some
additional explanation.
The first is to do with the role of theory in designing and implementing a
good crime prevention intervention. As Kurt Lewin (1951, p. 169) said, “there
is nothing so practical as a good theory”. In the case of crime prevention,
Pawson and Tilley (2003) have been more direct. They suggest that essentially
all programs are theories in the sense that they are informed speculations
on what is likely to work to produce the result we are looking for. Further,
since programs are embedded, active, and are open systems, they exhibit the
necessary qualities of a good theory in that they are testable and contestable.
John Eck (2005) has extended this argument by suggesting that getting the
theory right really does matter, and that relevant crime data in its own right
will not reveal the most appropriate interventions while using sound theory
will. Theory helps to understand problems and interpret outcomes and as
such, theory testing is critical to lesson learning on crime prevention.
The second condition worth discussing is governance and leadership. The term
“governance” deals with the processes and systems by which an organization
operates. The word relates to older English and French notions of “steering”,
and can be contrasted with the traditional top-down approach of governments
driving or controlling society. When combined with the issue of strong and
consistent leadership, this provides the framework within which good crime
prevention policy and programs can flourish.
The enemy of good leadership and governance structures is a tendency for
governments to continually reorganize the manner in which crime prevention
work is delivered. While it is important to review and refresh crime prevention
practice in order to ensure that it is based on the best available evidence and
is as effective and efficient as possible, change also requires time to achieve its
maximum impact.
Finally, issues to do with using effective communication to promote engagement
and sustainability may require some explanation. As was observed above, a
lack of effective communication processes has inhibited the effectiveness of
aspects of numerous crime prevention programs across the world. For example,
poor communication can hamper the sustainability of working partnership
arrangements. It can also prevent the flow of information necessary for
planning for the delivery of programs and supporting resources, and can work
against good performance measurement and program effectiveness monitoring.
Overall, ineffective communication can be a critical flaw for crime prevention
action, not least because the process of crime prevention is essentially an
exercise in social change.
What Lessons are There for Canada Today?
Canada is now implementing the Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention
led by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC, 2007). The
following brief observations are made based on very limited exposure to its
implementation processes.
First, while it is apparent that there is a good commitment to collaborative
working and significant resourcing (about $64 million per year), the Canadian
funding scheme is still only for development funds, not long-term programs.
This focus on short-term “seed” funding is premised on an anticipation that
other agencies or orders of government or the private or not-for-profit sectors
will support continuing crime prevention activity. However, experience around
the world suggests that this approach can cause some disquiet, particularly
among local government authorities who fear being left to find the resources
necessary for continuing the effort when the initial funding ends. This has
the potential to inhibit program effectiveness by reducing the willingness to
undertake long-tem initiatives.
At the same time, the current shift at the federal level to an emphasis on
identifying and addressing individual risk factors rather than underlying
structural causes of crime can also work against a commitment to long-term
prevention. It is also apparent that the strategy was failing to achieve consistent
buy-in from all of the Provinces, with the most notable exception being Alberta.
The absence of any major participant from a national strategy, such as this,

34 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 35
inevitably has the potential to undermine the strategy’s overall effectiveness
and credibility.
Based on experiences of similar or related crime prevention strategies across the
world, and the evidence about their potential for positive long-term impacts on
the community’s experience of crime, it is argued that Canada’s national crime
prevention agenda will succeed if there is:
• A committed national leadership operating within a coherent and flexible
policy framework.
• Evidence-based strategies and practices that are focused on results and
efficiently monitored and openly reported on.
• Responsive partnership arrangements with governance mechanisms
respectful of specific communities, priorities and existing experience.
• Long-term adequate resourcing informed by good data about problems
and strategically appropriate responses.
• A commitment to undertaking workforce and organizational development
and the active dissemination of good practice knowledge.
• A strategy for promoting an active and engaged community crime
prevention agenda.
These are the elements that must be assured if Canada is to develop an effective
and sustainable national crime prevention strategy. However, experience has
proven time and again that even the best policies and programs are incapable
of implementing themselves. Without ongoing commitment and adequate
support based on good research and effective monitoring, the latest Canadian
initiative may also become yet another footnote in the international history of
stop-start crime prevention efforts.
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Volume 3: pages 41–65
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
New Labour and Crime
Prevention in England and Wales:
What Worked?
Enver Solomon
Deputy Director of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies
King’s College London, UK
Résumé
Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 1997, le gouvernement travailliste a
entrepris une réforme de la justice pénale sans précédent dans l’histoire
britannique moderne. Tous les organismes de justice pénale ont fait l’objet
d’une évaluation et d’une réforme dans une tentative « d’être efficace contre
le crime et les causes du crime ». Il y a également eu des investissements
importants pour étendre la portée du système de justice pénale. Le bilan du
Parti du travail, cependant, a été mitigé. Un examen des progrès accomplis
sur la réduction de la criminalité, la lutte contre les comportements
antisociaux et l’augmentation du nombre d’infractions traitées par le
système pénal révèle que fournir un modèle efficace de contrôle et de
prévention de la criminalité s’est avéré extrêmement difficile. Un certain
nombre d’enseignements importants sont identifiés pour les praticiens et
les décideurs politiques au Canada. Les dangers d’un contrôle centralisé et
de cibles trop précises, les conséquences de la création de silos à l’intérieur
de silos, la nécessité d’un équilibre entre la prévention et la répression, le
besoin de se prémunir contre l’expansionnisme et de reconnaître les limites
des activités de la justice pénale, et l’importance d’incorporer une véritable
approche basée sur les éléments de preuve sont tous mis en évidence. La
principale leçon à tirer est que des stratégies situationnelles efficaces de
contrôle et de prévention peuvent faire une différence. Mais, adresser la
victimisation des jeunes exige une plus grande compréhension des causes
de la criminalité et du désordre social, et il est préférable d’aborder la
question par des interventions sociales plutôt que pénales.

42 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 43
Abstract
Since coming to power in 1997, the UK Labour government has embarked
on a “root and branch reform” of criminal justice unprecedented in modern
British history. All criminal justice agencies have been subject to wide
ranging review and reform in an attempt “to be tough on crime and the
causes of crime”. There has also been substantial investment to expand the
reach of the criminal justice system. Labour’s record, however, has been
mixed. An examination of progress on crime reduction, tackling anti-social
behaviour and increasing the number of offences dealt with by the criminal
justice system reveals that delivering a more effective model in crime control
and prevention has proved extremely challenging. A number of important
lessons are identified for practitioners and policy makers in Canada. The
dangers of over centralized control, the perils of targets, the creation of silos
within silos, the need to balance prevention and enforcement, and guarding
against expansionism, recognizing the limits of criminal justice activity and
embedding a genuine evidence based approach are all highlighted. The
primary lesson from the English and Welsh experience is that effective
situational crime control and prevention strategies can make a difference,
but tackling levels of youth victimization requires greater understanding
of the causes of crime and disorder, and is best addressed by resorting to
social rather than criminal justice interventions.
Introduction
Law and order is often considered to have been one of the Labour government’s
success stories. Significant falls in the official rate of crime in England and
Wales and record police numbers – two of the legacies the government
often highlights – have pleased many of its supporters while discomforting
its opponents. 1 On the international stage, the government is also feted for
creating local crime prevention partnerships, implementing strategies to tackle
persistent and prolific offenders, and creating multi-agency teams to prevent
youth offending. It is not uncommon for delegations from other English
speaking countries to visit on fact finding missions. Canada has particular
interest in the UK experience – for instance in April and May 2008 there were
separate visits from the British Colombia and Ontario governments.
1 It is important to note that this article focuses on England and Wales, although the information on
expenditure refers to the United Kingdom as a whole, owing to the way the data is compiled. Scotland
and Northern Ireland have separate and distinct criminal justice systems, with their own courts, agencies,
legislation and executives.
Criminal justice reform has certainly been at the heart of New Labour’s public
policy agenda. During its first time in office between 1997 and 2001, the
focus was very much on a “root and branch reform” of youth justice to prevent
offending and tackle what Labour described as the emergence of “an excuse
culture” (Home Office, 1997). Having been elected for a second term, the
focus switched to more ambitious wide ranging change to deliver “the most
comprehensive reform of the criminal justice system since the war” (Labour
Party, 2001, Renewing Public Services section). Since then, the pace of change
has been relentless. In the seven years between 2001 and 2008, there have
been four overarching criminal justice plans – a ten year plan in 2001 (Home
Office, 2001), a five year plan in 2004 (Home Office, 2004a), a series of wide
ranging policy reforms in 2006 (Home Office, 2006a) and another five year
plan in 2008 (Home Office, 2008a). There have also been various strategies
on anti-social behaviour, policing, community safety, prisons and probation
and violent crime. At the same time, there has been the introduction of a huge
array of crime-related pieces of legislation. According to one recent estimate,
between 1997 and 2004 nearly 50 Acts of Parliament were passed relating to
crime, disorder, policing, criminal justice and punishment (Loader, 2006).
Hyperactive law making and endless policy strategising have been a central
feature of the last 10 years.
So what should be made of Labour’s criminal justice reform agenda? Has it
delivered a new, more effective model in crime control and prevention? What
have been the successes and failures? Put bluntly, has it all worked? This article
attempts to answer those questions. It draws on policy analysis conducted for
two reports – Ten Years of Criminal Justice Under Labour: An Independent
Audit (Solomon, Eades, Garside, & Rutherford, 2007) and Ten Years of
Labour’s Youth Justice Reforms: An Independent Audit (Solomon & Garside,
2008) – that made independent assessments based on official data analyzing
the key targets and priorities that Labour set for itself. In considering what
the successes and failures have been, the article draws out the learning from
the bold, ambitious attempt to overhaul the criminal justice system that was
initially led by Tony Blair and more recently has been taken up by his successor
Gordon Brown. It examines progress in three key areas: crime reduction, the
so-called “justice gap” and “anti-social behaviour”. A number of key learning
points are identified for policy makers and practitioners to consider and draw
on in their own work. The article also looks at the extent to which the learning
has been recognized in the latest criminal justice policy strategies developed in
recent months by the Brown government.

44 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 45
Labour’s Vision
In the run up to the 1997 general election, law and order was a key electoral
battleground. Labour successfully repositioned itself as the party that was
“tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime”. Its election manifesto stated:
On crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in punishing crime,
but also tackling its underlying causes – so, tough on crime, tough on
the causes of crime, different from the Labour approach of the past and
the Tory policy of today. (Labour Party, 1997, We Will be Tough on
Crime and Tough on the Causes of Crime section)
This classic piece of political triangulation – putting distance between both
the “soft on crime” label accusation levelled at “old” Labour and the “prison
works” formula of the Conservatives – was an important factor in New Labour’s
rise to power. Indeed, it signified that Labour had repositioned itself as the new
law and order party of British politics.
Once in power, Labour initially adhered to the strict spending plans of the
former Conservative government which limited its ability to dramatically
shift the direction of criminal justice policy. However, this did not prevent
ministers from embarking on a flurry of activity to reform youth justice.
Within less than two months, six consultation documents on youth crime were
published (Newburn, 2002). The major proposals were brought together in
the government’s flagship legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which
set out the key elements of what has been described as the “new youth justice”
(Goldson, 2000): the establishment of the Youth Justice Board (YJB); the
creation of locally accountable multi-agency youth offending teams (YOTs);
the replacement of cautions with a new reprimand and final warning scheme;
and the restructuring of non-custodial penalties available to the youth court.
For the first time, the reforms contained an overarching mission for the whole
youth justice system. Section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act stated, “It
shall be the principal aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by
children and young persons”. Controversially, the 1998 Act also reduced the
age of criminal responsibility to ten, one of the lowest in Western Europe, by
abolishing the principle of doli incapax, the presumption that a child aged
between 10 and 13 is incapable of committing a criminal offence.
During Labour’s first term in office, youth justice was a major priority. Between
1998 and 2001, there were four separate acts of parliament that introduced new
legislation concerning the youth justice system: the Crime and Disorder Act
1998; the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which created youth
offender panels; the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which
introduced restorative cautioning; and the Criminal Justice and Police Act
2001, which extended child curfew schemes to children under the age of 16.
After the 2001 election, attention moved to other areas in an attempt to deliver
a more radical set of reforms which had been mapped out in a ten year plan
for criminal justice. That plan set the ambitious aim of a “comprehensive
overhaul of the criminal justice system to lever up performance in catching,
trying, convicting, punishing and rehabilitating offenders” (Home Office,
2001, p. 7). A “justice gap” had opened up during the 1980s and 1990s, the
document claimed. The criminal justice system had not kept up with rises in
crime. Too few of what were dubbed “persistent offenders” were being caught
and convicted. Labour embarked on a series of major reforms, supported by
substantial additional investment to create an effective criminal justice system
that could “drive down crime” (Home Office, 2001).
The year 2004 saw the concurrent publication of two overlapping five year
strategies: one for the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2004a) and one
for the Home Office (2004b). Following the appointment of John Reid as
Home Secretary, a third plan was published in July 2006, with the expressed
intention of building a criminal justice system that put the “law abiding
majority at its heart” (Home Office, 2006a, p. 2). These various overlapping
plans and strategies differ in important respects. Those published in 2004 and
2006, for instance, demonstrate a far greater preoccupation with “anti-social
behaviour” than that of 2001. 2 As a result, a degree of confusion at the level of
implementation has been inevitable. However, a number of core assumptions
about the criminal justice system and its role are apparent from the numerous
plans for law and order reform. The assumptions are that:
1. Crime levels and trends are significantly influenced through the operation
of the criminal justice system, and an appropriately resourced and effectively
organized criminal justice system will lead to lower levels of crime. This has
been a key driver behind the government’s numerous reforms and the record
levels of investment in both areas.
2 Anti-social behaviour is mentioned 36 times in the 2006 plan, 21 times in the 2004 criminal justice plan,
and 129 times in the 2004 Home Office plan. The 2001 plan makes only five, largely incidental, references
to it.

46 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 47
2. The traditional scope of criminal justice activities needs to widen to address
the new forms of crime and crime-like behaviours that are the result of the
changed society we live in. The anti-social behaviour and “Respect” agendas
are the obvious result of this concern with crime-like behaviours.
3. The effective management of crime requires the various criminal justice
agencies to expand into areas of policy not traditionally considered part
of their remit. This is best illustrated by the focus on early and rapid
intervention, and the development of programs such as summer “Splash”
schemes for youth in high crime areas and Youth Inclusion and Support
Programmes (YISPs) to identify children who are “at risk” of offending.
4. A welfare approach to dealing with children and young people who offend
should be replaced by one which relies far more on punishment – what
has been described as the development of a “punitive turn” or a “new
punitiveness” in youth justice (Goldson, 2000; Pratt, Brown, Brown,
Hallsworth, & Morrison, 2005). This was made clear in the White Paper
No More Excuses (Home Office, 1997), which stated “… punishment is
important to signal society’s disapproval of criminal acts and deter offending.
It is the appropriate response to children and young people who wilfully
break the law” (para. 5.1).
5. A commitment to systemic managerialism and central control. This is
reflected in the Public Service Agreements and national targets that have
driven the reform agenda. Performance against these targets has been key
to delivering change. This new approach seeks efficiency savings due to
downward pressure on budgets, the setting of clear priorities and targets
across public services, and the introduction of competitive tension into the
public sector (McLaughlin, Muncie, & Hughes, 2001).
These assumptions are touched on at different points in this article.
The Money and the Infrastructure
Initially, Labour chose to take a prudent approach to public sector spending
abiding by the spending plans of the previous Conservative administration.
This meant that criminal justice agencies did not receive a significant injection
of extra funds until 2001. However, when the spending did get underway, it
was extremely generous. Between 2001 and 2005, there was a 6.5% annual
growth in spending on law and order (Emmerson & Frayne, 2005). Labour
claimed it was the biggest injection of new resources for 20 years. By 2007-
08, the criminal justice system in England and Wales received just under
£23 billion, nearly 50 billion Canadian dollars, a third more than it received
ten years previously (Solomon et al., 2007).
Where did it go? A large part of the additional funding, nearly two thirds,
was for the 43 police forces in England and Wales, which received an annual
real terms increase in spending of just under 4 per cent between 2001 and
2006. This largely went toward the recruitment of police officers. Since 2000,
when numbers had been in decline, there has been a remarkable increase
from just under 125,000 officers to more than 141,000 in 2007. However,
and perhaps surprisingly, probation has had the largest real terms growth in
funding followed by youth justice (see Figure 1). The extra funds for probation
were largely for increases in support staff and the creation of a centralized
probation directorate.
Given that youth justice was a key focus of reform, it is not surprising that
there have been substantial increases in expenditure. Total spending on youth
justice increased by £267.2 million (around 540 million Canadian dollars)
between 2000 and 2007, a real terms increase of 45 per cent. This was initially
Figure 1: Percentage changes in cash and real (GDP deflated) spending on the
main criminal justice agencies, 2000-2001 to 2006-2007
Youth Justice
Police
Crown Prosecution
Service
HM Courts
Services
Prisons
Probation
Cash change
Real change
-20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Sources: DCA, 2007; Home Affairs Committee, 2007; Home Office, 2006b; Home Office, 2007.

48 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 49
to fund the creation of the new Youth Offending Teams and a national Youth
Justice Board (YJB) to oversee the youth justice system and purchase custodial
accommodation for children. The YJB has accounted for just over two-thirds
of spending on youth justice, the majority of which has been to pay for secure
accommodation for the increasing number of children in custody (the number
of children in prison has been no less than 2,600 since 2000). Overall, the
prison population has grown massively under Labour – at the end of June
2008 it was at 83,200, just over 150 per 100,000 of the population. Since
Labour came to power in 1997, when the prison population stood at just over
60,000, it has increased by more than a third.
By 2004, the government was spending 2.5 per cent of its national income
on law and order – a larger proportion than ever before. Moreover, according
to an analysis by the Labour government’s Strategy Unit, it was spending
proportionately more on law and order than any other country in the
industrialised nations of the OECD, including the United States and major
European countries such as France, Germany and Spain (Prime Minister’s
Strategy Unit, 2006).
The substantial increase in spending contributed to the creation of important
new partnership structures designed to deliver a different approach to crime
control and prevention. The most important have been the local Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and the Youth Offending Teams
(YOTs). Both were established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which
represented what many have considered to be a momentous shift in the way
crime is governed because it appeared to represent a move towards a holistic
prevention paradigm. Garland (2000), for example, described it as a “preventive
turn” reflecting an “epistemological break” with the past.
CDRPs, also known as Community Safety Partnerships, are partnerships
between the police, local authorities, the Probation Service, health authorities,
the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses. There are currently 375
in England and Wales. The responsible authorities are under a statutory duty to
ensure that the key agencies come together to work in partnership and carry out
an audit of local crime, disorder and misuse of drugs every three years. Using
the information arising from this audit and based on consultation with local
communities, they then formulate a strategy for prevention in the local area.
The other key crime prevention partnerships are the 156 Youth Offending
Teams (YOTS) designed to work with children who are given a youth justice
sanction and also to prevent “at risk” children from entering the youth justice
system. They are locally owned, accountable multi-agency partnerships
between the police, probation, health, education and children’s services and in
some cases housing. YOTs are supported with central guidance and funding
from the Youth Justice Board, which is co-sponsored by the Ministry of Justice
and the Department for Children, Schools and Families.
It was widely hoped that the creation of both YOTs and CDRPs would provide
an exemplary model of how to do crime prevention as opposed to endless law
enforcement. As Crawford (1998) stated, “They offer a fertile soil in which a
more progressive criminal justice policy, one which turns away from the punitive
populism of recent years, could begin to establish itself and flourish” (p. 4).
Crime Reduction
The primary purpose of the increased investment, multiple criminal justice
plans and structural reforms was to ensure a sustained reduction in the official
crime rate, as measured by the annual British Crime Survey (BCS). 3 A target
was set by the Home Office in agreement with the Treasury to deliver a 15 per
cent reduction in BCS measured crime in the five years to 2007-2008. Targets
were also set to reduce the so-called “volume crimes” of burglary by 25 per cent
and vehicle crime by 30 per cent over a five year period. Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships were expected to focus their activity on cutting these
volume crimes. In addition, there was also a Youth Justice Board target to
reduce self-report youth offending.
On the face of it, Labour’s record on crime has been impressive. Aggregate
BCS-measured crime has been falling since the mid-1990s. The most recent
annual BCS figure, published in July 2008, estimated total crime against private
households in the categories it measured at 10.1 million offences annually
(Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker, 2008). This compares with an estimated
16.7 million offences annually in 1997, a fall of 39 per cent (Figure 2). The
government has met its targets of a fifteen percent reduction in BCS measured
crime in the five years to 2007-2008. Since 2002-2003, BCS measured crime
has fallen by 18 per cent. However, it is important to look at BCS trends over
a longer time period.
3 The BCS is currently based on a sample of almost 50,000 people living in private households in England
and Wales. These individuals are asked about their experience of being a victim of certain types of crimes
over the course of the previous 12 months. The main offences covered by the BCS are vandalism, burglary,
vehicle-related thefts (including bicycles), other household thefts, theft from the person, common assault,
wounding and robbery. The BCS provides a more reliable estimate of the offences it covers than that given
by police recorded data. But the range of offences covered by the BCS is narrower than the police data. It
also underestimates some of the offences it covers (domestic violence, for example).

50 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 51
Figure 2: Trends in all BCS crime, 1981 to 2007–2008
Number of incidents (000s)
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1981
1983
1987
Source: Adapted from Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker (2008).
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001/02 ints
2002/03 ints
2003/04 ints
2004/05 ints
2005/06 ints
2006/07 ints
2007/08 ints
In 1981, the first year that the BCS was carried out, the survey measured a
total of just over 11 million offences. This figure rose through the 1980s and
1990s, to 15 million in 1991 and nearly 20 million in 1995. Since then, it has
been on a long-term decline. When Labour came to power in 1997, it stood at
16.7 million, falling to 12.6 million in 2001–2002 at the end of Labour’s first
term and the beginning of its second. Labour, in other words, inherited an
already declining BCS trend when it won the 1997 election.
In the five years between 1997 and 2001–2002, the period roughly
corresponding to Labour’s first term, the overall BCS crime rate fell by 22 per
cent (Simmons, 2002). One way of understanding Labour’s target for a 15 per
cent reduction in BCS-measured crime for the five years following 2002–2003
is that it is a target that asks it to be less successful than it was during its first
term in office. It is a tribute to Labour’s political skills that it has been largely
successful in presenting a rather unambitious target as a bold gesture.
It is also notable that Labour’s more unambitious target was set at a time when
its major criminal justice reforms and expenditure were getting underway. Just
as Labour was gearing up for a major program of criminal justice investment
and reform – which it claimed would deliver major dividends in terms of
falling crime – it set a target to do worse overall than it had done during its
first term, when finances were much tighter. In this light, Labour’s increased
criminal justice expenditure and major structural reforms appear rather less
prudent, and more questionable, than is often thought. It also raises questions
about the impact of these reforms on crime levels.
When the government’s Strategy Unit reviewed crime levels based on
modeling, it concluded that 80 per cent of the reduction in the official crime
rate since 1997 was the result of economic, not criminal justice, factors (PM
Strategy Unit, 2006). This assessment is in keeping with the assessment of
many criminologists, who argue that economic trends, employment levels and
relative income inequality, alongside technological developments and broader
cultural and social changes, are the main influencers of crime trends (Reiner,
2007). On the other hand, the prevention partnerships could be credited with
achieving 20 per cent of the reduction, although much of this does seem to
be linked to situational crime prevention that promoted greater home and
vehicle security. According to the BCS, between 1999 and 2006 domestic
burglaries fell by 43 per cent and vehicle crime by 36 per cent, far exceeding
government targets (Solomon et al., 2007). In both cases improvements in
security – perhaps more so than any partnership action – have been a major
contributor to the overall falls (see Home Office, 2006c; Walker, Kershaw, &
Nicholas, 2006). As the Home Office’s (2006c) annual report on crime noted,
households with simple security measures like deadlocks and window locks
were ten times less likely to be the victims of burglary.
The record on youth crime is much less impressive. The Home Office has
conducted a number of self-report youth surveys since the early 1990s which
provide an indication of trends in self-reported offending by children and
young people aged between 10 and 25 years old. They show that it has been
stable at between 19 and 22 per cent in the 13 years between 1992 and 2005
(Graham & Bowling, 1995; Flood-Page, Campbell, Harrington, & Miller,
2000; Budd, Sharp, & Mayhew, 2005; Wilson, Sharp, & Patterson, 2006).
It is striking to note that there is no indication that the creation of the YJB,
YOTs and the greater focus on youth offending, particularly in Labour’s first
term between 1997 and 2001, had any impact on reducing self-reported youth
offending. At best, all that can be said is that the wide-ranging reforms have
contributed to a continuing stabilization of self-reported youth offending at
the level the government inherited when it came to power in 1997. It might

52 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 53
equally be argued that all the expenditure and activity in this area has had
no measurable impact. Given the long-term trends in self-reported youth
offending, many may draw this conclusion. This inevitably raises the question
of the purpose of, and prudence involved in, the various youth justice reforms
and the increased expenditure that accompanied them.
The Justice Gap
The 1997 Labour Party election manifesto declared:
The number of people convicted has fallen by a third, with only one
crime in 50 leading to a conviction. This is the worst record of any
government since the Second World War – and for England and Wales
the worst record of any major industrialized country. (We Will be Tough
on Crime and Tough on the Causes of Crime section)
The disparity between crime and conviction became known as “the justice
gap”. Narrowing the justice gap by increasing the number of suspected
offences that result in an individual being cautioned, convicted or otherwise
sanctioned – known as “offences brought to justice” – has been a key priority
for the New Labour government and a driving force behind the activities of
the crime reduction partnerships, particularly the police. Forces across the
country were given specific sanction detection targets to ensure the justice gap
was narrowed.
An offence is considered to have been brought to justice “when an offender
has been cautioned, convicted or had the offence taken into consideration by
the court” (Home Office, 2006c, p. 84). Penalty notices for three notifiable
disorder offences – causing harassment, alarm or distress; destroying or
damaging property (damage under £500); and retail theft (under £200
in value) – and formal warnings for the possession of cannabis were also
categorized as “offences brought to justice” following their introduction
nationally in 2004. This broad range of categories contributed to an increased
target of 1.25 million offences brought to justice by 2007-2008.
The target was met a year ahead of the deadline – by the end of 2006,
1.4 million offences had been so-called “brought to justice”. However, the
target was not being met as a result of increases in successful convictions, but
through increased cautions, Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs), and formal
warnings for cannabis possession; these made up half of the offences brought
to justice. As a proportion of the total number of offences brought to justice,
successful convictions have actually fallen, from 69 per cent in 2003 to 53 per
cent in 2006. Overall, the number of cautions, PNDs and formal warnings for
cannabis possession have increased steadily since 2003.
There are widespread concerns that the “justice gap” target has had negative
unintended consequences. Firstly, there is evidence that increasing numbers of
children are being drawn into the criminal justice system unnecessarily. This
trend is particularly apparent in recent police arrest data, with children identified
as easy targets. The former head of the Youth Justice Board (YJB), Professor
Rod Morgan, has remarked that because the majority of crimes committed by
children are of a public nature, often in the streets or open spaces, arresting
children for the police is like “picking low-hanging fruit” (Solomon et al., 2007,
p. 40). Offences which would previously have been dealt with informally and go
unrecorded were attracting a formal response, reflected in the recorded figures
for the number of young people entering the youth justice system. Between
2002-2003 and 2006-2007, there was a 28% increase in the number of children
and young people given a youth justice sanction (Solomon et al., 2007).
For the police, the impact of the target has been to wholly undermine the
professional judgement and discretion previously exercised by individual
officers. In order to meet the sanction detection targets, officers’ hands have
been tied, resulting in some quite ridiculous cases. In one incident, a man was
cautioned for being found “in possession of an egg with intent to throw”. In
another, a child was arrested for throwing a slice of cucumber from a tuna
sandwich at another youngster. Such cases prompted the Chief Inspector of
Constabulary, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, to urge a rethink. In his recent review
of policing, he stated “The consequence of poor professional judgement,
combined with existing performance management arrangements, are that
officers are encouraged to criminalise people for behaviour which may have
caused offence, but the underlying behaviour would be better dealt with in a
different way” (Flanagan, 2008, p. 57).
Therefore, the fact that more than 1.25 million offences have been “brought to
justice” has not happened without unintended consequences. Primarily, it has
resulted in significant net widening, whereby behaviours and actions which
previously would not have been dealt with by criminal justice agencies have
been subject to formal legal sanctions. It is also questionable whether anything
of great value has been achieved. There are still only three convictions for
every 100 estimated crimes in England and Wales (Solomon et al., 2007).
Whether this corresponds to what most members of the public would consider
justice seems at best a moot point.

54 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 55
Anti-Social Behaviour
Tony Blair first wrote about anti-social behaviour (ASB) in a newspaper
article in 1988. “None of us should escape responsibility”, he wrote. “For we,
collectively, determine the values of our society. When a sense of community
is strong, that adds its own special pressure against anti-social behaviour”
(The Times, April 12, 1988). Ten years later, the Crime and Disorder Act
introduced a number of measures to tackle anti-social behaviour, including
the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). This was reinforced by measures
in the 2002 Police Reform Act and the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act. In
addition, the launches of the “Together Campaign” (October 2003) and the
“Respect Action Plan” (January 2006) have reaffirmed Labour’s commitment
to tackling ASB. For Tony Blair, tackling ASB became something of a personal
crusade, touring the country to urge practitioners to use the powers provided
by the legislation (Blair, 2003). Consequently, tackling ASB became a central
pre-occupation for Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.
ASB is defined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as “behaving in a manner
that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more
persons not of the same household as himself” (HM Government, 1998,
chapter 1.1). In practice, it is a broad and subjective umbrella term covering
a wide range of behaviours and activities. This has made it difficult, if not
impossible, to develop a reliable and robust data set on its prevalence and trends.
A “one day count” of anti-social behaviour, conducted in September 2003,
came up with a total of 66,107 “reports of ASB” in one day, equating to 16.5
million incidents per year. The Home Office itself appeared ambivalent about
the status of the results, warning that “reports are not the same as incidents of
anti-social behaviour” (Solomon et al., 2007, p. 44).
The main tool for dealing with these behaviours has been the Anti-Social
Behaviour Order (ASBO) which is a civil order available to the courts; it
can also be used by the criminal courts following a criminal conviction. The
government did not set an explicit target for the number of ASBOs issued.
Instead, it set a national target to reduce the percentage of people who perceive
ASB to be “a very or fairly big problem” to below 21 per cent, based on data
collected as part of the annual British Crime Survey (Solomon et al., 2007).
This target has been met, but there are a myriad of problems with defining and
measuring ASB. The official data on ASB perception reflects seven different
types of so-called anti-social behaviour: “abandoned or burnt-out cars”; “noisy
neighbours or loud parties”; “people being drunk or rowdy in public places”;
“people using or dealing drugs”; “teenagers hanging around on the streets”;
“rubbish or litter lying around”; and “vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate
damage to property”.
The government has not offered a satisfactory explanation for the choice of
these seven categories of ASB, nor why it has alighted on seven categories
in particular. It is notable, for instance, that “speeding traffic”, reported in a
government study of ASB as “the most widely perceived individual problem”,
is not included in the government’s preferred measure of ASB perception.
Indeed, of the top four types of perceived anti-social behaviour identified by
the government study, only “rubbish or litter lying around” is included in the
official measure (others were “cars parked inconveniently or abandoned” and
“dog fouling”) (Wood, 2004).
There are clearly questions about the usefulness of the target and whether
a subjective amorphous category provides the basis for robust, informed
and evidence based policy making. In addition, it is debatable whether the
government action and activity has actually made a difference to any of the
anti-social behaviour issues that most concern people. Well over 10,000 Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders have been issued – nearly half of them to children,
but there have been high levels of breach; research has found that for many
young people, they are regarded as a “badge of honour” (Youth Justice Board,
2006). Clearly, the brash attempt led by Tony Blair to use criminal justice
agencies to regulate behaviour by imposing civility through coercion has had
a limited negative effect.
Lessons from England and Wales
The ambition to overhaul criminal justice in England and Wales has been
very high; there has been significant extra investment, and major changes are
evident. But claims of success have at times been overstated by the Labour
government. In reality, its record is mixed. Despite record investment, there
has not been a steep change in outcomes. Crime and victimization levels,
particularly amongst young people, remain high and the proportion of crimes
dealt with is still extremely low. At the same time, there has been notable
success in dealing with the volume crimes of burglary and vehicle crime.
Overall, the official crime rate as measured by the British Crime Survey has
declined. However, there are a number of important lessons to be learned from
the New Labour reform program.

56 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 57
1. The Perils of Targets
It has become abundantly clear that centrally directed targets are counter
productive. They distort priorities and resource allocation, result in unintended
consequences and do not necessarily make for more effective delivery.
Critically, they impose a suffocating straitjacket on the work of criminal
justice practitioners, undermining their professional judgement, knowledge
and good practice. Performance indicators also impose a great burden on
crime reduction partnerships, reducing their capacity to respond to local
needs. In practice, partnerships have had to focus on complying with national
performance indicators in order to serve national political ends rather than on
meeting local needs.
Local partnerships need to be given space and authority, and encouraged to
focus on local priorities. New Labour, in its drive to ensure effective delivery,
has adopted a much too heavy handed centralised approach. Impatience at
the pace of change has resulted in an over-bureaucratised delivery framework
characterised by regular performance review cycles and stringent reporting
frameworks. A much lighter touch from the centre is far preferable.
2. The Creation of Silos Within Silos
The challenge of achieving effective partnerships is not to be underestimated.
It is not just a case of passing legislation or creating the necessary structural
framework. There needs to be a cultural shift too. Far too often, CDRPs have
been characterised by lack of organizational trust, desire to protect budgets,
unwillingness to share information and conflicting interests (Crawford,
2007). Rather than breaking down silos, they have created silos within silos.
This has particularly been the case with services geared towards children and
young people.
Several different agencies have responsibility for different aspects of youth
crime prevention. Despite the creation of multi-agency youth offending
teams, information on families and children who are deemed to be at risk
of offending, or who are known to the criminal justice agencies but not
subject to a criminal justice sanction, is not always shared. This leads to a
fragmented picture of individual needs. Furthermore, the variety of agencies
involved means it is difficult to establish who has responsibility for outcomes
of individuals who have yet to be subject to a criminal justice disposal, or
have completed a disposal and have left the youth justice system. Conversely,
children who are in the youth justice system can be treated differently from
other children, with mainstream agencies preferring to leave them to be dealt
with by YOTs.’
3. Balancing Enforcement and Prevention –
Why Who Leads Matters
There is clearly a need to ensure that the prevention logic does not become
captured by an enforcement approach. Labour set out to embed more effective
crime prevention strategies. However an ideological commitment to being
tough on crime, not just its causes, quickly resulted in enforcement trumpeting
prevention. This is evident from the increasing number of children and young
people who have been drawn into the criminal justice system (Solomon &
Garside, 2008) and the longer custodial sentences imposed for minor offences
committed by adults (Hedderman, 2008). The attempt to tackle anti-social
behaviour has also been characterised by a harsh enforcement-led approach to
increase the number of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders rather than emphasizing
the need to put in place multi-agency packages of support to address the causes
behind the behaviour.
If prevention is to be the central focus, there needs to be a political will and
commitment to hold off from pulling the enforcement lever, especially when
a major crime panic hits the media headlines. Putting lead responsibility in
the hands of a department that does not oversee criminal justice management,
or at least having joint sponsorship is one way to avoid the domination of
an enforcement agenda. Labour has always given the Home Office lead
responsibility for crime prevention. Arguably, it should at least be shared with
the Department for Communities and Local Government. Youth justice was
also in the Home Office. However, in 2007 responsibility was moved to the
Ministry of Justice and a new Department of Children, Schools and Families.
This has ensured that the latest youth crime action plan has a far greater
prevention focus (HM Government, 2008).
4. Guard Against Expansionism
Widening the traditional scope of criminal justice activities to encompass new
forms of crime-like behaviours should be given very careful consideration. The
lesson from the UK is that it does not result in tangible benefits in public
behaviour and order but simply extends the criminal justice net, resulting in
greater numbers being criminalized, particularly children and young people
(Solomon & Garside, 2008).

58 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 59
Defining what constitutes “anti-social behaviour” is also fraught with
difficulties. For New Labour, it has become whatever the government says it
means. This has allowed enormous scope for the authorities to target whatever
problem they consider to be of interest at any given point in time. Such a
subjective and amorphous category has resulted in a politically driven quest to
use coercive measures to impose civility.
5. A Genuine Evidence-Based Approach
Despite declaring a commitment to evidence based policy making soon
after entering government, New Labour has not followed this through. The
independent evaluation of its early Crime Reduction Programme quickly
became embroiled in the politics of government with the Home Office
reluctant to publish negative evaluation findings. A desire to secure the best
political outcomes was clearly incompatible with a commitment to following
the evidence base. Many criminologists were left feeling let down and
disheartened (Hope & Walters, 2008).
Developing effective crime prevention policies, however, requires a genuine
commitment to learning from the evidence. It means using knowledge more
effectively even if the findings from research are politically uncomfortable.
Ultimately, it requires politicians to resist allowing political imperatives to
interfere with research findings, however unpalatable they may be.
6. Invest to Deliver
A commitment to crime prevention requires a commitment to invest long
term in effective programs. Much of New Labour’s investment has been in the
creation of partnership structures and mechanisms for interagency working.
A great deal has also been spent on increasing the number of police officers
and the wider policing family. Ironically, there has been less investment in
prevention programs. This is best illustrated by the fact that just 5 per cent of
the Youth Justice Board’s budget is for prevention work.
Labour chose not to create dedicated budgets at either the local or national
level for crime prevention programs. It did, however, invest in neighbourhood
renewal initiatives and early years support for families and children. Arguably,
crime prevention that brings together work across government departments
and local agencies requires a distinct budget that is backed up by a long term
funding commitment. Instead, the Office for Criminal Justice Reform was set
up to take forward the work on the justice gap and anti-social behaviour. It
did not have any funding to direct to crime prevention programs. Had Labour
set up an Office for Crime Prevention, the priorities and outcomes could have
been rather different.
7. Understand the Limitations of Criminal Justice and
Set Realistic Expectations
Tooling up the criminal justice system to bear down on crime has been central
to New Labour’s approach. It has sought to extend the system’s reach to address
a wider range of behaviours. The assumption has been that criminal justice
reform can deliver significant crime reduction dividends. However, there are
limitations to what the police and other criminal justice agencies can achieve.
It is therefore necessary to set clear expectations about the role and purpose
of the criminal justice system in preventing crime rather than relying on it to
solve complex social and economic problems.
Rethinking Policy
It is to Labour’s credit that in the 12 months since Gordon Brown took over
from Tony Blair, there has been a reassessment of the approach taken to
tackling crime and public disorder. Whilst not all the lessons identified above
have been learned, some of them have at least been recognized and policy has
been accordingly reconfigured.
The Home Office has accepted some of the criticism of the “offences brought to
justice” target. Although it has not publicly acknowledged that it has resulted
in more people being unnecessarily drawn into the criminal justice system, it
recognizes that the target has imposed too much central control on the work
of individual police officers. The government concedes that greater discretion
should be given to Crime and Disorder Partnerships to determine priorities,
stating that:
Successful delivery of the Government’s vision cannot be imposed
simply through top-down performance management, and the strategy is
therefore to develop a criminal justice operating framework that provides
local services with greater flexibility to determine how this vision is to be
delivered effectively and efficiently. (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 3)
Generally, the government now acknowledges that the target-setting culture
has been too heavy handed. The new “offences brought to justice” target for
2008-11 subdivides data into three sub-categories – serious violent and sexual

60 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 61
offences, serious acquisitive crime, and other crime – so that it can readily
be seen precisely which parts of the justice gap are being narrowed. Local
areas are allowed to determine which “other crimes” to focus on in order
to ensure greater responsiveness to community concerns. To guard against
children being criminalized, an additional target has been set to consider,
among other things, how many children and young people are entering the
criminal justice system for the first time. A recent police reform paper also
proposes freeing up officers and supporting them to use greater discretion
(Home Office, 2008b).
The government is also seeking to rebalance its approach to youth crime
by taking “a ‘triple track’ approach of enforcement and punishment where
behaviour is unacceptable, non-negotiable support where it is most needed,
and better and earlier prevention” (HM Government, 2008, p. 1). The new
Youth Action Plan sets out detailed proposals to extend early intervention
programs with children and families to prevent crime. It ambitiously intends
to “set in motion a step-change in the delivery of early targeted support for
young people and families, encouraging the delivery of services which focus
on early intervention for families with children at greatest risk of becoming the
high-rate offenders of the future” (HM Government, 2008, p. 31).
The Brown government has subtly shifted away from tackling anti-social and
disorderly behaviour by children and young people through coercive measures
to significantly expanding the early intervention agenda. The focus is now
firmly on prevention by providing targeted support through mainstream,
locally governed social services. Although enforcement is still part of the
equation, prevention is seen as the most effective means of tackling youth
crime. Indeed, the Brown government has set an explicit target to provide
additional funding and expert support to at least 40 families in each local
authority where children are known to have behavioural problems and to be
in need of assistance.
Conclusions
Labour’s goal to reform criminal justice to be “tough on crime, tough on the
causes of crime” has been hugely ambitious. The scale of the investment, the
rapidity of the reforms and the political energy and attention given to them has
been unprecedented in modern British history. On paper, it appears to have
had a significant impact. Overall crime rates have fallen dramatically. Yet the
same decline has taken place in most other western nations. Arguably, crime
would have declined had Labour published only one criminal justice plan and
made just a few basic reforms. So, in conclusion, what should be the messages
that others take away from the New Labour reforms?
Firstly, it is important to recognize that effective crime prevention is more
often than not linked to what happens with the economy. In explaining the
recent decline in crime, the head of research in the Home Office, Professor
Paul Wiles, highlighted a decade of growth and prosperity as a key factor
(Travis, 2008). Regardless of what policies are adopted, if the economy is
buoyant crime will fall. This, however, does not mean that the scope and scale
of crime prevention strategies are not important.
Situational crime prevention has certainly had an impact in the UK in
contributing to substantial falls in vehicle crime and burglary. Initiatives to
improve home security and to encourage car manufacturers to “design out
crime” have played a part in reducing what a decade ago were major concerns
in all areas of the country. The work of partnerships which have prioritized
these volume crimes has also been instrumental in focusing resources and coordinating
effective action.
Yet, despite these successes, youth disorder and offending continues to be
a problem. In many inner city areas, the age of perpetrators and victims of
violent street crime involving weapons has declined from the mid-twenties to
late teens to the late teens to mid/early teens (Squires, Silvestri, Grimshaw, &
Solomon, 2008). Recently, Labour has come to realize that taking a simple
enforcement approach to the problem fails to address the needs of the families
and communities most at risk. It has also come to understand that extending
the remit of the criminal justice system to capture anti-social behaviours,
which in the past would have been dealt with informally, is counterproductive.
Yet, there is still a belief that more effective use of police resources or tough
punishment can make a difference. Prevention has yet to be firmly placed
outside the criminal justice arena and in the hands of welfare agencies.
Labour initially balanced the scales far more towards being tough on crime.
Gordon Brown is now attempting to rebalance them more towards tackling
the causes of youth crime through a concerted focus on early intervention.
He has yet to signal a desire to do the same for adult offending. The primary
lesson for those looking in on the English and Welsh experience is that effective
situational crime control and prevention strategies can make a difference,
but tackling levels of youth offending and victimization requires greater
understanding of the causes of crime and disorder, and is best addressed by
resorting to social rather than criminal justice interventions.

62 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 63
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Volume 3: pages 67–70
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Commentary from the
Co-Chairs of the National
Municipal Network for
Crime Prevention
Patrice Allard
Ville de Montréal
Christiane Sadeler
Regional Municipality of Waterloo
The articles by Homel and Solomon in this volume raise the question of what
we can learn from recent experiences in England and Wales, as well as Australia
and New Zealand. First, it should be noted that Canada is not a newcomer in
this policy area. In fact, since the international conference on crime prevention
in Montreal in 1989, many local authorities have taken leadership in the
prevention of crime, victimization and fear of crime, and have encouraged
multi-sector partnerships, citizen involvement, situational crime prevention
programs, and social development approaches. But these initiatives tend to
happen in isolation and to lack a broader political framework and orientation
to establishing goals and objectives across all orders of government.
In this sense, Canada stands at a distance from the experiences of other
countries where a national political commitment to crime prevention
preceded the implementation of local programs and partnerships. When
national priorities are established and include measurable targets of change,
investments to foster and support local communities tend to follow more
easily. This is crucial because municipalities are the order of government
closest to the experiences of public safety and security of their residents. The
top-down model of policy and programmatic change has the advantage of a
shared vision, political commitment and focused investment. It also has some
disadvantages, as demonstrated by both Homel and Solomon. The key is that

68 IPC Review 3 Commentary from the Co-Chairs of the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention 69
communities are more responsive to local needs and priorities, and central
governments sometimes run roughshod over these concerns.
In England and Wales, as indeed is the case in Canada, the notion of
Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD) has inspired many
organizations. In many cases, CPSD has animated organizations to work
together to develop partnerships and bring together people that formerly had
little experience in sharing a vision, let alone information and resources. This
approach “by and for communities” involves a process of empowerment, and
can help build social capital in communities. But this process is not automatic,
and there can be resistance from social and justice service sectors over resources
and power. The challenge is to ensure that the goals of crime prevention are
incorporated into organizations, and to sustain this long enough to be able to
affect system change and measure impacts.
Both Homel and Solomon conclude that one of the conditions for effective
crime prevention is the capacity to manage collaborative multi-agency actions.
This begins with an agreement that enforcement alone cannot address
the complex needs of the communities and families most at risk. While
investments in reactive and enforcement-based policies and programs may
be seen to be expedient, they cannot be expected to accomplish the work
necessary for effective crime prevention in local communities. In fact, they
may detract from other opportunities. Solomon outlines the drift of the British
Labour government from a “tough on crime, tough on causes” approach to a
mainly enforcement-based vision that criminalizes an increasing number of
people, including children and youth. Such coercive measures can be counterproductive,
both in terms of financial costs, and of the impact they have on the
trust and confidence of the community.
Fourteen Canadian municipalities from coast to coast have come together,
with the support of the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (at the University
of Ottawa), to form the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention.
We would be well served to heed some of the conclusions that have been
drawn by Solomon and Homel. Firstly, it can’t be stated forcefully enough
that political will is key for the success of crime prevention. Homel explains
that “the focus on short term (seed) funding is premised on an anticipation
that other agencies (...) will pick up any need for continuing crime prevention
activity”. Of course, this is not necessarily the case because of competing
demands or a lack of appreciation for their role in crime prevention.
This means that local politicians must ensure “strong and consistent
leadership and supportive governance structures” (Homel) and that “local
partnerships (…) be given space and authority, and encouraged to focus on
local priorities” (Solomon).
These and other lessons from international experiences are already reflected
in some Canadian crime prevention policies such as those of the Province
of Québec 1 and, more recently, the Alberta crime prevention action plan. 2
Importantly, both of these policies recognize the leading role and responsibility
of municipalities in crime prevention. These policies make a vital connection
between crime prevention and interventions in response to local issues in
public safety and security. But they cannot be accomplished without senior
orders of government collaborating with and supporting local governments in
their development efforts. Public safety and security need focused, committed,
evidence based investments that support a vision of a reduction and prevention
of crime, victimization and fear of crime for all.
For the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention, a key lesson
emerges from reflecting on the experiences of other countries: the importance of
dedicated and flexible resources. Long term and sustainable resources are needed
to implement significant projects in communities affected by crime, but we
also need resources to evaluate what is being done in order to ensure efficiency,
effectiveness and sustainability. Finally, these resources need to be based on
a common vision of crime prevention while remaining flexible enough to be
adaptable to local concerns. There must be “a much lighter touch from the
centre” as Solomon says, but we cannot expect crime prevention collaborations
and initiatives in municipalities to prevail without national and provincial
commitment and support.
In many municipalities across the country, there is a clear dedication to public
safety and security, but often the tools to accomplish the task are limited.
What is now needed is a national strategy that acknowledges and supports the
ground level while remaining flexible with regards to its application. We need
a commitment from all orders of government to move beyond jurisdictional
debates and focus on the vital impact that crime, victimization and the fear of
crime have on the quality of life of all communities.
The fourteen municipalities that have come together to form the National
Municipal Network for Crime Prevention have continued to exchange
experiences. We have learned that we are more similar than different. Some
actions are specific to the local context, but all speak to the vital need for
1 See www.msp.gouv.qc.ca/prevention/prevention.asp?txtSection=publicat&txtCategorie=politique
2 See www.justice.gov.ab.ca/safe/

70 IPC Review 3
a long term multi-sector vision that supports targeted local engagement and
initiatives, monitors their impact and is resilient to political shifts. Dialogues
between all orders of government are crucial for initiating and sustaining
prevention approaches in communities across Canada. Based on the experiences
of other countries, it seems likely that these conversations need local energy
and commitment (bottom up) as well as a national vision and supports from
central orders of government for local initiatives (top down). We are ready.
Are you?
Volume 3: pages 71–73
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Commentary from the Provincial/
Territorial Perspective
Beth Ulrich
Director, Crime Prevention Unit,
Community Justice Branch, Manitoba Justice &
Co-Chair, Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working
Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention
Canada’s Provinces and Territories are committed to addressing their local
crime and victimization issues. More and more provincial/territorial interdepartmental
committees are developing strategic responses to crime and
victimization problems related to areas such as youth, poverty and exclusion,
gangs and drug prevention, violence against women, auto theft, early childhood
development, Aboriginal justice, and many others. Local programs and policies
are then designed, funded and implemented. This work is resulting in the
development and implementation of crime prevention strategies and initiatives
across the country.
At times there is alignment and support from a national strategy, and the
work is done in collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Centre or
other Federal agencies. At other times, the Provinces or Territories operate
independently from a national framework. These local initiatives do not
always form the basis of a newsworthy announcement nor are they necessarily
woven together or presented as an overall crime prevention strategy, yet the
work is underway.
There is almost universal agreement that this work must be knowledgebased,
and the shift towards evidence-based approaches to “what works” is
permeating policy discussions at various community and government tables.
But, moving in this direction will require a great deal more attention at both
the local and national levels to what is needed to accomplish this task. As
Homel and Solomon suggest on the basis of their research, the minimal
requirements for success include: vision and leadership, adequately funded

72 IPC Review 3 Commentary from the Provincial/Territorial Perspective 73
and sustainable organizational structures, technical assistance and training,
access to appropriate data, and supports for the development of collaborations
and partnerships. We must also be leery about whether “model programs”
from elsewhere can be easily transferred and replicated in the various regions
of Canada. What works “there” may not work here, and we need to be
constantly attentive to the need to respect the concerns and priorities of diverse
communities and groups, as well as agreements and treaties with communities
and other governments.
and programs are informed by research. The provinces and territories will
continue to create and support local strategies. Perhaps together, with support
from the National Crime Prevention Centre and other federal partners, we
could imagine a future that includes a robust social safety net that helps assure
prevention in the long term, coupled with specific model interventions for
high risk individuals and communities.
The current global fiscal crisis will impact each province and territory in
different ways. Departments that are key to developing social and economic
strategies will need to become strong allies with Justice to review opportunities
to pool resources that will yield multiple positive outcomes; the Justice
department alone can not affect long term social change. The UK experience
as explained by Solomon and Homel, as well as an abundance of other research,
informs us that it is comprehensive approaches that integrate the contributions
of a number of key social sectors that will create the long term social fabric
necessary to prevent crime and victimization.
These approaches require collaboration between all orders of government and,
given their different roles and responsibilities, and the pressures they face, this
will be a huge challenge. While we work to create long term strategies, we
must also implement specific initiatives that focus on high risk offenders and
those at risk of re-victimization. Involvement of the justice system and law
enforcement will be key in this respect.
One message is clear in the work of both Homel and Solomon: the tendency
for prevention policy to swing like a pendulum between social or structural
approaches and individual or developmental approaches must stop. We
need to develop and implement a dual track process. Research supports
the effectiveness of each approach and highlights the necessity to invest in
comprehensive approaches that address individual, community and structural
risk and protective factors. To implement these approaches effectively, there
must be coordination between all orders of government; long term funding;
technical support for practitioners; flexible policies to meet the unique needs
of the provinces and territories; and support for collaborative partnerships.
Canada is fortunate to have within its borders institutions such as the
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montréal) and the Institute
for the Prevention of Crime (at the University of Ottawa), as well as many
local experts from various backgrounds who can help ensure that policies

Volume 3: pages 75–79
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Blueprint for Effective
Crime Prevention in Canada:
The National Crime
Prevention Strategy
Daniel Sansfaçon, PhD, & Lucie Léonard
National Crime Prevention Centre
The articles by Peter Homel and Enver Solomon describe some of the major
international experiences in recent years in the design and implementation of
national crime prevention strategies – they also provide a stimulating overview
of what they feel can be learned from these experiences, and of what might be
most relevant to Canadian practitioners and decision-makers.
Both authors attempt to identify some of the common themes in contemporary
crime prevention, and some of the lessons from these experiences that could
be applied to Canada’s current situation. Homel assesses a number of national
strategies, with an emphasis on recent developments in Australia and England
and Wales. He identifies a number of features of modern prevention, including:
multi-sectoral action based on the use of multiple interventions, focused
analysis, and evidence based interventions with a strong outcome focus and
an emphasis on locally “driven” initiatives. Solomon focuses primarily on
assessing the UK’s experience under the Labour government, which took
power in 1997. He identifies a number of areas where Canada might profit
from observing others. These include lessons related to: setting centrally
directed targets, creating organizational silos within silos, using evidencebased
approaches, attempting to balance enforcement and prevention and
addressing the “implementation gap”.
How do these international experiences apply to the Canadian situation or,
in other words, what should Canada learn from others? In this context, it is
useful to provide an overview of recent developments of the National Crime

76 IPC Review 3 Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention in Canada 77
Prevention Strategy, particularly its attempt to promote and support evidencebased
crime prevention in Canada.
Crime prevention is a relatively recent policy and program domain in Canada.
The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) was established in 1998 as the
responsibility centre in the Canadian federal government in crime prevention.
Its main role is to develop policy knowledge and to administer funding
programs under the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) which is the
main prevention policy framework of the federal government. It is important
to emphasize that the NCPS is not the only policy framework or funding
program with crime prevention implications in the federal government: one
could also think for example of the Family Violence Initiative (Public Health
Agency), the National Anti-Drug Strategy (Justice and Health Canada), the
Urban Aboriginal Strategy (Human Resources), the Youth Justice Initiative
(Justice Canada) or many initiatives in the RCMP (for example, on youth
intervention). While the NCPC has a mandate to coordinate and provide
some coherence between these various initiatives, it cannot replace or act in
lieu of these other sectors of government.
Furthermore, provinces have the possibility of adopting their own strategies.
Some may complement the NCPS, but they need not necessarily as provinces
have a direct responsibility for the administration of justice, health, education
and social services. The province of Québec paved the way with the adoption
of its city-focused strategy in the early 2000s. Other provinces, especially
Alberta, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, have more recently adopted crime
reduction and prevention strategies, sometimes more influenced by the UK
experience in crime prevention, reduction and community safety.
There are national, provincial, territorial and municipal strategies and
approaches to crime prevention in Canada. The positive aspects are that they
all pursue a prevention agenda and that, when taken together, they may well
have contributed to the overall decline in recorded crime rates in Canada since
the early 1990s. The federal government, through the NCPC, provides national
leadership, but there remains a great deal of variation between administrations
and jurisdictions, and communities and practitioners may have very different
views of what prevention is and of how it should be delivered on the ground.
The NCPS itself has changed quite significantly over the decade. Originally
conceptualized as a broad Crime Prevention through Social Development
(CPSD) approach that was largely based on community mobilization, it is now
a more focussed and evidence-based strategy. In effect, the renewed National
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) is based on the following four principles
described in its Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention (2007) 1 :
1. strengthening partnerships across all sectors and systematically
integrating crime prevention with enforcement, corrections and other
relevant interventions;
2. promoting effective crime prevention through the use of the evidence base;
3. focusing on specific priorities and groups; and
4. achieving measurable results.
More specifically, the NCPS aims to support evidence-based interventions that
address modifiable risk factors known to be related to offending among those
who are most at risk for delinquency. This translates in particular in a specific
focus on: children between the ages of 6-11, youth between the ages of 12-17
and young adults between 18-24 who present multiple risk factors.
These directions were chosen based on evidence and demonstrable results for
crime prevention, particularly in the areas of youth at-risk of offending. There
is a good degree of agreement among crime prevention specialists in Canada
and around the world that longitudinal studies following cohorts of children
from birth, as well as rigorous evaluation studies, have helped identify risk
factors for later delinquency. In particular, it is well established that early onset
of delinquent behaviour, especially when combined with other risk factors such
as having criminalized parents and/or being from a dysfunctional family, and
early aggressiveness and problem behaviour in school, significantly increase
the likelihood of being arrested at early adolescence; thus the need to focus on
early prevention with children and youth aged 6-11.
Adolescents who have been in contact with the police prematurely (before age
10), who have delinquent friends, or who have problems related to substance
use and abuse are at higher risk to become adult offenders; thus the focus
on the 12-17 age group, especially if they have already been in contact with
the justice system. And young adults 18-24 who, in addition to these past
experiences, are under-educated, unemployed, and demonstrate addictive use
of substances are at significant risk of entering a lifelong criminal trajectory.
Preventing these at-risk children and youth from entering a life of crime is the
overarching goal of the NCPS.
These directions were also established on the basis of reliable evidence with
respect to promising interventions. Many different institutes around the world
1 See www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/cp/_fl/ncps-blu-prin-eng.pdf

78 IPC Review 3 Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention in Canada 79
have identified such programs through meta-analyses of evaluation studies of
their effectiveness. For example, for children below the age of 12, Stop Now
and Plan (SNAP) or the Boys and Girls Clubs’ mentoring programs have been
recognized as model programs. For adolescents, Multisystemic Therapy (MST)
and Fast Track are examples of promising interventions. And for young adults,
Quantum Opportunities is an example of a promising intervention. On the
basis of an analysis of the existing scientific literature, and considering the
Canadian context, the NCPC has decided to give priority to funding twelve
model or promising programs that target these groups and address known risk
factors associated with crime and offending.
This said, very few of these interventions have been rigorously tested in
Canada, so their impacts are not well known. Furthermore, evaluation studies
have not always identified the key elements of the processes that make these
programs work. For example, more needs to be learned about the specific
characteristics of successful interventions (context, duration, intensity) or
the type of professionals or organizations required to deliver them and, in
particular, what and when to adapt them to best respond to the needs and
priorities of local communities.
Having adopted a strong focus on demonstrable results, and being very
conscious of the need to build longer-term sustainability for the most effective
programs, the NCPC has built an internal evaluation capacity to oversee
multi-site evaluation studies of the priority model and promising projects.
These evaluation studies, using the most rigorous available designs (whenever
possible a quasi-experimental design with comparable control group and
longitudinal follow-up of the clients) will aim to measure the effectiveness
(impacts) and cost-effectiveness (in selected cases) of these interventions. Once
effectiveness has been well established and more is known about “the how”,
the NCPC will work with its partners to identify appropriate ways to ensure
that these interventions are sustained.
A good policy translates into concrete and effective action, so bridging
the “implementation gap” is possibly the most challenging task in crime
prevention. Adopting an evidence-based strategy presents many challenges
for communities and practitioners: the knowledge base may not be accessible
to them and they may not have the tools or experience to implement model
and promising programs; they must also overcome the traditional resistance
to adopting models that do not have local roots. As such, active knowledge
transfer and dissemination of practical knowledge on effective crime prevention
practices are fundamental elements of the NCPC’s focus and activities.
More specifically, the NCPC conducts a series of activities designed to promote,
disseminate and foster the successful use of the knowledge base of effective
practices. The NCPC will continue to build its knowledge base, from research
reports reviewing the knowledge in a given domain, to fact sheets on evaluated
programs designed to inspire practice. But publications, whether physical or
electronic, can only go so far in helping to build the capacity of practitioners
and communities. In response, the NCPC also organizes a series of interactive
knowledge transfer and dissemination activities aimed at its own program
managers (who work directly with communities), its provincial and territorial
partners, and community-based organizations.
The implementation of the NCPS rests in particular on funding purposefully
selected promising and model programs in multiple sites, and the NCPC
is keenly aware that practitioners require information and support. So the
NCPC: makes available detailed information to funding recipients on these
promising and model programs (implementation fact sheets); organizes very
focused training sessions steered by a duo composed of a developer and a
deliverer of a given promising or model program; ensures that the funding
agreement includes a provision for in-depth training and continuous followup
of the service providers; orchestrates communities of practice both for
program managers within the Centre, and for recipient organizations in order
to ensure that practitioners in various parts of the country benefit from the
experience of others; and schedules yearly knowledge to practice seminars on
specific issues such as youth gangs, evaluation in Aboriginal communities, and
youth at-risk.
In conclusion, the NCPC remains committed to continuing to play an active
and collaborative role in the development and implementation of a national
crime prevention strategy for Canada, and to continuing to work in partnership
with the Provinces and Territories, municipal orders of government, and with
communities and organizations interested in contributing to the goal of a safer
and more secure Canada. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)
is attempting to address the challenges and difficulties described by Homel
and Solomon in a number of ways including the development of effective
crime prevention policies, a commitment to evidence-based practices, selective
interventions, a focus on evaluation, and by achieving strategic partnerships
and local collaboration to deliver good and sustainable crime prevention.

Volume 3: pages 81–86
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Lessons for Canadian Crime
Prevention: Cultural Shifts
and Local Flexibilities
Margaret Shaw
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)
This volume of the IPC Review contains two very significant articles, written
from the privileged position of hindsight by two very skilled observers. Peter
Homel’s Lessons for Canadian crime prevention from recent international
experience and Enver Solomon’s New Labour and crime prevention in England
and Wales: What worked? offer a wealth of experience and advice based primarily
on the recent history of criminal justice and prevention initiatives in Australia
and England and Wales. In 2008, ICPC published its first International Report
on Crime Prevention & Community Safety 1 , providing an opportunity to assess
the evolution, maturation and growth of crime prevention internationally.
These articles offer some valuable detail and commentary on some of the
international trends identified in that report.
Enver Solomon is a political scientist whose analysis draws on his recent
“independent audits” of ten years of criminal justice and youth justice reforms
in England and Wales, under Tony Blair’s Labour government. Peter Homel
has the dual distinction of having undertaken a major evaluation of the Crime
Reduction Programme in England and Wales, which formed a crucial part of
Tony Blair’s crime strategy, and of evaluating and observing many of Australia’s
recent crime prevention initiatives, as well as some of those in New Zealand
and the US. This enables him to reflect on the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of central government intervention in crime and its prevention.
In the late 1990’s England and Wales was seen as a poster child for crime
prevention in place of “endless law enforcement”. The enactment of mandatory
Local Crime Reduction Partnerships and Youth Offending Teams provided as
1 Visit http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org.

82 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention: Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities 83
Adam Crawford suggested, “a fertile soil in which a more progressive criminal
justice policy (…) could begin to establish itself and flourish” (see Solomon,
p. 49). What followed was, Solomon outlines, ten years of “hyperactive law
making and endless policy strategizing”, with almost 50 pieces of crime-related
legislation, four major criminal policy plans and numerous strategies affecting the
police, youth justice, probation, community safety and anti-social behaviour.
Officially recorded crime has indeed declined markedly in England and Wales
since the mid 1990’s, but the decline began in fact before the advent of all this
activity, and has occurred in most other Western nations as well. In 2006,
England and Wales was spending more per capita on “public order and safety”
than any other OECD country, and there has been a massive increase in the
prison population and child and young offenders, and, especially since 2004,
an obsession with “anti-social behaviour”.
Solomon identifies five core assumptions underlying all this activity:
1. Crime levels and trends are significantly influenced by the criminal
justice system;
2. The criminal justice system needs to address a wider range of “crime-like”
behaviours because of “changes” in society;
3. Criminal justice agencies need to expand their remit into non-traditional
areas such as early intervention and “at risk” populations;
4. A welfare approach to children and young people should be replaced by
one relying more on punishment; and
5. Systematic public managerialism, driven by national targets for crime
reduction, is the best way to achieve efficiency and results.
His analysis concludes that a buoyant economy has probably been the major
factor in the fall in crime over the ten year period (as was partly the case in
the crime drop in America), although crime prevention has had some impact.
A major characteristic of crime prevention in England and Wales, for a number
of historical reasons, has been its focus on situational prevention. Utilized
by local crime prevention partnerships, this has been effective in reducing
residential burglary and car theft. The dominance of situational prevention,
with its notions of rational choice and control, and the relative neglect of a more
balanced approach to prevention, help to explain the failure to understand the
behaviours of young people, and the obsession with anti-social behaviour. A
more balanced approach, which gives greater attention to social and community
interventions, targeting the conditions of poor and disadvantaged communities,
might have reduced the need to enlarge the net of “crime-like” behaviours.
Solomon concludes that the current government now recognizes that a
simple enforcement approach does not address the needs of families and
communities, and that the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) is now seen
as counterproductive. In effect there has been too great a focus on control
rather than prevention, on being “tough on crime” rather than on its causes,
and not enough expenditure on social interventions. The irony is that much
international prevention with young people at risk is based on the principle of
including excluded populations, and often working through informal social
controls, rather than using coercion and further exclusion (ICPC, 2008).
Peter Homel’s article starts from the premise that levels of reported crime
and victimization in most developed countries, including Canada, have
consistently declined over the past ten or more years, in parallel with the
growth of interest and investment in crime prevention by those countries. He
acknowledges the collective wisdom that perhaps some 20% of that decline can
be attributed to prevention programs, and examines eight key characteristics
of effective crime prevention strategies and programs in developed countries.
Essentially, these common components are about the methodology of
prevention, including collaborative multi-agency action, partnership
models, problem-focused and evidence-based approaches, and centrally
driven and locally delivered practice. They have required the emergence of
new governance structures for managing crime prevention, and a shift in
traditional methods requiring pooled budgets, negotiated partnerships, greater
client participation in service delivery, shared service responsibility, innovative
community consultation, and the development of shared databases and viable
performance measures.
Homel sees the Boston youth homicide reduction project, and the ongoing
Australian Pathways to Prevention project, as illustrating the power and
effectiveness of such methodological approaches. However, he also provides
clear analysis of the implementation failure of the world’s most ambitious
central prevention initiative, the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP)
in England & Wales. These included: the lack of suitably qualified staff;
high staff turnover; inadequate technical and strategic advice from central
government; and inadequate project management, competency and skills.
What is encouraging is his assessment that these lessons about implementation
and process have influenced subsequent national crime prevention programs,
notably the recent National Community Crime Prevention Programme in
Australia which has avoided such implementation failure and maintained
good central – regional relationships.

84 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention: Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities 85
The slippery concept of evidence-based policy has also been shown, argues
Homel, to be much more complex than its initial proponents suggested, since
it entails agreements on the nature of evidence, and strategic ways of creating
and measuring it. In the CRP, there was too great an emphasis on formal
research evidence, rather than on other types of evidence about how programs
worked, and what their outcomes were. He makes a useful distinction between
performance measurement and evaluation as two valuable aides to informing
crime prevention policy and practice: the former assists with the day-to-day
management of programs, while the latter informs overall decisions about
programs and policies.
There are a number of strategic lessons from these experiences that are
important for Canada. For example:
• A strong deterrent justice system is not sufficient to prevent crime – an
effective and well-funded justice system does not guarantee reductions in
crime or increased community safety and quality of life. The economy,
social and environmental conditions and other factors are also important
and likely to impact crime levels, and responding to those will save justice
and social costs. The experience of South Africa provides a stark example
of a country living under extreme security conditions, and with tough and
deterrent criminal justice, which has so far failed to impact the levels of
serious violent crime over the past twelve years. The recently launched
Action for a Safe South Africa 2 argues that the justice system would collapse
if all crimes were dealt with, and a broader preventive approach is seen as the
only solution.
• The dangers of target-setting and managerial approaches are well
demonstrated. They can be counterproductive, and reduce flexibility and
professional judgment.
• Too much focus on crime can contribute to increasing anxieties and
expectation of the government’s role and capacity to intervene – crime in
England and Wales is down, but levels of fear remain high.
• The focus of crime prevention policies should be on creating safe communities
rather than reducing or deterring crime. This requires long-term funding,
not just pilot or demonstration projects.
2 See www.safesouthafrica.org.za
• “Imposing civility by coercion”, as in the case of Anti-Social Behaviour
Orders in England and Wales, is a mistake which has been costly in
terms of increased justice interventions, as well as going against principles
of inclusion. The City of Bogota, by contrast, has clearly demonstrated
how a culture of civility can be created through the use of innovative and
participatory approaches, including clowns. The use of social mediators in
public spaces in France offers another example. International standards are
being increasingly applied in many countries. The UN Guidelines for the
Prevention of Crime (2002) stress the importance of the inclusion of young
people, especially those most likely to be involved in the justice system, not
their demonization.
• Governments can learn from the experience of other countries. While policy
does not always travel well, and it is important to look at and adapt programs
to local contexts and circumstances, some good lessons about process,
implementation, and evaluation have been learnt from recent experiences.
• Other countries and regions with rather different experiences from developed
countries, such as South Africa, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Trinidad &
Tobago or Chile can provide some valuable lessons about good practices.
• It is important to innovate, and to set realistic expectations about the likely
impacts of interventions. As Homel points out, research evidence is just
one source of knowledge; the messiness of actual project implementation,
the knowledge and energies of practitioners, and the timelines of policy
makers also affect outcomes and impacts. There should still be room for
innovation, not just replication of proven “examples”.
• The growing importance of modern “tools” for data collection and
analysis, such as observatories of crime and social problems, and the use of
local community safety audits to support local and regional multi-sector
partnerships and coordinating bodies.
• Crime happens locally – the importance of the principle of subsidiarity – of
the devolution of both powers and resources to local levels. This has been
very effectively demonstrated in Colombian and Brazilian cities, but with
strong central government support – financial, technical, and normative.
Much of the experience distilled in these articles, and ICPC’s (2008)
International Report, points to the learning curve of governments trying
to work in very different ways from the past, after centuries of national

86 IPC Review 3
responsibility for crime and safety. It underlines the emergence of a quite
different way of looking at, and responding to the individual, community,
social and economic problems which can lead to crime and victimization,
and of understanding the complexities of working out that new approach. As
ICPC’s (2008) International Report underlines, there is very clear progress
in understanding the need for crime prevention internationally, and how it
can be undertaken. Prevention is not a static concept; it is constantly evolving
and it requires the continuing development of a widening range of sectors,
professionals, practitioners, communities, and tools.
There is some irony in the fact that Solomon suggests that part of the failure
in England and Wales to tackle youth behaviours and offending is because
there has been too little emphasis on addressing its underlying structural
causes (until recently the major objective of the federal Canadian approach),
and too much focus on reducing victimization and re-offending (closer to the
current federal Canadian approach). Peter Homel makes a similar point that
the National Crime Prevention Centre’s 2007 Blueprint for Effective Crime
Prevention places greater stress on risk factors rather than underlying causes.
While it adheres to some of the principles outlined in the 2002 UN Guidelines
for the Prevention of Crime, not all those principles are included, nor is the
emphasis in both the 1995 and 2002 UN guidelines adopted by ECOSOC, on
the importance of local government, and the role of local actors, including city
governments and the police, in partnership with local populations.
YOUTH AND
COLLECTI V E
VIOLENCE
References
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC). (2008).
International report on crime prevention and community safety.
Montreal: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). (1995).
Guidelines for the prevention of urban crime. Resolution 1995/9, Annex.
New York: UN ECOSOC.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). (2002).
Guidelines for the prevention of crime. 11 th Commission on the
prevention of crime and criminal justice. Resolution 2002/13, Annex.
New York: UN ECOSOC.

Volume 3: pages 89–116
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Gang Violence Among Youth
and Young Adults: (Dis)Affiliation
and the Potential for Prevention
Melanie Bania
PhD Candidate, Department of Criminology
Research Associate, Institute for the Prevention of Crime
University of Ottawa
Résumé
Les taux de violence et les incidents liés aux gangs de jeunes ne sont
pas distribués au hasard; ils sont perpétrés et vécus par un petit nombre
de personnes et concentrés dans les quartiers les plus vulnérables aux
difficultés économiques et à l’exclusion sociale. Cet article examine les
dispositions socio-économiques actuelles et leur influence, autant sur la
répartition des possibilités offertes aux adolescents et aux jeunes adultes
que sur leur perception d’être dans une position d’exclusion. Ce sentiment
de désaffiliation sociale motive la participation de plusieurs dans des
gangs de rue. Il est proposé que la réponse à la violence liée aux gangs et
à l’utilisation des armes à feu parmi les adolescents et les jeunes adultes
devra aller au-delà des stratégies courantes de répression et de prévention
qui mettent l’accent sur les caractéristiques des individus et des quartiers
défavorisés afin de prendre une approche préventive plus « sociale ». La
situation dans la ville de Toronto au cours des dernières années est utilisée
pour illustrer les principaux thèmes de l’argument.
Abstract
Rates and incidents of gang-related youth violence are not randomly
distributed; they are perpetrated and experienced by a small number of
people, and concentrated in areas of our cities that are the most vulnerable
to economic hardship and social exclusion. This article examines current

90 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 91
socio-economic arrangements and how they affect both the distribution
of opportunities available to youth and young adults, and their perception
of being in a position of relative exclusion. This sense of social disaffiliation
motivates the involvement of many in gangs. It is argued that the response
to gun and gang violence among youth and young adults will have to go
beyond current repressive and preventive strategies that focus on the
characteristics of individuals and neighbourhoods, and take a more “social
approach” to prevention. The situation in the city of Toronto over the past
few years is used to illustrate the main themes of the argument.
Introduction 1
High-profile outbursts of gun and gang-related violence across Canada in
recent years have drawn a wave of attention to the problem of gang-related
and youth violence. There is some debate as to whether gang involvement
and gang-related violence among youth are actually on the rise. As we will
see, there are a number of definitional and methodological issues that make it
difficult to know exactly where Canada stands in this regard.
The primary focus of this article, however, is not on whether the level of gun
and gang violence among youth and young adults has been increasing or
decreasing in our major urban centres. The focus, rather, is on how to make
sense of the nature and origins of collective violence among youth and young
adults in recent times. We begin with the observation that rates of violence
are not randomly distributed; they are perpetrated and experienced by a small
number of people, and concentrated in areas of our cities that are characterized
by economic hardship and social marginalization. This suggests the need
to examine current socio-economic arrangements and how they affect the
distribution of opportunities afforded certain youth and young adults, and the
sense of social disaffiliation that can lead some young people to get involved
in gangs.
We then turn to a discussion of whether the current responses to gang violence
among youth and youth adults are effective in addressing the factors at play.
I will argue that we must go beyond current repressive and reactive responses
and strategies that focus on the characteristics and “risk factors” of individuals
and neighbourhoods, and take a more “social approach” to prevention. This
will require that we shift our focus and resources from responses that tend to
“blame the victim” (Ryan, 1976), and recognize the need for a broad-based
solution that reduces relative inequality and relieves some of the frustration
caused by our social, economic and political arrangements (Hastings, 2003;
Websdale, 2001). The situation in the City of Toronto over the past few years
will be used to illustrate some of these themes.
What We Know About Gangs in Canada: A Brief Overview
It is difficult to determine the extent of gang activity in Canada, or whether
we are actually witnessing a rise in the violence that is attributable to gang
members. This is due in part to a lack of definitional clarity and consistency
around terms such as “gang”, “gang violence” and “youth”, limitations in
gang-related data and statistics, and a general lack of Canadian research in
this area (Chettleburgh, 2007; Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2006;
Public Safety Canada, 2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). The terms “youth”,
“street”, “major”, and “urban” are often used interchangeably when referring
to “gangs”, and have been associated with a wide range of behaviours, from
loitering to school-yard fights, swarmings, common assaults, drug dealing,
rape, prostitution, drive-by shootings, shootouts and homicides (CISC, 2006;
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 1994).
In 2003, Chettleburgh conducted the first national survey of police agencies
on the issue of youth gangs. Sixty-three out of the 264 police agencies who
completed the survey indicated that “youth gangs” 2 were active in their
jurisdiction in 2002. Police executives identified 434 active “youth gangs” and
a total of 7000 active “youth gang members” under the age of 21, 50% of
whom were under the age of 18, and 6% of whom were girls. For the most
part, gangs were reported to be internally ethnically diverse, with varying
concentrations of African-Canadian, First Nation, Indo-Canadian, Asian-
Canadian and Caucasian members depending on their geographical location
(Chettleburgh, 2003).
1 Unless otherwise specified, the word “gang” refers to groups that have at least some organizational/
leadership structure, and that are involved in committing criminal and violent acts in order to gain power
and recognition and/or control certain areas of unlawful activity (Montreal Police Service, 2004). The
phrase “youth and young adults” refers to those who are currently in their adolescence and in what is now
referred to as “early adulthood” – the period that straddles adolescence and adulthood (up to age 25) when
important transitions in the life course occur (see Gaudet, 2007).
2 “Youth gang” was defined as “a group of youth or young adults in your jurisdiction, under the age of 21 that
you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify or classify as a gang.
As part of this definition, we ask you to exclude motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs,
and other exclusively adult gangs” (Chettleburgh, 2003, p. 5).

92 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 93
More recently, CISC (2006) reported a total of 344 “street gangs” and 11,900
“street gang members” 3 active in 166 urban, rural and Aboriginal reserve areas
across the country. 4 It reported that the majority of “street gang members” in
Canada are between 21 and 30 years old, with a range as broad as 16 to 46
years. Most Canadian gangs have members that are considered “youth” in
legal terms, as well as adult members – only about 6% of Canadian gangs
are composed exclusively of members aged 17 and under (CISC, 2006).
CISC (2006) reports a relatively stable number of street gangs and street
gang members in Canada over the past 10 years, with the majority operating
in large urban centres. Gang activities were reported to consist primarily of
street-level illicit drug trafficking and prostitution, but to also involve weapons
trafficking, robbery, home invasions, extortion and fraud, as well as both
strategic violence (planned or organized incidents to increase the gang’s profits,
gains and criminal capabilities) and tactical violence (more opportunistic,
reactive or expressive incidents that can sometimes lead to unintentional or
collateral harm to the public) (CISC, 2006).
This gives us a preliminary picture of gang activity in Canada, but differences
in focus and terminology (i.e., “youth gangs” versus “street gangs”), definitions,
and methodologies result in a slightly disjointed description that is further
limited by its reliance on the perspectives of law enforcement agencies and
intelligence alone.
Violence and Homicide in Toronto
and Links to Guns and Gangs
It can be useful, and somewhat more telling, to look at what we know
about youth violence and gang-related violence at the local level, such as
within a city like Toronto. 5 According to Statistics Canada, the rate of
police recorded violent crime in Toronto has dropped 9% since 1992,
compared to 14% for all of Canada (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &
Fraser, 2008). However, in 2004, for the first time, youth (i.e., those
3 The CISC defines a “street gang member” as “someone who is involved (directly or indirectly) in gangmotivated
crime”, and who has been identified as a gang member through at least two of the following
means: reliable source information (i.e., fellow/rival gang member, legitimate community resources); police
surveillance; self-report/admission; court findings; common and/or symbolic gang definition (i.e., gang
paraphernalia, tattoos, clothing, etc.). We return to more of the CISC methods and findings later on.
4 Data sources included the 2005 and 2006 CISC Integrated Provincial Threat Assessments, law enforcement
agency materials and interviews, academic research, and intelligence from the Automated Criminal
Intelligence Information System (ACIIS).
5 References to “Toronto” represent the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Toronto (as defined by Statistics
Canada), which includes a number of police forces. References to the “City of Toronto” refer specifically to
that which falls under the jurisdiction of the Toronto Police Service.
12-17 years old) charged with violent crime in Toronto outnumbered those
charged with property crime, which is unusual in Canada (Janhevich, Johnson,
Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). 6
The rate of homicide in Toronto has remained relatively stable over the past
30 years (1977-2007) at about 2.5 per 100,000 people, which is close to the
national average (Gartner & Thompson, 2004; Li, 2008). However, the risk
of homicide victimization for some groups – in particular males, young people,
and black Torontonians – has gone up (Gartner & Thompson, 2004):
• Males accounted for 73% of all homicide victims during and after the
1990s, compared to about 64% of all victims from 1974-1989.
• Since 1998, the average age of homicide victims has been 33 and 40% of
victims are under the age of 25, compared to an average age of 37 in the
1970s (when 25% of victims were under age 25).
• The homicide rate per 100,000 black Torontonians is almost 5 times
greater than the average overall homicide rate per 100,000 population.
The information available on homicide offenders is less complete. Gartner
and Thompson (2004) have not been successful in obtaining police files for
years after 1991, and the data available from Statistics Canada does not provide
detailed information on offender characteristics, such as ethnic background. 7
Nonetheless, police reports show that the number of youth (those 12-17 years
old) charged with homicide 8 in Toronto has increased in recent years. For
example, 33 youth were charged with homicide between 1992 and 2002, but this
increased to 37 for the much shorter period between 2003 and 2007 (Statistics
Canada, Uniform Crime Reports). Youth have also become an increasing
proportion of all persons charged with homicide in Toronto (Statistics Canada,
UCR). That said, these numbers must be interpreted with caution, since they
do not take into account the possible effects of population change.
Finally, Gartner and Thompson (2004) have further shown that the
characteristics of homicides in Toronto have changed over the past 30 years.
The proportion of homicides committed in public spaces and those committed
with guns were significantly greater between 1993-2003 than in the 1970s and
6 This data should be interpreted with caution as it is subject to police discretion and may reflect police
activity more than actual rates of offending.
7 There is a long-standing debate in Canada around the potential benefits and harms of systematically coding
for race variables in crime statistics (see Gabor, 1994; Roberts & Doob, 1997). It is therefore difficult to
obtain information on offending by ethnic group simply because “race” or “ethnic background” is not
coded in national crime data, except for with regards to Aboriginals.
8 Includes charges for first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter.

94 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 95
1980s; the proportion of homicides committed in the course of robberies or sexual
assaults have not increased. Furthermore, there was a marked increase in gunrelated
homicides in the City of Toronto in 2005, dubbed “The Year of the Gun”
by the media: 51 of the 79 (65%) homicides were gun-related, which is more than
double the number of gun-related homicides in 2004 (Toronto Police Service,
2006). There also appears to have been a relatively high number of homicides
and gun-related homicides in the City of Toronto since 2005 (see Table 1).
Table 1. Homicides and gun-related homicides in the City of Toronto, 1997-2007
Total Homicides Gun-Related Homicides % Gun-Related Homicides
2007 84 43 51%
2006 71 34 48%
2005 79 51 65%
2004 64 24 38%
2003 66 32 49%
2002 65 28 43%
2001 59 33 56%
2000 59 25 42%
1999 48 18 38%
1998 56 13 23%
1997 60 24 40%
Sources: Toronto Police Annual Reports.
Though there appears to be some trends in homicide characteristics in the
City of Toronto, is it difficult to determine the extent to which they are linked
to gang violence among youth and young adults. CISC (2006) reports a total
of 80 street gangs in the Greater Toronto Area, noting that they are highly
engaged in firearm-related incidents, but providing no additional detail or
explanation. Information on gang-related homicides reported by Statistics
Canada is available at the provincial level only, and is limited by a change
in the definition of what constitutes a “gang-related” homicide that occurred
in 2005. 9
9 Before 2005, police were asked if a homicide was “gang-related”. In 2005, the question was amended to
allow for specification of whether the homicide was: (a) confirmed as gang-related, or (b) “suspected” as
gang-related. It is unknown if “suspected” gang-related incidents were included in numbers prior to 2005;
the criteria used for making the distinction are not readily available (see Li, 2008).
Survey research conducted by Wortley and Tanner (2004) provides some
insight into the involvement of some youth and young adults in gangs and
violence in Toronto. Their work showed that 11% of high school students aged
14 to 20 years and 27% of the street youth aged 14 to 24 years claimed that
they had been a “gang” member at some point in their life. However, a portion
(31% of students and 8% of street youth) could be considered “social” members
of a “gang” rather than “criminal” members – the activities they described as
part of their gang affiliation were more “social”, such as hanging out with
other gang members or playing sports within the “gang” context. Only 4% of
the high school students and 15% of the street youth in the study sample who
reported a “gang affiliation” could be considered current members of a criminal
gang. An additional 3% of the students and 9% of the street youth reported
being the former member of a criminal gang (Wortley & Tanner, 2004).
Current criminal gang members had much higher rates of self-reported
involvement in crime and violence over the past 12 months than any other
group (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). For example:
• Nearly 91% of current criminal gang members reported being involved in
a fight, compared to 27.5% of social gang members and 26.5% of those
never involved in a gang.
• 51.4% of current criminal gang members reported selling drugs 10 times
or more, compared to none of the social gang members and 2.1% of those
never involved in a gang.
• 11.3% of current criminal gang members reported sexually assaulting
someone, compared to none of the social gang members and 0.3% of those
never involved in a gang.
• 68.3% of current criminal gang members reported having carried a gun or
a knife, compared to 11.8% of social gang members and 11.2% of those
never involved in a gang.
For the most part, those who had never been in a gang, or who were current
or former social members of a gang, were relatively uninvolved in criminal
activities. The criminal involvement of former criminal gang members over
the past year was much higher, but still nowhere near the level of involvement
of current gang members. Current gang members were also much more likely
to report experiencing various types of criminal victimization than any other
group (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). For instance, among the high school

96 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 97
students who reported currently being in a gang, 79% reported being physically
assaulted and 45% being assaulted with a weapon in the past year, compared
to 35% (for physical assault) and only 5% (for assault with a weapon) of those
who have never been in a gang (Wortley & Tanner, 2004).
These findings are consistent with a survey conducted by Erickson and her
colleagues (2006) who found that among the 14-17 year old males in their
Toronto sample, 4.2% of the students, 32.5% of those who left school, and
60.3% of youth detainees reported having carried or carrying a gun in the
past year. 10 The strongest predictor of gun violence among male students and
detainees was gang fighting, while selling crack/cocaine was the strongest
predictor of gun violence among those who left school. A similar survey of
14-17 year old girls in Toronto showed that among those who left school and
detainees, 21.2% reported carrying a gun and 52.2% reported carrying a
knife; 39.5% reported carrying a weapon (club/stick, knife or gun) as a result
of violence experienced by them or others close to them (Erickson et al., 2006).
As with the young men, gang fighting significantly increased the likelihood of
gun-related violence among young women; involvement in the drug market,
however, did not (Erickson et al., 2006).
Concentrations of Risk
Research on urban violence shows that it is not randomly distributed; it is
perpetrated and experienced by a small number of people, and concentrated
in the areas of our cities that are the most vulnerable to economic hardship
and social marginalization (see Fitzgerald, Wisener, & Savoie, 2004; Gannon,
2006; Perreault, Savoie, & Bédard, 2008; Savoie, 2008; Savoie, Bedard, &
Collins 2006). Furthermore, violence within and between gangs is far more
prevalent than gang-related harms to the public (CISC, 2006; Chettleburgh,
2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005).
About 16% of offenders between the ages of 12 and 21 (inclusively) can be
considered “chronic offenders” (i.e., those with 5 or more incidents that led
to a charge and a referral to court), and these individuals are responsible for
nearly 60% of all court referrals for their age group (Carrington, Matarazzo,
& deSousa, 2005). As previously mentioned, youth who identify being in a
criminal gang also report significantly greater levels of criminal activity and
violent offending than non-gang-involved youth, as well as a greater levels of
10 These rates are higher than those of a male sample in Montreal, where 2.8%, 17.6% and 48.6% of
students, those who left school, and detainees, respectively, reported having carried or carrying a gun in
the past year.
victimization (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). CISC (2006) further contends that
gun violence is much more prevalent among street gangs comprised mostly of
young men 30 years of age and under.
Geo-coding exercises examining the relationships between the distribution of
crime and the socio-economic and demographic makeup of Canadian cities
show that crime and violence tend to be concentrated in certain areas of our
cities, and tend to be highest in neighbourhoods characterized by economic
disadvantage, high mobility 11 and social disorganization 12 (see Fitzgerald,
Wisener, & Savoie, 2004; Gannon, 2006; Savoie, 2008; Savoie, Bedard,
& Collins 2006). A recent examination of the distribution of youth crime
in Montreal shows that rates of violent crime among youth were higher in
neighbourhoods characterized by a higher proportion of low-income earners,
visible minorities, and residents lacking a high school diploma (Perreault,
Savoie, & Bédard, 2008). Though geo-coding studies have certain important
limitations 13 , it is fairly clear that some areas of our cities are more vulnerable
to violence than others. Finally, as reported by CISC (2006), most gangs
operate in distinct territories and most gang violence occurs in and around the
low-income communities in which members live.
It is difficult to obtain a complete and reliable picture of the location and
distribution of gang-related violence in Toronto. There have not been any
geo-coding exercises in Toronto, and current data sources are limited by
various challenges. Nonetheless, a number of initiatives have contributed some
information on Toronto neighbourhoods, and on their relative levels of gun
and gang-related activity. In April 2004, the United Way of Greater Toronto
(UWGT) and the City of Toronto created the Strong Neighbourhoods Task
Force. The goal was to develop an action plan for neighbourhood revitalization
in Toronto (UWGT, 2005). Its first task was to determine the areas of the city
that were the least advantaged in terms of the quality of life of their residents
(Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). Statistical information on the
location and use of essential services and socio-demographic census data were
used to determine levels of neighbourhood need (UWGT, 2005).
11 “Mobility” refers to the percentage of the population in a neighbourhood living at another residence one
year prior to the Census (Fitzgerald, Wisener, & Savoie, 2004). American research has linked “residential
mobility” with higher crime rates through reduced guardianship and/or local social involvement
(Sampson, 1993).
12 “Social disorganization” refers to a decrease in the influence of social rules over behaviour, taken from the
work of Sampson (1993) and Sampson & Lauritsen (1994).
13 Geo-coding studies rely solely on incidents recorded by the police, raising some concern around issues of
underreporting and of police bias. Second, it is unclear whether we would witness significantly different
patterns in “homicide” if that variable was disaggregated to reflect different types of homicide, such as
gang-related homicide versus spousal and domestic homicide, for example.

98 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 99
Around the same time, in March of 2004, Mayor Miller announced his
Community Safety Plan which emphasized neighbourhood-level actions to
address gun and gang violence among youth (Community Safety Secretariat,
2004). Based on available data, the City designated 13 of its neighbourhoods
as “priority neighbourhoods” on the basis of their “high needs” in terms of
gun violence, social and economic disadvantage, and poor access to services
(Community Safety Secretariat, 2004). 14 That said, there are some concerns
regarding the methodology used to identify and select these “13 priority
neighbourhoods”. The City was unable to obtain the cooperation of the Toronto
Police Service in gaining access to information on incidents of gun and gangrelated
violence within the city, so they had to rely on an inventory of media
accounts of the location and nature of gun crimes in Toronto (IPC, 2007).
This raises important concerns regarding possible media misrepresentation
and/or selection bias, and makes it more difficult to assess the validity of the
City’s designation of these “priority neighbourhoods”.
Finally, in January of 2006, following the high-profile shooting death of
bystander Jane Creba, a Tri-Level Committee on Guns and Violence was formed,
comprised of senior representatives from the City of Toronto, the Government
of Ontario and the Federal Government (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &
Fraser, 2008). This included the creation of the Tri-Level Indicators Group
(TLIG) to bring together local, provincial and federal data to obtain a better
picture of the quality of life within the 13 priority neighbourhoods and to
chart progress in addressing the “risk factors” for crime and violence within
them (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). The indicators they used
included the number of youth involved in gangs, youth convictions for violent
offences and drug offences, school drop-out rates and literacy rates, youth
unemployment, family income, and the number of youth involved in sports,
recreation and volunteer activities (see TLIG, 2006).
The TLIG (2006) data show that 4,511 City of Toronto youth under the
age of 18 were admitted to secure pre-trial detention, secure custody, and
community supervision (i.e. probation) during the 2004-2005 fiscal year. 15
More importantly:
• 2,332 (51.7%) of them resided in the “13 priority neighbourhoods”, where
2,179 lived in the other 127 neighbourhoods of the City of Toronto;
14 Visit http://www.torontopaye.ca/PriorityAreas.pdf for a map of the 13 priority neighbourhoods.
15 Information on youth admissions and “gang alerts” was generated by the Youth Offender Information
Tracking System maintained by the Youth Justice Services of the Ontario Ministry of Children and Youth
Services (Tri-Level Indicators Group, 2006).
• 45 youth from the priority neighbourhoods were identified by police or
correctional staff with a “gang alert”, compared to 35 youth from the other
127 neighbourhoods; and
• 231 youth from the priority neighbourhoods were admitted for violent
and/or weapons/firearms offences in contrast to 299 for the rest of
the City.
This information suggests that when compared to the 127 other neighbourhoods
in the City of Toronto, the “13 priority neighbourhoods” account for a
disproportionate amount of Toronto’s young offenders, “gang alerts”, and
youth committing violent and/or weapons/firearm offences. Though official
data such as these are always subject to limitations of bias and subjectivity,
they are consistent with other findings that violence is disproportionately
perpetrated and experienced by a relatively small number of people and is
concentrated in certain areas of our cities.
Making Sense of Gun and Gang Violence Among
Youth and Young Adults in Recent Times
Gang members in Canada come from a variety of ethnic, demographic and
socio-economic backgrounds (Chettleburgh, 2003; CISC, 2006). However,
the majority of gang members seem to come from groups that suffer from
the greatest levels of inequality, disadvantage, and social marginalization
(Chettleburgh, 2003; CISC, 2006; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). Canadian
research shows that some of these youth have been exposed to violence since
childhood, and many are struggling with mental health and substance abuse
problems. Their motivation for joining a street gang can range from seeking
money to looking for prestige, protection, and a sense of belonging (Dorais
& Corriveau, 2006; Totten, 2000; Wortley & Tanner, 2005; as well as the
articles by Corriveau and Totten in this volume). Gun and gang violence
among youth and young adults should therefore be considered in the context
of the socio-economic conditions and structural arrangements that influence
the lives of young people, and on the social context of gun and gang violence
among youth and young adults.
The Attributes of (Dis)Affiliation
In his work on issues relating to social cohesion, crime and insecurity, Castel
(1995) identifies a continuum of social integration that is based on measures
of social affiliation along two axes: (1) work, and the economic position
associated with it; and (2) social relations, meaning one’s interaction with –

100 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 101
and level of attachment to – others, and to mainstream society groups and
institutions (see Graph 1).
Graph 1. Continuum of Social Integration
Adapted from Janhevich, Bania, & Hastings (2008).
Castel (1995) argues that in our current global capitalist economy, one’s status
within society is increasingly determined by the attributes attached to “work”,
and less by other aspects of identity such as heritage and family history. At the
same time, the very nature of the post-industrial, global capitalist economy
has led to increasingly problematic relations to “work”. These are manifested
by (Castel, 1995):
1. A destabilization of the “middle-class” due to the increasing difficulty of
obtaining a full-time, permanent salaried position and the certainty and
stability that come along with this.
2. The emergence of a certain “peripheral” group caught in a cycle of shortterm
and unstable part-time minimum wage jobs or welfare dependence,
either because they are too old or not skilled enough for training but too
young to retire, or because they are youth who are under or over qualified
for the work that is available to them; and
3. A deficit of “spots” within the mainstream social structure associated with
social usefulness and public recognition.
Castel (1995) insists that those most affected are youth, especially the less
educated and non-skilled youth and young adults who have fewer options for
integration into the labour market. The decline in manufacturing industries
and in “good” working class jobs (i.e., secure and unionized jobs), affects them
the most (Castel, 1995; see FitzGerald, Stockdale, & Hale, 2003; Websdale,
2001). Many are left with “McJobs” (Ritter & Anker, 2002) as their only
option – those unstable, low-paying service sector jobs that promise very little
in the way of career development or advancement. This lack of integration
into the workforce can result in disqualification for civic/political integration
and for broader social integration (Castel, 1995). When combined with other
forms of social marginalization, such as a lack of meaningful ties with family
and friends, discrimination based on gender, race/ethnicity, ability, and/or the
stigma of having been in conflict with the law (see Davies & Tanner, 2003),
some youth and young adults are left with a sense of exclusion and pessimism
about the future (Chettleburgh, 2007; Totten, 2000; Wortley & Tanner,
2005). Castel (1995) calls this group the “surnuméraires”, the “excess baggage”
who may seek prosperity and stability, but who are stuck in a social “no man’s
land” and are doubtful that it is achievable. Given their lack of integration
into the workforce and into mainstream society, these youth often give up on
traditional means of “success” and adopt survival strategies that are based in
the present, on living “day to day” (Castel, 1995).
There are indications that the economic position and sense of exclusion of
certain groups have been getting relatively worse in Canada, and that this may
influence involvement in gangs. Canada is experiencing growing inequality
with increasing disparity between high and low-income families (Heisz,
2005). Young men in Canada have felt this income inequality most acutely,
despite general increases in educational attainment for this group (Beaujot
& Kerr, 2007). The relative economic position of men aged 16-29 years in
Canada has declined over the past twenty years both in terms of their rate of
full-time employment and in their earnings, while the economic position of
older men and of women of all ages has remained relatively stable (Beaujot
& Kerr, 2007). There has also been an increase in the spatial polarization of
low-income families into distinct neighbourhoods (Heisz, 2005). In Toronto,
the number of higher poverty neighbourhoods increased dramatically over
the past twenty years (from 30 in 1981 to 120 in 2001), and “poor” families
are increasingly concentrated in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of
families living in poverty (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). There has also been a

102 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 103
60% increase in the number of youth living in higher poverty neighbourhoods
over the twenty-year period from 1981-2001 (UWGT & CCSD, 2004).
Furthermore, 87-90% of the employable population in “very high” to “high”
poverty neighbourhoods in Toronto are working, compared to 93% for the
rest of the city (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). The high poverty levels in these
communities are likely linked to residents having less stable and lower-paying
forms of part-time work (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). This is despite evidence
that the percentage of residents in Toronto’s “higher” poverty neighbourhoods
without a high school diploma dropped from 46.5% in 1991 to 33% in 2001
(UWGT & CCSD, 2004). Within this spatial polarization, there is also an
aspect of ghettoization of visible minority “poor” (Heisz, 2005; Hou & Picot,
2003). Visible minority families now account for 77.5% of the total “poor”
family population in higher poverty neighbourhoods in Toronto, compared to
37.4% in 1981 (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). Finally, there is evidence that black
men living in Toronto’s predominantly black neighbourhoods are more likely
to be unemployed than any other group living in an ethnic enclave (Hou &
Picot, 2003). 16
Link to Gang Involvement and Violence
Castel (1995) argues that those who feel the least connected to a valuable
and valued role in the economy, the lowest sense of attachment to others,
and the most pessimistic about their chances for improving their situation
in the future (i.e., those in the lower left quadrant of Graph 1) are the most
likely to offend, as well as most likely to become chronic offenders. Relative
economic deprivation and social marginalization have indeed been linked to
gang membership. Gangs are seen as a “fast-track” to the material goods and
sense of belonging some disaffiliated youth crave (see Chettleburgh, 2007;
Decker, 2004; Sutherland, 1947). These themes were prominent in Wortley
and Tanner’s (2005) Toronto Street Gang Pilot Project, a series of 102 face-toface
interviews with Toronto youth (aged 16-24 years) who have been identified
(or self-identified) as being part of a gang:
We made lots of money sellin drugs and stealin and ripping people off.
I got to buy stuff I could not get with no job at McDonalds (21-yearold
male).
16 “Ethnic enclaves” are defined as census tracts with at least 30% of the population from a single visible
minority group (Hou & Picot, 2003).
Nobody respects some guy flippin burgers or wearing some stupid ref
shirt at Foot Locker. I make real cheddar in the gang, we are our own
bosses, and we get plenty more respect from people cause of money we
got… (22-year-old male).
It’s like us against the world. We respect each other, support each other.
Nobody in the outside world helps, or cares, so it is up to us. That’s it
man. Family (20-year-old male).
What chance has a guy like me got in the real world. A poor black guy?
… teachers don’t think you can do the work. Nobody’s gonna give me
a job. So I’ll get paid and live in another way, in another world where
I get respect and nobody cares what I look like or where I come from.
I know I’ll probably die young or go to jail, but what other chance is
there? (22-year-old male).
The competition for limited resources, profitable markets and social status
that emerges within a climate of deprivation and exclusion has further been
linked to gun violence in urban centres (see Daly & Wilson, 1988 and 1997).
Research reveals that acts of “strategic” or “instrumental” violence, such as
those relating to heists and robbery, tend to occur in the context of competition
for material wealth, whereas more “tactical” or “expressive” forms of gunrelated
violence, such as homicide, occur mostly in the context of competition
for social status (Wilson & Daly, 1985).
Imagining a Better Response to Gun and Gang
Violence Among Youth and Young Adults
The most common response to youth violence, and especially in the case
of violence perpetrated by members of youth gangs, is suppression by the
criminal justice system (Chettleburgh, 2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005).
These responses focus on identifying persistent offenders and aggressively
enforcing laws as they apply to these individuals (Chettleburgh, 2007).
Critics suggest that these enforcement strategies alone have little effect on
rates of crime and victimization, and can lead to unintended consequences
and counter-productive impacts on individuals and communities, including:
increasing the cohesiveness of a neighbourhood gang and its attractiveness
to vulnerable youth in the face of high profile and aggressive police activity;
undermining the reputation and legitimacy of the police when few arrests
actually turn into serious charges; and creating a damaging cycle of release
and imprisonment of young adults, especially young males (Chettleburgh,

104 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 105
2007; Decker, 2004; United Nations, 2006; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). That
is not to say that there is no role for enforcement. When the emphasis is
placed on neighbourhood level problem-solving and coordination between
criminal justice and other agencies, reductions in gang-related crime and
violence can occur (see Braga & Kennedy, 2002). However, these benefits are
likely to be temporary unless the structural context of the underlying problem
is addressed.
This has led to increasing attention to “the promise of prevention” and to a
shift to the “community” as a new partner in prevention initiatives (Cohen,
1985; Crawford, 1998; Garland, 2001; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Hughes,
2007; Jamieson, 2008). The focus in Canada has been placed mainly on
Crime Prevention Through Social Development (CPSD) initiatives that seek
to address the factors that place young people at “risk”, and enhance the factors
that can provide some protection or resiliency to individuals, families and
communities (see Birbeck, 2005; Hastings, 1998).
There are three main variants of CPSD, as identified by Hastings (1998):
• the developmental approach: focused on addressing the individual risk
factors associated with persistent offenders;
• the community approach: focused on local problem-solving through
mobilization and partnerships; and
• the social approach: focused on addressing and reducing patterns of
stress, inequality and relative deprivation.
In Canada, the focus has largely been on developmental and community
approaches to crime prevention (see Birkbeck, 2005; National Crime
Prevention Council, 1997; National Crime Prevention Centre, 2007).
However, investment in prevention initiatives pales in comparison to the
ever-expanding resources going towards the suppression of gang violence in
Canada through enforcement. The policies and practices that have emerged
in the City of Toronto since 2004 are but one example.
In Toronto, Mayor Miller introduced the Community Safety Plan (CSP)
in 2004 in an attempt to “balance” criminal justice responses with a
more “preventive” approach (Miller, 2004, p. 1). The primary focus of
the Plan was youth violence, particularly guns and gangs within the
13 priority neighbourhoods. The CSP is coordinated by the Community
Safety Secretariat and overseen by the Mayor’s Panel on Community
Safety. In 2004, the Panel’s membership included the Mayor, two city
councillors, three provincial government ministers, the federal minister
for infrastructure and communities, the chairs of the two school boards
as well as a youth and a community representative (Community Safety
Secretariat, 2004). The main goals were to create positive opportunities
for marginalized youth who live in the 13 priority neighbourhoods and to
strengthen neighbourhoods through problem-solving partnerships under the
guise of Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs) (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina,
& Fraser, 2008).
The NATs focus on integrating City service planning and delivery from a
neighbourhood perspective (Toronto Community Housing, 2006). They
describe their priorities as: increasing the equitable participation of racialized
(and especially African-Canadian) youth by identifying and reducing
systemic barriers; creating and maintaining safe spaces that support healthy
youth development; providing meaningful youth engagement opportunities
that build resilience; and harmonizing standards and policies in City service
delivery as it pertains to youth (Toronto Community Housing, 2006).
Building on the Community Safety Plan, the City of Toronto launched the
Making a Safe City Safer strategy in 2007. It focuses on five key areas: (1)
gun control, (2) victims of violence, witnesses and their families, (3) violence
against young women and girls, (4) the youth justice sector, and (5) skills
development, training and employment (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &
Fraser, 2008; Miller, 2008). Also, in January of 2006, in the aftermath of the
shooting death of Jane Creba, all three orders of government came together
to form the Tri-Level Committee on Guns and Violence (IPC, 2007). The aim
was to bring together various representatives from the City of Toronto, the
Government of Ontario and the federal government to share information and
resources relating to the challenges posed by youth gangs in Toronto (IPC,
2007). Other than the ongoing work of the Tri-Level Indicators Group, which
was previously discussed, very little information is available on the progress or
other activities of this Committee.
Both the provincial and federal governments have invested funds in
various developmental and social approaches in Toronto since then, mostly
geared towards improving skills training and job opportunities for youth.
These include:
• The Ontario Youth Challenge Fund, created in February 2006 with $15
million towards funding of local training and job programs for at-risk youth
in Toronto’s 13 priority neighbourhoods (Office of the Premier, 2006); and

106 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 107
• The Youth Opportunities Strategy, launched in 2006 to provide funding for
800 summer jobs for youth from Toronto’s priority neighbourhoods, youth
outreach workers, and a school-based prevention and diversion program
to keep at-risk youth in school (Ontario Ministry of Children and Youth
Services, 2007).
At the federal level, an $11.1 million Youth Gang Prevention Fund was
established in January 2007. Housed within the National Crime Prevention
Centre, the fund was created to provide financial support to community
level programs across Canada that address individual, family, school and
community “risk and protective factors” associated with youth violence and
gang membership; programs that work with youth to help them exit gangs;
and programs that provide ex-gang members with the support needed to avoid
returning to the gang lifestyle. Much of the focus is on equipping Canadian
youth with the supports they need to resist joining or returning to gangs
(Public Safety Canada, 2007).
However, the money invested in these initiatives does not compare to the
ever-expanding resources going towards the suppression of gang violence in
Toronto. For example, in 2005, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) announced
the new Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), which included
the hiring of 450 new police officers (TPS, 2008). In January of 2006, the
province of Ontario announced an additional 150 officers for TAVIS and
another $5 million in annual funding over 3 years. The province has also
spent $26 million towards the creation and implementation of a new stateof-the-art
Operations Centre for a provincially-led Anti-Guns and Gangs Task
Force in Toronto that brings police and prosecutors together under one roof
(Ministry of the Attorney General, 2005; Office of the Premier, 2007).
In contrast, Toronto’s Community Safety Secretariat is comprised of one Project
Manager and a few staff (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). A large
part of the Secretariat’s work therefore involves seeking and securing funds
and resources (both human and material) from other orders of government,
community partners and the private sector, including for programs and projects
conducted under the Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs). Though the
Secretariat has had some success in leveraging resources, long-term funding
and sustainability remain a great concern (see Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &
Fraser, 2008).
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the nature and quality of the
relationship between the Community Safety Plan and the Toronto Police Service,
or the extent to which the activities of one take into account the planning
and activities of the other. The fact that the City has not yet been successful
in obtaining crime and violence data from the TPS for its planning exercises
points to a serious gap in collaboration and coordination. The same can be
said for the various prevention initiatives being introduced in Toronto by
different orders of government. There are indications that consultations and
collaboration are not taking place (IPC, 2007), which leads to serious concerns
regarding the comprehensiveness and integration of various prevention efforts
within the city.
What we are left with, then, is a social problem in need of a broad-based
and well-coordinated solution that includes mechanisms to address and relieve
the inequality caused by our social, economic and political arrangements, but
that is dealt with mainly through criminal justice and enforcement (Hastings,
2003; Websdale, 2001).
Conclusion
Developmental prevention policies and programs for marginalized youth are
unlikely to make a significant difference – and could even accentuate the
frustration – if current labour market conditions are not addressed (Castel,
1995). What is the use of encouraging youth to “maximize their potential”
or of spending resources on preparing them for the workforce if they are
unlikely to find adequate employment? Similarly, placing a focus on the
dynamics within neighbourhoods fails to acknowledge the broader sociopolitical
and economic factors (i.e., lack of affordable housing, poverty, (un)
employment, racism, exclusion, etc.) that are beyond the jurisdiction and
control of local “communities”, but that play a significant role in challenges
of crime and safety (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998; Hastings & Jamieson,
2001; Hughes, 2007). In this sense, we may be setting the “community”
up to fail, and setting the stage for increased frustration and resentment
(Hastings & Jamieson, 2001).
If we are serious about addressing the issue of gang involvement and violence
among youth and young adults, we need a comprehensive, coordinated approach
that addresses underlying issues of child poverty, inadequate housing, barriers
to education, unemployment, mental health, racism and discrimination. The
recent Review of the Roots of Youth Violence report, prepared for the Province
of Ontario and released in November of 2008, reiterates this (see Government
of Ontario, 2008).

108 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 109
Why, then, do we continue to rely on all other types of strategies that focus
mainly on criminal justice and individual level “risk factors”? Ryan (1976)
argues that “blaming the victim” in this way serves to justify action that is
designed to change society’s “victim” and its “symptoms” rather than society
itself. Hastings (1998 and 2007) argues that we often start with solutions
that protect our vested interests, then work backwards to legitimize them.
Developmental and community streams of crime prevention are “safe”,
tangible responses, but we end up with what organizations and communities
are willing and able to do with their limited resources, rather than what needs
to be done (Hastings, 1998 and 2007).
In this sense, our current political responses remain largely expressive and
focused on managing public perceptions and expectations, rather than on
responding adequately to the complexities of the issue at hand (Cohen, 1985;
Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Jones, 2003). A shift to a more comprehensive,
equitable and long-term solution requires greater awareness of the complexities
surrounding issues of crime and safety, and the political will to tackle these
issues head on. It also requires more access to the knowledge, skills and
resources to accomplish what needs to be done, as opposed to expending
resources on “solutions” that can be done within our current mindset and
budgets (Hastings, 1998). A more effective response to the challenges posed by
youth involvement in gangs in Canada begins with the tools and data needed
to study this phenomenon more appropriately. This includes developing clear
and measurable indicators to help guide our objectives, target our efforts, and
serve as benchmarks for assessing our success.
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whoWeHelp/reports/strongNeighbourhoods.php

Volume 3: pages 117–134
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
La violence dans l’univers
des gangs : du besoin de
protection à la construction
identitaire masculine 1
Patrice Corriveau
Professeur adjoint au département de criminologie
Université d’Ottawa
Abstract
Violence and anti-social behaviour are not the only components within the
dynamics of street gangs. That said, the use of violence in the context of
gangs seems to be trivialized, encouraged by peers, and to some extent
institutionalized through the violent initiation rituals involved in becoming
a full gang member. This article will examine how the violence perpetrated
by youth as part of their association with a gang is in many respects a
fundamental aspect of their social relations, given their struggle for wider
social integration and recognition. To do so, we first deal with the different
approaches developed by researchers to explain violence in gangs. Next,
we examine the reasons why some youth may turn to gangs and examine
factors that may affect the level of violence surrounding their participation.
Three such reasons will be addressed: the feeling of exclusion, the need
for protection, and the search for a male identity. Finally, options to
improve preventive interventions in order to tackle both this violence and
the emergence of gangs will be explored, focusing on social rather than
individual-level interventions.
1 Un grand merci mes collègues Jean-François Cauchie et Michel Dorais pour leur relecture et conseils,
de même qu’à Ross Hastings pour m’avoir incité à m’intéresser à cette facette des gangs de rue. Merci
finalement aux évaluateurs pour leurs judicieux commentaires.

118 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 119
Résumé
La violence et les comportements anti-sociaux ne sont pas constitutifs
des gangs de rue. En revanche, l’usage de la violence y semble banalisée,
encouragée par les pairs et institutionnalisée dans une certaine mesure par
l’entremise des rituels initiatiques pour devenir membre à part entière du
gang. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous étudierons en quoi cette violence
des jeunes perpétrée dans le cadre de leur association au gang (et non aux
actes individuels de violence) est à plusieurs égards fondatrice de liens
sociaux pour ces jeunes en difficulté d’intégration et de reconnaissances
sociales. Pour se faire, nous aborderons tout d’abord les différentes
approches développées par les chercheurs afin d’expliquer la violence au
sein des gangs pour ensuite nous attarder aux raisons qui incitent un jeune
à se tourner vers un gang et qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur le niveau de
violence entourant son adhésion. Trois d’entre elles seront spécifiquement
examinées : à savoir le sentiment d’exclusion, le besoin de protection et la
quête d’une identité masculine. Finalement, quelques pistes de réflexion
seront exposées en vue d’améliorer les interventions préventives pour
faire face à cette violence et à l’émergence des gangs, lesquelles mettent
l’accent sur des actions globalisantes et sociales plutôt qu’à des prises en
charge individualisante.
Introduction
La violence est-elle constitutive des gangs de rue? Et quand bien même y seraitelle
présente, peut-on la limiter à l’univers des gangs? N’est-elle pas par ailleurs
fondatrice de liens sociaux et autres formes de reconnaissance et d’intégration?
Médias et dirigeants politiques soulignent régulièrement la violence des
gangs de rue, ces derniers étant devenus à leurs yeux le premier vecteur de la
violence urbaine et de l’insécurité dans nos quartiers. Nul ne saurait nier que
les gangs de rue soient impliqués dans plusieurs formes de violence et actes
jugés anti-sociaux, ne serait-ce que par la nature de certaines de leurs activités
délictueuses, comme le proxénétisme ou le trafic de drogue par exemple. Et
bien que la violence et les comportements anti-sociaux ne soient pas l’apanage
des gangs – la violence ayant toujours été associée à la jeunesse en général, les
jeunes garçons plus particulièrement (Muchembled, 2008), il n’en demeure
pas moins que le gang de rue apparaît comme un environnement où la violence
est banalisée, voire encouragée par les pairs et qu’à cet égard, les gangs de rue
se différencient des simples ‘bandes d’amis’ par exemple (Stretesky et Pogrebin,
2007). Nombreuses sont d’ailleurs les recherches qui soulignent que les gangs
de rue sont plus enclins à commettre des crimes et délits violents que les jeunes
en général, y compris ceux qui y sont épisodiquement associés (Gordon et al.,
2004; Thornberry et al., 1993; White et Manson, 2006).
Or, étudier et comprendre les liens qui unissent les gangs de rue à la violence
n’est pas si évident qu’il n’y parait de prime abord. D’une part, le concept
de violence est en soi difficile à cerner, la violence des uns n’équivalant pas
toujours à celle des autres. Alors que certains estiment que les simples gestes
d’intimidation d’un gang dans un quartier constituent une forme de violence,
pour d’autres, la violence correspond ni plus ni moins aux actes criminels
commis par les protagonistes. 2 Plusieurs études sont ainsi venues montrer
que les activités délictueuses et la violence demeurent proportionnellement
minimes dans l’ensemble des activités d’un gang de rue, Sanchez-Jankowski
(1991 et 1994) et Spergel (1995) affirmant même que la « criminalité » des gangs
demeure peu fréquente et que seul un faible pourcentage des jeunes membres
de gangs de rue aboutit à une criminalité sévère et soutenue (Spergel, 1995).
D’autre part, il n’existe aucun consensus entourant la définition de ce qu’est
un gang de rue et sur les individus qui le composent. 3 Le phénomène des
gangs, son membership et la nature des activités qui en découlent, notamment
l’usage de la violence, sont fluides, labiles (Dorais et Corriveau, 2009; Hamel,
Cousineau et Vézina, 2008). Qui plus est, « si la criminalité et la délinquance
représentent ce qui les distingueraient le plus des autres types de gangs (bandes
d’amis, compagnons de travail, etc.), on constate, dans les faits, que ce n’est
pas si facile de les départager entre eux » (Perreault, 2005a, p. 58), des groupes
perçus comme inoffensifs (une bande d’amis par exemple) pouvant tout aussi
bien commettre des actes très violents et criminalisables. Comme le signalent
Sanchez-Jankonski (1991) ainsi que White et Mason (2006), la plupart
des adolescents, qu’ils fassent partie d’un gang ou non, s’engagent dans des
activités similaires, notamment les actes de violence. Il est par ailleurs difficile
de déterminer si les actes de violence ou d’incivilité reprochés ont été perpétrés
dans le cadre des activités du gang, et non à titre individuel. Par exemple,
comment savoir si une bagarre entre deux jeunes découle de leur appartenance à
un gang et non d’un quelconque malentendu, comme cela arrive fréquemment
durant l’adolescence?
2 Pour une excellente réflexion sur la violence et la violence des jeunes plus particulièrement, voir Mucchielli,
2004, 2006 et 2008.
3 Voir notamment Covey, Menard et Franzese, 1992; Howell, 1994; Parks, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Ball et
Curry, 1995; Decker et Van Winkle, 1996; Shelden, Tracy et Brown, 1996; Hamel et al., 1998; Sanchez-
Jankowski, 2003; Perreault, 2005a; Sullivan, 2005; White, 2008.

120 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 121
Dans le cadre de cet article, nous nous restreindrons à étudier la violence des
jeunes perpétrée dans le cadre de leur association au gang (et non aux actes
individuels de violence), c’est-à-dire la violence telle qu’elle est instrumentalisée
(voire institutionnalisée) par le groupe. Par gang, nous désignerons, dans un
but heuristique et à l’instar de Sullivan (2005), un regroupement d’individus
partageant des codes et des règles de conduites relativement bien définis, et des
signes et des symboles distinctifs qui viennent montrer leur appartenance au
groupe. Le gang possède également un leadership apparent. Mais, afin de les
distinguer des groupes sportifs et autres ‘bandes d’amis’, nous suivons Sullivan
(2005) en reconnaissant un engagement dans la commission d’actes illégaux,
considérés ici comme violence (commerce de drogue, proxénétisme, taxage
scolaire, etc.). En ce sens, nous sommes conscients que ces différentes variables,
qui nous aident à concevoir ce qu’est un gang, varient à la fois dans le temps, selon
les circonstances et d’un gang à un autre. Néanmoins, cette définition générale
nous aide à mieux saisir les diverses fonctions jouées par la violence à l’intérieur de
ces gangs. Tout d’abord, nous examinerons brièvement les différentes approches
développées par les chercheurs pour expliquer la violence au sein des gangs.
Ensuite, nous présenterons certaines fonctions que semble jouer la violence dans
l’univers du gang pour finalement, en guise de conclusion, exposer quelques
pistes de réflexion en vue d’améliorer les interventions préventives pour faire
face à cette violence et à l’émergence des gangs.
Quelques approches explicatives de
la violence dans l’univers des gangs
Lorsqu’il est question d’aborder la question de la violence au sein des gangs,
différentes théories sont avancées par les chercheurs. 4 Pour les uns, si la
violence est prédominante dans l’univers des gangs c’est essentiellement parce
que ces regroupements d’individus sont constitués de jeunes délinquants
(Gerrard, 1964; Yablonsky, 1962). Ainsi, les membres d’un gang seraient
« par nature » violents, et c’est pour cette raison qu’ils sont recrutés par les
gangs. Cette explication, on le conçoit bien, tient difficilement la route puisque
partout où le phénomène des gangs de rue est avéré en Occident, ce sont
systématiquement les gens issus des quartiers défavorisés qui en constituent le
membership. Très peu à voir donc avec une quelconque nature criminelle ou
délinquante. D’ailleurs, les premières études sur les gangs de l’École de Chicago
dans les années 1920/30 ont très bien montré l’impact de la désorganisation
sociale et de la pauvreté dans l’adhésion de certains jeunes à des gangs, le
« problème » ne résidant pas dans la « nature » des gens qui peuplent ces zones
de pauvreté mais plutôt dans les facteurs structurels (exclusion, chômage, etc.).
Cloward et Ohlin (1960) considèrent pour leur part que c’est principalement
la structure des opportunités (légitimes et illégitimes) des différents quartiers
de la ville qui explique la présence grandissante de gangs dans les milieux
urbains défavorisés.
Poussant plus loin cette logique d’une « nature délictueuse », que l’on pourrait
découvrir à l’aide de facteurs de risque, d’autres chercheurs considèrent que les
nouveaux adhérents aux gangs sont recrutés en fonction de leur propension à
commettre un jour des actes illégaux et violents, la structure du gang venant
exacerber ce côté délinquant qu’ils auraient déjà en eux (Decker et Van Winkle,
1996; Gordon et al., 2004). Ainsi, ces chercheurs s’attardent à montrer que
les membres des gangs de rue sont, en règle générale, davantage criminalisés
avant même de faire partie intégrante du gang et, qu’une fois dans le gang,
ces activités violentes et criminelles s’intensifient (Gordon et al., 2004). Les
effets de la socialisation des pairs et la transmission des valeurs du gang
sont alors avancés pour expliquer cette recrudescence de violence et d’actes
antisociaux. Intéressant à certains égards, notamment en ce qui a trait aux
processus de socialisation, ces études négligent cependant le caractère subjectif
du processus de criminalisation, c’est-à-dire que si les jeunes issus de certains
milieux sont davantage criminalisés, c’est aussi parce que l’attention policière y
est plus présente et soutenue que dans les autres quartiers non reconnus pour la
présence de gangs. Car, faut-il le rappeler, près de 99% des Canadiens avouent
avoir commis des actes réprimés par le Code criminel canadien (Gabor, 1994),
une étude montréalaise soulignant également que près de 80% des 3000
adolescents questionnés (toutes classes sociales confondues) ont admis avoir
enfreint le Code criminel (LeBlanc, 1983).
C’est en opposition avec ces visions essentialistes de la violence chez ces jeunes
que d’autres chercheurs estiment que les membres des gangs ne sont pas
différentiables des autres jeunes. C’est plutôt la culture (sous-culture) du gang
qui les incitent à adhérer aux valeurs du gang, notamment l’usage de la violence
pour se faire reconnaître, pour se défendre, pour gagner le respect de l’autre,
pour imposer leur loi, etc. Évidemment, ce ne sont pas tous les jeunes issus des
gangs qui adhéreront avec la même intensité à cette culture du gang, l’identité
d’un jeune en tant qu’individu et membre d’un gang restant fluide, c’est-à-dire
que « young people have multiple identifications, and can be simultaneously
gang members and non-gang members » (White, 2008, p. 149). Certains s’y
lanceront à fond et finiront peut-être par en faire une « carrière » délinquante
au sens beckerien. Pour d’autres, le gang ne sera qu’une passade dans leur vie,
laquelle leur aura permis de se découvrir et de se faire reconnaître par des pairs.
4 Voir à ce sujet Sanchez-Jankowski, 2003; Thornberry et al. 1993.

122 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 123
En d’autres termes, les raisons pour rejoindre un gang et s’y impliquer sont
plurielles, circonstancielles et variables dans le temps et selon les individus. 5
Parmi les nombreuses raisons qui incitent un jeune à se tourner vers un gang
et qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur le niveau de violence entourant son
adhésion, trois ont retenu notre attention suite aux entretiens réalisés auprès
d’une cinquantaine d’intervenants sociaux, communautaires et policiers –
essentiellement des villes de Québec et de Montréal, à savoir le sentiment
d’exclusion, le besoin de protection et la quête d’une identité masculine (ces
facteurs étant présents de façon variable et suivant différents degrés d’intensité
selon les jeunes concernés). 6
La formation d’un gang, un moyen
de lutter contre l’exclusion
Bien que multiples et complexes, les facteurs sociaux qui poussent les jeunes à
intégrer un gang renvoient souvent à l’incapacité pour ces derniers de s’intégrer
complètement à la société, que ce soit sur le marché du travail ou à l’école.
Au Canada (comme aux États-Unis d’ailleurs), les gangs de rue se composent
majoritairement de jeunes de familles issues de l’immigration ou encore de
jeunes appartenant à des groupes minoritaires en difficulté d’intégration sociale
et économique (pauvreté, contexte familial difficile, exclusion et discrimination
qu’ils subissent ou estiment subir dans le milieu du travail ou à l’école). 7
C’est d’ailleurs essentiellement pour cette triste raison de discrimination
socio-économique des communautés ethniques que les gangs se composent
majoritairement de jeunes issus de ces communautés. Ce n’est en effet pas un
hasard si partout en Amérique du Nord, les gangs sont formés de jeunes issus
de quartiers défavorisés, où les minorités visibles sont surreprésentées (Dorais
et Corriveau, 2009).
Les gangs regroupent ainsi un grand nombre de jeunes qui ont parfois vu
leurs parents et leurs entourages familiaux trimer dur pour s’intégrer à la
société québécoise et canadienne, sans pour autant obtenir les résultats ou les
5 White (2008, p. 151) souligne par exemple qu’en Australie, “ethnicity (a distinct cultural identity) often
forms the core of social relationships, but then intersects with variables such as geography (specific locality),
age (mainly teenagers, but up to mid-twenties), size (sheer number of people who congregate at any point
in time), affiliation (with people from similar cultural backgrounds) and familiarity (of one’s immediate
neighbors, peers and acquaintances)”.
6 Le matériel empirique utilisé dans la rédaction de cet article provient d’un travail de recherche de quatre
années ayant mené à la publication de deux ouvrages sur la prostitution juvénile organisée par l’entremise
des gangs de rue : Dorais, M. et Corriveau, P. (2006). Jeunes filles sous influence. Montréal : VLB; Dorais,
M. et Corriveau, P. (2009). Gangs and girls. Montréal/Toronto : McGill/Queen’s University Press.
7 Belitz et Valdez, 1997; Spergel, 1995; Covey, Menard et Franzese, 1992; Trasher, 1927.
succès escomptés (Dorais et Corriveau, 2009). Le gang apparaît alors comme
un lieu compensatoire d’intégration. Appartenir à un gang s’avère un gage
de respect et de reconnaissance par les pairs, tout en permettant parfois des
gains financiers non négligeables par l’entremise de la commission de certaines
activités illicites. Cela signifie parfois user de comportements violents ou
encore commettre certains délits perçus comme violence par le reste de la
société. En d’autres termes, s’intégrer à un gang devient, pour plusieurs jeunes
en mal d’intégration, une « solution » acceptable, du moins à court terme. Les
chercheurs Perreault et Bibeau (2003) ont d’ailleurs souligné les différentes
difficultés liées au processus d’immigration. En outre, certains canadiens issus
de familles d’immigrants éprouvent encore le sentiment d’être traités comme
des immigrants et ce, même si leur famille est établie au Canada depuis plus
d’une génération. En manque de repères collectifs et donc de reconnaissance
sociale, plusieurs de ces jeunes luttent pour à nouveau se sentir accepter et
reconnu par leurs pairs, par des autrui qu’ils considèrent significatifs. Un
défi difficile quand on sait combien les situations d’échec (familial, scolaire,
affectif, professionnel) tendent aujourd’hui à être de plus en plus ressenties,
par ceux qui en sont victimes, comme autant de disqualifications individuelles
(Van Campenhoudt et al., 2005, p. 26).
Suivant cette logique, le phénomène des gangs de rue, et la violence qui en
découle parfois, est surtout lié à une (més)adaptation socio-économique de
certains jeunes, souvent de groupes ethniques, en recherche de reconnaissance
et d’appartenance : les problèmes familiaux, la pauvreté, l’absence de contact et
de reconnaissance des institutions publiques étant des facteurs d’exaspération.
Le gang, dira alors Cohen (1955), devient l’échappatoire par excellence, le
lieu où les jeunes ont l’impression de pouvoir affronter ensemble ces mêmes
difficultés d’intégration, et ceci sur la base de règles qui sont les leurs. En
d’autres termes, nos entretiens ont montré que la volonté de ces jeunes de se
regrouper entre pairs provenait surtout du désir de résoudre les problèmes
auxquels ils sont confrontés (besoin d’argent, menaces du monde extérieur,
etc.), d’une incompréhension du « système », d’une recherche de substitut à la
famille jugée incapable de résoudre ces problèmes. 8 Comme l’ont souligné les
intervenants, le gang leur propose du même coup des moyens pour évacuer
leurs frustrations à l’égard de ce sentiment d’exclusion, notamment en usant de
la violence, voire en leur permettant de compter sur des pairs pour commettre
certains délits, définis comme violence par le reste de la société.
8 Perreault (2005) regroupe ces raisons en quatre catégories : 1- le gang est un groupe d’amis qui partagent
des réalités communes; 2- le gang constitue une nouvelle famille qui comprend le jeune et peut l’aider; 3- le
gang représente une défense personnelle; et 4- le gang constitue une occasion de faire de l’argent.

124 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 125
La formation d’un gang, un moyen de protection
Paradoxalement, cette implication dans des actes de violence renvoie
simultanément à un exutoire face à la frustration vécue ou ressentie (sentiment
d’être rejeté, exclu, stigmatisé des institutions sociales), à un besoin de
protection (protection face à l’univers des gangs) mais aussi à un besoin de
reconnaissance et d’intégration. Aussi, nombreux sont les membres des gangs
de rue à souligner que leur adhésion au gang découle d’abord d’un besoin
de protection face à d’autres groupes « ennemis ». Le gang n’est donc pas en
soi instigateur de la violence. Plusieurs intervenants mentionnent au contraire
qu’il émane généralement d’une peur anticipée de la violence des autres et/
ou d’un sentiment d’exclusion sociale, réel ou perçu. À cet égard, il importe
de rappeler que la violence des gangs est principalement de deux ordres : soit
elle se produit à l’intérieur même du gang parce qu’imputable à la volonté
des membres d’éviter une éventuelle dissolution du gang 9 ou liée au rituel
initiatique, soit elle provient de conflits inter-gangs. Pour Decker et Van
Winkle (1996), ce besoin de protection constitue d’ailleurs l’un des principaux
facteurs d’adhésion au gang.
Faut-il le rappeler, les premiers gangs de rue états-uniens, tels que nous
les connaissons aujourd’hui (soit les héritiers des Bloods et des Crips), ont
pris naissance suite à des agressions racistes de jeunes blancs sur des jeunes
afro américains. Aussi, avant d’être eux-mêmes offensifs et violents, ces
regroupements de jeunes afro américains avaient comme fonction la défense
contre les attaques racistes dont ils étaient les cibles. 10 Par la suite, ces groupes
de jeunes sont entrés en conflit récurrents les uns envers les autres pour
finalement devenir les gangs que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire
des regroupements d’adolescents et de jeunes adultes souvent identifiables à
leurs couleurs fétiches (le bleu ou le rouge), aux différents logos qu’ils exhibent
ou encore aux graffitis et autres objets qui marquent leur territoire. Toutefois,
l’association au gang n’est pas que symbolique, elle peut pour certains jeunes
se transformer souvent en un désir réel de contrôler un territoire ou certaines
activités spécifiques, désir qui se reflète ensuite dans l’engagement des individus
dans ces activités illicites et parfois teintées de violence (distribution de la
drogue dans certaines zones de la ville).
Comme nous le disions dans notre dernière recherche, de défensifs, les gangs
sont d’autant plus aisément devenus offensifs que des jeunes hommes qui se
9 La cohésion du gang dépendrait alors du sentiment de crainte qu’il inspire à l’endroit de ses membres.
10 Voir Alonso “Black street gangs in Los Angeles: A history”, http://www.streetgangs.com/history/hist01.
html. Site consulté le 12 septembre 2008.
sentent injustement marginalisés, discriminés ou exclus peuvent en venir à
considérer des moyens « alternatifs » pour se faire justice, pour créer leur propre
justice et pour assurer leur subsistance de façon plus ou moins illégale (Dorais
et Corriveau, 2009). Qui plus est, une fois protégé par les autres membres du
gang, l’individu se retrouve dans une situation difficile, voire impossible lorsqu’il
s’agit de refuser d’user à son tour de la violence pour protéger un confrère en
danger ou qui se sent menacé. Une fois le pied posé dans l’engrenage, le jeune
ne peut plus faire marche arrière : la peur de l’agression incitant à l’agression
et ainsi de suite.
La formation d’un gang, la mise en
avant de l’identité masculine
Cependant, outre ce besoin de protection et de sécurité, et plus encore qu’une
réponse à une (més)adaptation sociale, nous croyons que le gang constitue
une véritable sous-culture de domination et d’identification masculines, où la
violence en tant que valeur virile est prisée par les pairs. Le gang apparaît en
effet comme l’endroit par excellence de la valorisation des valeurs considérées
masculines. Il représente cet univers (un lieu de passage) où les jeunes garçons
croient découvrir ce qu’est être un homme et comment le devenir. Être un
homme, c’est pour eux : susciter le respect en prouvant son endurance physique,
c’est montrer une certaine insensibilité émotionnelle, c’est être performant et
actif sexuellement, c’est rejeter à divers degrés l’autorité institutionnelle, c’est
enfin, ne pas avoir peur d’utiliser la violence pour se faire valoir, reconnaître
(Dorais et Corriveau, 2006, 2009). 11 Plusieurs recherches montrent d’ailleurs
que les jeunes membres de gangs voient dans leurs pairs les plus aguerris des
figures et des modèles de réussite par le respect et la crainte qu’ils imposent, la
richesse qu’ils exhibent et leur succès auprès de la gente féminine. Le gang vient
ainsi satisfaire, chez bons nombres d’entre eux, leurs besoins d’identification
à ce qu’ils définissent comme des modèles de réussite (Dorais et Corriveau,
2009; Perreault, 2005b; Perreault et Bibeau, 2003). Le gang « constitue un
lieu et un lien socialisant très attirant pour les jeunes » dira Tichit (2003,
p. 65), où le sentiment d’appartenance au groupe permet à ces jeunes de sortir
de leur isolement en leur offrant un espace collectif d’identification. 12 Perrault
(2005, p. 59) constate à cet égard que si les jeunes se tiennent en gang, « c’est
d’abord pour avoir du plaisir et pour être en meilleure position pour séduire
11 Perreault (2005b, p. 104) avance une hypothèse fort intéressante à propos du rapport à la violence des
jeunes membres de gangs : « Alors que les jeunes de la rue sont davantage portés à retourner la violence
contre eux par leurs pratiques autodestructrices, les jeunes des gangs de rue l’utilisent contre le ‘système’ et
leurs ennemis. Ils extériorisent la violence au moyen de leurs pratiques antisociales ».
12 Selon Perreault et Bibeau (2003), le gang, loin d’être le symbole univoque d’une dérive sociale des jeunes,
est plutôt un lieu privilégié de création du lien social.

126 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 127
l’autre sexe. Le gang se présente d’abord comme un espace de socialité, un lieu
d’appartenance et d’identification des pairs, qui fait l’envie des uns et qui est
craint par les autres ».
Ainsi, loin de nier l’existence de la violence ou encore de banaliser celle-ci dans
les dynamiques qui entourent les gangs de rue, nous concevons que le gang peut
à la fois être fortement positif pour l’individu mais également l’entraîner dans
un cercle vicieux de la violence et de la délinquance en tant que violence (viols,
vols, drogues, etc.). Et bien que ce ne soit pas la criminalité et la délinquance
qui attirent ces jeunes, « le passage qui se présentait au départ comme une issue
de secours, une issue vers le succès, se dévoile, dans les faits, pour plusieurs,
tel un cul-de-sac dans lequel on se retrouve très tôt coincé. Le tous pour un,
un pour tous devient la règle et on est prêt, devant n’importe quelle situation,
à défendre et à venger les siens pour sauver l’honneur face aux membres des
groupes ennemis » (Perreault, 2005a, p. 60). Blondin (1995) croit pour sa part
que certains d’entre eux ont à ce point banalisé la violence qu’ils en viennent
à trouver « normal » la délinquance et la violence qui règnent dans l’entourage
du gang. L’utilisation de la violence devient alors une façon comme une autre
de se faire valoir, d’être reconnu par les pairs et d’imposer une certaine forme
de « respect ».
C’est dans cette optique que Perreault (2005a, p. 64) conclut à juste titre que
« faire partie de la gang, c’est accepter de s’identifier à un certain niveau de
violence, même si, au début, on peut très bien ne pas être tout à fait conscient
des implications graves liées à cette violence ». La violence joue ici un rôle dans
le marquage identitaire chez ces jeunes.
From this perspective, the gang provides a forum or ready-made
opportunity structure within which to engage in what is felt to be
exhilarating activity. Fighting is fun; and gangs provide an avenue to
increase the thrill factor beyond the norm. Violence can be seen to
be attractive and desirable in its own right, as well as being linked to
instrumental purposes. (White et Mason, 2006, p. 68)
Cette culture de la violence est d’ailleurs institutionnalisée dans les rituels
initiatiques. En effet, règle générale, l’intégration d’une recrue passe par la
commission d’un acte de violence à l’égard d’un ennemi ou à l’encontre d’une
institution civile, ou encore en subissant cette violence en étant battu par les
membres de son propre gang, rituel communément nommé le « punching
initiation » ou PI. Chez les jeunes filles plus spécifiquement, cette violence
initiatique prend principalement deux formes suivant le « statut » qu’on leur
attribue dans le gang : soit l’initiation se résume, à l’instar des garçons, à
la participation à la commission d’un délit ou d’une bagarre avec des filles
de gangs rivaux, soit il s’agit d’un « gang bang » initiatique, appelée aussi le
« sex-in » 13 ou le « roll-in » 14 (Burris-Kitchen, 1997; Chesney-Lind et Shelden,
2004; Miller, 2001; Schalet et al., 2003). Selon Molidor (1996), ces rituels
initiatiques violents servent à la fois à humilier la jeune fille et surtout, à
la dissuader de vouloir un jour trahir le gang. Subi ou non, le gang bang,
comme forme de violence initiatique, permet « de rappeler aux hommes qui y
participent, et aux femmes qui le subissent, la hiérarchie sociale, sexuelle et de
genre qui existe », et se doit d’exister, au sein du gang, où le gang demeure un
univers à domination masculine (Dorais et Corriveau, 2006, p. 25).
En somme, nous croyons que l’expression de la violence, quelle qu’elle soit, est
intimement liée à la quête d’identité masculine chez plusieurs jeunes hommes,
pas seulement ceux impliqués dans les gangs. Appartenir à un gang, c’est
devenir « quelqu’un » à leurs yeux et aux yeux des autres. C’est acquérir un
certain statut social et, par le fait même, gagner du respect, face à soi d’abord,
face aux pairs ensuite. Et ce sentiment d’appartenance, est-il important de
le mentionner, se développe autour d’une socialisation homosociale, quasi
exclusive aux hommes : le gang se veut un monde d’hommes et de virilité mis
en place et dominé par les hommes pour le bénéfice des hommes (Dorais et
Corriveau, 2009).
Et, bien que variant d’un groupe à un autre, les rituels initiatiques, toujours
empreints de violence, conservent généralement la même fonction : évaluer la
loyauté et le courage, où la capacité à subir ou générer de la violence est perçue
par les pairs comme une source de prestige et de notoriété. L’initiation soutient
donc à la fois une logique d’acquisition de respect et de pouvoir, mais aussi la
confirmation de son identité de mâle, d’homme viril. Nos données montrent
en effet que ces rituels viennent d’abord confirmer l’identité de genre des jeunes
garçons, la souffrance corporelle confirmant à l’ensemble du groupe la virilité
de la recrue qui ne craint pas de souffrir pour le gang (Dorais et Corriveau,
2009). Dans les gangs, seuls comptent vraiment les garçons et l’expression de
leur virilité (ou du moins ce qu’ils perçoivent comme telle). Pour Perreault
(2005b, p. 104), « il n’y a pas de place pour celui ou celle qui ne montre pas
d’aptitudes pour l’action et la bagarre ». C’est pourquoi l’initiation comporte
si souvent un déni du corps au profit du gang. La recrue doit démontrer qu’elle
13 Le « sex-in » se distingue du gang bang non initiatique en ce sens qu’il constitue, per se, l’expérience
sexuelle de groupe spécifiquement liée au rituel initiatique, alors que le gang bang renvoie à l’ensemble des
relations sexuelles à plusieurs qui n’ont plus nécessairement à voir avec la phase initiatique.
14 Le « roll-in » consiste pour la jeune femme à tirer un dé, lequel déterminera le nombre de ses partenaires
sexuels. Le gang bang est parfois appelé le « run-train ».

128 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 129
est prête à endurer la souffrance et la violence qui entoure la « vie » à l’intérieur
du gang.
En somme, le gang devient une véritable microsociété homosociale, un lieu
où l’affirmation virile devient essentielle pour le jeune désireux d’y adhérer.
Un monde de gars, pensé, créé et géré par eux, où il importe de montrer qui
est le plus fort, le plus intimidant, le plus susceptible d’être respecté (Dorais
et Corriveau, 2009), la violence (contre autrui ou à l’encontre des institutions
civiles) devenant un paramètre incontournable dans l’affirmation de soi.
Quelques pistes de réflexion vers l’action
Plusieurs facteurs ont donc été avancés pour expliquer les raisons qui poussent
certains jeunes à adhérer à un gang de rue et à user de la violence pour y être
acceptés. Lors du colloque Création d’un réseau québécois d’échanges : les jeunes
et les gangs de rue faut plus qu’en parler !, qui s’est tenu au Québec les 13 et 14
février 2003, les intervenants ont par exemple souligné l’effritement du tissu
social, les pertes des valeurs familiales, l’isolement social et la tendance des
adolescents à admirer les modèles délinquants comme facteurs explicatifs de
l’implication à un gang de rue. Pour Lanctôt et Leblanc (1996), les jeunes qui
se tournent vers les gangs ont certaines prédispositions individuelles à le faire,
comme l’attrait de la violence, l’imprévisibilité, une éducation déficiente, des
difficultés scolaires et familiales, une mauvaise estime de soi, une perception
idéalisée de la vie dans les gangs et une vision noire de la réalité liée au manque
d’opportunités sociales. À cela Hamel et Brisebois (2005) ajoutent que la
plupart de ces jeunes ont un faible contrôle de leurs émotions et sont animés
par la quête de sensations fortes, sensations que peut procurer la violence et la
délinquance qui entourent la vie au sein d’un gang de rue.
Sans nier l’existence de ces facteurs de risque, il importe cependant de rester
prudent en ce qui a trait à l’usage qui peut en découler. Comme le signale à
juste titre White (2008), il faut éviter de les utiliser à des fins de pronostic car
l’attention portée vers ces facteurs de risque néglige de les recontextualiser dans
l’histoire de vie de l’individu. 15
By their nature, these kinds of risk assessment tools fail to capture
the historical dynamics of societies. The tools reinterpret certain
characteristics as representing the failings of individuals. This is because
they are constructed on the basis of individualized data, rather than
analysis of, for example, how state policy affects particular groups. The
15 Le lecteur est à ce sujet invité à consulter l’article de Bania (2009) dans ce numéro.
structured formation of specific groups and individuals, as the outcome
of inequality, discrimination and the absence of opportunity, is basically
lost in such analysis. (White, 2008, p. 156)
C’est dans cette optique que nous estimons que la violence des gangs et les
comportements délictueux (en tant que violence) qui y sont souvent associés
restent d’une part un moyen pour plusieurs de ces jeunes d’accéder à ce que
d’autres ont déjà, c’est-à-dire l’intégration socio-économique. 16 Et d’autre part,
une façon de s’affirmer en tant qu’homme 17 à l’intérieur d’une micro société
homosociale et machiste où la violence en tant qu’acte de virilité engrange le
respect des pairs. L’implication dans un gang se doit alors d’être interprétée
en partie comme une échappatoire à des situations jugées discriminatoires et
exclusives sur le plan social et professionnel, la violence permettant à plusieurs
de ces jeunes d’évacuer leurs frustrations et, parallèlement, de créer une
nouvelle conscience collective bien à eux.
On peut dès lors affirmer que la violence perpétrée lors des rituels initiatiques
vient rappeler ce ras-le-bol généralisé à l’égard de la société, tout en au proposant
aux jeunes un nouveau cadre normatif où ils auront l’opportunité d’élaborer de
nouveaux liens de solidarité entre eux. Ce n’est donc pas le fruit du hasard si les
gangs se forment sur une base élective, les jeunes ayant le sentiment de vivre les
mêmes difficultés d’intégration. En plus de leur rappeler qu’ils partagent tous
un passé similaire, le gang propose aux jeunes une nouvelle cohésion sociale
et un nouveau système de valeur où la violence occupe une place intégrative.
Lorsqu’il est question d’intervention ou de prévention, on met souvent l’accent
sur la violence des gangs en tant que déficience, personnelle ou collective,
alors qu’il faudrait davantage réfléchir cette violence en termes de besoins
d’intégration et de reconnaissance, besoins que la société et ses institutions
n’arrivent pas à combler auprès de ces jeunes.
Intégration socio-économique, voire professionnelle d’un côté, mais également
intégration identitaire de l’autre, car parallèlement à cette nécessité d’inclure
ces jeunes sur le marché du travail et/ou à l’école, nous avons mis en lumière
que le monde des gangs s’avère aussi une manière pour ces jeunes de percevoir
la société, ses symboles de réussite et ce que doit être un homme. Le gang offre
16 En guise d’exemple, soulignons simplement qu’en 2001, « sur les 48 720 personnes d’origine africaine
vivant au Québec, 24 % avaient au moins un diplôme universitaire, pour 14 % des Québécois. Le taux
de chômage des Africains s’établissait à 21 % comparativement à 8% pour l’ensemble de la population
québécoise. Quant à leur revenu moyen, il était de 18 500 $ comparativement à 27 000 $ chez les
Québécois ! » (Le fil des événements, 11 mai 2006).
17 Il existe évidemment plusieurs façons de s’affirmer en tant qu’homme et celle-ci peut paraître éthiquement
contestable.

130 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 131
à plusieurs d’entres eux des figures d’appartenance et des modèles auxquels
ils peuvent et veulent s’identifier (les enjeux identitaires selon Perreault,
2005a et 200b). Or, ces modèles de réussite présentent souvent des visions
problématiques de la réussite et de ce qu’est être un homme, la violence et le
machisme devenant souvent des règles à suivre pour être respecté par autrui.
Voilà pourquoi il faut proposer de nouveaux modèles de réussite à ces jeunes
afin de modifier cette perception qu’ils ont de la masculinité et de ce qu’il faut
faire pour gagner le respect de l’autre.
Autrement dit et à la lumière de ce qui vient d’être présenté, on comprendra
que les pistes d’intervention et de prévention qui ne miseront que sur les
« facteurs de risque » liés à l’individu – lesquels se révèlent souvent n’être que
des symptômes de la problématique – seront vouées à l’échec ou à des succès
limités et temporaires. L’implication de jeunes dans l’univers des gangs de
rue renvoie, nous venons de le voir, davantage à des problématiques sociales
(difficulté d’intégration sur le marché du travail, discrimination, chômage,
etc.), qui nécessitent des actions globalisantes et sociales, qu’à des individus
problématiques en soi et nécessitant une prise en charge individualisante. Ces
interventions auprès des individus, bien que nécessaires et utiles, restent bien
insuffisantes pour réparer (combler) certaines injustices vécues ou perçues
comme telles par ces jeunes sur le plan de l’intégration socio-économique et
pour leur offrir des figures de réussite autres que celles, machistes et souvent
violentes, proposées par les membres de gang.
Nourri par des médias en quête de sensationnalisme et des orientations
politiques discriminatoires, le rejet social et professionnel exprimés à l’égard
de ces jeunes incitent plusieurs d’entre eux à se définir et à agir, au moins
partiellement 18 , en opposition avec le reste de la collectivité. La majorité de ces
jeunes associés à l’univers des gangs, est-il nécessaire de le rappeler, ressentent
les mêmes besoins, valeurs et aspirations que les autres jeunes de la société
canadienne. Comme le soulignait déjà Thrascher en 1927 dans son étude sur
les gangs de Chicago, le but de ces jeunes n’est pas tant d’être violent, de
commettre des actes délictueux ou encore d’être hors la loi mais bien de se
recréer un monde où ils se sentent inclus et appréciés. Dès lors, les pistes d’action
se doivent de passer par l’intégration sociale, économique et professionnelle de
ces jeunes et par notre capacité à leur offrir des figures alternatives de réussite
auxquelles ils pourront s’identifier. Et cette acceptation débute inévitablement
par une modification du regard médiatique, politique et institutionnel que l’on
porte sur ces jeunes, notamment en faisant preuve d’ouverture et d’acceptation
18 Comme mentionné précédemment, ils s’en rapprochent en effet considérablement à plusieurs égards :
intégration socio-économique, quête de réussite, etc.
face à leurs habillements, attitudes et comportements, qui dérangent parfois
moins par leur déviance que par leur différence.
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Volume 3: pages 135–156
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Aboriginal Youth and Violent
Gang Involvement in Canada:
Quality Prevention Strategies
Mark Totten, M.S.W., R.S.W., Ph.D.
Revue de L’
IPC
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Résumé
Il y a une épidémie de violence des gangs de jeunes Autochtones dans
certaines parties du Canada d’aujourd’hui et ces jeunes s’entretuent et se
suicident à des taux qui dépassent ceux de tout autre groupe au Canada.
Cet article présente un aperçu de la situation actuelle et décrit cinq grandes
voies d’adhésion aux gangs et à leur violence pour les jeunes Autochtones.
L’utilisation d’approches qui ont été démontrées inefficaces est ensuite
décrite et critiquée. L’auteur plaide pour un passage à une approche de
prévention et de santé publique qui traite les voies d’adhésion aux gangs
et à leur violence et décrit certaines approches qui ont fait leurs preuves.
L’auteur conclut que le refus d’agir dès maintenant se traduit par une
situation qui va s’aggraver très rapidement puisque le taux de natalité des
Autochtones est en explosion et que la population « à risque » doublera au
cours de la prochaine décennie.
Abstract
There is an epidemic of Aboriginal youth gang violence in some parts of
Canada today, and young Aboriginal gang members are killing each other
and committing suicide at rates that exceed those of any other group in
Canada. This paper provides an overview of the current situation, and
describes five major pathways to violent gang involvement for Aboriginal
youth. It then goes on to describe and critique the use of approaches
that have been proven not to work. It argues for a shift to a public health
approach that addresses the pathways to gang violence, and describes some
evidence-based models that have been proven to work. The conclusion is

136 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 137
that a failure to act now will result in things getting much worse very shortly
since the Aboriginal birth rate is exploding and the population “at risk” in
many areas will double within the next decade.
Introduction
Overview of Aboriginal Youth Gangs in Canada
The focus of this paper is on Aboriginal youth gang members aged 12-30 years.
In Canada, it is estimated that twenty-two percent of known gang members
are Aboriginal, and that there are between 800-1000 active Aboriginal gang
members in the Prairie provinces (Astwood Strategy Corporation, 2004; CISS,
2005; CSC, 2001a and 2003; Totten, 2008).
Aboriginal youth gangs are visible groups that come together for profit-driven
criminal activity and severe violence. They identify themselves through the
adoption of a name, common brands/colours of clothing, and tattoos to
demonstrate gang membership to rival gangs. Gang-related communication
rituals and public display of gang-like attributes are common (Gordon, 2000;
Totten, 2000 and 2008). Membership is fluid, there is a lack of organization
and structure, and many of these gangs operate independently in small cells.
Status is gained through the ability to make large amounts of cash and
engage in serious violence. Aboriginal gangs tend to be intergenerational and
rely on violent entry and exit rituals to protect the gang from outsiders. The
organization of these gangs varies in terms of: the structure and hierarchical
nature of the gang; the gang’s connection to larger, more serious organized
crime groups; the sophistication and permanence of the gang; the existence
of a specific code of conduct or set of formal rules; initiation practices; and
the level of integration, cohesion, and solidarity between the gang’s members
(Mellor, MacRae, Pauls, & Hornick, 2005; Totten, 2008).
Membership commitment can be measured in a hierarchical ranking system
within the gang. Often, there is not one person who directs other members,
although older members have more influence compared to young members
(CISC, 2006; Mellor et. al., 2005). Leaders (also called King Pins, Bosses,
Presidents or Captains) actively promote and participate in serious criminal
activity. These males are generally in their late twenties or early thirties.
Veterans (also called Heavies or Higher-Ups) decide which criminal activities
the gang will participate in and are considered to be faithful in their loyalty to
the gang. Along with leaders, they are responsible for settling internal conflicts
within the gang. Core members (also called Regular Members, Associates
or Affiliates) usually have been with the gang since it started, and are
experienced, proven members. Most gang leaders require prospective recruits
to meet certain criteria and perform serious crimes of violence before they are
allowed membership into the gang. These youth want to prove themselves
and rise through the ranks; they often earn serious money for gangs. To gain
entry, a recruit generally requires sponsorship. It is common for recruits to
“do minutes”, that is to survive a beating at the hands of some gang members.
Strikers (also called Soldiers) are also highly likely to engage in serious acts of
violence. Females who participate in Aboriginal gangs are for the most part
treated as sexual slaves and are forced to play tertiary roles (look-out for the
police, dealing drugs, sex trade work, carrying drugs and weapons). Often,
they are traded amongst gang members for coercive sex.
The Aboriginal Burden of Suffering in Canada
First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples comprise 4% of the population of
Canada, or approximately 1,325,000 people (Statistics Canada, 2008). The
majority lives in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and in the Northern
Territories, and almost one-half of the Aboriginal population now live in urban
areas. The proportion of Aboriginal peoples is increasing rapidly compared to
every other group in Canadian society, and their average age is much younger
than the rest of the population.
Most Aboriginal young people who grow up in high-risk environments do
not become gang-involved – they have positive school and community
supports, and particular protective individual attributes like perseverance
and determination. Yet, Aboriginals experience a disproportionate burden of
suffering, and this helps explain their participation in gangs. Factors related
to this include racism, colonization, marginalization and dispossession; the
loss of land, traditional culture, spirituality and values; and the breakdown of
community kinship systems and Aboriginal law. Psycho-social problems are
linked to these factors, including:
• Entrenched and severe poverty, and overcrowded and substandard housing
(Bittle, Hattem, Quann, & Muise, 2002; Dooley, Welsh, Floyd, Macdonald,
& Fenning, 2005).
• High numbers of placements into child welfare, mental health and other
institutions (Blackstock, Trocme, & Bennett, 2004; Grekul & LaBoucane-
Benson, 2006; Trevethan, Auger, Moore, MacDonald, & Sinclair, 2002).

138 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 139
• Alcohol and drug abuse: one quarter to two thirds of Aboriginal
young people in remote communities inhale gasoline. The incidence
of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) is very high (Canada,
House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, 1990;
RCAP, 1996).
• Low educational attainment and high rates of school drop-out and unemployment,
which block conventional means of achieving success and bonding to
broader Canadian society (RCAP, 1996; Statistics Canada, 2001).
• Ill-health and suicide: the suicide rate for young Aboriginals in many
communities is approximately six times higher than the rate for non-
Aboriginals (Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Shah, 1990;
Statistics Canada, 2001; York, 1990).
• High rates of criminalization: Aboriginals are significantly over-represented
at all stages of the justice system (Brzozowski, Taylor-Butts, & Johnson, 2006;
Calverley, 2007; Dauvergne, 2008; Dauvergne & Li, 2006; Li, 2007).
• High rates of violence, where family violence, sexual assault, child witnessing
of spousal violence, and homicide involving Aboriginals as both perpetrators
and victims are serious concerns. On-reserve violent crime rates are elevated
for both youth and adults. Youth are accused of committing homicides on
reserve at about 11 times the rate of youth elsewhere in Canada (Brzozowski
et al., 2006; Calverley, 2007; Dauvergne, 2008; Dauvergne & Li, 2006;
Li, 2007).
Understanding Forms of
Aboriginal Youth Gang Violence
Aboriginal youth gang violence is different than that exhibited by other youth
gangs in Canada. Rates of internalized violence, including suicide, drug
overdose, and self-injurious behaviors are far higher than externalized criminal
forms of violence. Preliminary Canadian data from the Prince Albert and
Regina projects (Totten, 2009a and 2009b) suggest that far more Aboriginal
youth gang members die from suicide and drug overdoses than homicide.
These data also point to extremely high rates of other forms of self-injurious
behaviours such as slashing and burning, particularly among young Aboriginal
women. Most acts of physical violence in Aboriginal youth gangs are motivated
by revenge, retaliation, and reputation (Kelly & Totten, 2002), and the result
is that young Aboriginal men are killing other young Aboriginal men.
Most females who are gang-involved have personal relationships with male
gang members, and those who do not become involved through sexual
exploitation, forced prostitution, and sexual trafficking. Gang members use
many forms of violence to initiate girls into and maintain their involvement in
sex trafficking. Most girls are “gang-banged” as part of initiation into gangs.
In some communities, family members socialize girls into the sex trade. This
is a common way for families to make money and the practice is perceived as
legitimate employment.
In general, there is a poor fit between traditional, perpetrator-orientated
theories of instrumental and expressive violence, and violence exhibited by
Aboriginal gangs. The process behind Aboriginal youth gang violence involves
a number of identifiable steps:
1. Members feel loose bonds to the gang and there is fluid membership. Most have
a fatalistic outlook on life, believing that they will die in the near future.
2. Members perceive a threat from a rival gang: this increases gang cohesion
and solidifies temporary membership. The threat is often irrational, given the
high degree of trauma most members have suffered. Intergenerational family
ties are important, and often one family is at war with another family.
3. An incident takes place which sparks an escalation of gang violence.
4. The gang responds in a chaotic and violent manner, similar to the process of
spontaneous combustion. The fact that most gang members have cognitive
impairments due to FASD contributes to the impulsive and unplanned
nature of the violence.
5. The other gang retaliates. In this tinderbox-like environment, escalating
violence affects the identities of those involved. This helps to spread gangs
across neighbourhoods and reserves and increases membership.
Collective and individual violence by Aboriginal gang members, whether
directed internally or at other gangs:
• produces more collective violence through the processes of threat and
unpredictable combustion;
• increases solidarity of gang members for a brief time, serving to unite them
against a common enemy by increasing their dependence on each other
and/or disciplining members;

140 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 141
• perpetuates gang values, norms, and the conditions of membership;
• reinforces familial ties in marginalized and transient communities; and
• provides members with a structure and sense of purpose, combating
hopelessness and a sense of powerlessness over their lives.
Members talk about feeling a sense of honour, self-respect, and self-esteem
when they engage in violence (Totten, 2009a and 2009b). It can also motivate
some members to exit the gang when the violence reaches levels that are
unacceptable to them. Finally, it can function to impede efforts to settle
land claims, implement self-government, and address the criminalization of
Aboriginals (researchers have identified some of these factors in African and
Latino gangs, including Decker, 1996; Klein, 1971 and 1995; Sanders, 1993).
Pathways into Violent Gang
Involvement for Aboriginal Youth
A pathways approach is useful in identifying the primary mechanisms through
which Aboriginal youth find themselves involved in violent gang activity. Some
gang members are located on one primary pathway; others become gang-involved
through a number of different pathways. Aboriginal youth are more vulnerable
to these conditions compared to other youth and therefore are at greater risk of
going down these paths. Evidence supporting the existence of these pathways
comes from initial data analyses from the Prince Albert Warrior Spirit Walking
Gang Project and the Regina Anti-Gang Services Project (Totten, 2009a and
2009b) involving a combined sample of approximately 150 youth, along with the
few Canadian studies on this issue (for example, Dickson-Gilmore & Laprairie,
2005; Kelly & Totten, 2002; Totten, 2008; Weatherburn, Fitzgerald, & Hua,
2003). There are five main pathways, each of which is briefly described below.
The first pathway into gang violence is violentization, the process through
which survivors of extreme physical child maltreatment and neglect become
predators and prey in adolescence. When Aboriginal children suffer these forms
of harm, they are at high risk for reduced academic attainment, neurological
impairment, and restricted language development. They are more likely to have
personality disorders, impaired psycho-social development, and internalizing
and externalizing symptoms. Suffering chronic and repeated sexual trauma
throughout childhood is also a key driver into gang life. Typical victims experience
multiple types of exploitation within a single year, including sexual abuse,
commercial sex work and trafficking. These children are most often abused by
male family members or men who know them. More girls are victims, although
many male youth who participate in violent gang activities report having been
sexually abused (Totten, 2009a and 2009b). This betrayal of trust and abuse of
power is aggravated in many communities by sexist beliefs that promote the early
sexualization of girls.
The second key pathway into violent gang life is experiencing multiple out-ofhome
placements in child welfare and correctional facilities (Kelly & Totten,
2002; Totten, 2000 and 2008). These facilities are prime recruiting grounds
for gang members, and a significant number of gang members report that they
only became gang-involved following placement in such facilities (Totten, 2008a
and 2008b). Currently, one in ten Aboriginal children are in foster care and
group homes compared to one in two hundred non-Aboriginals. Today, there
are about 28,000 Aboriginal youth in care, a number three times the total at the
height of the operation of residential schools (Blackstock et al., 2004; Trocme,
Knoke, & Blackstock, 2004). The main reason Aboriginal kids are brought into
care is neglect, including severe poverty, substance abuse by parents, and poor
housing (Trocme, 2005). In Canada, most Aboriginal children are placed in
White settings, where it is very difficult to learn about Aboriginal teachings and
develop a cultural identity. Thus, many Aboriginal children in care experience
culture loss and are at high risk of gang recruitment and sexual exploitation as
a way to feel loved and survive. Growing up in care often results in attachment
disorders, which magnify the impact of childhood maltreatment.
The third pathway reflects the lifelong impact of brain and mental health disorders
that result from prolonged childhood trauma and FASD, and of the accompanying
developmental impairments and emotional vulnerability. These leave Aboriginal
children with little time and energy to grieve their losses. Suffering severe abuse
is directly related to experiencing mental health problems such as Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Depression, and Bipolar
Disorder. Major childhood losses and disrupted attachments can result in youth
who don’t want to feel anything because it hurts too much. Many Aboriginal
gang members who engage in violence have a state of “terminal” thinking that
leads them to focus on survival only. Their wounds are so profound that their
souls are barely alive. Many young Aboriginal gang members hide behind the
armour of violence and emotional detachment; their sense of security, safety
and trust is never developed. Hardy and Laszloffy (2005) theorize that the net
impact is a state of psychological homelessness wherein unresolved and buried
grief results in monstrous acts of rage which camouflage deep-rooted sorrow.
The fourth pathway revolves around the social exclusion and devaluation
related to social class, race, sexual orientation, and gender. Colonization and
forced assimilation have resulted in the disintegration of family units, and the

142 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 143
loss of language, culture, economic status, and parenting capacity in many
communities. The loss of cultural identity, combined with social and economic
marginalization, fuels gang violence. Gang-related activities offer employment
and income for many members. Some Aboriginal girls are vulnerable to gang
involvement, and can become sexually exploited and trafficked in urban
settings because they can not meet their basic needs.
The final pathway relates to the development of hyper-masculinities and
sexualized femininities. Violence is used to construct masculinity, and sexuality
to construct femininity. For male gang members, the experience of prolonged
sexual abuse at the hands of men relates directly to the construction of violent
gang identities. Many young men who were abused around the time that they
reached puberty report having deep-seated fears about their sexual identities.
They report feeling responsible for the abuse because they became sexually
aroused; many believe that they must be gay because they “had sex” with
men. Violence compensates for these threats to heterosexuality (Totten, 2000,
2009a, and 2009b). Even for male gang members who have not suffered violent
trauma, the elimination of traditional means of achieving masculinity (such
as supporting families through hunting and trapping) is compensated for by a
hyper-masculine exertion of power and control over women and children (Blagg,
2000). Aboriginal girls in gangs negotiate gender roles outside of traditional
femininity – the gang is a space to “do gender differently” (Campbell, 1991).
These pathways can intersect to form compounding challenges for some
Aboriginal youth. Pathway four, for example, can be associated with all
other pathways.
Quality Violence Prevention, Intervention
and Suppression Approaches
Although there are many Canadian gang prevention, intervention and
suppression initiatives, few focus exclusively on Aboriginal youth, and most
have not been adequately evaluated. It is hoped that this situation will change
in the near future, given that the National Crime Prevention Centre is currently
funding a number of multi-year projects, all with robust evaluation designs.
We do nevertheless have some basis for determining what types of programs
or approaches are likely to fail or to succeed.
What Doesn’t Work?
In Canada, unproven gang suppression strategies have won out over evidencebased
treatment and prevention, and scarce resources are usually spent on
“get tough” approaches. The approaches described below are proven to be
ineffective and should be stopped.
• Gang suppression program evaluations have found mixed results. These
programs seek to prosecute and convict gang members, especially gang
leaders. Although effective in decreasing gang-related crime in the short
term, they fail to address psychosocial issues such as child maltreatment,
mental health, substance abuse, education and employment. Suppression
initiatives should only be utilized to complement a range of interventions.
• Incarcerating gang members does not reduce future criminal behaviour (Aos,
Miller, & Drake, 2006). Studies in the U.S.A. and Canada demonstrate
that locking up gang members increases the chances of re-offending and
staying in the gang (Benda & Tollet, 1999; Nafekh, 2002; Nafekh & Stys,
2004; Olson, Dooley, & Kane, 2004). Grouping early onset, high-risk
youth together increases the negative bonding amongst members and leads
to even more entrenched anti-social and criminal behaviour. Individualized
approaches in facilities work best (such as cognitive-behavioural individual
and family therapy), but gains are only maintained if adequate resources
are provided to support long-term transition into the community
following release.
• Curriculum-based prevention programs targeting youth at-risk for gang
involvement, such as the American Gang Resistance Education and Training
program (G.R.E.A.T.) and the D.A.R.E. program effect modest, shortterm
change. However, follow-up studies have found program participants
to be as likely as non-participants to become gang members in the longterm
(Esbensen & Osgoode, 1999; Esbensen, Osgood, Taylor, Peterson, &
Freng, 2001; NIJ, 1998; U.S. Surgeon General, 2001).
• Traditional detached-worker programs are ineffective and can do more harm
than good by increasing gang cohesion (Klein, 1995). Modern detachedworker
programs have included curriculum components addressing
consequences of gang involvement, peer pressure, and substance abuse. These
programs remain ineffective unless they are integrated into a comprehensive
and coordinated community-wide approach.
• Community development approaches founded on the premise that there is a
singular and cohesive “Aboriginal community” do not work. In reality, there
are many competing interests in most reserves and urban neighbourhoods,
and divisions reflecting religious and spiritual lines, access to income and

144 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 145
wealth, gender, clans and ethnicities, family and gang allegiances. Programs
must effectively engage these subgroups and address the concerns and
priorities of each.
• Child welfare models that bring youth into care are replicating Canada’s
sad legacy of Residential Schools. Grouping teens with varying degrees of
antisocial conduct and attitudes in child welfare facilities leads to delinquency
training. Negative attention-forcing behaviour is highly resistant to change:
reprimands serve as rewards because they are reinforced by the reaction of
peers. Longitudinal studies repeatedly show association with deviant peers
is the strongest correlate of escalation in problem behaviors in adolescence.
Children living in group care face much higher risks of being victimized
by bullying, sexual abuse, physical restraints by staff, and ultimately being
criminalized. A lack of permanency planning contributes to many Aboriginal
children being moved from placement to placement, which contributes to
attachment problems and deep-rooted feelings of rejection and shame.
What Works?
Evidence-based approaches are presented below along the five key strategic
areas identified by the National Working Group on Crime Prevention (2007)
as elements of success: collaboration and problem-solving partnerships,
concentrating investments on highest needs, developing and sustaining
community capacity, adequate and sustained supports and resources, and
public engagement. Lessons learned from three Canadian projects currently
being evaluated by this author are included in the discussion. All three projects
have mainly Aboriginal staff teams, many of whom have past experience in
gangs, the sex trade and street life; Elders are employed in each project as
well. All are gender-responsive, culturally competent, and have the capacity to
respond 24 hours a day, year-round. These programs are:
• The Warrior Spirit Walking Project, delivered by the Prince Albert Outreach
Program Inc., targets 12-20 year-old Aboriginal gang members and youth
at high-risk of gang membership. The Circle of Courage model (Brendtro,
Brokenleg, & Van Bockern, 2002) is the foundation for this program.
• The North Central Community Association’s Regina Anti-Gang Service
project (RAGS) targets 16-28 year-old gang leaders and their partners and
family members. Core services are based upon the Wraparound and Multi-
Systemic Therapy models (Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, Rowland, &
Cunningham, 1998).
• The Vancouver Aboriginal Youth – Vancouver Police Department Working
Group Creating Healthy Aboriginal Role Models (CHARM) Project targets
youth aged 12-18 years in East Vancouver who are most at risk of being
recruited into gangs. All core services are based upon principles of positive
youth development and asset building.
Collaboration and Problem-Solving Partnerships
Community-wide, cross-sectoral strategies are required to address the multiple
factors related to gang violence. Silos separating sectors, including Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), must come down. There are excellent models
from other parts of the world that can provide inspiration (see Capobianco,
2006; Capobianco, Shaw, & Dubuc, 2003). In the U.S.A., Spergel’s (1995)
Comprehensive Gang Model is a good example of a community-wide response
to gangs. The model assumes that the youth gang problem can be explained by
a lack of social opportunities and social disorganization within a community,
where contributing factors such as poverty, institutional racism, poor social
policies, and a lack of or misdirected social controls are important. It consists
of five core strategies which flow from an integrated and team-oriented
problem solving approach using secondary and tertiary prevention. These
strategies include: community mobilization; social intervention; provision
of academic, economic, and social opportunities; gang suppression; and
facilitating organizational change and development (Howell, 2000; OJJDP,
2006; Spergel, 1995). The Little Village Project in Chicago has shown the
most positive outcomes of any comprehensive gang intervention program 1
(Spergel, 2006; Spergel et al., 2003). The Project, which involved 200 youth,
was credited with a significant decrease in the number of self-reported offences
and arrests over a two-year period, including arrests for violent crimes. Results
indicated that gang members who participated in more individual counseling
sessions were more likely to reduce involvement in gang activities. The hardcore
gang youth demonstrated the most significant decreases in arrests, but there
was not a major decrease in the overall gang crime in the Village. This could
be due to a number of factors, including the fact that many gang members in
Little Village did not participate in the project.
Partnerships are also required to develop new models of child welfare and
Aboriginal justice. Aboriginal leaders and various levels of government must
1 Data consisted of 127 individual interviews between Time I and Time III, monthly activity reports to
the Chicago Police Dept., gang member surveys and self-reports, project worker summary reports, field
observations, focus group findings, and police arrest and incident data. These data were compared to data
collected during a three year pre-project period, and with two control groups obtained through arrests of
non-targeted young people at program entry.

146 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 147
develop effective mechanisms for sharing information. This begins with the
early identification and support of high-risk children and families, in order
to provide intensive programs and practices that maintain permanent family
connections for all children. Family empowerment and connectedness should
be targeted in a flexible manner; the goal is to have a continuum of connections
and to repatriate kids to their home environments. A proven method to reduce
reliance on residential placement and keep youth in their neighbourhoods
with intensive supports is the Wraparound Process. There are many examples
of the effectiveness of this approach with Aboriginal peoples in other countries
(for example, see Wyles, 2007). Today, however, the INAC Child and Family
Services Program gives 22% less funding per child than provincially-funded
child welfare agencies.
New models of youth justice are also required. Incarceration often takes place
before youth are recruited into gangs, or, it serves to increase gang cohesion
and membership for those who are already gang-involved. The Canadian
Aboriginal Justice Strategy has not reduced rates of crime, victimization, and
incarceration among Aboriginals. The Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) has
a special set of criteria and measures for Aboriginal youth, but Provinces and
Territories are not always implementing the Act as intended. Unless we can
dramatically reduce the number of young Aboriginals who are incarcerated,
gang violence will only increase.
New collaboration and problem-solving partnerships must be culturally and
gender competent; this goes beyond “cultural awareness” (knowledge about a
group) and “cultural sensitivity” (some level of experience with another group).
The Medicine Wheel is an important symbol in Aboriginal teachings; it is a
circular, holistic approach as opposed to the linear approach used in many
Western settings. Aboriginal ways of learning place communal generosity
and sharing above individualistic and materialistic gain. The Wheel is highly
valued by the Prince Albert, Regina and Vancouver gang projects as an
approach to preventing violence and supporting gang-involved youth to figure
out their journey in life. However, not all youth want or have a connection to
traditional teachings. In such cases, these projects support youth in exploring
other spiritual avenues, such as faith-based alternatives. The principle of
gender responsiveness is also highly valued in these projects, and addressing
the unique needs of females is prioritized. These young women need nonpunitive,
strength-based and non-hierarchical, relationship-based programs.
It can be dangerous to mix both genders of high-risk youth in the same
program – many females report physical, sexual and verbal abuse by young
men in facilities, and that hyper-sexualized relations with male peers and
staff are common (Totten, 2002 and 2004a). There are excellent examples
of quality programs in Ontario youth justice that address these concerns (see
Covington, 2003; Myhand & Kivel, 1998).
Concentrating Investments on Highest Needs
The best way to prevent Aboriginal youth gang violence is to intervene early in
the lives of children (ages 0-6) and families who are at greater risk of negative
outcomes, where children may be exhibiting early onset aggression. One proven
approach is in-home, culturally competent public health nurse visitation with
young, high-risk mothers over the long term, using the “Families First” model
(Browne et al., 2001). If implemented in an intensive manner, physical child
abuse and neglect can be reduced by as much as 80% in high-risk communities
(Duggan et al., 2004; Olds et al., 1998).
Comprehensive FASD prevention programs are also required, as are school
readiness and family literacy programs, infant stimulation and Head Start
programs, and other health promotion programs. The best way to address the
sexual exploitation and trafficking of gang-involved Aboriginal girls and women
is to prevent child sexual abuse and implement broad-based education programs
to confront sexism and the early sexualization of girls. Gender inequalities
can be reduced by engaging women in positions of power and leadership in
individual communities (NWAC, 2007). Finally, quality programs for men
who sexually abuse should be implemented in a comprehensive manner (see
CSC, 1997 and 2001b; Macgregor, 2008).
The cultural competencies of schools can be enhanced by increasing the number
of Aboriginal teachers and administrators, teaching traditional language
acquisition, reducing the suspension and expulsion of Aboriginal students,
and reshaping the curriculum to reflect Aboriginal approaches to knowledge
and teachings. Primary schools are excellent places where children can safely
work on grief and trauma; creative arts techniques and play therapy are proven
interventions (see Crenshaw & Garbarino, 2007; Sklarew, Krupnick, Ward-
Wimmer, & Napoli, 2002). Schools are also good venues to implement quality
suicide prevention programs (see White & Jodoin, 2004).
Developing and Sustaining Community Capacity
We must address the link between individual life experiences and the social
and economic inequalities experienced by Aboriginal people. Strategies must
confront the lack of social opportunities and the social disorganization that

148 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 149
characterizes many communities. Gang-related activities offer employment
and a good income; we cannot reduce gang violence without replacing the lost
income and jobs which gangs provide to members. Quality programs include
those that confront low educational attainment, unemployment, poverty,
unstable and crowded housing conditions, high residential mobility and
substance abuse. Programs must respond to the many competing interests on
many Reserves and urban neighbourhoods. There is a sound body of evidence
supporting the relationship between Aboriginal self-government and positive
outcomes. Efficient settlement of land claims is directly related to improving
the overall standard of living for Aboriginal peoples (Capobianco, 2006;
Capobianco et al., 2003; Blackstock & Trocme, 2005).
Adequate and Sustained Supports and Resources
Most gang-related resources go to law enforcement and corrections – yet,
things will not get better until more resources are dedicated to prevention.
This means re-dedicating existing resources and getting players in the justice
sector to behave differently. There is much resistance to doing this. One small
example is the proven ineffectiveness of the RCMP curriculum-based drug
and gang prevention programs (Ennett & Tobler, 1994; U.S. Surgeon General,
2001). This money should be reinvested in proven school-based programs
involving police such as the intensive mentoring, supervision and support of
very high-risk students and their families, beginning in elementary school
(Schumacher & Kurz, 1999; Totten, 2004b). Although the most effective
method of preventing youth gang involvement is reducing child maltreatment,
the vast majority of Aboriginal child welfare funds go to strategies that don’t
work, such as placements in residential facilities. Money can be saved by closing
some facilities and investing the savings in intensive, home-based programs.
Finally, we should extend National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) funding
for Aboriginal gang prevention projects far beyond 2011, and assure that other
prevention initiatives have long-term funding and robust evaluations.
Public Engagement
In Canada, few seem to care about the burden of suffering of Aboriginal
youth. Young gang members, most of whom have survived trauma in
childhood, are committing suicide and killing each other at alarmingly high
rates – and things will only get worse with the rapidly shifting demographics
in many communities. There are thousands of missing and sexually trafficked
Aboriginal girls in this country, many of whom are gang-involved. But, the
average Canadian faces little or no risk of being harmed by young Aboriginal
gang members, who arguably are killing the Aboriginal part of themselves.
Public education is required to confront the huge gap between what we are
currently doing to address gang problems and what the evidence says works.
The Federal Public Apology in June 2008 and the Residential School Truth
and Reconciliation Commission present excellent opportunities to engage
the Canadian public on the unique historic, social and economic context
enveloping Aboriginal youth gang violence.
Conclusion
Aboriginal youth gang violence in Canada has reached epidemic levels in many
communities. If we fail to act now, we will pay dearly within the next decade.
Many remote and urban communities in Western Canada will have double
the number of young Aboriginal men within the next ten years – it is these
male youth who are most at risk of gang involvement. Prevention strategies
must interrupt the main pathways into gang violence, including serious and
prolonged child maltreatment, long-term institutionalization in child welfare
and youth justice facilities, brain and mental health disorders caused by
trauma and FASD, social exclusion and devaluation, and the development of
violent and sexualized gender identities. In general, there is a poor fit between
traditional theories of violence and that exhibited by Aboriginal gangs. These
models do not incorporate factors related to loss, trauma and developmental
impairments, nor do they focus on historic, social and economic conditions.
Most of our current strategies to address youth gang violence are not based on
sound evidence. Repression approaches are very costly and do not offer longterm
solutions; in fact, a substantial body of evidence suggests that law and
order approaches actually increase gang activities. We should shift our focus
and our supports to more proven and promising ways of addressing Aboriginal
youth gang violence.
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Volume 3: pages 159–177
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Community Collaboratives as
a Strategy to Engage Regional
Government in the Prevention
of Violence Against Women
Julie Pehar
Peel Committee on Sexual Assault
Christine Sevigny
Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse
Résumé
Les réponses pénales à la violence faite aux femmes tendent à être
réactives et orientées vers le contrevenant. D’autre part, les initiatives
préventives ne donnent que peu d’attention à l’importance de la prise
en compte du genre (gender mainstreaming) dans leurs pratiques et
politiques. Les actions des gouvernements centraux à l’égard de la violence
faite aux femmes ne reflètent que rarement une analyse des causes
systémiques du problème ou un engagement pour les types de solutions
nécessaires pour améliorer la sécurité des femmes. Plusieurs ont donc
tourné leur attention à tenter d’influencer les politiques et pratiques au
niveau local et, plus particulièrement, à essayer d’assurer une approche
systématique à l’intégration de l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes
dans la planification, la mise-en-œuvre et l’évaluation des programmes
et services municipaux ou régionaux. Cet article décrit l’émergence d’une
telle tentative dans la Région de Peel en Ontario (Canada) sous la forme de
collaboration communautaire entre de nombreuses agences qui œuvrent
dans le domaine de la violence faite aux femmes. La discussion met l’accent
sur leur succès et sur certains des défis auxquels ils et elles font face et
termine en proposant des recommandations pour améliorer l’efficacité et
la durabilité de la collaboration communautaire dans ce domaine.

160 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 161
Abstract
Criminal justice responses to violence against women have tended to be
reactive and offender-focused and crime prevention initiatives have paid
relatively little attention to gender mainstreaming. Central government
action in this area seldom reflects a broad analysis of the systemic root
causes of the problem, or a commitment to the types of solutions needed
to be effective in improving the safety of women. In response, many
have turned their attention to attempting to influence local policies and
practices and, more specifically, to trying to assure gender mainstreaming
in the planning, delivery and evaluation of municipal or regional programs
and services. One approach is the emergence of community collaboratives
that bring together agencies and advocates active in the area of violence
against women. Using a case study of two community collaboratives in
Peel Region, Ontario (Canada) this article describes their emergence and
their attempts to influence the practices of the Regional Government. The
discussion focuses on some of their successes and on some of the challenges
they face, and concludes with recommendations for improving the efficacy
and the sustainability of community collaboratives.
Introduction
According to the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World
Conference on Women in 1995:
Violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of the
objectives of equality, development and peace. Violence against women
both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their
human rights and fundamental freedoms. (para 112)
Yet, designing and implementing an effective response to violence against
women is proving difficult, in part because of the emphasis of central
governments on justice-oriented and offender-based responses. Such
approaches fail to acknowledge that interpersonal violence is linked to the
social, political and economic structures in which individuals live or to see
that violence prevention initiatives will only be effective if they address these
structural factors (Hayes, 2006).
Addressing violence against women requires an integrated approach by
all levels of government, and must include a commitment to “gender
mainstreaming”, or the incorporation of a gender lens into all aspects and all
stages of the planning, delivery and evaluation of public policy. This has been
espoused as necessary and critical to ensuring that the “needs and differential
experiences of women and girls (and men and boys) are taken into account at
all stages of community safety planning, especially at the local level” (Shaw
& Capobianco, 2004, p. 3). Women’s voices must be present and supported
as integral components of the governance in attempts to address violence
against women. Structures and processes must allow women to participate
in an effective and inclusive manner in the design, delivery and evaluation of
initiatives that address community safety and the problem of violence against
women. In addition, local municipal and regional governments must recognize
their enormous potential to affect programs and services in a meaningful way
using the knowledge and research available on crime risk and protective factors
as they pertain to violence against women (Johnson, 2007).
One response is the emergence of community collaboratives. These initiatives
usually involve cooperative relations among and between advocates, activists
and agencies involved in responding to violence against women. This article
focuses on two community collaboratives in Peel Region (Ontario, Canada).
It describes the emergence of these collaboratives, and discusses some of their
successes and some of the challenges they face in their attempt to achieve
gender mainstreaming within Regional Government planning and activities.
Collaboratives: An Adaptation to Challenging Times
Collaboratives have been defined as “a group of community leaders who use an
inclusive strategy to establish shared goals and agree to use their personal and
institutional power to achieve them” (Institute for Educational Leadership,
2008, p. 3). Gray (1989) highlights that “collaboration is a process through
which parties who see different aspects of a problem constructively explore their
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited visions
of what is possible” (p. 5, as cited in Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996, p. 605).
Collaboration is further “characterized by mutual benefit, interdependence,
reciprocity, concerted action and joint production” (Abramson & Rosenthal,
1995, p. 1479 as cited in Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996, p. 605). Armed with
a collective mandate and formal partner agreements, collaboratives are seen
as credible and can attract and involve a wide range of community experts
and resources. In an environment where resources are limited and government
functions are increasingly decentralized, the trend toward collaboratives has
been labelled the “devolution revolution” (Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996,
p. 602) Inter-organizational community-based collaboratives are seen as a
strategic response to a changing social work agenda, and a means for local

162 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 163
health and social service organizations, community leaders and neighbourhood
businesses to improve their access to resources and decision-making processes
(Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996).
There are two collaboratives active in the area of violence against women in the
Peel Region – the Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse (PCAWA) and the
Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA) – which have been operating for
almost 25 and 20 years, respectively. In our view, the established partnerships
and a history of working relationships with the municipality, combined with
a roster of successful initiatives, have encouraged the increasing support of
municipal leaders for gender mainstreaming in attempts to respond to violence
against women.
Peel’s response to issues of violence against women has broadened over time to
extend the focus beyond a single problem and toward affecting social change
by utilizing a comprehensive, integrative anti-racism/anti-oppression approach.
As articulated by Together We Can (2009), “reform will not succeed unless
collaboratives give serious attention to the inclusion of diverse groups, drawing
upon their cultural strengths and ensuring equal opportunity for people of all
backgrounds”. Often, municipal governments are simultaneously engaged in
a multitude of services and programs that address issues of violence against
women yet do not recognize the broad links between social, economic and
health services as they impact women’s lives and safety. Engaging participation
from and partnership with the municipal government has been a deliberate
strategy by the collaboratives in attempting to get involved in policy and program
development, and to encourage the types of complex and multi-departmental
regional approaches that will contribute to ending violence against women.
Community collaboratives can be fragile. Together We Can (2009) describes
the collaborative process as “non linear” and emphasizes that “collaboratives
are a spiral process, where they often take several steps forward and then
double back to address earlier unresolved issues.” Being in a collaborative is
a journey in patience, frustration, insecurity and complete exuberance where
collective voice is often delicate and powerful all at once. Bailey and McNally
Koney (1996) add that collaboratives are often faced with dilemmas that
reflect competing realities: “a dilemma, unlike a problem, presents different
approaches to an issue. Whereas a problem tends to have a good and bad or
right and wrong solution, a dilemma usually represents multiple truths with
degrees of rightness and wrongness” (p. 4). As with many conflicts that arise in
collective work, these dilemmas cannot be treated and resolved as if they were
problems – they must be managed (Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996).
Collaborative work on violence against women, and attempts to partner
with municipal governments, face a number of challenges, including limited
funding, misunderstandings and misinformation, personal biases, stereotypes
and entrenched systemic sexism, racism and other forms of oppression.
The combination of traditional approaches to crime and caution around
entering the realm of private, domestic or sexual behaviours can also generate
resistance to gender mainstreaming work. Collaboratives are entities that must
continually adapt to challenges, some of which are expected and others that
are unforeseen.
Nevertheless, the government in Peel Region is including longstanding
community collaboratives in their attempts to broaden the scope of antiviolence
work. Through a case study of Peel Region, this article will address:
• The nature of collaborative partnerships between Peel regional government
and two community collaboratives, the Peel Committee Against Woman
Abuse (PCAWA) and the Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA).
• The dynamics of a deepening relationship between the regional government
and the two community collaboratives.
• The critical role of Women in Cities International (WICI) and the skills
and increased capacity that PCAWA and PCSA have acquired as a result of
participation with WICI.
• The strategies that are being used to ensure the successful integration
of equity tools and gender mainstreaming principles in the municipal
government’s programs, services and internal operations, and the challenges
that come along with these initiatives.
The Collaboratives of Peel Region
A Snapshot of Peel Region
Peel Region is a large urban and rural geographical expanse, situated directly
west of Toronto, Ontario. It is comprised of two cities, Mississauga and
Brampton and one town, Caledon. Peel has a two-tier governance system
including regional and local governments. Peel also has three mayors, one for
each city and town. At present, all three mayors are women, and a higher than
average number of elected counselors in Peel are also women (58% compared
to the national average of 22%).
According to 2006 Census data, the population of Peel is 1,159,405 people,
and is 51% female and 49% male (The Social Planning Council of Peel, 2007).

164 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 165
Peel Region is ethno-racially and culturally diverse:
• 43% of Peel’s population are immigrants compared to the Provincial
average of 27%;
• There are 93 ethnic groups in Peel, with 60 different languages
spoken; and
• 50% of Peel’s population consists of people from racialized communities.
Peel Region is one of the top ten fastest growing Regions in Canada, and
from 2001 to 2006, it was the second fastest growing Region in Ontario,
with 34,000 people moving into Peel Region each year (The Social Planning
Council of Peel, 2007). This poses significant challenges to the service system
in its attempts to provide truly accessible and inclusive services. One of the
ongoing barriers to meeting the service needs of residents in Peel is the “Fair
Share” allocation of provincial funding support, which is not reflective of the
reality of Peel’s growth patterns:
Provincial funding for social services has not kept pace with the growth
of regions in the [geographical areas surrounding Toronto] or with
increasing ethno-cultural diversity, which have both contributed to
significant increases in need. Indeed, Peel receives less than half of what
some municipalities received when viewed on a per capita funding basis
for the province. (Fair Share Task Force, 2009)
Wait times for subsidized housing for applicants who have experienced
domestic violence have increased to 1-3 years compared to the originally
intended wait of 1-2 months. In Peel, wait times for subsidized housing for
adults and families is the longest in the Province and is currently 21 years
(Region of Peel Housing, 2009).
As for crime rates, Peel Regional Police annual statistical reports for Mississauga
and Brampton indicate that from 2003 to 2007, domestic disputes have
increased by 35.4% and sexual assaults have increased by 18.5%. These rates
remind us that in an increasingly borderless world, gender-based violence is a
wide-spread and socially tolerated form of human rights violations, and “both
reflects and reinforces inequities between men and women and compromises
the health, dignity, security and autonomy of its victims” (United Nations
Population Fund, 2005 as cited in Johnson, 2006, p. 8).
Meet the Collaboratives
The Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse (PCAWA) and the Peel Committee
on Sexual Assault (PCSA) operate as community collaboratives in Peel Region.
Both have a combination of core funding and project funding and engage
multiple community partners representing a wide variety of human service
sectors, including education, health, police, legal, crown attorneys, victim
witness, child witness, victim services, sexual assault services, counseling,
family services, housing, shelters, children’s aid, Ontario Works, ethnospecific,
seniors and youth. Initiatives range from the development of Regional
best practices and protocols, to cross-sectoral training, service coordination,
referral practices, resource development, professional development and
training, networking, relationship building, public education, advocacy, and
media relations.
The Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse was first established in 1984
when a group of individuals from various Violence Against Women agencies
came together to consider ways of working collaboratively towards the
elimination of violence against women in the Region of Peel. In the early
years, PCAWA’s core operations consisted of networking, advocating for
increased funding, raising public awareness through education and outreach
campaigns, community development, and building the organizational capacity
of the membership. PCAWA has since grown in size and scope, reflecting the
needs and capacities of its members and the diverse communities they serve.
PCAWA’s membership now consists of close to 40 agencies and organizations.
It currently has two full-time staff; additional staff are hired on contract to
implement individually-funded projects when they arise. Currently, it is not an
independently incorporated organization and relies on having a lead or trustee
organization to manage its funds.
The Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA) formed in 1989 when
a consortium of multi-disciplinary professionals came together to work
collaboratively to establish a comprehensive and effective community response
to sexual violence. In 1992, Trillium Health Centre became the Regional
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Treatment Centre for Peel Region.
Shortly after, in 1995, the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care provided
core funding for PCSA to operate as a part of Trillium Health Centre’s
Women’s and Children’s Health System, and the Ministry of the Attorney
General funded the Sexual Assault/Rape Crisis Centre of Peel.

166 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 167
PCSA’s goal is to enhance interagency and community co-operation and
collaboration and to promote, enhance and maintain a continuum of education,
prevention, service delivery, research and social change initiatives. PCSA
operates as a community collaborative and has 25 signatory members. Like
PCAWA, the core operations consist of networking, advocating for increased
and supplemental funding, raising public awareness through education and
outreach campaigns, community development, and building the organizational
capacity of the membership. It is currently staffed by one full-time coordinator
and one part-time administrative assistant. Contingent on project funds,
consultants are occasionally hired to work on specific initiatives.
PCAWA and PCSA operate from a common framework that provides a
foundation for understanding issues and experiences, and also serves as a tool
for problem-solving. The Integrative Feminist Anti-Racism/Anti-Oppression
Framework is an approach that is woman-centred and focuses on the lives
and realities of women and marginalized people. It affirms women’s right to
contribute to, and to determine, the social, political and economic changes
in their lives. It affirms their right to safe spaces in the groups, agencies, and
institutions they encounter in their lives. This framework also recognizes that
racism and oppression are systemic within our institutions, both formally and
informally, intentionally and unintentionally. It recognizes that power and
privilege exist and that these are based on skin colour, sexual orientation, class,
gender, age, faith, and ability, and that these privileges are institutionalized
and help maintain unequal relationships between people and groups. An
Integrative Feminist Anti-Racism/Anti-Oppression Framework recognizes that,
while violence against women cuts across all communities of women, it always
happens in a social and historical context.
This framework is further supplemented by an intersectional approach
(Crenshaw, 1994) that analyzes how gender, race, class, sexuality and other
social and cultural identities intersect to create a system of multiple forms of
oppression. This requires that members of both collaboratives also consider their
own lives in the light of an intersectional framework, to see who they are, how
they are connected and how they are also participants in systems of oppression.
It is important to recognize that the process of developing and fostering this
understanding is complex and transformative, and it can be challenging to
make the necessary changes to move towards more equitable systems and
relations. This framework, and the insistence that women and girls must be
distinctly named and included in any crime prevention initiative, are the rudder
that steers the collaboratives in their work, whether internally, within partner
agencies, amongst the community or when engaging in political consultation.
Groundwork with Peel Municipal/Regional Government
The PCAWA and PCSA have been around long enough to build trusting
relationships with regional partners. The Region of Peel was an early supporter
of collaborative work and of the community working together to end woman
abuse, and participates in a number of work groups and community projects
in areas such as public health, sexual health, housing, Ontario Works, mental
health, childcare, early child development, youth, and police services.
The Region has contributed directly to the governance of both collaboratives
through the allocation of staff representatives and financial resources.
Furthermore, the Region of Peel currently provides core financial support to
PCAWA, which illustrates the value the Region places on the outcome-based
and community-driven model of work adopted and practised by PCAWA.
This level of participation has ensured that the collaboratives receive current
information on related regional programs and have direct access to some of the
supports and resources offered by the Region. There have been many successful
partnership projects over the past twenty years between the Region of Peel and
the two collaboratives, some of which are still in place. One such example is
the Building Blocks Project, which developed an anti-violence resource for
service providers and parents to use with children. Member organizations of
the collaboratives, including the Region of Peel’s Public Health Department,
participated in its development and production. More recently (and four years
after its initial production), the Public Health Department reached out to the
collaboratives in order to revise the tool and reproduce and redistribute it to
the community. Another successful undertaking was the partnership created
between the Region of Peel’s Public Health Department and the collaboratives
to provide awareness raising and educational initiatives to service providers in
Peel on the topic of sex work. This also resulted in the adoption of new protocols
within both the PCSA and PCAWA for the inclusion of sex trade workers.
Yet, despite the longstanding relation between the collaboratives and the
Region, and some successful ventures, a pattern of unidirectional influence was
apparent. The Region’s support was largely financial, advisory and in the form
of staff support for working groups, making the collaboratives the recipients
of support and information from the Region. There was no forum through
which the expertise or equity-based philosophy of the collaboratives could be
captured in any Regional planning or programming. In 2006, participation in
a national project and in a United Nations Conference would be the catalyst
for monumental change in Peel.

168 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 169
Women in Cities International
As in many Western countries, ground level work on women’s safety and
equity in Canada and in Peel Region specifically is often carried out in
isolation and with much energy expanded on organizational survival and
meeting the immediate service needs of women and their children. Often,
knowledge exchange and involvement in broader global advocacy is not within
our practical reach or part of the focus of funding priorities. Our introduction
to Women in Cites International (WICI) would offer us the opportunity to
position ourselves on the international stage and enable us to examine the
work in Peel in relation to similar work that was happening globally.
In 2006, Women in Cities International, funded by Status of Women Canada,
circulated a call for proposals for a project entitled “Building Partnerships
for Local Action on Women’s Safety.” WICI is an international network of
partners concerned with gender equity issues and the place of women in cities.
It seeks to disseminate information on issues related to gender equality, the role
of women in cities, and the application of a gender approach in community
and municipal decision-making and public policy processes. This network acts
as a consultant to local, national, and international governments in promoting
policies and programs that take gender into account, foster the greater
participation of women, and increase the effectiveness of actions undertaken
by women’s organizations at the community level. The Building Partnerships
for Local Action on Women’s Safety project aimed to facilitate the involvement
of women’s organizations in the public policy process and increase sustainable
working relationships between public bodies and communities by developing
and implementing a new partnership model in six pilot communities in Canada.
Peel was accepted as one of the six pilot sites (along with Williams Lake, BC;
Regina, SK; Bellechasse, QC; Kuujjuaq, NU; and Charlottetown, PEI) and
began a multi-year initiative with WICI to learn to partner effectively with
our Municipal government and raise awareness of gender mainstreaming and
ultimately facilitate its implementation. The conclusion of the second year of
this project involved Peel region’s participation in the UN-Habitat Conference,
the World Urban Forum III (WUF3).
Since the mid 1970s, the United Nations has been experiencing a ground
swell of women-led advocacy around issues of women’s safety and political
participation. At that time, the United Nations supported the UN Environmental
Program (UNEP), which struggled to differentiate the complex intersection
of environmental and habitat issues (Lee-Smith, 2006). The result was the
formation of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS),
which, in 2002 became United Nations Habitat (UN-Habitat), a full fledged
program of the United Nations (Lee-Smith, 2006). The tireless advocacy of
many feminists and their allies to highlight women’s unique experience of
their environment and habitat fostered a growing consciousness of the rights of
women to own, control and inherit property, as well as their role in governance
and community development, including safety. The World Urban Forum III
took place in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada in June 2006 and was the
meeting ground for the Women in Cities International pilot site directors, as
well as thousands of women’s organizations from around the world.
The WUF3 was dedicated to examining rapid urbanization in a world where
half of humanity lives in cities and where, over the next 50 years, that proportion
is expected to reach two-thirds of the global population. Most of this urban
growth is taking place in developing countries, but wealthier nations are also
experiencing problems of rapid urbanization such as crumbling infrastructure,
smog, and social exclusion. The Region of Peel’s Commissioner of Health
and both collaborative directors traveled to Vancouver for the WUF3. The
Forum brought together experts from around the world representing all
levels of government, local authorities, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, community groups,
urban and business professionals, academics, students, and national and
international associations. For five days, thousands of participants from more
than 150 nations discussed, debated and shared experiences about how to make
our cities better places to live. Canada’s participation featured Peel Region,
along with the other five Canadian pilot sites, as models of communities
working effectively with their municipal government. The experience provided
the collaboratives with strategies to continue to broaden their influence with
the Region. Participation in this event provided PCAWA and PCSA with
a stronger rationale and an evidence-based foundation on which to begin
changing the unidirectional nature of their relationship with the Region and
introduced both the collaboratives and the Region of Peel to the fundamental
principles of gender mainstreaming in local governance.
Gender Mainstreaming in Peel Region
Upon returning from the World Urban Forum in June 2006, PCAWA,
PCSA and the regional Commissioner of Health developed new strategies as
to how to influence discussions about gender mainstreaming at the regional
level. Coincidentally, the Region was in the midst of developing a three-year
Regional Strategic Plan (2007-2010), for which it was soliciting stakeholder
input. Both collaboratives participated in the stakeholder sessions to attempt

170 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 171
to push for gender analysis at the Regional planning level. While input was
graciously received at that time, the priorities of the Regional Strategic Plan did
not reflect gender specifically, but rather referred to gender within the context
of a grouping of diverse communities and vulnerable people. Response to this
omission by the collaboratives was swift. A joint letter was prepared which
represented the collective disappointment of over 40 community agencies.
The Region of Peel responded by inviting PCSA and PCAWA to a meeting with
senior administrators, including the Regional Chair, the Chief Administrative
Officer and two commissioners (Health and Human Services). At this
unprecedented meeting, a series of recommendations for a “Gender Strategy”
were made. The following recommendations were presented by PCSA and
PCAWA to the Region of Peel:
• A commitment to developing and establishing a gender strategy in the 2007-
2010 Strategic Plan.
• A resourced staff person or consultant to implement the “gender strategy”
for Peel Region tied to the strategic priorities and plan.
• The adoption and application of an agreed upon gender equity tool through
which the Region considers the impacts of gendered experiences of diverse
groups of women.
• The development of an accountability process that engages diverse
women and women’s groups within Peel to ensure the success of the
gender strategy.
• The development of, and support for, a Women’s Advisory Council to ensure
structured community participation by diverse women and women’s groups
to advise the Region on issues of concern.
• The expansion of financial support from Peel region to gender specific work
through support of the PCSA and PCAWA collaboratives.
Shortly following this meeting, two of the recommendations were adopted
by the Region: a senior staff person from the Region was assigned to work in
partnership with the collaboratives on issues of gender mainstreaming, and
a commitment was made to identifying and using a gender equity tool. The
Region was not questioning “why” gender mainstreaming was critical, but
acknowledging that they needed the collaboratives’ help in understanding
“how” we could successfully work together to achieve it. This was indeed a
turning point in our work together and has been the foundation and centre of
our work since.
Following several brainstorming meetings over several months, we collectively
agreed to proceed by exploring the adoption of a gender equity tool. We discussed
how to integrate such a tool, and in particular the existing one developed by
the City of Ottawa, into regional strategic processes at all levels. Additionally,
work with senior regional staff began to identify and align pre-existing work
at the Region which was addressing some of the individual, relationship and
social/systemic factors identified by the World Health Organization as key risk
factors for violence (Krug et al., 2002).
The work with the Region of Peel in the prevention of violence against women
remains a case study “in motion”, as it is still largely in its infancy. The
relationship with and support from WICI was the catalyst from which the
well-established collaboratives gained the momentum necessary to work with
the Region in a richer and more reciprocal way. The gender mainstreaming
approach has provided a sound, evidence-based vehicle for PCAWA and PCSA
in working towards integrating gender as a dimension in planning, policy and
service delivery in Peel Region.
Successes and Challenges
Recognizing and Integrating Gender
According to Shaw and Capobianco (2004), “over the past few years the
need for gender to be taken into account at all policy levels has been clearly
articulated[…] There is now some evidence of greater understanding of the
need to put gender into crime prevention” (p. 3). The absence of a gender
analysis in political discourse contributes to the invisibility of private violence
that is perpetrated by friends, acquaintances and intimate partners and
family members in the privacy of homes. The systemic variables involved in
global violence against women and children are critical targets of effective
crime prevention and safe, sustainable cities. Gender mainstreaming, or
the incorporation of gender into all areas of public policy, was formally
promoted by the United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing
in 1995. It requires that governments ensure that women participate in
political decision-making (Shaw & Andrews, 2005). Central to the concept of
women’s empowerment and voice is an approach that walks with women from
dependence to autonomy. According to Whitzman (2006):
The people who are most vulnerable to violence can become experts in
what is needed to make their communities safer. They need to be listened

172 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 173
to, given the resources to help themselves, and empowered to make
positive decisions for themselves and the people they care for. (p. 25)
In Peel Region, we have met with considerable successes in the area of
naming gender and introducing concepts of gender mainstreaming, though
there is still much work to be done. Successes include the broadening of a
gender equity approach into a multi-focal strategy that recognizes intersecting
oppressions and is more inclusive. Also, there is an increasing understanding
on the part of funders of the priority of addressing violence against women and
of the importance of consulting with women-centred service agencies around
their future funding priorities. There is a growing acknowledgement of the
notions of equity and inclusion and most community initiatives have a strong
“diversity” component. Lastly, initiatives such as those supported by WICI
and Status of Women Canada highlight the connection between global and
local advocacy efforts and provide us with rare opportunities to position our
Region in the context of international advocacy.
Despite these successes, we continue to face a number of challenges in the area
of naming gender and successfully applying a gender mainstreaming approach.
Woman abuse and sexual violence continue to remain outside the traditional
notions of crime prevention. Many victims and advocates continue to place
issues of woman abuse outside of the concept of “crime” – statistics around
disclosure and accessing the criminal justice system for domestic violence
and sexual assault reiterate the great number of victims who do not see the
criminal justice system as providing them with just, nor, acceptable solutions.
While the reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the scope of this case
study, the relevance to our work in Peel is that the concept of preventive work
around woman abuse and sexual violence is often secondary to the work of
providing adequate and valuable service to victims who are seeking support. In
an environment where waiting lists, case overload and project-based funding
prevail, education, advocacy and prevention initiatives are sparse, short-term
and difficult if not impossible to adequately evaluate. Where communities are
fortunate enough to have community collaboration, the participants typically
lack the capacity to adequately or extensively evaluate the short or long-term
efficacy and effectiveness of any given initiative.
Regional Government: The Ideal Site
for the Prevention of Woman Abuse
According to Hayes (2006), “it is at the local level and via local government
that violence prevention policies and interventions may best be enacted, with
municipal governments facilitating the coordination of local initiatives and
supporting community initiatives” (p. 9). Gender mainstreaming approaches
attempt to resource, coordinate and mainstream the many separate services
that exist independently at the regional level of government (Hayes, 2006).
UN-Habitat concurs that local government is a key player in strategies to
fight violence against women and in making connections between women’s
experiences of private and public violence.
Governance includes the pivotal role of mayors and other municipal leaders
in confronting increasing problems of community safety. Shaw (2001) argues
that the twenty-first century will present a “huge challenge” for mayors and
local government around emerging issues of urban migration, poverty, social
exclusion, minority and immigrant populations, substance abuse and urban
crime. Local governments are coming to view community safety as a human
right and a necessary condition for full participation in civic life, and crime
remains a debilitating threat to urban sustainability.
The work in Peel Region highlights our success in partnering with local
government around the issues of woman abuse and sexual assault. There is
an ongoing commitment from PCAWA, PCSA and the Region of Peel to
engage the regional leaders and the Region as the appropriate place to link
all efforts to address the prevention of woman abuse. This is largely due to
successes in working collaboratively with multiple sectors to engage in effective
crime prevention.
Challenges include the lack of a formal regional vision on crime reduction that
is inclusive of a gender analysis, as well as the absence of a formalized process for
the Region to engage in community consultation and to incorporate the input
into operations. In addition, the community collaboratives, while formally
structured, have difficulty in sustaining consistent partnerships due to a lack
of funding, the turnover of leadership, changing membership, competing
priorities and sometimes differing philosophies and ideologies.
Financial and Ideological Support
The financial sustainability of collaboratives remains tenuous and unstable.
Both PCAWA and PCSA have some core funding, but they are largely influenced
by external factors and the political climate of the day. This instability and the
constant need to chase funding can result in staff turnover. Unfortunately, most
collaboratives do not have a paid or formally structured coordinator position,
and collaborative work is often taken on by dedicated staff as an add-on to full

174 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention of Violence Against Women 175
time work commitments. This compromises the sustainability of partnerships
with regional government. Sustaining relationships and strategic objectives
long enough to accomplish the formal integration of gender mainstreaming
into regional policy becomes very difficult when staff and organizations are at
constant risk.
Another problem is the tendency for funding bodies to restrict support to
project-based work. Without operational support, agencies scramble to meet
the funder requirements, and often must apply staff resources and volunteers
to short-term, unsustainable programs. There is usually relatively little hope of
having the capacity to maintain the project after the funding ends. In addition,
non-incorporated agencies (like community collaboratives) require a lead
agency to serve as the financial administrator for the funds. These agencies
may be competing for the same funding. Despite assurances by funders
that all proposals are considered separately and that they greatly encourage
community partnerships, agencies may be afraid that partnering with others
or that serving as a lead will compromise their chances of receiving funding.
In addition, some initiatives are not defined as part of the core function of
the collaborative, and therefore are difficult to maintain. In Peel, the work
of gender mainstreaming is a relatively new initiative and has not received
specific financial support. This additional work then becomes one of the many
priorities of the collaboratives and is at times difficult to sustain in the face of
competing demands.
Collaboratives such as PCAWA and PCSA are accountable to their member
agencies and must exercise caution around messaging and media interaction.
Mainstream organizations, who receive funding from a government body or
with a visible public profile, may not be agreeable to strong, critical messages
about issues such as intimate relationships and sexual behaviours, and may be
cautious about criticism of systemic and institutional discrimination. Gender
neutrality seems to be a palatable reaction to the challenges of addressing the
issue of woman abuse, and this serves to hamper crime prevention efforts
aimed at violence against women.
Conclusions
PCAWA, PCSA and the Region of Peel are well aware of the challenges that are
inherent in this work. The future of the partnership between the collaboratives
and the municipal government is rooted in a strong foundation. In the
foreseeable future, it appears as if all partners are committed to investing in this
gender mainstreaming initiative. Despite this optimism, we are also aware that
resistance (both practically and ideologically) is common. While confronting
this, it is critical that we continue to work towards building and nurturing the
trust between the individuals and agencies involved, and recognize and utilize
the support of allies within the municipal government. We also recognize that
moving forward in Peel requires an ongoing commitment to an anti-racism/
anti-oppression feminist framework as reflected in the “multi-focal approach”
with the regional government. The collaboratives are working towards a
sustainable strategy and a sustainable structure that can cope with changes to
staffing, turn-over in political leaders and a varying political climate. The goals
of the collaboratives are to have gender and other identities such as race, faith,
sexual orientation, class and ability recognized, and to address and overcome
the inequality that exists.
The prevention of violence against women remains on the margins for most
local and regional governments. The private nature of woman abuse and sexual
violence, and the tendency to blame victims rather that those perpetrating the
violence, are a significant part of the problem (Johnson, 2007). Despite this,
considerable advances have been made in the area of women’s safety, stranger
assaults and public spaces. Unfortunately, far less has been accomplished in
responding to the private nature of violence against women and the irrefutable
connection to systemic conditions of gender inequality.
In response, it is paramount that community collaboratives and their respective
memberships work together to develop a shared vision to ensure successful
community partnerships, project successes and credible relationships with
funders. In essence, the evolution of solid partnerships between local/regional
government and community service agencies serves to sustain the collective
work of the regional government and the collaboratives.
We know that our work in Peel Region is in its infancy but we have been
successful in creating a space for dialogue and learning. Working with regional
government requires a belief in the process of “relentless incrementalism” and
the passion to persevere in the face of anything and everything that gets in the
way of our vision to one day end violence against women.
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Volume 3: pages 179–200
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Venir en aide aux enfants
exposés à la violence conjugale :
évaluation d’un projet pilote de
collaboration intersectorielle
Myriam Dubé
Chercheure, CRI-VIFF
Raymonde Boisvert
Professionnelle de recherche, CRI-VIFF
Abstract
Two health and social services networks in Montréal have been developing
and implementing a protocol to guide intersectoral collaboration in cases
of children exposed to domestic violence. The protocol specifies four welldefined
types of collaboration: the exchange of information, personalized
references, personalized transfers and clinical exchanges. Participants in
the protocol come from six different institutional and community sectors:
shelters for women victims of domestic violence, services geared towards
abusive partners, Health and Social Services Centres, youth centres, Service
Côté Cour, and the Montreal Police Services. This exploratory study assesses
the implementation of the protocol in these two networks. The results show
that an in-depth knowledge of the mandates of the various organizations
and of how they function in practice is key to facilitating the implementation
of the protocol by the participants. The author recommends involving a
number of participants who are familiar with the two organizational cultures
in question (community and institutional) in order to further help develop a
common language that would facilitate future efforts in collaboration.

180 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 181
Résumé
Un protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la
violence conjugale a été implanté dans le cadre d’un projet pilote prenant
place à l’intérieur de deux réseaux de services sociaux et de santé à Montréal.
Ce protocole présente quatre modalités bien définies de collaboration
(échange d’informations, références personnalisées, transferts personnalisés
et échanges cliniques) partagées par six partenaires provenant des secteurs
communautaires et institutionnels, soit les maisons d’hébergement pour
les femmes victimes de violence conjugale, les organismes pour conjoints
ayant des comportements violents, les Centres de santé et de services
sociaux, les centres jeunesse, Côté Cour et le Service de police de la Ville de
Montréal. Une étude exploratoire dresse un constat de l’implantation dans
ces deux réseaux. Les résultats montrent qu’une connaissance pratique et
intégrée de l’articulation des mandats et du fonctionnement de l’ensemble
des organisations facilite l’utilisation du protocole par l’ensemble des
partenaires. La recherche d’un certain nombre d’acteurs qui connaissent
les deux cultures organisationnelles (communautaire et institutionnel) afin
de faciliter l’arrimage entre celles-ci par le partage d’un langage commun
est une recommandation du présent rapport.
Introduction 1
Le partenariat et l’action intersectorielle sont des notions similaires mais non
interchangeables, la première étant une condition nécessaire à la réalisation
de la seconde. Lorsqu’on traite d’action intersectorielle, peu importe le
champ du social où l’on se situe, on aborde inévitablement la notion d’un
partenariat dans lequel s’inscrit « un rapport complémentaire et équitable »
entre des structures, « différentes par leur nature, leur mission, leurs activités,
leurs ressources et leur mode de fonctionnement, fondé sur un respect et une
reconnaissance mutuelle des contributions et des parties impliquées dans un
rapport d’interdépendance » (Panet-Raymond et Bourque, 1991 dans Savard,
Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003, p. 24). Lorsque l’objectif de ce partenariat
est de mettre en place un plan d’action global pour résoudre un problème
1 Nous remercions chaleureusement les intervenantes et les intervenants qui ont accepté avec beaucoup
d’affabilité de participer aux entrevues de recherche, malgré leur travail très prenant, mais combien
essentiel, auprès des personnes qui vivent une situation de violence conjugale. Nous tenons aussi à
remercier tous les membres du comité de suivi et des comités locaux d’implantation rattachés à la Table de
concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal qui ont accepté généreusement de partager avec nous leurs
réflexions, enrichissantes et constructives, autour du protocole et de cet article. Selon notre humble avis,
c’est l’engagement de tous auprès des personnes vivant de la violence conjugale, et particulièrement auprès
des enfants qui y sont exposés, qui va faire la différence dans la prévention de cette problématique en en
déracinant la transmission intergénérationnelle.
complexe (Ouellet, Paiement et Tremblay, 1995), on touche à la notion
d’action intersectorielle. Et cette action est régie par plusieurs règles qui sont
relativement formelles et structurées.
Cette vision structurale de l’action intersectorielle se retrouve dans plusieurs
recherches en sciences sociales (Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003). Dans
chacun de ces domaines, des acteurs sociaux, soit des professionnelles,
proviennent du secteur communautaire et d’autres, du secteur institutionnel.
Certains peuvent aussi avoir travaillé dans les deux milieux. Les études ont
cherché à établir les facteurs qui influencent la nature des relations qui existent
entre ces deux secteurs d’activités sociales. Ces facteurs peuvent être regroupés
en deux catégories, les facteurs personnels et les facteurs organisationnels. Dans
plusieurs études, on souligne les qualités humaines des partenaires impliqués
dans l’action intersectorielle même si on reconnaît que ce ne sont pas là les seuls
facteurs ayant une influence sur la qualité des relations entre les organismes
(Clément, Tourigny et Doyon, 1999; Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003).
L’écoute, les échanges respectueux, la transparence, la capacité de remettre
ses propres idées en question facilitent l’action intersectorielle. Parmi d’autres
facteurs clés, Lamoureux et Lesemann identifient : « les conceptions de la
société véhiculées par l’intervenant de l’établissement public, ses sensibilités
à la communauté, son empathie pour les gens qu’il côtoie, sa formation à une
approche communautaire plutôt qu’unilatéralement clinique » (1988, p. 206
dans Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003).
Sur le plan organisationnel, plusieurs facteurs peuvent faciliter l’implication des
différents partenaires. La formalisation d’une entente écrite, sous la forme d’un
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle, précise les rôles, les responsabilités et
les mandats de chacun des partenaires, de même que les modalités d’application
de l’action intersectorielle. La participation à une table de concertation est une
autre forme de formalisation des échanges entre partenaires (Panet-Raymond
et Bourque, 1991 dans Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003). De plus, la
reconnaissance par les bailleurs de fonds des coûts engendrés par l’action
intersectorielle est souvent perçue comme un facteur de succès sine qua none
(Savard et Mayer, 2001). Certains textes sur le partenariat vont même pointer
la participation des usagers et usagères comme un élément garant de son succès
(René et Gervais, 2001).
Contexte historique du protocole : d’hier à aujourd’hui
En 2003, la Table de concertation en violence conjugale et l’Agence de la
santé et des services sociaux décident de s’allier pour partager leur expertise

182 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 183
et leur leadership respectif dans la création d’un protocole de collaboration
intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale et dans
l’implantation de celui-ci. Lors des premiers travaux du comité de suivi chargé
de la création et de l’implantation du protocole, les membres, peu importe leur
provenance organisationnelle, se sont entendus sur une définition commune
de l’exposition des enfants à la violence conjugale.
Ces débuts prometteurs se sont poursuivis au comité de suivi par le
développement de quatre modalités de collaboration :
1. L’échange d’informations est une discussion entre partenaires concernant la
situation personnelle ou familiale d’une cliente ou d’un client et permettant
de recueillir des informations, de connaître les services disponibles, de
préciser une intervention, d’évaluer une situation, d’actualiser un plan
d’intervention, etc.
2. Les références personnalisées sont effectuées en vue de prendre contact
avec un autre partenaire pour solliciter des services complémentaires ou
supplémentaires. L’organisme demandeur peut demeurer saisi du dossier
et peut conserver une responsabilité clinique dans le dossier. Il est à noter
que l’intervenant et l’intervenante recevant une demande de référence
personnalisée s’engage à émettre un accusé réception (téléphonique ou écrit)
dans les 72 heures suivant la demande. De plus, l’endroit où rejoindre la
cliente référée devra être spécifiquement indiqué afin d’assurer la sécurité
et la protection. Dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement et des organismes
pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, la clientèle prend contact
avec l’organisme.
3. Les transferts personnalisés sont réalisés en vue de prendre contact
avec un autre partenaire pour solliciter des services complémentaires ou
supplémentaires. L’organisme demandeur ne demeure plus saisi du dossier et
ne conserve pas de responsabilité clinique dans le dossier.
4. Les échanges cliniques favorisent la communication et la transmission
d’informations pertinentes entre les intervenantes et intervenants impliqués.
La collaboration entre les partenaires devrait permettre des échanges
cliniques visant l’amélioration des services offerts aux familles aux prises avec
la violence conjugale. Lorsque jugées à propos, la présence et la participation
de la cliente ou du client sont favorisées. Des plans de services individualisés
peuvent aussi être élaborés par les partenaires impliqués en vue de coordonner
et d’harmoniser les interventions. Ceux-ci peuvent être modifiés en tout
temps pour tenir compte de circonstances nouvelles. Dès que plus d’un
partenaire est impliqué, les échanges cliniques sont recommandés. Ceci
devient une stratégie d’intervention supplémentaire. Ces échanges doivent
se dérouler dans la confidentialité et la sécurité des familles.
Il est à noter que, dans chaque cas, un formulaire d’autorisation dûment signé
par la cliente/le client est nécessaire.
Ces modalités, étant les assises mêmes du protocole de collaboration
intersectorielle, sont d’ailleurs maintenant implantées, dans le cadre d’un projet
pilote, depuis octobre 2006 sur deux territoires de la santé et des services sociaux
à Montréal, soit le Centre de santé et de services sociaux (CSSS) Jeanne-Mance
et le CSSS de la Montagne. Six différents partenaires, dans chacun des territoires
couverts, ont accepté de participer à cette implantation, soit les maisons
d’hébergement pour les femmes victimes de violence conjugale, les centres
jeunesse, les organismes pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, les
CSSS, Côté Cour et le Service de police de la ville de Montréal (SPVM).
Cette implantation a démarré par une formation dont l’objectif principal était
de favoriser la collaboration intersectorielle par l’utilisation du protocole dans
les deux réseaux impliqués. Elle portait ainsi sur la problématique des enfants
exposés à la violence conjugale, sur les mandats des organisations partenaires
au protocole ainsi que sur les modalités du protocole et leur application. Les 10
sessions de formation de deux jours ont permis de rejoindre 163 intervenantes et
intervenants provenant des différentes organisations partenaires du protocole.
Méthodologie
Les objectifs spécifiques de cette étude exploratoire sont les suivants :
• Identifier les difficultés résultant de l’application des modalités de
collaboration et de référence
• Identifier les conditions facilitatrices
• Positionner les rôles, s’il y a lieu
• Proposer des ajustements, si nécessaire, dans l’application du protocole.
Dans le cadre de cette évaluation portant sur le projet pilote d’implantation
du protocole, nous avons réalisé 12 entrevues avec des intervenantes et des
intervenants qui ont à utiliser ce protocole. Nous avions prévu rencontrer six
personnes qui avaient reçu la formation sur l’utilisation du protocole et six qui
ne l’avaient pas reçue, soit deux par organisation (un formé et un non formé).
Ces organisations étaient toutes rattachées aux territoires des deux CSSS où

184 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 185
le projet pilote d’implantation du protocole avait lieu. Toutefois, il s’est avéré,
dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement, dans celui des organismes d’aide pour
conjoints ayant des comportements violents et dans le cas de Côté Cour, que
tous les intervenantes et intervenants avaient reçu la formation. Nous avons
donc interviewé huit intervenantes et intervenants qui avaient reçu la formation
et quatre qui ne l’avaient pas suivie. L’objectif visé par les entrevues était de
savoir si on utilisait ou non le protocole de collaboration lors des interventions,
quels en étaient les motifs ainsi que de connaître le contexte d’utilisation dans
lequel les modalités d’action prenaient place.
Avec l’autorisation des participantes et des participants, les entrevues ont été
enregistrées et ensuite retranscrites intégralement. Par la suite, une analyse
thématique de contenu (Quivy et van Campenhoudt, 2006) a permis de dégager
les principaux thèmes des entrevues qualitatives. Dans ce type d’analyse, la
représentativité du contenu des discours à l’étude est assurée par le principe de
saturation, c’est-à-dire que la cueillette de nouvelles données cesse lorsqu’aucun
contenu nouveau n’apparaît, ce qui est le cas dans la présente étude. Un logiciel
d’analyse de contenu, soit QSR NVIVO a été utilisé. La réduction des données
a permis de structurer l’information en catégories selon les objectifs de la
recherche. Le matériel a été ensuite organisé par thèmes et regroupé. Le guide
de codification ainsi développé a permis d’analyser l’ensemble des verbatims
des entrevues. En conformité avec le processus d’analyse qualitative, ce guide
de codification a été élaboré par deux personnes indépendantes. Par ailleurs,
la saturation de l’échantillon a été obtenue suite à l’analyse qualitative des 12
entrevues quant aux catégories principales de ce guide, soit les informations sur
le mandat de l’organisme, l’exposition à la violence conjugale, la connaissance du
protocole et son utilisation.
Résultats
Mandat des organisations partenaires
Le mandat des organisations consiste essentiellement à offrir de l’aide, soit aux
femmes violentées dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement, aux victimes de
violence conjugale et familiale dans le cas de Côté Cour, aux enfants en ce qui
concerne les centres jeunesse, aux conjoints dans le cas des organismes pour
conjoints ayant des comportements violents, à l’ensemble des citoyens dans le
cas des CSSS et du Service de police.
Le mandat des intervenantes qui offrent de l’aide aux femmes en maison
d’hébergement est d’abord axé sur la sécurité des femmes et des enfants.
Donc on offre de l’hébergement d’urgence, en situation de crise aux
femmes qui veulent soit quitter le domicile familial où il y a la violence
ou du moins prendre un répit de ce qui arrive à la maison pour venir
réfléchir dans un lieu sécuritaire. […] Chez nous, c’est notre mandat
premier, les enfants. (Entrevue 7)
Le service Côté Cour, pour sa part, vient en aide aux victimes de violence
conjugale et familiale. Les intervenantes peuvent ainsi rencontrer des parents
qui ont été violentés par leurs enfants, des enfants qui ont été violentés par leurs
parents, mais environ 80 % des usagers sont des femmes victimes de violence
conjugale. Le rôle des intervenantes qui y travaillent est de venir en aide aux
victimes de violence conjugale qui ont porté plainte à la police et qui doivent
composer avec le système judiciaire. Elles évaluent la situation de la femme,
lui fournissent une aide psychosociale qui répond à ses besoins et font des
recommandations au procureur de la Couronne. Elles collaborent également à
un programme, qui existe depuis une dizaine d’années, nommé Communicaction
qui offre un service aux victimes dès la sortie de détention de l’accusé.
Les centres jeunesse ont un mandat légal de protection pour les enfants qui
vivent différents types de compromission à leur sécurité ou leur développement
au sein du milieu familial.
Moi je travaille pour la préservation de la famille. On est un petit
département qui offre des services pour garder les enfants dans leur
milieu familial. Ça fait qu’on travaille avec les familles […] pour essayer
de tout faire pour les garder ensemble. (Entrevue 6)
Il existe aussi des services d’aide pour les auteurs de violence conjugale
au sein desquels les intervenants croient à l’importance du protocole. Cette
ressource communautaire a un rôle actif dans l’aide psychosociale apportée
aux conjoints et participe aussi aux activités de sensibilisation et de formation
de la relève et des collègues.
… à travers la psychothérapie afin d’aider les hommes à changer leurs
comportements violents dans un contexte intime et/ou familial. Alors
notre mandat principal c’est l’intervention auprès des hommes violents
[…] qui veulent entreprendre une démarche thérapeutique pour cesser
d’agir d’une façon violente. (Entrevue 5)
Les CSSS répondent à plusieurs mandats et offrent des :
… services d’accueil, d’évaluation, d’orientation, de référence, de
consultation auprès de la population. Donc je fais des suivis, des prises

186 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 187
en charge avec des personnes qui viennent, qui nous sont référés soit par
l’accueil psychosocial ou des fois par des organismes à l’extérieur. Donc
c’est un suivi individuel. (Entrevue 9)
Le service de police assure la sécurité psychologique, morale et physique de
l’ensemble des citoyennes et des citoyens. Les situations de violence conjugale
et familiale font partie des nombreux appels à la ligne d’urgence 911 sur l’île
de Montréal. Un policier mentionne que les agents sociocommunautaires de
quartier ont un rôle à jouer dans la prévention de la violence, entre autres,
par l’établissement de liens avec les organismes communautaires du quartier
(Entrevue 12).
L’exposition à la violence conjugale : c’est quoi?
Toutes les personnes interviewées parlent spontanément des éléments qui les
amènent à penser qu’un enfant a été exposé à la violence conjugale. Qu’elles
agissent directement auprès des enfants ou plutôt auprès de la famille ou des
femmes; de façon unanime, elles rapportent des éléments similaires quant à
l’exposition à la violence conjugale.
Dans les maisons d’hébergement, les intervenantes vont être attentives aux
signes présents chez l’enfant qui leur laissent voir qu’il vit les impacts de cette
exposition à la violence conjugale, que celle-ci soit directe ou indirecte.
Il y a des petits trucs des fois qui peuvent nous mettre la puce à l’oreille,
mais c’est sûr que tous les enfants qui arrivent ici on prend déjà pour
acquis qu’ils ont été témoins de la violence. (Entrevue 7)
De même les travailleuses sociales des CSSS sont sensibles au fait que l’enfant
ait pu être exposé à la violence subie par la mère et ce, même si cette dernière
n’a pas tout à fait nommé la violence conjugale, ni identifié sur elle-même tous
les effets de cette violence.
Et des fois ça va être des femmes qui n’en ont pas conscience, ça va être
plus la violence psychologique, elle va dire : « Je suis pas capable de voir
mes amis, il se fâche pour un rien … il est très inégal dans son humeur »,
mais sans me dire que c’est de la violence, et si elle a des enfants, moi, je
me doute que l’enfant voit ça et ensuite je suis sensible à ça qu’un enfant,
même en bas âge, il intériorise ça, …donc je vais le spécifier dans mon
évaluation. (Entrevue 4)
Les policiers, intervenants de première ligne, sont également sensibilisés au
fait que des enfants soient exposés à la violence conjugale, qu’elle soit physique,
verbale ou psychologique, et ils l’indiquent dans leur rapport. Ils transmettent
les informations à Côté Cour qui, de cette façon, a accès aux renseignements
portant sur le contexte de violence conjugale et sur le fait que des enfants
étaient présents. Les propos des intervenantes de Côté Cour vont dans le
même sens que ceux des policiers à l’effet qu’avant même l’implantation du
projet pilote, elles avaient déjà accès aux informations transmises par ces
derniers et elles pouvaient collaborer avec eux.
Les organismes pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents ont
une mission d’aide aux familles mais en passant par l’aide aux instigateurs de
violence. Les intervenants de ces organismes croient que si un homme qui a
des enfants accepte de suivre une thérapie pour régler un problème de violence,
c’est à peu près certain que ses enfants ont été exposés à cette violence.
Il est donc possible d’avancer que tout le monde interviewé a la même
perception de l’exposition à la violence conjugale et ce, même si le niveau de
connaissances varie quant à la complexité des effets de cette exposition. En
effet, les intervenantes et intervenants peuvent détecter le fait qu’un enfant
a été exposé en interrogeant le contexte de violence, et leur façon d’identifier
l’exposition demeure pratiquement la même.
Échange d’informations
Les intervenantes et intervenants ont été questionnés quant à leur application du
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle. Tout d’abord, ils devaient indiquer
le type de modalités qu’ils étaient appelés à utiliser le plus souvent dans le cadre
du protocole. Des entrevues, il ressort que les intervenantes et intervenants
font surtout de l’échange d’informations. De fait, plusieurs interviewés (8 sur
12) ont mentionné qu’ils utilisaient cette modalité et ce, la majorité du temps.
Par exemple, dans une maison d’hébergement, les intervenantes sont souvent
appelées à échanger des informations à propos des résidentes et ce, la majeure
partie du temps, par téléphone.
Au service de police, on utilise fréquemment le protocole car les patrouilleurs
sont sensibilisés à la problématique de l’exposition à la violence conjugale.
Leur rôle dans le protocole est surtout de transmettre l’information, en autant
qu’elle soit demandée.
Les CLSC [Centres locaux de services communautaires] n’ont pas accès
au rapport de police […] mais on a l’autorisation de donner une petite

188 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 189
narration de ce qui est arrivé. […] Le protocole, je le vois plus comme
l’utilisation par chaque organisme qui se dit : les enfants sont là, il faut
faire notre part de travail dans ça. (Entrevue 12)
Du côté des CSSS, les échanges d’informations se font avec l’ensemble des
partenaires au protocole et ce, dû à la diversité des services intégrés dans
leur mandat.
Les modalités souvent ça se fait par téléphone, les discussions… on a
besoin davantage d’informations aussi sur la situation, des fois on a
besoin de savoir est-ce qu’on peut laisser un message sur la boîte vocale
de la personne, tu sais des petits détails comme ça, qui au niveau du
scénario de protection sont importants à savoir. Donc, on contacte
l’agent sociocommunautaire ou le policier qui a pris la demande, qui a
pris… pour avoir plus d’informations. (Entrevue 9)
Le service Côté cour utilise fréquemment l’échange d’informations.
Par exemple, je rencontre une femme, je sais que la DPJ [Direction de
la protection de la jeuness] ou Batshaw est déjà impliqué, madame se
présente à la cour, elle veut absolument que la plainte soit retirée, elle
ne veut pas témoigner, moi après évaluation, je vois que les enfants,
il y a peut-être un risque de dangerosité, alors moi je vais transmettre
l’information à l’intervenant de la DPJ que la plainte a été retirée,
madame est retournée vivre avec son conjoint. Alors, c’est ce genre
d’information là qu’on transmet. (Entrevue 3)
Références personnalisées
Même si l’échange d’informations est la modalité qui sert le plus souvent
dans le cadre du protocole, on a parfois l’occasion de procéder à des références
personnalisées. La moitié des participantes et participants aux entrevues (6
sur 12) ont dit avoir déjà référé quelqu’un ou reçu une personne référée par un
organisme partenaire.
La référence personnalisée semble une modalité relativement utilisée par les
policiers, du moins quand il s’agit de référer au CSSS. Rappelons qu’il existe
un protocole de collaboration entre les CSSS et le SPVM.
La grosse grosse majeure partie en violence conjugale, on va référer au
CLSC. Par la suite, il y a une des personnes responsables dans chaque
poste de quartier qui va s’assurer du suivi au niveau est-ce que le
formulaire a été bien complété, est-ce que vous l’avez reçu? Il y a un lien
qui se fait entre les deux. (Entrevue 8)
La référence personnalisée semble aussi bien fonctionner du côté des CSSS à
l’endroit des autres organismes.
Si je reçois une demande et en cours de suivi, ça arrive aussi qu’on voit
qu’il y a une situation c’est la violence qu’on est en train d’évaluer […]
c’est le scénario de protection, c’est la prévention, et c’est de la référence
aussi au secteur enfants. (…) Donc, c’est des suivis qui peuvent être plus
longs, beaucoup plus longs. (Entrevue 9)
Échanges cliniques et transferts personnalisés
Cinq personnes mentionnent avoir fait des échanges cliniques dans certaines
situations. Les échanges cliniques avec d’autres organismes partenaires du
protocole sont plus courants en maison d’hébergement. Par exemple, une
intervenante raconte qu’elle a eu à effectuer des échanges cliniques avec la
Direction de la protection de la jeunesse (DPJ).
On a eu des fois où on est allé, des fois où eux sont venus à la maison ici,
puis qu’on s’est assis, le travailleur social, une intervenante de la maison
d’hébergement avec une résidente pour parler de sa situation à elle,
qu’est-ce qui va être mis en place par rapport à ses enfants, est-ce que je
lui réfère la maison d’hébergement, qu’est-ce que la DPJ va offrir, pour
voir si on ne dédouble pas une intervention là. (Entrevue 7)
À l’intérieur des maisons d’hébergement, les intervenantes échangent aussi
cliniquement avec des intervenantes d’autres organismes qui ne sont pas inclus
présentement au protocole. Elles estiment que le protocole devrait inclure
plus de partenaires qui seraient, eux aussi, qualifiés pour détecter la violence
conjugale et voir si un enfant y est exposé.
Seulement deux personnes ont parlé de transferts personnalisés, mais cela ne
signifie pas que les autres n’utilisent pas cette modalité. Il semble que dans les
maisons d’hébergement, le transfert personnalisé vers d’autres organismes
partenaires fasse partie de leurs interventions.
Si nous on doit transférer on va faire les démarches avec elle pour trouver
un autre endroit, une autre maison d’hébergement. Ça, on le faisait déjà.

190 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 191
Pour les CLSC, une femme qui quitte qui veut avoir quand même le
suivi psychosocial… on essaie de rentrer en contact avec une personne
au CLSC ou du moins on donne le numéro de téléphone, le nom d’une
personne-ressource. Même chose pour la DPJ aussi, on accompagne les
femmes même s’ils doivent faire un signalement ou qu’elles sont déjà
suivies par la DPJ, on les accompagne à ce niveau là. Donc c’est déjà des
choses qu’on faisait. (Entrevue 7)
Perception en regard du protocole et de son applicabilité
Nous avons voulu connaître la perception des intervenantes et intervenants
interrogés à propos du protocole. La majorité d’entre eux ont identifié certains
défis à relever dans son application. Cependant, ils ont aussi mentionné ce qu’ils
considéraient comme des bénéfices ou des acquis. Ils ont également expliqué
comment ils voyaient l’application du protocole dans leur organisme et s’ils
le considéraient approprié dans leur intervention. Pour finir, ils ont fourni
quelques pistes pour améliorer de façon générale l’utilisation du protocole.
Quelques-uns ont relevé des résistances à travailler en partenariat, celles-ci
touchant plus précisément l’éthique d’intervention.
C’est drôle, c’est l’idéal de travailler en réseau mais ils ne savent pas si
ça va se faire, compte tenu du volume, de la charge de travail, puis de la
résistance aussi. Parce que c’est une toute autre manière de travailler. Il y a
peut-être plus de résistance qu’on pense. Je pense qu’ici on attend de voir
pour savoir jusqu’où on peut aller dans la circulation de l’information.
La résistance elle serait plutôt là, c’est quoi les limites à la confidentialité,
qu’est-ce qu’on peut partager, est-ce qu’on peut tant que ça faire des
réunions sans que monsieur ou madame soient là? (Entrevue 2)
Dans les maisons d’hébergement, on a aussi certaines réserves de nature
éthique quant à l’utilisation du protocole dans le meilleur intérêt de la mère et
de l’enfant.
On veut améliorer la vie de l’enfant, mais on trouve souvent qu’on
nous demande de donner plus qu’on veut parce que l’information
qu’ils nous demandent … ça peut tourner mauvaisement pour la mère
de l’enfant. […] Par exemple, si j’ai une femme qui frappe son enfant
on ne va pas appeler la DPJ, on va travailler avec cette femme, on va
travailler avec les problèmes dans la maison, le temps qu’elle est avec
nous autres, on va essayer de travailler avec elle. Quand elle part de
chez nous, c’est sûr et certain que si on trouve que son comportement
n’est pas parti et ça a continué, c’est sûr et certain que la DPJ va être
appelée. (Entrevue 1)
Plusieurs répondantes et répondants déplorent la méconnaissance du protocole
et trouvent difficile de collaborer avec des intervenantes et intervenants de
d’autres organismes qui n’ont jamais ou guère entendu parler du protocole.
J’ai vu un intervenant du centre jeunesse la semaine passée qui s’est
présenté à la cour, puis on avait un dossier commun justement, et lui
n’était pas au courant du tout du protocole enfant témoin. Il n’avait
jamais entendu parler de ça. (Entrevue 3)
Il semble que le rituel de passage d’une philosophie de travail en silo à une
philosophie de collaboration intersectorielle qui se veut rassembleuse, comme
le suggère le protocole, demande un changement de mentalité pour travailler
en partenariat, malgré et avec les différentes façons d’intervenir. Et qui dit
changement, dit temps.
Je pense que c’est le temps, ce n’est pas du jour au lendemain que ça va
rentrer dans les habitudes et dans les cultures de chaque organisme. Mais
il faut qu’il y ait une volonté aussi de la part des cadres. (Entrevue 3)
Dans certaines situations, on trouve difficile de concilier les mandats d’aide
et de contrôle et cela complique la relation et diminue d’autant l’efficacité de
la collaboration. Par exemple, dans les maisons d’hébergement, on tient à la
collaboration, mais on n’est pas nécessairement prêt à tout dévoiler des usagères.
Alors, comment concilier les différents mandats? On retrouve le même obstacle
du côté des organismes d’aide pour les conjoints ayant des comportements
violents qui, eux, n’ont pas un mandat de contrôle mais bien d’aide.
Des comités sont mis sur pied afin que les organismes qui ont des philosophies
d’intervention différentes, pour ne pas dire contraires, trouvent un
terrain d’entente.
Il y a un comité qui existe…pour améliorer justement la collaboration
entre les deux organismes, parce que nous on travaille sur une base
volontaire et la DPJ francophone et anglophone sont davantage sur une
base non volontaire dans la vie des gens, des familles, sans que personne
les ait appelés, on les a invités plutôt là. Donc, on avait souvent des
difficultés de collaborer ensemble parce que nos mandats sont tous
différents. (Entrevue 7)

192 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 193
Malgré des difficultés identifiées lors de l’application du protocole, notamment
du côté des centres jeunesse, on le trouve pertinent.
Moi je vous dis très honnêtement, j’aime beaucoup ce genre de
collaboration, ce protocole là à savoir, c’est nécessaire dans notre travail.
Nous on en a besoin de ça. […] Parfois on manque d’outils, on manque
de gens qui peuvent nous aider, nous supporter, nous encourager, dans
l’intervention à faire […] On le déplore depuis beaucoup d’années, du fait
de trop se retrouver seuls et quand on avait besoin de services externes,
c’était toujours très long avant de pouvoir obtenir une évaluation, obtenir
un suivi, obtenir… Puis je me dis plus on rend le service rapidement à
l’enfant, puis si l’enfant a minimalement le potentiel, bien mon Dieu
c’est intéressant. (Entrevue 10)
En CSSS, on sentait aussi le besoin de pouvoir s’appuyer sur quelque chose
de tangible afin que la communication passe entre les organismes. Dans ce
contexte, le protocole semble contribuer à la concertation et à la continuité
dans l’accès aux services. Dans les maisons d’hébergement, on le trouve utile
pour sensibiliser les autres organismes à la problématique des enfants exposés.
Oui, c’est ça, mon point de vue c’est que ça peut être positif pour
davantage sensibiliser les autres organismes qui le sont peut-être même
moins par rapport à la violence conjugale, les effets que ça peut avoir
sur les enfants, l’importance d’offrir de la continuité dans leurs services,
pour ça oui. Pour sensibiliser davantage, je vois que ça a un lien.
(Entrevue 7)
Malgré les défis à relever dans la collaboration entre les divers organismes
partenaires, il ressort des entrevues que dans le cas des enfants exposés à la
violence conjugale, les intervenantes et intervenants ont tendance à collaborer
avec des intervenants et intervenantes de d’autres organismes qui ne sont pas
impliqués dans le projet pilote.
À la Direction de la protection de la jeunesse, on fait ainsi fréquemment
appel aux hôpitaux dans les cas où l’enfant est exposé à la violence conjugale.
… On s’assoit une table de 10 intervenants avec les parents où là on a
vraiment une panoplie de services qui peut se mettre en place rapidement.
Puis c’est fascinant à partir du moment où tout le monde est mobilisé
autour du service à rendre à la famille. (Entrevue 10)
Les maisons d’hébergement sont aussi en communication avec d’autres
organismes et, semble-t-il, assez fréquemment avec les écoles et les CPE.
…si les écoles ou les CPE étaient impliqués dans le projet comme
partenaires par exemple, ça aurait été utilisé très souvent. Le seul endroit
que j’aimerais le voir, comme j’ai dit plusieurs fois, c’est dans les écoles et
les CPE. On travaille de la même manière qu’eux autres, avec l’acte signé
par la mère qui nous donne le droit de parler pour elle, de parler de son
cas avec l’école ou le CPE. (Entrevue 1)
Les maisons d’hébergement traitent aussi avec l’Indemnisation des victimes
d’actes criminels (IVAC) d’après cette même intervenante. « C’est un grand
nombre de nos clientes qu’on réfère à l’IVAC, on fait une demande à l’IVAC.
Oui, parce qu’être victime de violence conjugale, l’IVAC va payer pour le
psychologique » (Entrevue 1). D’ailleurs, on pense sensiblement de la même
façon du côté des ressources pour conjoints ayant des comportements
violents. En effet, on juge aussi qu’il faudrait impliquer d’autres partenaires
dans le projet, à tout le moins dans les comités.
Je pense qu’il y a des joueurs qui sont pas présents qui peut-être auraient
avantage, et c’est tout le réseau qui aurait avantage à les inviter à faire
peut-être partie de ce comité local. Exemple, les écoles, écoles primaires,
les CPE, centres de petite enfance, les maisons de transition, ce sont des
partenaires qui sont impliqués, ils ont eu affaire avec des familles, avec
des pères, avec des mères des enfants. (Entrevue 5)
Afin de relever les nombreux défis qui jalonnent le travail en partenariat, les
répondantes et répondants proposent des solutions ou des outils susceptibles
de soutenir la collaboration entre les partenaires. Par exemple, on suggère
de donner des exemples d’activités, en lien avec le protocole, qui ont bien
fonctionné. Ces exemples serviraient à faire connaître les possibilités qu’il offre
à l’ensemble des partenaires.
Un répondant croit qu’il est plus difficile d’implanter le protocole dans des
organisations où il y a beaucoup de roulement de personnel et lorsqu’il y a
plusieurs intervenantes et intervenants à rejoindre. À son avis, c’est moins
complexe lorsque l’organisme est plus petit, car se dessine la possibilité
d’entrevoir une autre façon de travailler en intervention.
On est un petit organisme, c’est plus facile de transmettre, de disséminer
de l’information. Je pense que premièrement implanter quelque chose de

194 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 195
nouveau il faut avoir l’ouverture et l’ouverture d’esprit pour commencer à
penser à des choses d’une façon un peu plus différente. Et l’implantation,
et peut-être le futur succès de l’implantation du protocole ça va
dépendre de ça je pense. Et que l’esprit derrière tout ça c’est qu’on fait
une tentative de mieux aider les enfants et parallèlement les familles, les
pères, les mères. Alors c’est un début d’échange entre partenaires, entre
intervenants, et je pense que ça peut être un déclencheur de plusieurs
échanges entre partenaires dans le futur. (Entrevue 5)
Sensibiliser les intervenantes et intervenants au protocole par de la formation
continue a également été mentionné. Ces formations contribueraient à favoriser
une meilleure interprétation du protocole et aideraient à la compréhension des
modalités d’action. Une version en anglais simplifierait aussi l’application du
protocole et serait grandement appréciée du côté anglophone.
Pour faciliter l’utilisation du protocole et qu’on ait le réflexe de le faire, il
faudrait sans doute des outils qui peuvent être consultés d’un simple coup
d’œil. De fait, tous les partenaires ont mentionné qu’il faudrait des outils dont
le contenu est à la fois complet, facilement accessible, clair et d’application
concrète, car certaines personnes ne comprennent pas toujours de la même
façon toutes les modalités d’application.
Discussion des résultats et recommandations
Rappelons que les partenaires engagés dans le protocole de collaboration
intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale proviennent
de deux secteurs principaux d’intervention : le communautaire, auquel
appartiennent les partenaires des maisons d’hébergement et des organismes
pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, et l’institutionnel, auquel se
rattachent les partenaires des centres jeunesse, des CSSS, de Côté Cour et du
SPVM. Donc, deux secteurs, deux façons différentes et complémentaires de
concevoir l’intervention tant dans les objectifs que dans la philosophie sousjacente.
À cet égard, il est plus que nécessaire de souligner l’implication, dans
ce projet-pilote, de l’Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal
et de la Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal qui a
permis l’implantation de ce protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour
les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale. Sans la volonté et le leadership
décisionnels de ces deux pouvoirs politiques et sans la concertation entre ceuxci,
le développement d’une véritable collaboration entre les divers secteurs
d’intervention n’aurait pu se faire.
Missions des partenaires : des réalités contrastées
Un accent particulier a ainsi été mis sur les mandats des différentes
organisations. Dans la collaboration intersectorielle, bien connaître le
mandat des partenaires permet de mieux cerner les limites organisationnelles
auxquelles font face l’ensemble de ceux-ci. Les résultats pointent l’importance,
à cet égard, de pouvoir compter, au sein du protocole, des partenaires pivots,
motivés par la collaboration intersectorielle dans l’intervention auprès des
enfants exposés, qui, non seulement, connaissent très bien les rouages de
leur organisation, mais peuvent, de surcroît, les communiquer simplement
et efficacement aux autres partenaires. Les résultats sous-tendent aussi la
pertinence d’intégrer des partenaires qui ont travaillé au sein de plus d’une
culture organisationnelle et qui peuvent faciliter le développement de relations
entre les acteurs de divers secteurs d’intervention. Les résultats de Lessard et
coll. (2006) montrent d’ailleurs qu’une meilleure connaissance de l’ensemble
des partenaires est une stratégie permettant de contourner les difficultés liées
aux contingences légales et matérielles.
Par ailleurs, les propos des participantes et participants travaillant en institution
rapportent aussi l’importance d’intégrer des cadres, d’une part, intéressés à
l’intervention auprès des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale, et d’autre part,
actifs dans des postes stratégiques leur permettant d’exercer une influence sur
les décisions qui se prennent à l’intérieur des organisations (sources d’accès au
financement disponible dans l’organisation pour le dégagement d’intervenantes
et d’intervenants qui travaillent à l’implantation du protocole, maintien de ce
dossier dans les priorités de l’organisation, etc.).
Le type de modalités utilisées dans le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle
est aussi tributaire des mandats des différentes organisations. Certaines
modalités d’action ne s’appliquent ainsi pas au travail de certains partenaires.
Par exemple, les échanges cliniques qui ne conviennent pas au travail des
policiers ne seront que très peu utilisés par eux. La modalité de références
personnalisées de victimes vers des services sociaux et de santé, bien au
contraire, fait partie de leur travail quotidien. L’utilisation de cette modalité
en est ainsi structurée par une entente de collaboration officialisée entre le
SPVM et les CSSS.
Par ailleurs, pour les maisons d’hébergement et les organismes pour les conjoints
ayant des comportements violents, l’échange clinique semble s’appliquer plus
facilement à leur culture organisationnelle. Les milieux communautaires étant
plus petits, ils ne sont pas soumis aux dédales administratifs qui alourdissent les

196 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 197
démarches d’intervention intersectorielle. Ils peuvent être ainsi plus efficaces
dans l’organisation de tels échanges.
Les transferts personnalisés font aussi partie de la culture organisationnelle des
organismes communautaires. On peut supposer que, contrairement aux CSSS
qui offrent un très vaste éventail de services en santé et services sociaux sur
place, les organismes communautaires ont la nécessité, pour mieux répondre
aux besoins à long terme des usagers, d’effectuer des transferts personnalisés
vers d’autres organismes.
L’échange d’informations est fréquemment utilisé par l’ensemble des
partenaires. Dans le cas du service Côté Cour, on a développé un réseau de
communication avec l’ensemble des partenaires autant dans la réception que
dans la transmission d’informations aidant à bien comprendre la situation des
femmes victimes de violence conjugale et favorisant le dépistage des enfants
exposés à cette violence.
La sensibilisation et la formation sur la problématique
des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale :
un incontournable dans le travail en partenariat
Le dépistage des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale est une initiative mise
de l’avant par le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle. L’ouverture du
protocole à d’autres partenaires que ceux initialement impliqués dans le projet
pilote va demander une formation commune sur la problématique des enfants
exposés qui est de plus mise à jour de façon constante, structurée, complète,
vulgarisée et adaptable selon les besoins des personnes qui y assistent, de façon
à ce qu’elle en rejoigne le plus grand nombre possible. De plus, cette formation
nécessitera une mise en application concrète des différentes modalités du
protocole à partir de situations réelles, demandant une intervention concertée
entre partenaires et ce, afin que les acteurs suivant la formation puisse d’ors et
déjà se les approprier.
Les formations auront aussi tout avantage à être montées et animées par des
gens de terrain qui ont une expertise en intervention auprès des enfants exposés
à la violence conjugale. Comme les secteurs communautaire et institutionnel
sont représentés dans ce protocole, il serait équitable et réaliste qu’ils le soient
aussi au sein des formations le concernant. La qualité des échanges entre les
formateurs, le travail de concertation qu’ils auront dû réaliser pour créer et
donner la formation (contenu et contenant), les stratégies de collaboration qu’ils
auront développées ensemble pour tenir compte du mandat de leur organisation
et de leur philosophie d’intervention respective, permettront aux participantes
et participants à la formation de s’ancrer dans le travail en partenariat.
Les intervenantes et intervenants du secteur communautaire et institutionnel
déplorent d’ailleurs la difficulté de travailler avec des philosophies
d’intervention différentes qui découlent, entre autres, des mandats d’aide
donnée sur une base volontaire et d’aide imposée par un contrôle judiciaire. À
ce titre, les maisons d’hébergement, les organismes pour les conjoints ayant des
comportements violents et les centres jeunesse ont tout intérêt à créer ensemble
une formation. D’une part, l’expertise des partenaires du communautaire
relativement à la problématique de la violence conjugale est indiscutable.
D’autre part, la reconnaissance officielle de l’exposition à la violence conjugale,
par le partenaire institutionnel, à titre de mauvais traitements psychologiques
pouvant compromettre l’intégrité morale et le développement de l’enfant et,
dans certains cas, entraîner d’autres problématiques ou y être concomitants,
amène une autre façon de concevoir la famille aux prises avec la violence
conjugale. Leur mandat respectif, leur façon d’intervenir et les objectifs qu’ils
poursuivent, même s’ils diffèrent, n’en restent pas moins complémentaires, et
méritent d’être arrimés par une compréhension en profondeur et commune de
l’exposition des enfants à la violence conjugale.
Un second avantage de la formation donnée de façon intersectorielle, outre
le fait de pouvoir réaliser que le travail en partenariat est une réalité possible,
est de pouvoir s’identifier à sa propre organisation. Plusieurs participantes
et participants ont mentionné que le protocole n’était pas connu au sein de
leur milieu. À tout le moins, une piste de solutions peut être empruntée. Les
personnes qui suivent la formation peuvent devenir des agents multiplicateurs
de l’application du protocole dans leur milieu de travail. La formation, à cet
égard, aura tout avantage à être répétée à intervalles réguliers, avec les mêmes
personnes, si elles le désirent, tout en incluant de nouveaux individus, de façon
à préserver les acquis, à faire de nouveaux apprentissages et à former le plus
de gens possible. L’avantage de ceci est de pallier les nombreux roulements de
personnel dans le secteur institutionnel et de la santé dus, entre autres, aux
constantes réorganisations des structures établies.
Outre la formation elle-même, les intervenantes et intervenants émettent la
possibilité d’aménager le protocole pour leurs collègues de travail en créant
des outils concrets et vulgarisés des différentes modalités sous l’angle de leurs
mandats respectifs. Ces outils pourraient être aussi présentés à une diversité de
partenaires, par le biais de la Table de concertation en violence conjugale de
Montréal et de l’Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal, engagées

198 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 199
dans l’implantation du protocole. Ce travail en équipe autour d’outils a, par
ailleurs, débuté depuis près d’un an dans deux sous-comités d’implantation du
protocole, appelés comités locaux de collaboration intersectorielle, au CSSS de
la Montagne et au CSSS Jeanne Mance. Des intervenantes et intervenants des
six groupes partenaires se mobilisent à intervalles réguliers, non seulement pour
y créer des outils pour vulgariser le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle,
mais aussi pour y discuter de situations cliniques réelles et envisager des solutions
possibles pour dénouer certaines difficultés et intervenir en partenariat dans le
meilleur intérêt de l’enfant et de sa famille.
Conclusion
L’implantation d’un tel protocole, aussi structuré et impliquant autant de
partenaires, est une première en Amérique du Nord (Harper, 2002). Le
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence
conjugale est plus qu’une structure de collaboration entre divers secteurs, elle
est une structure de partenariat qui nécessite de leur part une action collective
d’intervention. La collaboration intersectorielle est l’étape préalable à cette
action et pour qu’elle atteigne un engagement partenarial, il a fallu qu’elle
soit régie par des balises à la fois explicites et implicites qui l’ont structurée; ce
qu’est le protocole actuel. Ces balises peuvent être aménagées de façon souple,
modifiées, ajustées selon les besoins de l’intervention, et supposent donc une
qualité d’engagement dans l’action qui est omniprésente dans le partenariat.
Partant de cette analyse, il est recommandé que le terme protocole de
collaboration intersectorielle soit remplacé par celui d’action intersectorielle.
Cette action intersectorielle est tributaire de la volonté d’engagement des
partenaires dans l’intervention auprès des enfants exposés à la violence
conjugale et d’une ouverture pour partager les connaissances théoriques et
pratiques sur la problématique de même que les divers objectifs d’intervention
et les façons d’intervenir, et ce même si elles diffèrent. De ce fait, l’implantation
d’un protocole d’action intersectorielle, est aussi celle d’une philosophie
d’intervention. Philosophie, qui se veut rassembleuse, parce qu’implantée
pour décloisonner le travail en silo et l’ouvrir à un travail en complémentarité.
Et qui dit philosophie d’intervention dit durée et constance afin de réussir
à l’ancrer pour de bon dans les services sociaux et de santé, de même que
dans tous les services susceptibles d’agir auprès des enfants exposés à la
violence conjugale.
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(2006). Conditions for resolving controversies between social actors
in domestic violence and youth protection services: Toward innovative
collaborative practices. Children and Youth Services Review, 28, 511-
534.
Ouellet, F., Paiement, M., et Tremblay, P.-H. (1995). L’action intersectorielle,
un jeu d’équipe. Montréal : Direction de la santé publique de
Montréal-centre/CECOM de l’Hôpital Rivière-des-Prairies.
Quivy, R. et Van Campenhoudt, L. (2006). Manuel de recherche en sciences
sociales. Paris : Dunod.
René, J.-F. et Gervais, L. (2001). La dynamique partenariale : un état de la
question. Les enjeux du partenariat aujourd’hui. Nouvelles pratiques
sociales, 14(1), 20-30.
Savard, S. et Mayer, R. (2001). Le partenariat interorganisationnel dans
le secteur de la petite enfance : le cas des projets financés par le
Programme d’action communautaire pour les enfants. Revue
canadienne de service social, 18(1), 107-130.
Savard, S., Turcotte, D., et Beaudoin, A. (2003). Le partenariat et les
organisations sociosanitaires du secteur de l’enfance, de la famille et de
la jeunesse : une analyse stratégique. Nouvelles pratiques sociales, 16(2),
160-177.

200 Revue de l’IPC 3
Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal et Agence de
la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal. (2004). Protocole de
collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence
conjugale. Les modalités de référence et de collaboration. Montréal :
Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal. Consulté
le 15 janvier 2006, à : http://www.tcvcm.ca/images/docs/TCVCM_
ProtocoleCollaboration_enfants_2004-06-17.pdf
Volume 3: pages 201–222
March/mars 2009
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Revue de L’
IPC
R E V I E W
Concentrating Investments to
Prevent Violence Against Women
Holly Johnson & Jennifer Fraser
Department of Criminology & Institute for the Prevention of Crime
University of Ottawa
Résumé
Le Groupe de travail national sur la prévention de la criminalité (2007)
recommande la « concentration des investissements sur les besoins les
plus importants » comme un élément essentiel d’une stratégie nationale
efficace en prévention. Nous examinons ce que cela veut dire pour la
prévention de la violence contre les femmes en adressant trois grands
défis : maintenir un engagement politique de haut niveau à l’égard du
problème; développer un consensus sur des indicateurs appropriés pour
décrire le problème et évaluer le succès de nos interventions; et assurer
l’accès aux données nécessaires et à l’expertise technique pour bien les
utiliser. Nous considérons les avantages qu’une approche systématique
d’intégration de l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes (gender
mainstreaming) pourrait apporter au maintient d’un engagement politique
d’inclure une perspective de genre dans les initiatives préventives. Nous
examinons aussi les quelques recherches qui ont étudié les expériences
violentes vécues par des femmes dans des contextes où cette violence n’a
pas traditionnellement été étudiée. Pour l’instant, nos outils diagnostiques
et de collecte de données ne semblent pas en mesure d’inclure ces
expériences. Une vision plus large de la gamme d’expériences violentes
vécues par les femmes doit être intégrée dans les stratégies canadiennes
de collecte de données. Ceci nous permettrait d’améliorer notre capacité
de décrire la nature et l’étendu de cette violence et d’évaluer l’efficacité de
nos interventions.

202 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 203
Abstract
The National Working Group on Crime Prevention (2007) recommends
“concentrating investments on the highest needs” as an essential element
of a successful national crime prevention strategy for Canada. This article
reflects on what this means for the prevention of violence against women
by addressing three major challenges: sustaining high-level government
commitment to preventing violence against women; achieving consensus
on what constitutes appropriate indicators for measuring the nature and
extent of the problem and evaluating success; and, ensuring access to
relevant data and the technical expertise to use it effectively. We consider
the benefits of gender mainstreaming for sustaining high-level commitment
to including a gender perspective in violence prevention activities. We
also profile research that examines women’s experiences of violence in
contexts where it is not traditionally studied and conclude that traditional
diagnostic and data collection tools are not adequate to the task. A broader
vision of where and how girls and women experience violence needs to be
integrated into data collection strategies in Canada. This would enhance
our capacity to assess the nature and prevalence of this violence and the
effectiveness of interventions.
Introduction
Male violence against women has not fit easily within traditional crime
prevention initiatives, most of which have tended to employ a gender-neutral
perspective. Within analyses of gender-based violence, efforts to prevent male
violence against women are often fragmented along two lines: intimate partner
violence and women’s safety in public spaces (Shaw & Andrew, 2005). In
addition, prevention of violence against women initiatives face many of the
same challenges as traditional crime prevention policies and programs: while
promising prevention approaches have been developed, most are implemented
on an ad hoc basis and face problems of sustainability.
The National Working Group on Crime Prevention (NWG), sponsored by
the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) at the University of Ottawa,
identifies five key elements of a successful national crime prevention strategy
for Canada (2007, p. 16-17):
1. Collaboration and problem-solving partnerships;
2. Concentrating investments on the highest needs;
3. Developing and sustaining community capacity;
4. Ensuring adequate and sustained supports and resources; and
5. Fostering public engagement.
This article will assess how the second of these elements, concentrating investments
on the highest needs, can be accomplished in relation to the problem of violence
against women. Table 1 lists the current situation, gaps, and recommendations
outlined by the NWG (2007, p. 16-17) with respect to concentrating investments
on groups or areas with the highest needs in crime prevention in general. The
NWG makes a number of observations: successful prevention initiatives are
not well-known; the nature of appropriate indicators for identifying crime
problems continues to be debated; there are problems with access to data and
to the diagnostic tools and data collection mechanisms required for targeting
interventions and assessing progress; and, commitments to prevention initiatives
often lose out to demands for resources for the operation of the criminal justice
system. The NWG (2007) recommends that, in order to improve the capacity
to concentrate investments on highest need areas and situations, we need clear
and measurable indicators to serve as benchmarks for diagnoses and to assess the
impacts of interventions, improved access to data, as well as the required training
and technical assistance to make the best use of what is available.
In this article we reflect on what is meant by “concentrating investments on
highest needs” when it comes to formulating, implementing, and sustaining
initiatives to prevent male violence against women. We highlight some of the
challenges of sustaining an interest in the prevention of violence against women,
the difficulties related to achieving consensus on appropriate indicators for
diagnosing problems and evaluating success, and major issues around access
to the data needed to inform prevention efforts.
Table 1: Concentrating investments on highest needs
Current situation
Gaps
Recommendations
• Recent National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) emphasis on evidence-led focused action;
• Some important success stories;
• Debates over appropriate indicators; and
• Lack of required data.
• Success stories not well-known;
• Difficult to elicit a clear interest in prevention; and
• Insufficient access to user-friendly data.
• Identify clear and measurable indicators to serve as benchmarks for diagnoses
and evaluations;
• Assure user-friendly access to required data; and
• Invest in training and technical assistance.
Source: Adapted from NWG (2007, p. 16-17).

204 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 205
Sustaining a Commitment to Prevention
This section focuses on two major issues related to sustaining an interest in
preventing violence against women: shifts in priority setting by various orders
of government, and challenges to gender mainstreaming approaches. It also
features an example of an academic/community partnership that has resulted
in a sustainable violence prevention program for youth.
Priority Setting
Canada’s National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) was instituted in
1998 with a mandate to oversee the development and implementation of the
National Crime Prevention Strategy. At this time, three priority areas were
identified: youth, Aboriginal people, and violence against women. In 2007,
with an annual budget of $63 million, the NCPC refocused its work on four
priority areas: (1) addressing early risk factors among vulnerable families and
children and youth at risk; (2) responding to priority crime issues such as
youth gangs and drug-related crime; (3) preventing recidivism among high
risk groups; and (4) fostering prevention in Aboriginal communities (National
Crime Prevention Centre, 2007).
Violence against women is no longer listed as a specific priority for the NCPC.
However, a program can qualify for funding if it can be demonstrated that
it fits within one of these four priorities areas, for example violence against
women in Aboriginal communities, or is an intervention aimed at preventing
reoffending in cases of intimate partner violence. In addition, eleven specific
programs are favoured for significant funding by the NCPC over the next five
years (NCPC, 2008):
1. Boys & Girls Club of Canada / Mentoring;
2. Police Athletic League;
3. Fast Track;
4. Stop Now and Plan;
5. Multisystemic Therapy;
6. Life Skills Training;
7. Leadership and Resiliency Program;
8. Youth Inclusion Program;
9. Quantum Opportunities Program;
10. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care; and
11. Circles of Support and Accountability.
With this refocusing comes an emphasis on measureable results, project
evaluations, and the development of a knowledge base on effective prevention
practices that can be broadly disseminated (NCPC, 2007). This is an important
role for a federal crime prevention agency, but the lack of specific commitment
to funding for demonstration projects on violence against women is acutely
felt, especially given the paucity of evaluations in this area in comparison to
the numerous and extensive evaluations of programs aimed at preventing youth
crime (Kruttschnitt, McLaughlin, & Petrie, 2004; Schewe, 2002).
At the provincial level, Alberta and Nova Scotia have recently established
coordinated, multi-agency provincial crime prevention initiatives in which
the problem of violence against women and strategies for preventing
it and responding to victims are conceptualized quite differently. The
terms of reference for the Alberta government’s Crime Reduction and Safe
Communities Task Force make no mention of gender as a vulnerability or risk
factor for violence, and sexual assault is mentioned primarily in the context of
the sexual exploitation of children (see Government of Alberta, 2007). After
six months of public consultation, the Task Force made 31 recommendations.
Included among them is the expansion of specialized domestic violence courts,
the expansion of provincial support for programs aimed at preventing domestic
violence, and providing support for families that are victims of domestic
violence (Government of Alberta, 2007). While a commitment to providing
additional support for families and prevention programs is certainly promising,
it is a curious choice of phrasing to identify “families” and not women and
children as the primary victims of domestic violence. In the $468 million
3-year Safecom Action Plan established to respond to these recommendations,
family violence is not listed among the 11 priority areas to be tackled first. 1
Framing the issue as one of “domestic” or “family” violence suggests that
violence is age- and gender-neutral and fails to acknowledge that women and
children are those at greatest risk of physical and sexual violence in private
settings and who suffer the most serious consequences (Johnson, 2006).
Sexual violence, the most gendered of crimes, is not mentioned in the Alberta
government’s Action Plan, despite the fact that sexual violence affects almost
500,000 women in Canada and about 54,000 women in Alberta each year
(Gannon & Mihorean, 2005). A strategy to end violence in women’s lives
must aim to address the gendered contexts in which this violence proliferates
(Johnson, 2007). Experts argue that despite good evidence of the risk factors
1 See http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=48560 for a chart of the
recommendations and priorities.

206 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 207
for violence and the social contexts in which violence occurs, the major
underlying causes of male violence against women, such as the abuse of power
and gender inequality, remain poorly understood by the public and are seldom
effectively addressed in prevention efforts (Wolfe & Jaffe, 2001, p. 283). This
situation is made worse when government funding bodies fail to accurately
identify the nature of the problem and to link causes to appropriate solutions.
In 2006, in response to concerns about rising violent crime and youth crime,
the Minister of Justice of Nova Scotia created the Task Force on Safer Streets
and Communities. Its mandate was to identify best practices and ways to
support communities in their efforts to address conditions that contribute to
crime (Government of Nova Scotia, 2007). Although violence against women
was not listed among the 18 priority areas for action in the Task Force report,
the government response specifically identified the importance of raising
awareness and changing attitudes and misconceptions about family violence,
sexual assault, and other forms of violence against women. The government
report also recommends counselling for children who witness family violence;
enhanced support for victims of family violence, intimate partner violence,
and sexual assault to help prevent re-victimization; annual training for justice
officials responding to family violence; and, improved coordination of services
in domestic violence cases.
Government initiatives like these play an important leadership role in terms of
facilitating coordination among sectors and allocating resources to community
groups and agencies working to prevent crime and improve community
safety. However, priority setting by national and provincial crime prevention
initiatives serves an equally important symbolic function. By identifying
certain groups or crime problems as priorities, governments use their authority
to construct some social problems as more worthy of attention than others.
One example is the way in which combating youth crime involving guns and
gangs has become a priority for the federal government, despite the fact that
this problem is concentrated within a few specific communities and geographic
areas, in contrast to intimate partner and sexual violence which affect large
numbers of mainly women and children throughout the broader population.
Women’s groups and community agencies continue to struggle to sustain a
commitment to keeping the prevention of violence against women on the
public policy agenda.
Despite these ongoing challenges, there have been some successes. One notable
initiative in Canada is The Fourth R, an anti-violence program for youth that
evolved out of academic/community partnerships within the University of
Western Ontario and the Thames Valley School Board in London, Ontario.
Though the program was developed through funding from various federal
and Ontario government agencies and is housed in the Centre for Prevention
Science of the Centre for Addictions and Mental Health (CAMH), the
expansion of The Fourth R to sites across Canada has been largely privately
funded by the Royal LePage Shelter Foundation and a philanthropic family
(Crooks, Wolfe, Hughes, Jaffe, & Chiodo, 2008).
A rigorous evaluation of The Fourth R indicates that early intervention in high
school settings through curriculum-based programming can have a positive
impact on the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of adolescents concerning
sexual and relationship violence (Crooks et al., 2008). Unlike many other
prevention efforts that involve short-term or one-time interactions with young
people in school settings, the key to the sustainability of The Fourth R is the
curriculum-based nature of the program and the provision of training and
pedagogical materials to teachers who deliver the program. As a result of the
growing awareness and support for this program among high school teachers
and administrators, The Fourth R has been integrated into the curriculum
in more than 350 schools in Ontario and in schools in six other Canadian
provinces (Crooks et al., 2008).
Gender Mainstreaming
Gender mainstreaming is one approach to sustaining efforts to prevent
violence against women over the longer term; is designed to institutionalize
gender concerns and to incorporate the safety and security of women into
government policies and programs (Moser, 2008). British researcher Caroline
Moser (2008) illustrates how the use of a gender mainstreaming approach
at the local level provides a useful lens for examining how different types of
crimes are interrelated and how gender intersects with other social disparities,
such as those based on ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation. Gender
mainstreaming was established by the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action as the
major global strategy for achieving gender equality and empowering women
(United Nations, 1995). It is defined by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations as “the process of assessing the implications for women
and men of any planned action…so that women and men benefit equally
and inequality is not perpetuated” (UN Economic and Social Council,
1997). Other definitions also incorporate gender equality in staffing, women’s
participation in decision-making processes, and specific activities to empower
women (Moser, 2008).

208 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 209
Montreal has been a world leader in municipal action to prevent violence
against women through the work of the Comité d’action femmes et sécurité
urbaine (CAFSU – Women and Urban Safety Action Committee) which was
formed in 1992 to focus on violence against women in public spaces, primarily
through public awareness campaigns and safety audits. Also during this time,
the city’s crime prevention program, Tandem Montreal, extended its mandate
to include a women’s safety component (Michaud & Chappaz, 2002). The
network Women in Cities International (WICI – Femmes et villes) developed
out of the work of CAFSU to facilitate the exchange of information and
provide advice to governments on gender issues and gender mainstreaming in
the governance of cities. Since its inception, WICI has undertaken a number
of activities to encourage gender equality in municipal governments and has
developed nine key organizing themes on women’s safety. These incorporate the
use of a gender-based approach, conducting safety audits and safety planning
from a woman’s perspective, using research, and sharing good practices. 2
In 2002, CAFSU and WICI released a report that encourages municipal
governments to move away from a paternalistic/dependence to an
empowerment/autonomy approach to women’s safety. Such an approach
places women as the central point of reference for community safety
issues, and is part of a comprehensive model that relies on communication
with stakeholders, research and policy, safety planning and design, and
community mobilization (Michaud & Chappaz, 2002). Also in 2002, the
Montreal Declaration on Women’s Safety identified good local governance
using a gendered approach as a key component to ensuring women’s safety.
In collaboration with other partners, WICI has also produced publications
to guide local action on addressing women’s safety concerns, on conducting
safety audits, and on achieving gender equality through equal representation
in municipal governments and decision making. An online exchange forum
with women’s groups from five continents in 2006 resulted in a number of
key elements for ensuring gender mainstreaming in local governance
(Michaud, 2007).
Finally, WICI is currently helping to build partnerships between local women’s
groups and their municipalities and to implement safety approaches that focus
on marginalized women. With funding from Status of Women Canada, this
project aims to provide training for the development and implementation of
safety audits in four Canadian cities (Montreal, Gatineau, Peel, and Regina)
with a focus on Aboriginal women, elderly women, immigrant and minority
2 For more information on WICI and the initiatives mentioned in this article, visit
http://www.womenincities.org/english/sets_en/set_bienvenue_en.htm
women, and women with disabilities. WICI is also undertaking a comparative
study of safety audits, funded by the UN Safer Cities program.
Another example of a Canadian city that has made steps to promote safety in
public spaces is Saskatoon. In 2008, Saskatoon embedded Crime Prevention
through Environmental Design (CPTED) into all city planning. Their
Neighbourhood Safety Program uses a local area planning process to facilitate
the participation of community members and stakeholders in the future of their
own communities (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). While not
explicitly targeting women’s safety concerns, the mainstreaming of CPTED
into the city’s development plan could achieve positive results for the safety of
women in public spaces.
Although these practices are encouraging, Moser (2008) cautions that gender
mainstreaming has been largely unsuccessful in achieving gender equality
because of failures of implementation, failure to follow through with good
intentions, and political opposition based on gendered power relations.
Selecting Appropriate Indicators
The NWG (2007) argues that clear and measurable indicators are needed
to serve as benchmarks for diagnosing crime problems and for evaluating
programs and policies, and that a lack of consensus concerning the nature of
appropriate indicators has hindered progress in a number of areas. A related
question pertains to how we measure success of violence prevention efforts.
The ultimate goal of programs and initiatives designed to address violence
against women is a reduction in violence, but by what measure? Should success
be assessed only by measurable reductions in violent behaviour? If so, by what
means and at what cost? In this section, we consider how new research about
the manifestations of violence against women has revealed gaps in traditional
indicators for problem identification and indicators of success for prevention
efforts.
The lack of consensus concerning the nature of appropriate indicators may
pose a greater challenge to designing and sustaining initiatives to prevent
violence against women than is the case for most other types of crime.
Feminist researchers contend that ambiguities concerning the nature of sexual
and intimate partner violence and the impact on victims, and the reluctance to
acknowledge the very high incidence of male violence against women, continue
to seriously undermine efforts to prevent and react effectively to these crimes
(Kelly & Radford, 1996). It is well documented that substantial proportions

210 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 211
of women in Canada and around the world experience violence and threats
of violence in the form of sexual harassment, sexual assault, physical assault,
stalking, and homicide (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005; Johnson, 1996). These acts
of violence are not mutually exclusive and are perpetrated by male intimate
partners, acquaintances, family members, and strangers with varying degrees
of severity. Widespread beliefs that women are to some extent to blame for this
violence make it difficult to achieve agreement on appropriate indicators for
analyzing the manifestations and extent of the problem (Johnson, 2007). As a
result, the process of designing appropriate diagnostic tools and data collection
mechanisms for monitoring progress in preventing violence against women is
still in its infancy.
Despite slow progress in this area, Canada is recognized as a world leader
in developing ways to interview women about violence that yield reliable
and valid statistical data about women’s experiences, the consequences
of violence for them, and their decisions to use criminal justice and social
services (Johnson, Ollus, & Nevala, 2008, p. 13). In 1993, Statistics Canada
conducted the first national survey dedicated to interviewing a random
sample of women about their experiences of physical and sexual violence and
sexual harassment (Johnson & Sacco, 1995). Modules of questions on spousal
violence and stalking have been adapted to the ongoing General Social Survey
(GSS) on Victimization which provides estimates of a wide range of crimes on
a five year cycle, as well as a limited number of risk factors. However, the depth
and breadth of questions on sexual assault have been reduced considerably
from the 1993 survey, and sexual harassment has been eliminated entirely.
While rates of spousal violence are calculated to cover a five-year period and
are available at the national and provincial/territorial levels, rates of sexual
assault are calculated for a one-year period and are available at the national
level only.
The telephone methodology used to interview women directly about their
experiences of violence is cost-effective and produces good general coverage
in countries with broad telephone ownership, but it is not without important
limitations. Surveys conducted by telephone effectively exclude marginalized
populations living in shelters, unstable housing, or on the street; those who
cannot respond in English or French; and, cultural and linguistic minorities
for whom telephone surveys are not a familiar medium for disclosing personal
or sensitive experiences. In addition, there is no guarantee that the general
risk indicators produced at the national aggregate level apply universally to
excluded individuals. For example, one Australian study found that attitudes
toward intimate partner and sexual violence varied according to the gender
and ethnicity of respondents (Taylor & Mouzos, 2006). In Canada, there
is a lack of understanding and adequate data about the cultural specificities
related to women’s experiences of violence, particularly about the way in
which discrimination and oppression based on gender, age, race, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, and level of ability intersect to affect these experiences and
their impacts.
Coupled with the ambiguity that often surrounds beliefs about what
constitutes harmful acts of violence against women is a limited understanding
of where such violence occurs, who the perpetrators are, and who the victims
are. Researchers who apply a gender analysis to forms of crime not typically
considered under the banner of violence against women, such as street-level
violence and gang violence, have discovered important links to various
forms of violence against women. Mark Totten (2000) conducted in-depth
interviews with marginal street-involved male youth in Ottawa in an attempt
to understand their violent behaviour toward girlfriends. These young men
made sense of their behaviour by subscribing to rigid patriarchal beliefs
about men and women, and rationalized their violence as a legitimate way to
control “their” women when they stepped outside stereotypical gender roles.
These youth possessed limited means through which to construct a sense of
masculinity; violence was one way they could construct an identity as a “real
man” and escape the oppression of a disadvantaged life with poor prospects
for the future. The socialization of these youth occurred through many
different means (e.g., media, military, sports, and peer groups), the majority
had been abused by a father figure (80%), and a substantial proportion had
been encouraged by a father figure to abuse women (43%). Additionally, all
of the youth reported engaging in other criminal activity and substance abuse,
most on a daily basis.
Jody Miller (2008) examined how the structural inequalities that form
racialized urban spaces of poverty affect young women’s experiences of
violence. Through in-depth interviews with 75 young African American
men and women in disadvantaged St. Louis neighbourhoods rife with gang
violence, criminal activity, and low collective efficacy, Miller (2008) provides
a convincing argument for broadening the conceptualization of violence
against women. Eighty-nine percent of young black women in her sample had
experienced either sexual or gender harassment 3 , 61% had experienced physical
violence in a dating relationship, and 54% had experienced some form of sexual
3 Sexual harassment encompasses verbal, physical, and visual forms of unwanted sexual attention, including
sexual comments, touching, or public exhibition of pornography. Gender harassment refers to behaviours
that degrade or are insulting to women (Miller, 2008).

212 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 213
victimization 4 (Miller 2008). This violence cannot be fully understood without
considering the dynamics of male-female relationships in disadvantaged urban
neighbourhoods. Miller (2008) proposes that gendered violence is perpetrated
because it is culturally supported; historical and continuing racial oppression
limits men’s access to legitimate means for constructing masculinity which
then leads to the adoption of a street reputation, based on the “cool pose” 5
and its associated violence. This violence is central to the identities of these
young men and so they minimize the harm done to women by characterizing
violence as “play”, engaging in victim-blaming, and defining violence in very
narrow terms (Miller, 2008).
In her work with young men in Columbia, Moser (2008) challenges traditional
thinking in which domestic violence and street violence are approached as
separate issues and demonstrates how intra-familial violence and urban
violence are intricately linked. Not only do witnessing and directly experiencing
domestic violence raise the risk of perpetration of violence among young men,
but Moser (2008) describes how a lack of safety in violent homes helps to
propel young men out of the house and onto the streets where they join gangs,
turn to drugs, and become involved in robbery, attacks, and other crime.
These groups of aggressive young men on the street have a negative impact
on public safety, social cohesion, and social capital in the neighbourhood.
Unless a gender analysis is applied to these interrelated problems, the situation
is often misinterpreted as one solely of public safety, and responses formulated
to address the problem fail to take into account women’s safety in the home
and in public spaces.
These studies should not be interpreted to suggest that gendered violence is
only perpetrated in disadvantaged social spaces, but that factors like class and
race influence the dynamics of the perpetration of violence against women.
These and other studies demonstrate how, by employing a gender analysis
to the priority problem of youth violence – typically considered a problem of
young men posing a threat to public safety – new information comes to light
that has the potential to elevate women’s safety concerns on public agendas by
illuminating the risks they face when interacting with these young men. This
violence is unlikely to be recorded in police statistics, victimization surveys, or
other common methods of problem identification in crime prevention. In order
to be able to select indicators that are appropriate for accurately identifying
4 Sexual victimization includes rape, attempted rape, gang rape, or pressured or coerced sex (Miller, 2008).
5 The “cool pose” is a mask to conceal vulnerabilities that is characterized by control of emotions, aloofness,
toughness, and detachment for many black males (Majors & Billson, 1993; Miller, 2008).
problems and measuring success, we must expand our knowledge of how and
where these problems occur.
While sexual harassment, intimate partner violence, and sexual violence are
experienced by women of all socioeconomic statuses, ages, races, ethnicities,
sexual orientations, and levels of ability, all women do not experience violence
equally. The concept of “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1994) refers to the
intersections of power (e.g., based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation)
and oppression (e.g., prejudice, class stratification, gender inequality,
heterosexist bias) that are thought of as key explanatory factors, rather than
risk factors for violence (Bogard, 2005). A relevant Canadian example is the
systemic victimization of Aboriginal women rooted in the historical process
of segregating Aboriginal children from their families and communities in
residential schools, where they were meant to unlearn their Aboriginal cultures
in poor living conditions rife with psychological, physical, and sexual abuse
(see Backhouse, 2008; McGillivray & Comaskey, 1999; Monture-Angus,
1995 and 1999). This practice has contributed to the extremely high rates of
sexual and intimate partner violence against Aboriginal women in Canada
today (Johnson, 2006).
Totten (2000), Miller (2008), and Moser (2008) illustrate how violence
against women is manifested in situations where youth criminality and
gang violence proliferate. These studies show that gendered violence can be
observed by looking in the spaces where it is generally not considered to be
the major problem. They also indicate that diagnostic tools and data collection
mechanisms used to assess the nature and extent of male violence against women
must take into account the vast range of situations and contexts in which this
violence occurs. Moser (2008) highlights the benefits of a “violence roadmap”
approach which entails conducting a detailed gender analysis of violence and
insecurity in the local area and identifying interconnections among them so
that policymakers can identify appropriate solutions. This approach can help
categorize manifestations of gender-based violence in contexts where it has not
been identified as the primary concern. Diagnoses that focus solely on methods
traditionally employed for problem identification will fail to adequately capture
the range of women’s experiences of male violence and subsequently limit the
range of strategies designed to address it.
Access to Data
The NWG (2007) recommends that, in order to improve our capacity to target
problems and concentrate resources more effectively, it is important to ensure

214 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 215
user-friendly access to relevant data and to provide sufficient training and
technical assistance to those responsible for using this data. In this section, we
discuss some of the issues related to using traditional research methodologies
to study violence against women and explore some options for using new
technologies and accessing untapped data sources to expand our knowledge
in this area.
The World Health Organization (WHO) finds it useful to conceptualize the
interplay of risk factors for violence in an ecological model (see Figure 1).
This model can be used to illustrate how intimate partner violence and sexual
assault are influenced by factors at four separated but interconnected levels:
1. The individual level (e.g., history of witnessing or experiencing violence,
substance abuse);
2. In relationships with others (e.g., peer support, patriarchal
domestic relationships);
3. In the community (e.g., concentrated poverty, norms supportive of
violence); and,
4. Within society (e.g., social norms supportive of traditional gender roles,
economic and gender inequality, tolerance for violence).
This ecological model suggests that prevention programs and strategies need
to target all four of these levels, and that relevant and appropriate data will be
required in order to concentrate our efforts and assess their impact. There is a
dearth of outcome evaluations for the prevention of violence against women,
and most available evaluations focus on process and implementation of
programs targeted at the individual or relationship level. Much less evaluative
work has been conducted on interventions aimed at the community or
societal level. Clear evaluation methodologies are needed from the onset of
program implementation, in addition to a wide range of data for evaluating
the effectiveness of prevention programs and strategies targeted at all levels
(Barchechat & Sansfaçon, 2003).
The ecological model is useful for conceptualizing interconnections among
risk factors for violence at a general level, but the data required to diagnose
the nature of violence against women in specific communities, or to assess the
effectiveness of programs aimed at targeting these risk factors and correlates
only exists in a limited and patchwork fashion. For example, in Canada,
data from the General Social Survey on Victimization provide estimates at the
national level (and to a limited extent provincial and territorial levels) of the
prevalence of intimate partner violence and sexual assault and a very general
Figure 1: WHO Ecological Model of the Risk Factors for Violence
Societal Community Relationship Individual
Source: Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano (2002).
indication of individual-and relationship-level correlates. Despite very large
samples and sophisticated methodologies, national surveys cannot provide
estimates of the prevalence or manifestation of crime problems at the level of
municipalities or neighbourhoods. In addition, there is little or no information
available about the community or societal level factors that help perpetuate
such violence, such as attitudes and social norms supportive of violence.
It is also unrealistic to expect municipalities and local communities to have the
capacity and resources to conduct such surveys at the local level, particularly
when national and provincial agendas do not consistency prioritize violence
against women in their decisions on funding. Surveys on violence against
women have not been conducted at the city level in Canada since the late
1980s and early 1990s (Randall & Haskell, 1995; Smith, 1990) and are very
rarely conducted at the local level (e.g., Hamner & Saunders, 1984 in Leeds,
UK for example). While reference manuals are available to assist municipalities
in conducting audits to identify crime and safety problems (European
Forum for Urban Safety, 2007), the technical expertise required to gather
and analyze detailed survey data is not likely to be readily available among
municipal personnel, nor are the financial resources likely to be available
in municipal budgets. There are also concerns that specialized surveys that
interview women about their experiences of violence should not be undertaken
without appropriate measures to ensure the safety of survey respondents and
interviewers (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005).
The NWG (2007) contends that regular victimization surveys are needed to
uncover unreported crime and assess the effectiveness of interventions. But
even these may not be sufficiently reliable to measure changes in the prevalence
of violence against women accurately, given the reticence of women to disclose
personal experiences. This reflects a number of factors, including fear of
retaliation from violent partners; social norms that can affect disclosure; and,
language, cultural, and religious barriers (Johnson et al., 2008).

216 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 217
One alternative might be to use indirect or proxy measures. For example,
positive changes in knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about sexual and intimate
partner violence, improvements to criminal justice policies and processes,
or changes in community and societal responses are useful indicators of
progress in this area. Other plausible measures of progress include growth
in the number of available services, improvements in training for police and
prosecutors, increased budgets and funding, an increase in referrals among
police and community agencies, an increase in interventions with children
exposed to intimate partner violence, or a positive change in public awareness
of the problem. The relative benefits of these as high level indicators of societal
change in addressing male violence against women continue to be debated at
the international level (UNODC, 2007; Walby, 2007). A case can be made
for including each of these in indicators of progress in responding to and
preventing violence against women, but the data needed for many of them
remain either unavailable or difficult to access.
British researchers Maddy Coy, Liz Kelly, and Jo Foord (2007) are working
within a coalition of organizations in the United Kingdom called End Violence
Against Women (EVAW), which has prevention as a central goal. They mapped
geographically the violence against women services available in the UK and
concluded that women face a “postcode lottery” in their access to support
services. This technique revealed that one-third of local government regions
in the UK have no specialized support services to respond to female victims of
violence. Most of the existing services address intimate partner violence, few
services are geared to helping victims of sexual assault, and very few services
are available specifically for ethnic minority women. The maps are useful for
illustrating how resources are concentrated in major cities and for identifying
areas that are particularly underserved. Because violence against women can
result in severe physical and mental health consequences for victims, and
because women tend to use multiple services, access to an array of medical and
social services is integral to their recovery. Support services are also important
for the public awareness and outreach prevention work they do in the local
community. The authors note that the lack of services is particularly acute in
England and Wales where local authorities are not guided by national strategies
on service provision for violence against women, in contrast to Scotland where a
commitment to ending violence against women has been made by the national
government. This research is an excellent example of how new technologies
can be used to assess progress in responding to violence against women, and
it illustrates how important national governments are in providing a vision
for preventing and responding to violence against women that affects service
delivery at the local level.
As part of the Take Care New York agenda, the New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) brought together multiple data
sources to further understand the problem of intimate partner violence for
women in that city. Police statistics describing homicides of women and those
from the DOHMH’s Female Homicide Surveillance System were tracked
along with trends in female emergency room visits, assault hospitalizations,
and data from three population based surveys: the annual Community Health
Survey (that includes a question on fear of intimate partner violence), the
biannual Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (that asks a question about physical
violence in teen dating relationships), and the Pregnancy Risk Assessment
Monitoring System (that follows up with every woman who delivers a baby in
NYC about her pregnancy experience, including intimate partner violence).
The data indicate that the prevalence of teen dating violence for females has
risen from 7.1% to 10.6% in the last 10 years; women in their 20s, black
and Hispanic women, and women living in low income neighbourhoods are
most likely to be killed by an intimate partner; and, emergency room visits for
female victims of assault are on the rise 6 (Stayton et al., 2008).
The use of new technologies and multiple data sources can help uncover some
of the hidden nature of men’s violence against women. The “map of gaps” in
the UK uses geographic technology to examine government and community
responses to violence against women in an innovative way. The NYC study
demonstrates the importance of combining questions about various forms of
violence against women with ongoing survey instruments. It also illustrates
that, with proper screening tools and documentation processes for doctors and
nurses, health care data sources provide valuable information concerning the
severity and frequency of intimate partner violence among women who seek
medical services but who may not contact social or criminal justice services.
These projects highlight the potential of combining the perspectives and data
of a variety of disciplines to acquire a multi-dimensional view of the problem
of men’s violence against women.
Conclusion
What does it mean, then, to concentrate investments on highest needs with
respect to preventing violence against women? It means having the ability to
accurately identify the nature of the problem, where these problems are most
acute, who is affected, and what interventions are most appropriate. This
6 An increase in emergency room visits may not necessarily reflect an increase in assaults, but can also be
attributed to an overall increase in emergency department utilization or improved documentation (Stayton
et al., 2008).

218 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 219
requires access to a wide range of good information, the skills to analyze it,
and the knowledge to put it into practice in a way that will have a positive
impact on those most affected. All of this requires a clear and sustained
commitment to tackling the issue from national, provincial/territorial, and
municipal governments.
The research literature provides examples of the benefits and new insights that
can be gained when a gendered analysis is applied to crime problems. Studies
have highlighted how violence against women is manifested in spaces defined
by street crime or gang violence, an aspect not often considered in analyses
of these phenomena. A broader vision of where and how girls and women
experience violence needs to be integrated into data collection strategies in
Canada so that our choice of indicators to assess the prevalence and nature of this
violence, and the availability of data to assess the effectiveness of interventions,
is enhanced. There is a need to expand the available array of data to include
health and other service sector data, to incorporate new technologies such as
geographic mapping, and to form partnerships with stakeholders in these and
other disciplines. Finally, there is a need to apply tested methodologies and
to develop new methodologies for studying key sub-populations of women,
for example new immigrants, street youth, or girls in schools, in order to
disaggregate some of their unique experiences of victimization from national
aggregate data. Overall, a commitment to concentrate investments requires a
more complete accounting for the complexities of women’s experiences of male
violence on which to develop, implement, and sustain prevention initiatives.
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Notes