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Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité<br />
Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime<br />
Faculté des sciences sociales / <strong>Faculty</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Sciences</strong><br />
Université d’Ottawa / University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa<br />
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5 Canada<br />
613-562-5798<br />
IPC@uOttawa.ca<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
ISSN 1913-1941<br />
Revue de l’ IPC Review March / mars 2009 • volume 3<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
volume 3<br />
Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité<br />
Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime
L’Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité (IPC) a pour mission de rassembler<br />
les meilleures connaissances scientifiques provenant des sources les plus réputées<br />
afin que les Canadiens puissent bénéficier des taux de criminalité et de victimisation<br />
les plus bas. L’Institut s’efforce de rendre accessibles toutes ces connaissances aux<br />
responsables des politiques, aux universités, aux médias et aux intervenants sur le<br />
terrain. Il vise à développer la capacité des Canadiennes et Canadiens d’avoir recours<br />
aux approches préventives reconnues efficaces. L’Institut collabore avec tous les ordres<br />
de gouvernement, la société civile et les praticiens afin de prévenir la criminalité de<br />
manière abordable, responsable et durable.<br />
La Revue de l’IPC fournit aux responsables des politiques une analyse pointue des<br />
connaissances canadiennes et internationales sur ce qui s’avère efficace à réduire la<br />
criminalité et sur comment mettre en œuvre ces approches.<br />
La Revue de l’IPC est disponible gratuitement et peut aussi être téléchargée à partir<br />
de notre site Web à l’adresse www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
The Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (IPC) seeks to bring together the best<br />
scientific knowledge from the most authoritative sources so that Canadians will enjoy<br />
the lowest rates <strong>of</strong> crime and victimization possible. It strives to make this knowledge<br />
accessible to policy makers, practitioners, universities and the media, and to develop<br />
the capacity <strong>of</strong> Canadians to use evidence based crime prevention. It collaborates<br />
with all orders <strong>of</strong> government, civil society and practitioners to prevent crime in an<br />
affordable, responsible and sustainable way.<br />
The IPC Review provides state <strong>of</strong> the art reviews on what works to reduce crime and<br />
how to deliver it successfully. Canadian and foreign academics and experts bring<br />
together the latest knowledge on a variety <strong>of</strong> crime prevention topics aimed specifically<br />
at policy makers.<br />
The IPC Review is available free <strong>of</strong> charge, and can also be downloaded from our<br />
website at www.ipc.uOttawa.ca
Volume 3 Revue de L’<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca IPC<br />
© IPC 2009 R E V I E W<br />
La prévention de la criminalité :<br />
poursuivre sur sa lancée<br />
Crime Prevention:<br />
Sustaining the Momentum<br />
Sous la direction de / Edited by: Ross Hastings & Melanie Bania<br />
Remerciements / Acknowledgements........................................................iii<br />
La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins.............................1<br />
Ross Hastings<br />
Crime Prevention at a Crossroads..............................................................7<br />
Ross Hastings<br />
BUILDING A C A NA DI A N CR IME PR EV ENTION<br />
STRATEGY: LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES<br />
Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention<br />
from Recent International Experience...................................................... 13<br />
Peter Homel<br />
New Labour and Crime Prevention<br />
in England and Wales: What Worked?.................................................... 41<br />
Enver Solomon<br />
Commentary from the Co-chairs <strong>of</strong> the National<br />
Municipal Network for Crime Prevention................................................ 67<br />
Christiane Sadeler & Patrice Allard<br />
Commentary from the Provincial/Territorial Perspective......................... 71<br />
Beth Ulrich
Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention:<br />
The National Crime Prevention Strategy................................................. 75<br />
Daniel Sansfaçon & Lucie Léonard<br />
Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention:<br />
Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities...................................................... 81<br />
Margaret Shaw<br />
YOUTH AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE<br />
Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults:<br />
(Dis)Affiliation and the Potential for Prevention...................................... 89<br />
Melanie Bania<br />
La violence dans l’univers des gangs : du besoin de<br />
protection à la construction identitaire masculine...................................117<br />
Patrice Corriveau<br />
Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement<br />
in Canada: Quality Prevention Strategies............................................... 135<br />
Mark Totten<br />
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN<br />
Laying the Foundation for Effective Collaboration<br />
and Problem Solving Partnerships.......................................................... 159<br />
Julie Pehar & Christine Sevigny<br />
Protocole montréalais de collaboration intersectorielle<br />
pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale :<br />
évaluation du projet pilote d’implantation............................................. 179<br />
Myriam Dubé & Raymonde Boisvert<br />
Remerciements<br />
Nous tenons à exprimer nos remerciements à Sécurité publique Canada (SP)<br />
dont le soutien financier a rendu possible la préparation, la publication et la<br />
distribution de ce volume de la Revue de l’Institut pour la prévention de la<br />
criminalité (RIPC). Toutes les opinions exprimées dans cette Revue sont celles<br />
des auteurs et n’engagent aucunement SP ou ses représentants.<br />
Acknowledgements<br />
We wish to express our appreciation for the support <strong>of</strong> Public Safety Canada<br />
(PS) in the preparation, publication and distribution <strong>of</strong> this volume <strong>of</strong><br />
the Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime Review (IPCR). The financial<br />
contribution <strong>of</strong> PS has made this initiative possible. All the opinions<br />
expressed herein are those <strong>of</strong> the authors <strong>of</strong> the articles and in no way reflect<br />
the positions <strong>of</strong> PS or its representatives.<br />
Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women........... 201<br />
Holly Johnson & Jennifer Fraser
Volume 3: pages 1–5<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
La prévention de la criminalité<br />
à la croisée des chemins<br />
Ross Hastings<br />
Département de criminologie et Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité<br />
Université d’Ottawa<br />
Si près et si loin à la fois…<br />
Ces mots peuvent évoquer bien des images différentes; toutefois, dans le cas qui<br />
nous occupe, ils font référence à la prévention de la criminalité au Canada.<br />
Si près… De prime abord, la prévention de la criminalité à grandement<br />
progressé au Canada. Pour bien des gens, certains tournants ont revêtu une<br />
importance majeure : la Conférence européenne et nord-américaine sur la sécurité<br />
et la prévention de la criminalité en milieu urbain, qui s’est tenue à Montréal en<br />
1989; ce qu’on a désigné comme le Rapport Horner, de 1993; peut-être aussi<br />
le lancement de la phase I de la Stratégie nationale pour la prévention du crime<br />
(SNPC), incluant la fondation du Conseil national de prévention du crime en<br />
1994. Dans les premiers temps, la promesse que portait la prévention suscitait<br />
une grande énergie et beaucoup de fébrilité, mais les ressources et les appuis se<br />
faisaient rares. En lançant la phase II de la SNPC, on a tenté de s’attaquer à ce<br />
problème en investissant plus de 30 millions de dollars par année pour soutenir<br />
des initiatives de prévention; cette somme a plus que doublé depuis. Et on a<br />
connu certaines réussites. On a réalisé beaucoup de choses et tous les ordres de<br />
gouvernement tiennent maintenant compte de la prévention de la criminalité<br />
dans l’élaboration de leurs politiques et pratiques; celle-ci jouit en outre d’un<br />
appui populaire et politique appréciable.<br />
Et si loin à la fois… Il existe un sentiment préoccupant voulant que la<br />
prévention soit parvenue à la croisée des chemins et que son avenir soit loin<br />
d’être assuré. Les signes abondent. Au niveau fédéral, le financement du Centre
2 Revue de l’IPC 3 La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins<br />
3<br />
national de prévention du crime (CNPC) a été majoré considérablement et le<br />
Centre a lancé son Plan d’action visant à diminuer efficacement la criminalité<br />
(2007), qui l’aidera à explorer de nouvelles orientations dans nombre de<br />
secteurs. Mais le Centre semble en proie à une crise de croissance, dont l’une<br />
des manifestations, et non la moindre, est son incapacité d’allouer tous ses<br />
fonds (au cours d’un récent exercice, près de la moitié des fonds du CNCP<br />
n’a pas pu être reportée). Quelques provinces et territoires sont à élaborer des<br />
politiques coordonnées de prévention de la criminalité et de nombreuses villes<br />
investissent beaucoup d’argent et de ressources dans la conception d’initiatives<br />
de prévention. Mais ces efforts ne sont pas entre liés et il n’existe aucune stratégie<br />
nationale réelle qui intègre les efforts de tous les ordres de gouvernement dans<br />
une approche globale et durable de gouvernance et de gestion de la prévention<br />
de la criminalité et de la sécurité communautaire au Canada.<br />
La prévention se heurte aussi à certaines sources importantes de résistance. Une<br />
certaine incertitude persiste quant aux résultats escomptés de la prévention<br />
et quant aux moyens de les mesurer. Le manque de ressources adéquates et<br />
durables a des incidences encore plus importantes : on semble croire que la<br />
prévention est l’approche la plus économique et la plus rentable, mais il y a peu<br />
de signes d’une volonté de développer et de financer la prévention au même titre<br />
que les trois autres piliers du système de justice (la police, les tribunaux et les<br />
services correctionnels). En dernier lieu, il se pourrait que les vents politiques<br />
aient tourné : la crise financière qui sévit actuellement rend tout le monde<br />
plus résistant à des changements qui pourraient menacer leurs intérêts et plus<br />
prudent en ce qui a trait à l’allocation permanente de ressources considérables<br />
à de nouvelles initiatives. En définitive, la prévention de la criminalité figure à<br />
l’ordre du jour, mais elle n’occupe pas une place de pouvoir ou d’influence. La<br />
promesse que portait la prévention ne s’est pas suffisamment traduite en des<br />
initiatives efficaces et durables, et l’avenir pourrait ne pas être aussi rose qu’on<br />
le souhaiterait.<br />
Cela s’explique en bonne partie par le fait que nous n’avons toujours pas<br />
affronté ni surmonté trois obstacles importants à la mise en œuvre et à la<br />
durabilité d’une approche globale et intégrée de prévention de la criminalité<br />
et de sécurité communautaire. Les articles et commentaires contenus dans ce<br />
numéro traitent tous de ces obstacles d’une façon ou d’une autre.<br />
Un premier obstacle qui se dresse est le défi de l’imagination. Le problème<br />
ici est lié à notre incapacité de concevoir un langage commun entourant les<br />
buts et les indicateurs de succès, ou de recueillir les données nécessaires pour<br />
évaluer la nature et l’importance des problèmes, de cibler nos initiatives et d’en<br />
évaluer les incidences. Plusieurs des articles contenus dans ce numéro abordent<br />
ce thème. Le <strong>text</strong>e de Holly Johnson et de Jennifer Fraser met l’accent sur le<br />
défaut trop fréquent de tenir compte des différences entre les sexes dans la<br />
planification et la mise en œuvre des activités de prévention. Elles avancent qu’il<br />
nous faut améliorer notre capacité de composer avec les réalités de la violence<br />
faite aux femmes et d’apprécier comment les femmes vivent leur victimisation<br />
dans différents con<strong>text</strong>es sociaux. Elles soutiennent qu’il faut qu’on s’engage à<br />
intégrer la dimension genre et de faire en sorte que les besoins et le vécu des<br />
femmes soient au cœur de la planification et de la mise en œuvre des activités<br />
de prévention.<br />
Trois autres articles s’intéressent au rapport existant entre la violence chez les<br />
jeunes et les gangs; ils insistent sur l’importance de situer ces phénomènes dans<br />
leur con<strong>text</strong>e social particulier, de même que dans un système social et structurel<br />
plus large. Mélanie Bania se penche sur les répercussions de la désaffiliation<br />
sociale et du sentiment d’exclusion; Patrice Corriveau décrit comment les gangs<br />
et la violence chez les jeunes sont liés à un désir de protection et d’inclusion<br />
ainsi qu’aux efforts déployés par les jeunes pour se forger une identité et un<br />
concept de soi positif; quant à Mark Trotten, il examine la crise associée à la<br />
violence chez les jeunes autochtones membres de gangs. Il existe un commun<br />
dénominateur, en l’occurrence une conviction selon laquelle, pour certains<br />
jeunes, l’adhésion à un gang peut être perçue comme une solution à leurs<br />
problèmes, alors que la violence pourrait jouer un rôle clé pour rehausser leur<br />
prestige et renforcer leur position. Cela sous-entend que même la répression<br />
criminelle la plus efficace et des approches concertées visant à agir sur les<br />
facteurs de risque sur le plan individuel ne suffiront pas pour s’attaquer au<br />
problème de la violence au sein des gangs de jeunes – une approche globale<br />
exigerait qu’on se penche sur les origines sociales de ce phénomène. Il n’est pas<br />
possible de le faire dans les limites du système de justice pénale ou au moyen<br />
de projets à court terme axés sur des individus.<br />
Le prochain obstacle est le défi de la collaboration. Dans les faits, il nous faudra<br />
concevoir des solutions qui sont aussi complexes que le sont les causes de la<br />
criminalité, de la victimisation et de l’insécurité. Aucune organisation, même<br />
une organisation aussi bien financée que les piliers du système de justice pénale,<br />
n’a le mandat ou les ressources requises pour s’attaquer à cette tâche à elle<br />
seule. Il faut travailler en partenariat et la capacité de collaborer constitue la<br />
composante de base de la réussite à ce chapitre. Cela dépendra par ricochet de<br />
notre capacité d’adopter un langage commun, de parvenir à s’entendre sur les<br />
buts et stratégies, et de concevoir une approche commune de l’évaluation et de<br />
la reddition de comptes. En outre, pour que les partenariats soient couronnés
4 Revue de l’IPC 3 La prévention de la criminalité à la croisée des chemins<br />
5<br />
de succès, il doit exister des structures de gouvernance et d’administration qui<br />
permettent aux participants de s’acquitter de leur tâche de manière efficiente<br />
et efficace, et il doit y avoir en place un processus de reddition de comptes<br />
permettant de reconnaître le mérite des gens, le cas échéant, et d’attribuer la<br />
responsabilité, si les choses ne se déroulent pas comme prévu.<br />
L’article de Julie Pehar et Christine Sévigny ainsi que celui de Myriam Dubé<br />
et Raymonde Boisvert portent sur cette question. Pehar et Sévigny décrivent<br />
leur expérience liée aux efforts déployés par deux groupes de concertation<br />
communautaires en vue d’enchâsser l’intégration de la dimension de genre<br />
dans la planification des activités gouvernementales dans la Région de Peel.<br />
Quant à Dubé et Boisvert, elles décrivent l’expérience liée à l’élaboration<br />
et à la mise en œuvre d’un protocole interorganismes visant à orienter la<br />
collaboration dans la prestation de services à l’intention des femmes victimes<br />
de violence et des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale. Les deux articles<br />
traitent éloquemment des difficultés de travailler en collaboration ainsi que<br />
de certaines des sources de résistance auxquelles on a été confronté en tentant<br />
d’aller de l’avant. Essentiellement, il ne s’agit pas d’un travail facile, mais<br />
certaines avancées sont possibles.<br />
Le dernier obstacle est l’obstacle de la mise en œuvre. Il est généralement<br />
convenu que la planification en matière de prévention devrait s’appuyer sur<br />
une démarche de résolution de problèmes. Il émerge aussi une appréciation<br />
de l’importance de centres de responsabilité pour guider et diriger ce travail<br />
et faciliter la collaboration entre tous les participants. Le problème est que la<br />
prévention de la criminalité demeure le parent pauvre du système de justice<br />
pénale. Tenter de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre une stratégie globale de<br />
prévention et d’en évaluer l’efficience et l’efficacité, c’est une chose, mais c’est<br />
une tout autre chose de tenter de le faire à bon marché.<br />
Nous avons tenté d’amorcer une discussion de ce genre en invitant des<br />
représentants des ordres de gouvernement fédéral, provincial et territorial, et<br />
municipal à réfléchir à ce que les travaux de Homel et Solomon pourraient<br />
signifier pour le Canada. Nous avons également demandé à Margaret Shaw du<br />
Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité d’évaluer s’il existe<br />
un rapport entre ce travail et les leçons apprises d’autres pays. Leurs réponses<br />
ont été provocantes et ont suscité certaines inquiétudes à savoir si le Canada<br />
s’en va dans la bonne direction.<br />
En fin de compte, même après plus de vingt années d’attachement et<br />
d’engagement à la cause de la prévention, il semble qu’on soit encore loin de<br />
tirer pr<strong>of</strong>it de la promesse qu’elle porte. Nous espérons que les articles présentés<br />
dans ce numéro vont contribuer à alimenter des discussions et des débats<br />
publics et inclusifs sur les moyens qui nous permettraient de progresser vers<br />
une stratégie de prévention de la criminalité qui soit efficace et responsable.<br />
Une telle stratégie se devrait de concentrer nos énergies et nos ressources là où<br />
elles seraient le plus nécessaires, de faire en sorte qu’on dispose de ressources<br />
adéquates et durables pour assurer que le travail se fait, et d’amener la population<br />
à contribuer à la réalisation de cette tâche.<br />
Nous espérons que nous y parviendrons avant que la prévention ne soit<br />
définitivement reléguée en marge des politiques et des pratiques sociales et<br />
pénales et avant que la promesse qu’elle porte ne soit anéantie par une vague<br />
de zèle excessif en faveur des approches réactives envers la criminalité et de<br />
la victimisation.<br />
Heureusement, il existe une somme croissante de connaissances et de leçons<br />
tirées des expériences menées ailleurs. Deux des articles dans ce numéro, ceux<br />
de Peter Homel et d’Enver Solomon, font le point sur les expériences récentes<br />
vécues en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, en Australie, en Nouvelle-Zélande et<br />
aux États-Unis. Les deux auteurs jettent un éclairage sur ce qu’il faut faire et ne<br />
pas faire. Ni l’un ni l’autre ne présumerait qu’un programme peut facilement<br />
être transféré d’un endroit à un autre. Toutefois, compte tenu de l’influence<br />
que certaines initiatives menées dans ces pays ont pu avoir au Canada<br />
(particulièrement celles menées en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles), il faudrait<br />
se pencher attentivement sur les leçons qui s’en dégagent et sur les mises en<br />
garde qu’ils soulèvent par rapport à l’adoption d’une démarche semblable.
Volume 3: pages 7–10<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
IPC<br />
Revue de L’<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Sustaining the Momentum:<br />
Crime Prevention at a Crossroads<br />
Ross Hastings<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Criminology & Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa<br />
So near, and yet so far…<br />
These words can conjure up a number <strong>of</strong> different images; in this case though,<br />
the reference is to crime prevention in Canada.<br />
So near…On the surface, crime prevention in Canada has come a long way.<br />
For many, the major turning points were the European and North-American<br />
Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention in Montreal in 1989, or<br />
the so-called Horner Report in 1993, or perhaps the launch <strong>of</strong> phase I <strong>of</strong> the<br />
National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), including the founding <strong>of</strong> the<br />
National Crime Prevention Council in 1994. In those early days, there was a<br />
great deal <strong>of</strong> energy and excitement about the promise <strong>of</strong> prevention, but little<br />
in the way <strong>of</strong> resources and supports. The launch <strong>of</strong> phase II <strong>of</strong> the NCPS tried<br />
to address that problem by investing over $30 million per year in support <strong>of</strong><br />
prevention initiatives, an amount that has since more than doubled. And there<br />
have been some successes. Much has been accomplished and crime prevention<br />
has become an aspect <strong>of</strong> the policies and practices <strong>of</strong> all orders <strong>of</strong> government,<br />
and has considerable popular and political support.<br />
And yet, so far…There is a disquieting sense that crime prevention is now at a<br />
crossroads, and that its future is far from assured. The signs are numerous. At<br />
the federal level, the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) has received<br />
significantly increased funding and has launched its new Blueprint for Effective<br />
Crime Prevention (2007) that will help it move in new directions in a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> areas. But there seem to be some growing pains, not the least <strong>of</strong> which<br />
is an inability to allocate all its funding (the NCPC lapsed close to half its
8 IPC Review 3<br />
Sustaining the Momentum: Crime Prevention at a Crossroads<br />
9<br />
funds in a recent fiscal year). Some Provinces and Territories are developing<br />
coordinated crime prevention policies, and a number <strong>of</strong> cities are investing<br />
significant time and resources in the development <strong>of</strong> prevention initiatives.<br />
But, there is no real national strategy that integrates the approaches <strong>of</strong> all<br />
orders <strong>of</strong> government into a comprehensive and sustainable approach to the<br />
governance and administration <strong>of</strong> crime prevention and community safety<br />
in Canada.<br />
Prevention is also running up against some significant sources <strong>of</strong> resistance.<br />
There continues to be an uncertainty about what prevention is meant to<br />
accomplish and about how this could be measured. More important is the<br />
lack <strong>of</strong> adequate and sustained resources – there seems to be a sense that crime<br />
prevention is a cheaper and more cost-effective way to go, but there is little<br />
indication <strong>of</strong> a willingness to develop and fund prevention in the same manner<br />
as we do with the other three pillars <strong>of</strong> the justice system (the police, the courts<br />
and the correctional system). Finally, the political winds may have shifted:<br />
the current economic crisis is making everyone more resistant to changes that<br />
might threaten their interests, and more cautious about committing significant<br />
permanent resources to new initiatives. The bottom line is that crime prevention<br />
is on the agenda, but not in a position <strong>of</strong> power and influence. The promise <strong>of</strong><br />
prevention has not been sufficiently translated into effective and sustainable<br />
initiatives, and the future may not be as rosy as we hope.<br />
A good part <strong>of</strong> the reason for this is that we still have not confronted and<br />
resolved three major challenges to the implementation and sustainability <strong>of</strong> a<br />
comprehensive and integrated approach to crime prevention and community<br />
safety. The papers and comments in this volume all address these challenges<br />
in one way or another.<br />
The first hurdle is what I would call the challenge <strong>of</strong> imagination. The<br />
problem here is our inability to develop a common language around goals and<br />
indicators or to provide the data necessary to assess the nature and prevalence<br />
<strong>of</strong> problems, target our initiatives, and assess their impact. A number <strong>of</strong> the<br />
articles in this issue address this theme. The contribution <strong>of</strong> Holly Johnson<br />
and Jennifer Fraser focuses on the all too frequent failure to include a gender<br />
perspective in prevention planning and activities. They argue that we need<br />
to improve our ability to come to grips with the realities <strong>of</strong> violence against<br />
women and to appreciate women’s experiences <strong>of</strong> victimization in different<br />
social con<strong>text</strong>s. They argue that we need to start with a commitment to gender<br />
mainstreaming in order to assure that the needs and experiences <strong>of</strong> women are<br />
central to all prevention planning and activities.<br />
Three other articles focus on the relationship <strong>of</strong> youth violence and gangs,<br />
and insist on the importance <strong>of</strong> locating these phenomena within their social<br />
con<strong>text</strong>s and wider social and structural arrangements. Melanie Bania focuses<br />
on the impact <strong>of</strong> social disaffiliation and the perception <strong>of</strong> being excluded;<br />
Patrice Corriveau describes how gangs and youth violence are linked to the<br />
desire for protection and inclusion and the attempt <strong>of</strong> youth to construct a<br />
positive identity and self-concept; and Mark Totten addresses the crisis <strong>of</strong><br />
violence among aboriginal youth gang members. The common thread is a<br />
conviction that for some youth, gang membership can be viewed as a solution<br />
to problems, and violence can be instrumental in advancing one’s status and<br />
position. The implication is that even the most effective enforcement and<br />
concerted approach to addressing risk factors at the individual level will not be<br />
sufficient to deal with the problem <strong>of</strong> youth gang violence – a comprehensive<br />
approach also requires that we address the social origins <strong>of</strong> the phenomenon.<br />
This cannot be done within the confines <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system or<br />
through short-term projects aimed at individuals.<br />
The next hurdle is the challenge <strong>of</strong> collaboration. The fact is that the solutions we<br />
come up with will have to be as complex and complicated as are the causes <strong>of</strong><br />
crime, victimization and insecurity. No organization, even if it is as well financed<br />
as the pillars <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system, has the mandate or the resources<br />
necessary to take on the task all by itself. Partnerships are necessary, and the<br />
capacity to collaborate is the fundamental building block <strong>of</strong> success in this area.<br />
This in turn will depend on our ability to establish a common language, to<br />
come to agreement on goals and strategies, and to devise a common approach<br />
to evaluation and accountability. In addition, successful partnerships require<br />
governance and administrative structures that allow participants to get the job<br />
done efficiently and effectively, and an accountability process that gives people<br />
credit when due and assigns responsibility when things don’t go as expected.<br />
The articles by Julie Pehar and Christine Sevigny, as well as by Myriam Dubé<br />
and Raymonde Boisvert focus on this area. Pehar and Sevigny describe their<br />
experience with the attempts <strong>of</strong> two community collaboratives to enshrine<br />
gender mainstreaming in the planning activities <strong>of</strong> the government in Peel<br />
Region. Dubé and Boisvert describe the experience related to the development<br />
and implementation <strong>of</strong> an inter-agency protocol to guide collaboration in the<br />
provision <strong>of</strong> services to women who are victims <strong>of</strong> violence and to children<br />
who are exposed to conjugal violence. Both are eloquent about the challenges<br />
<strong>of</strong> working collaboratively, and about some <strong>of</strong> the sources <strong>of</strong> resistance that<br />
were faced in attempting to move forward. The bottom line is that this work<br />
is not easy, but progress can be achieved.
10 IPC Review 3<br />
The final hurdle is the challenge <strong>of</strong> implementation. There is general agreement<br />
that prevention planning should adopt a problem-solving approach. There is<br />
also an emerging appreciation for the importance <strong>of</strong> responsibility centres in<br />
guiding and directing this work and facilitating the collaboration <strong>of</strong> all the<br />
participants. The problem is that crime prevention remains very much the<br />
“poor cousin” <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system. It is one thing to set out to design<br />
and implement a comprehensive prevention strategy and to assess its efficiency<br />
and its effectiveness – it is an altogether different thing to try to do this “on<br />
the cheap”.<br />
Fortunately, there is a growing body <strong>of</strong> knowledge and lessons that has emerged<br />
as a result <strong>of</strong> experiences elsewhere. Two <strong>of</strong> the articles in this issue, those by<br />
Peter Homel and by Enver Solomon, review recent experiences in England and<br />
Wales, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Both authors provide<br />
insights on what to do and what not to do. Neither would assume that the<br />
programs from one place can be easily transferred to another. However, given<br />
the influence that initiatives in these countries have had in Canada (especially<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> England and Wales), careful consideration should be given to<br />
the lessons they have learned and to the cautions they raise about going in the<br />
same directions.<br />
We have attempted to launch such a discussion by inviting representatives from<br />
the federal, provincial and territorial, and municipal orders <strong>of</strong> government to<br />
reflect on what the work <strong>of</strong> Homel and Solomon might mean for Canada. We<br />
have also asked Margaret Shaw from the International Centre for the Prevention<br />
<strong>of</strong> Crime to asses how this work relates to what has been learned from other<br />
countries. Their replies are provocative, and they raise some concerns about<br />
whether Canada is going in the right direction.<br />
BUILDING A<br />
CANADIAN CRIME<br />
PR EV ENTION<br />
STR ATEGY:<br />
LE A R NING FROM<br />
OTHER COUNTRIES<br />
In the end, and in spite <strong>of</strong> over twenty years <strong>of</strong> commitment and engagement in<br />
prevention, the potential for delivering on its promise still seems far away. Our<br />
hope is that the articles in this issue will contribute to more public and inclusive<br />
discussions and debates about how we can move forward toward an effective<br />
and accountable national crime prevention strategy. Such a strategy must<br />
concentrate our energy and resources where they are the most needed, provide<br />
adequate and sustainable resources to assure the work gets done, and engage<br />
the public in this work. Our hope is also that we do this before prevention gets<br />
permanently relegated to the fringes <strong>of</strong> social and justice policies and practices,<br />
and its promise gets swallowed by an over-zealous commitment to reactive<br />
approaches to crime and victimization.
Volume 3: pages 13–39<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Lessons for Canadian Crime<br />
Prevention from Recent<br />
International Experience<br />
Peter Homel<br />
Research Manager for Crime Reduction and Review, Australian Institute<br />
<strong>of</strong> Criminology 1 & Pr<strong>of</strong>essor, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and<br />
Governance, Griffith University<br />
Résumé<br />
Cet article identifie huit principaux éléments de la pratique contemporaine<br />
de la prévention du crime qui semblent être associés à la baisse<br />
ininterrompue de la criminalité dans la plupart des pays développés de<br />
l’Ouest et examine leur pertinence pour le Canada. Parmi ceux-ci, nous<br />
trouvons : la collaboration intersectorielle pour mettre en place des<br />
interventions multiples et intégrées; un accent sur l’approche de résolution<br />
de problèmes; des stratégies fondées sur des données probantes; et des<br />
initiatives dirigées par le niveau central mais mises en œuvre au niveau<br />
local. La conclusion est que le succès des initiatives canadiennes courantes<br />
exigera un leadership national, un cadre d’analyse cohérent et flexible<br />
fondé sur la recherche et des pratiques ciblant des résultats qui sont<br />
surveillées et communiquées de manière transparente. Tout ceci devra être<br />
appuyé par des ressources adéquates et stables, par le développement<br />
organisationnel et la formation pr<strong>of</strong>essionnelle, par la dissémination<br />
de pratiques efficaces et une stratégie pour promouvoir l’engagement<br />
du public.<br />
1 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views <strong>of</strong> the AIC or the Australian<br />
Government.
14 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 15<br />
Abstract<br />
This article identifies eight key aspects <strong>of</strong> contemporary crime prevention<br />
practice which appear to be associated with the continuing declines<br />
in crime in most <strong>of</strong> the Western developed world and examines their<br />
relevance to Canada. These characteristics include: collaborative multiagency<br />
partnerships using multiple linked interventions, problem focused<br />
analysis, evidence-based strategies with a strong outcome focus, and<br />
an emphasis on centrally driven initiatives that are delivered locally.<br />
Using examples from the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand, these<br />
features are examined for their relevance for Canada. It is concluded that<br />
the success <strong>of</strong> Canada’s current crime prevention initiatives will require a<br />
committed national leadership, a coherent and flexible policy framework<br />
based on evidence, and results-oriented practices that are efficiently<br />
monitored and openly reported on. In addition, there must be responsive<br />
partnership arrangements with governance mechanisms respectful <strong>of</strong><br />
specific communities, priorities and experience. These must be supported<br />
by long term adequate resourcing informed by good data about problems<br />
and strategically appropriate responses. Workforce and organizational<br />
development, the active dissemination <strong>of</strong> good practice knowledge<br />
and a strategy for promoting an active and engaged community are<br />
also required.<br />
Introduction<br />
Canada is experiencing continuing declines in its crime rates. In fact, the<br />
most recent figures indicate that the 2007 national crime rate is the lowest in<br />
30 years; there was a 7% decline over the previous year, making it the third<br />
consecutive annual decrease (Dauvergne, 2008). The experience in Canada<br />
mirrors that <strong>of</strong> most other countries <strong>of</strong> the Western developed world. A similar<br />
pattern has been observed in England and Wales where crime rates have fallen<br />
by 42% since a peak in 1995 – the risk <strong>of</strong> being a victim <strong>of</strong> crime is now<br />
24% compared to 40% recorded in 1995 (Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker,<br />
2008). In Australia, recent figures confirm a continuing decline with a drop<br />
<strong>of</strong> around 10% in most categories <strong>of</strong> crime from 2006 to 2007 (Australian<br />
Bureau <strong>of</strong> Statistics, 2008). The overall victimization rate in 2005 was 6%<br />
compared with 9% in 2002 (ABS, 2006). Significantly, the rates for a range<br />
<strong>of</strong> property crimes in Australia are now at their lowest levels since records were<br />
first collected (ABS, 2008).<br />
Due to changes in data collection methodologies used for the National Crime<br />
Victimization Survey, it is more difficult to make definitive statements about<br />
the most recent crime trends in the United States <strong>of</strong> America. However, it<br />
appears that violent and property crime rates in urban and suburban areas <strong>of</strong><br />
the USA remained stable between 2005 and 2006 (Rand & Catalano, 2007).<br />
Previously, the percentage <strong>of</strong> households experiencing one or more crime had<br />
dropped from 25% in 1994 to 14% in 2004 (Catalano, 2005).<br />
The most recent International Criminal Victimization Survey (ICVS)<br />
conducted during 2004-05 shows that the level <strong>of</strong> victimization for the 15<br />
major developed countries peaked halfway through the 1990s and has since<br />
shown a slow but steady decline (van Djik, van Kestern, & Smit, 2007). The<br />
victimization rates <strong>of</strong> nearly all individual countries show the same curve-linear<br />
trend over the past 15 years. The drops are most pronounced in property crimes<br />
such as vehicle-related crimes (bicycle theft, thefts from cars and joyriding)<br />
and burglary. In most countries, crime levels in 2004 were back at the level <strong>of</strong><br />
the late 1980s. The USA has acted as trendsetter with levels <strong>of</strong> victimization<br />
already declining in the second sweep <strong>of</strong> the ICVS in 1992.<br />
While it is never hard to find someone willing to take the credit for improvements<br />
in crime rates, it is quite difficult to isolate definitive explanations for why these<br />
changes have occurred so consistently over such a sustained period <strong>of</strong> time.<br />
However, it is noteworthy that these declines in crime have coincided with a<br />
significant and steady growth in the sophistication and scale <strong>of</strong> investment in<br />
crime prevention efforts in each <strong>of</strong> these countries.<br />
Canada has a long history <strong>of</strong> investing in crime prevention work at both the<br />
national and the provincial/territorial levels. During the 1990s, the former<br />
National Crime Prevention Council played an important role in promoting<br />
and supporting innovative crime prevention policy and practice across Canada.<br />
More recently, the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) within Public<br />
Safety Canada has developed a national strategic plan for crime prevention<br />
action across Canada, known as A Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention<br />
(NCPC, 2007), which draws on some <strong>of</strong> the principles <strong>of</strong> the United Nations’<br />
Guidelines for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (UN ECOSOC, 1995 and 2002).<br />
The current Canadian national strategy is designed as a four-year program <strong>of</strong><br />
targeted initiatives to be implemented jointly with the Provinces. It places an<br />
emphasis on reducing victimization and re-<strong>of</strong>fending, whereas the previous<br />
strategy focused on addressing underlying structural causes <strong>of</strong> crime. It is<br />
built on the principles <strong>of</strong> integration; evidence-led efforts; focused action
16 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 17<br />
and measurable results. These principles have been interpreted into a series <strong>of</strong><br />
“priorities for focused action” that include (NCPC, 2007):<br />
• Early risk factors among vulnerable families and children and youth<br />
at risk;<br />
• A response to priority crime issues;<br />
• Youth gangs;<br />
• Drug related crime;<br />
• Recidivism among high-risk groups; and<br />
• Prevention in Aboriginal communities.<br />
The current national strategy and program <strong>of</strong> work appears to be a substantial<br />
and well-managed initiative. Furthermore, it seems to be soundly based in<br />
current crime prevention theory and practice, particularly through the<br />
working relationship with the Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime at the<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa, and to build on the many years <strong>of</strong> previous Canadian<br />
crime prevention experience. So what lessons could Canada possibly need to<br />
learn from other countries?<br />
Providing some answers to this question is the purpose <strong>of</strong> this article. It is in<br />
part informed by a brief visit to Canada in early 2008 for discussions with<br />
some <strong>of</strong> those involved in guiding the national strategy’s implementation<br />
process as well as those actually doing it. However, it is also informed by an<br />
analysis <strong>of</strong> the experience <strong>of</strong> developing and implementing crime prevention<br />
initiatives in various parts <strong>of</strong> the world over the past decade, including detailed<br />
reviews <strong>of</strong> programs in the UK (Homel, Nutley, Tilley, & Webb, 2004) and<br />
in Australia (Anderson & Homel, 2005 and 2006; Anderson & Tresidder,<br />
2008; Homel, 2006; Homel, Morgan, Behm, & Makkai, 2007) as well as<br />
close observation <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> recent crime prevention initiatives in the USA<br />
and New Zealand.<br />
On the basis <strong>of</strong> these analyses, it is possible to identify a series <strong>of</strong> key<br />
characteristics that are common to most modern crime prevention programs.<br />
These are summarised below and discussed in detail in the next sections.<br />
Common Features <strong>of</strong> Modern Crime Prevention Programs<br />
Most contemporary crime prevention initiatives around the world tend, to a<br />
greater or lesser extent, to be:<br />
1. Built on collaborative multi-agency based action variously known as:<br />
• “whole <strong>of</strong> government/community” (Australia);<br />
• “networked government” (USA); or<br />
• “joined-up government” (UK).<br />
2. Problem-oriented (e.g., using Problem-Oriented Policing strategies).<br />
3. Built on the use <strong>of</strong> multiple interventions to address linked problems.<br />
4. Evidence-based, or at least “evidence-informed” (Nutley, Jung, &<br />
Walter, 2008).<br />
5. Outcome-focused (i.e., measures performance and effectiveness).<br />
6. Centrally developed and driven but locally delivered.<br />
7. Built on partnerships and shared outcomes.<br />
8. Focused on principles <strong>of</strong> inclusiveness and participation.<br />
While this list is not exhaustive, it <strong>of</strong>fers a set <strong>of</strong> commonly identifiable features<br />
to consider when thinking about how well a strategy is constructed, how a<br />
program is performing, and ultimately how effective and efficient it is.<br />
1. Collaborative Multi-Agency Action<br />
Generally speaking, crime prevention strategies and programs are built on the<br />
idea <strong>of</strong> collaborative multi-agency action. This is because <strong>of</strong> the near universal<br />
acceptance these days that neither the criminal justice system nor human<br />
service agencies alone are able to adequately address the complex array <strong>of</strong> causes<br />
<strong>of</strong> crime. As a result <strong>of</strong> developing a better understanding <strong>of</strong> these causes, it has<br />
been possible to improve our appreciation <strong>of</strong> the type and mix <strong>of</strong> measures that<br />
can be used to bring about a sustained reduction in crime. We have also come<br />
to recognize that the interventions that make up these new programs are likely<br />
to have a greater chance <strong>of</strong> success if they are designed and undertaken as a<br />
package <strong>of</strong> closely linked and coordinated measures. In this way, the sometimes<br />
perverse or contradictory effects <strong>of</strong> separate single measures can be planned for<br />
and designed out prior to implementation. For example, consider the probable<br />
interactions and possibly contradictory results arising from promoting a drug<br />
treatment service in an area, and at the same time launching a drug supply<br />
suppression intervention in that same area. While both may be needed, they<br />
will be more effective if managed conjointly.<br />
At another level, this will frequently also mean the establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
new governance arrangements for crime prevention policy and program<br />
management that are quite complex. For example, the UK’s Crime Reduction<br />
Programme during the 1990s was managed through a series <strong>of</strong> inter-agency<br />
committees linked to a Cabinet sub-Committee at one end and regional and<br />
local committees at the other, such as the local Crime and Disorder Reduction
18 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 19<br />
Partnerships (Homel et al., 2004). In Australia, crime prevention activity in<br />
the states <strong>of</strong> New South Wales and Western Australia is managed through<br />
similar Cabinet level committees linked to an advisory council and central,<br />
regional and local inter-agency forums (Anderson & Homel, 2005; Anderson<br />
& Tresidder, 2008; Homel, 2004) as indeed it was previously in the state <strong>of</strong><br />
Victoria (Cherney, 2004). Similar structures can be found in New Zealand<br />
(NZ Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice, 2003) and are recommended in principle in the UN<br />
crime prevention guidelines (UN ECOSOC, 2002).<br />
This collaborative approach is not unique to crime prevention. Rather, it<br />
is an example <strong>of</strong> a more general shift in public administration away from a<br />
command and control model <strong>of</strong> governance towards governance through<br />
multiple stakeholders working together to deliver integrated solutions to social<br />
problems across sectors and tiers <strong>of</strong> government. Within Australia, this sort <strong>of</strong><br />
approach is most commonly described as the “whole <strong>of</strong> government” or “whole<br />
<strong>of</strong> community” approach to crime prevention. In parts <strong>of</strong> the USA, it is known<br />
as “networked government” while in the UK the approach is popularly known<br />
as “joined-up government” (Lee & Woodward, 2002).<br />
This innovative multi-agency model is not without challenges. Some <strong>of</strong> these<br />
include the need for a high level <strong>of</strong> policy, program and organizational integration<br />
to the point <strong>of</strong> joint or collective action, and shared or mutual responsibility for<br />
performance and outcomes. In a report on some <strong>of</strong> the early experiences <strong>of</strong><br />
implementing these models in a number <strong>of</strong> sectors in Australia, the Institute<br />
<strong>of</strong> Public Affairs Australia (IPAA, 2002) identified a number <strong>of</strong> significant<br />
practical implications for how normal business needs to be transacted:<br />
• Processes such as pooled budgets need to be established.<br />
• Partnership arrangements need to be negotiated and established; they do<br />
not just happen automatically.<br />
• Relationships between the service provider and client will <strong>of</strong>ten need to<br />
be revised. “Whole <strong>of</strong> community” models generally seek to establish a<br />
relationship with the client that sees them defining priorities for action and<br />
resource deployment.<br />
• The need to co-ordinate service delivery and tendering with partner criteria.<br />
Partnership models recognize the economic value in different agencies<br />
coming together to coordinate and share the delivery <strong>of</strong> services that might,<br />
for example, be directed to a single family unit or community as a way <strong>of</strong><br />
improving both effectiveness and efficiency.<br />
• The need for integrated planning and triple bottom line analysis (i.e.,<br />
assessing economic, environmental and social impacts). A simple example<br />
is the use <strong>of</strong> a measure designed to improve natural surveillance by<br />
clearing foliage and vegetation. However, while crime prevention may be<br />
achieved, the attractiveness and the environmental qualities <strong>of</strong> a location<br />
may be degraded.<br />
• The undertaking <strong>of</strong> innovative community consultation, engagement and<br />
joint management arrangements.<br />
• The development and implementation <strong>of</strong> joint databases and customer<br />
intake and referral mechanisms.<br />
• The development <strong>of</strong> viable and meaningful joint performance measures<br />
and indicators.<br />
These requirements are challenging but evidence suggests that where they<br />
are applied effectively, the results can be impressive. A classic example is the<br />
experience <strong>of</strong> significantly reducing gun-related homicides by young people<br />
involved in gangs in South Boston in the late 1990s (Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl,<br />
2001). This initiative exemplifies the manner in which these principles can be<br />
applied by practitioners using a problem-solving approach which is focused on<br />
achieving a clearly defined set <strong>of</strong> shared outcomes, in this case the reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
gun-related youth homicides among a specific population.<br />
2. Problem-Oriented Analysis and Intervention Design<br />
Contemporary crime prevention is built around the systematic use <strong>of</strong> analytical<br />
tools for developing a more precise understanding <strong>of</strong> crime problems and a<br />
strategic application <strong>of</strong> appropriate responses. One <strong>of</strong> the best known techniques,<br />
which was deployed to great effect in Boston, is the Problem-Oriented Policing<br />
(POP) approach first developed by Herman Goldstein during the 1970s and<br />
early 1980s. POP was originally developed as a method for improving police<br />
effectiveness through examining and acting on the underlying conditions that<br />
give rise to community problems. Responses emphasize prevention, go beyond<br />
the criminal justice system alone, and engage with other public agencies, the<br />
community and the private sector, where practical.<br />
POP is based on the understanding that incidents that come to the attention<br />
<strong>of</strong> police are rarely random: police <strong>of</strong>ten find that they return repeatedly to the<br />
same place or are dealing with the same individual or groups. Further, not all<br />
incidents are directly crime-related or amenable to enforcement action (e.g.,<br />
racial harassment or anti-social behaviour). Analyzing these patterns is the key<br />
to POP (Goldstein & Scott, 2001).
20 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 21<br />
The methods and techniques pioneered through Goldstein’s POP model are<br />
now in widespread use in the development <strong>of</strong> crime prevention interventions.<br />
For example, Ekblom’s (2000) Conjunction <strong>of</strong> Criminal Opportunity (CCO)<br />
theory has built extensively on some <strong>of</strong> the key POP steps in order to develop<br />
a model for crime prevention interventions that is more purposeful and<br />
comprehensive than the basic POP model.<br />
3. Multiple Interventions to Address Linked Problems<br />
Ekblom’s (2000) CCO model attempts to address the fact that crime prevention<br />
programs will frequently contain a number <strong>of</strong> different initiatives using varying<br />
mechanisms or types <strong>of</strong> interventions that are implemented simultaneously<br />
or at least contemporaneously. A classic example <strong>of</strong> this was the UK’s Crime<br />
Reduction Programme (CRP) from the early 1990s which, by the time it was<br />
fully implemented, involved more than 1500 individual interventions across<br />
twenty different program areas under five key strategic themes (Homel et<br />
al., 2004).<br />
Costing around £400 million over four years, the CRP was developed as a<br />
series <strong>of</strong> specific, but linked, initiatives <strong>of</strong> varying scale organized around the<br />
five broad themes <strong>of</strong>:<br />
1. Working with families, children and schools to prevent young people<br />
becoming <strong>of</strong>fenders <strong>of</strong> the future.<br />
2. Tackling crime in communities, particularly high volume crime such as<br />
domestic burglary.<br />
3. Developing products and systems that are resistant to crime.<br />
4. Identifying more effective sentencing practices.<br />
5. Working with <strong>of</strong>fenders to ensure that they do not re-<strong>of</strong>fend.<br />
The 1500 on-the-ground projects dealt with issues <strong>of</strong> community concern<br />
(e.g., violence against women, youth inclusion), specific types <strong>of</strong> crime such as<br />
burglary, and special and difficult populations such as repeat <strong>of</strong>fenders.<br />
The objectives <strong>of</strong> the CRP were to achieve a sustained reduction in crime,<br />
improve and mainstream knowledge <strong>of</strong> best practice, and maximize the<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> cost-effective crime reduction activity. The program was<br />
thus intended to contribute to crime reduction by ensuring that resources<br />
were allocated to where they would achieve greatest impact (Nutley &<br />
Homel, 2006). Targets were set in relation to the crime reduction goal <strong>of</strong><br />
the program, and although combining knowledge development aims with the<br />
need to achieve crime reduction targets proved to be an ongoing problem for<br />
the CRP, it did help the program secure significant funds from the Treasury<br />
(Maguire, 2004).<br />
What the CRP experience demonstrated very clearly was that implementing<br />
such an ambitious agenda was extremely difficult. In practice, the task <strong>of</strong><br />
managing the progressive implementation <strong>of</strong> such a large number <strong>of</strong> initiatives<br />
created major difficulties and degraded the CRP’s overall effectiveness quite<br />
significantly. In its first three years, the CRP experienced major implementation<br />
delays – at least one <strong>of</strong> the five major streams had not commenced by the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> the second year. In addition, some <strong>of</strong> the streams that had commenced<br />
were showing implementation failure rates <strong>of</strong> between 25% and 50%.<br />
“Implementation failure” in this con<strong>text</strong> was defined as a project for which<br />
funds had been “expended” and little or no project related activity had<br />
occurred. In addition, by the end <strong>of</strong> the first year only 13% <strong>of</strong> the anticipated<br />
annual expenditure for that year had been expended. By the end <strong>of</strong> the third<br />
year, when the CRP was originally intended to have finished, this expenditure<br />
rate had risen to only 83% (Homel et al., 2004).<br />
Essentially, the difficulties that the CRP experienced proved to be a function<br />
<strong>of</strong> four specific and closely related issues (Homel et al., 2004):<br />
1. Ongoing difficulties recruiting suitably qualified and skilled staff.<br />
2. High staff turnover, particularly as a result <strong>of</strong> competition for the few<br />
highly skilled staff available.<br />
3. Generally inadequate technical and strategic advice from the central<br />
agency guiding implementation as well as intermediate agencies.<br />
4. Inadequate levels <strong>of</strong> project management competency and skill,<br />
particularly around the management <strong>of</strong> finances.<br />
However, many <strong>of</strong> the lessons arising from dealing with these practical matters<br />
appear to have been learned by subsequent initiatives. For example, the most<br />
recent national crime prevention program in Australia, the National Community<br />
Crime Prevention Programme (NCCPP) put significant effort into building<br />
good lines <strong>of</strong> support and communication with funded projects and making<br />
resources and other assistance available to potential applicants, particularly<br />
in the form <strong>of</strong> tip sheets and public forums for those considering applying for<br />
funds. As a result, the NCCPP achieved a very high level <strong>of</strong> implementation<br />
performance as well as good working relations between the funding agency and<br />
those implementing projects (Homel et al., 2007). This pattern <strong>of</strong> successful<br />
project implementation is also being demonstrated by the Western Australian
22 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 23<br />
Office <strong>of</strong> Crime Prevention (OCP) through its current Safer Community and<br />
Crime Prevention Program which is being undertaken in partnership with local<br />
government authorities (Anderson & Tresidder, 2008).<br />
4. Evidence-Based Policy and Programs<br />
A further feature <strong>of</strong> most contemporary crime prevention programs is a strong<br />
reliance on evidence-based policy and practice. In their basic form, evidencebased<br />
policy programs are usually about learning “what works” to meet<br />
specified policy goals or needs (Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2002). In practice,<br />
it has been suggested that an evidence-based policy program will need to be<br />
much more complex, having to address four key requirements for maximizing<br />
the evidence use (Nutley, Davies, & Walter, 2002, p. 3):<br />
1. Agreement as to the nature <strong>of</strong> “evidence”;<br />
2. A strategic approach to the creation <strong>of</strong> evidence, together with the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> a cumulative knowledge base;<br />
3. Effective dissemination <strong>of</strong> knowledge, together with the development <strong>of</strong><br />
effective means <strong>of</strong> access to knowledge; and<br />
4. Initiatives to increase uptake <strong>of</strong> evidence in both policy and practice.<br />
The evidence-based policy approach attempts to build public policy, strategies<br />
and interventions based on the best available research and evaluation findings<br />
(Davies, 2004). That this approach has been attractive to the crime prevention<br />
field is hardly surprising when you consider the potential it presents for moving<br />
past the reactive ideological arguments that are typical <strong>of</strong> the field.<br />
The UK’s Crime Reduction Programme was also one <strong>of</strong> the earliest examples <strong>of</strong><br />
trying to use the principles and process <strong>of</strong> evidence-based policy and programs<br />
within modern crime prevention – at least in principle and as far as political and<br />
practical realities permit. The CRP was meant to accumulate the best available<br />
research-based evidence for “what works” from any area that might contribute<br />
to the achievement <strong>of</strong> crime reduction outcomes. This knowledge was to be<br />
organized in terms <strong>of</strong> whether the initiatives were: (a) promising but so far<br />
unproven; (b) based on stronger evidence, but confined to limited research<br />
settings or derived from non-criminal justice areas (e.g., health or education);<br />
or (c) proven in terms <strong>of</strong> small-scale initiatives and therefore ready for larger<br />
scale implementation. On the basis <strong>of</strong> this knowledge, a portfolio <strong>of</strong> viable<br />
evidence-based initiatives was to be developed. It was intended that initiatives<br />
would be reviewed, refined and further developed during implementation<br />
using program evaluation feedback. The overall learning from the initial<br />
(three-year) implementation phase would be accumulated and disseminated,<br />
with successful initiatives moved into mainstream funding while unsupported<br />
or cost-ineffective strategies would be withdrawn.<br />
This program logic meant that the CRP was attempting to implement and<br />
review a complex array <strong>of</strong> initiatives with varying levels <strong>of</strong> research evidence<br />
to support them. Further, it was seeking to determine which initiatives were<br />
individually strong and cost-effective as well as assessing the best mix <strong>of</strong><br />
strategies for maximizing crime reduction impacts. It was also aiming to learn<br />
about sustainability, both in terms <strong>of</strong> the impact <strong>of</strong> initiatives and how they<br />
might be transferred to mainstream programs and continued over time. While<br />
some projects within the CRP were centred on making better use <strong>of</strong> routine<br />
internal data (Stanko, 2004), the predominant concern <strong>of</strong> the CRP was the<br />
deployment and development <strong>of</strong> research and evaluation evidence.<br />
Other more recent crime prevention programs have placed less emphasis on<br />
the generation <strong>of</strong> evidence and looked to the practical application <strong>of</strong> available<br />
research and evaluation findings to the development and implementation <strong>of</strong><br />
specific initiatives. Indeed, this is a feature <strong>of</strong> the current Canadian program<br />
and also can be seen in the recent NCCPP initiative in Australia. In doing<br />
so, these programs are avoiding a number <strong>of</strong> the overheads associated with<br />
generating new knowledge. However, at the same time they are also confronting<br />
a number <strong>of</strong> typical barriers for getting research information into practice. Key<br />
among these are:<br />
• The inconclusive nature <strong>of</strong> most research.<br />
• The fact that research may not be as timely or relevant to practice.<br />
• The fact that research findings frequently are communicated only within<br />
narrow channels (e.g., conferences and journals) and in a language that may<br />
not be accessible to practitioners.<br />
• The practical implications <strong>of</strong> many research findings are not always clear<br />
and may only become so over time.<br />
• The day to day business <strong>of</strong> policy and program management frequently<br />
mitigates against being able to adequately engage with the research process<br />
and give the findings adequate priority.<br />
• Findings from research (formal knowledge) are just one source <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />
about good practice. Informal knowledge (such as that embedded in many<br />
systems and procedures, which shapes how an organization functions,<br />
communicates and analyses situations), tacit knowledge (arising from the<br />
capabilities <strong>of</strong> people, particularly the skills that they have developed over<br />
time), and cultural knowledge (relating to customs, values and relationships
24 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 25<br />
with clients and other stakeholders) are also powerful influences on people’s<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional practices (Nutley & Davies, 2001).<br />
• Individual and organizational resistance to the application <strong>of</strong> research-based<br />
knowledge to policy and program development and implementation.<br />
Some have argued that these practical barriers to the application <strong>of</strong> an evidencebased<br />
approach for crime prevention are so great that it represents a false and<br />
unachievable goal (Cherney & Sutton, 2007). However, as Welsh (2007)<br />
has succinctly observed, “evidence-based crime prevention ensures that the<br />
best available evidence is considered in the decision to implement a program<br />
designed to prevent crime” (p. 1).<br />
5. Outcome-Focused with Performance<br />
and Effectiveness Measures<br />
Crime prevention also strives to be outcome (product) focused rather than<br />
simply output and process (or activity) focused. This is largely a function <strong>of</strong><br />
adopting a problem analysis and evidence-based approach to the design <strong>of</strong><br />
programs and interventions. It is also an efficient method for dealing with the<br />
complex governance arrangements that are needed to manage the multiple<br />
partners participating in a crime prevention intervention and the different<br />
inputs they provide. In other words, if the accountability mechanisms are set<br />
up in such a way as to focus on the results or outcomes <strong>of</strong> the intervention<br />
rather than merely accounting for the inputs such as money and staff, it is<br />
easier to assess whether an intervention was worth the investment it required<br />
(Friedman, n.d.; Schacter, 2002).<br />
There are two basic tools for measuring the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> any policy or<br />
program: performance measurement and evaluation. Both work from some<br />
common data sources, and both take as their fundamental point <strong>of</strong> reference the<br />
logic model that underlies any policy or program. However, they differ in their<br />
time horizons, their assumptions and their particular uses. Evaluation reflects on<br />
the design and implementation <strong>of</strong> a program to determine whether the chosen<br />
strategy has achieved its stated objectives by assessing intended and unintended<br />
outcomes. Evaluation also explores alternative explanations for these outcomes.<br />
Furthermore, evaluation will normally attempt to explain why a policy or<br />
program has or has not achieved its objectives in terms <strong>of</strong> both internal and<br />
external causes, and recommend strategies to improve performance.<br />
Performance measurement can provide insight into whether a policy or program<br />
is actually likely to achieve its objectives by enabling ongoing monitoring <strong>of</strong><br />
key performance information. Evaluation feeds into higher-level decisions<br />
about the choice and design <strong>of</strong> policies and programs, while performance<br />
measurement is used mainly for day-to-day management and accountability.<br />
The performance measurement system represents an ongoing learning tool to<br />
identify what practices are going well and what needs to be fixed, changed or<br />
even abandoned in the light <strong>of</strong> changing circumstances, new problems and<br />
improved practice.<br />
Current Australian experience is making it clear that it is realistic to look<br />
upon the performance measurement process as a vital building block for<br />
encouraging more systematic program appraisal processes by project managers<br />
(Homel et al., 2007; Willis & Homel, 2008). That project and policy<br />
managers are increasingly seeing the benefit <strong>of</strong> the efficient collection and flow<br />
<strong>of</strong> performance measurement data is laying down a basis for more systematic<br />
and integrated evaluation work. The major point <strong>of</strong> leverage here is that policy<br />
and program managers get to see continuous information flows about project<br />
performance and no longer see the data collection process as a burdensome<br />
task providing only long-term feedback on effectiveness. At the same time,<br />
program evaluators begin to gain access to a richer and more diverse range <strong>of</strong><br />
higher quality data suitable for inclusion in evaluation studies.<br />
There are a small number <strong>of</strong> important crime prevention evaluations that have<br />
demonstrated the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> a combined evaluation and performance<br />
measurement approach. One <strong>of</strong> these is the seminal Operation Ceasefire<br />
project directed at reducing youth gang homicides in Boston in the late<br />
1990s (Kennedy et al., 2001). In Australia, the Pathways to Prevention project<br />
(Homel, R. et al., 2006) is an example <strong>of</strong> how this combined approach is being<br />
applied to evaluation. The evaluation <strong>of</strong> this program represents the most<br />
comprehensive analysis <strong>of</strong> the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> an early intervention project to<br />
date in Australia.<br />
The Pathways to Prevention project is a service delivery and policy development<br />
initiative that was designed to overcome the long-term and <strong>of</strong>ten entrenched<br />
patterns <strong>of</strong> inter-generational involvement in crime and victimization in a<br />
disadvantaged urban community with a mixed demographic pr<strong>of</strong>ile. Pathways<br />
began in Brisbane, Queensland in 2001 with the aim <strong>of</strong> involving family,<br />
school and community in a broad set <strong>of</strong> planned interventions to prevent antisocial<br />
behaviour among young children as they progress into adolescence.<br />
The program targets four to six year olds who are in transition to school and<br />
focuses on enhancing their communication and social skills and empowering<br />
their families, schools and communities to provide supportive environments
26 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 27<br />
for positive development. There is growing evidence that developmental<br />
prevention programs can open up opportunities for children and young people<br />
and reduce their involvement in crime, especially if they live in disadvantaged<br />
communities (Homel, 2005a). Early results from the project are demonstrating<br />
important positive results and <strong>of</strong>fer significant opportunity for sustained<br />
improvements (Homel, R. et al., 2006).<br />
The approach taken for the evaluation <strong>of</strong> the Pathways project was designed to<br />
improve practice and guide future policy development through a mix <strong>of</strong> “realtime”<br />
research, performance measurement processes and outcome evaluation.<br />
The service delivery function is conducted through collaboration between a<br />
non-government organization and a university, with considerable support from<br />
a range <strong>of</strong> key stakeholders. Policy development and research is conducted<br />
by a team <strong>of</strong> researchers actively engaged with the service delivery aspects <strong>of</strong><br />
the initiative.<br />
The long-term focus <strong>of</strong> developmental crime prevention makes demonstrating<br />
positive outcomes difficult. However, using a series <strong>of</strong> economic simulation<br />
studies to assess the longer term impact <strong>of</strong> the Pathways interventions in the<br />
areas studied, the project demonstrated a potential cost reduction to juvenile<br />
justice services <strong>of</strong> AUD$415,000 alone over three years, based on a projected<br />
21 percent reduction in <strong>of</strong>fending in the target community.<br />
This work has had considerable influence both nationally and internationally,<br />
shaping government policy in relation to not only crime prevention, but child<br />
protection, health, education and other areas, and informing the development<br />
and implementation <strong>of</strong> national and state and territory programs (Pathways to<br />
Prevention, 2007).<br />
6. Centrally Developed and Driven with Local Delivery<br />
While the focus <strong>of</strong> crime prevention is generally on reducing crime problems<br />
within local communities, the processes for promoting and implementing<br />
those goals are frequently centrally driven. To some extent, this is a function<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fact that criminal justice services and related data systems are centrally<br />
managed while many day-to-day crime problems are very local in nature.<br />
It is also a practical example <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> “subsidiarity”, which is<br />
typical <strong>of</strong> the manner in which modern states are organized. While crime<br />
prevention activity takes place at different levels (i.e., local, sub-national,<br />
national, and international), the division <strong>of</strong> tasks and resources is structured<br />
in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, meaning that the investment <strong>of</strong><br />
authority with ensuing resources and responsibilities is at the local (municipal/<br />
town) level.<br />
Organizing centrally for regional and local crime prevention program delivery<br />
has a history <strong>of</strong> significant implementation problems (Homel, 2006) that are<br />
common across borders and in different systems <strong>of</strong> government (i.e., between<br />
federal systems such as Australia, Canada and the USA, or unitary systems<br />
such as in the UK and New Zealand).<br />
For example, the review <strong>of</strong> the UK’s Crime Reduction Programme highlighted<br />
numerous difficulties associated with the relationship between the central<br />
agency responsible for the program (i.e., the Home Office) and the bodies<br />
undertaking local coordination and implementation (i.e., the Local Crime and<br />
Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Regional Government Offices). The<br />
experience <strong>of</strong> implementing the CRP showed that to achieve effective local<br />
management, the central agency must be an active part <strong>of</strong> a delivery process: a<br />
process that treats all layers <strong>of</strong> the delivery stream as a single integrated system<br />
(Homel et al., 2004).<br />
This means that the centre itself must be appropriately staffed and adequately<br />
resourced if it is to usefully contribute to the delivery process. Similarly,<br />
any regional <strong>of</strong>fices must be staffed with technically competent and policyliterate<br />
staff capable <strong>of</strong> providing direct support (such as analytical and project<br />
management guidance and training) to individual projects, as well as assisting<br />
to ensure a high level <strong>of</strong> coherence between other companion initiatives<br />
operating across the region and at a local level. The regions must also be capable<br />
<strong>of</strong> assisting the centre to remain actively informed <strong>of</strong> progress towards agreed<br />
outcomes, and where and in what form strategic and technical assistance is<br />
required to address emerging deficits.<br />
A policy review <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the key aspects <strong>of</strong> the New Zealand crime prevention<br />
program at the time, the Safer Community Council (SCC) Network, found<br />
that in spite <strong>of</strong> a ten-year implementation experience, “there is no discernible<br />
evidence that the SCCs are making a strong contribution to reducing crime<br />
in local communities” (NZ Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice, 2003, p. 4). The explanation<br />
for this apparent failure was a lack <strong>of</strong> specific crime prevention expertise at<br />
the local level, inappropriate local co-ordination, and a breakdown <strong>of</strong> the<br />
relationship between central government and local stakeholders.<br />
The report’s recommendations for improving the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> crime<br />
prevention delivery at the local level parallel many <strong>of</strong> the findings from the
28 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 29<br />
CRP implementation review. In particular, the report recommended that the<br />
NZ Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) should be able to <strong>of</strong>fer communities the<br />
following services (NZ Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice, 2003, p. 7):<br />
• Leadership – by setting the national crime prevention policy direction and<br />
effectively managing partnerships;<br />
• Operational support – including facilitating access to appropriate crime<br />
prevention training, coaching, and contract management;<br />
• Resources – funding, expertise, knowledge transfer and capacity building<br />
in the areas <strong>of</strong> crime prevention program management and governance;<br />
• Information – provision <strong>of</strong> timely, accurate and relevant information<br />
on policy [through the Crime Reduction Strategy], crime data analysis,<br />
problem identification, program planning, and best practices; and<br />
• Marketing – advocacy to [Government] Ministers on behalf <strong>of</strong> SCCs.<br />
The Australia experience <strong>of</strong> crime prevention implementation has been similar<br />
with a strong central policy driven agenda and an expectation <strong>of</strong> mainly local<br />
delivery. However, unlike New Zealand and Britain, Australia’s federal system<br />
has meant that the bulk <strong>of</strong> program delivery has been the responsibility <strong>of</strong> state<br />
and territory governments.<br />
The existence <strong>of</strong> this third layer <strong>of</strong> government, between the national and<br />
local government structures, has had an impact on the development and<br />
delivery <strong>of</strong> crime prevention work in Australia. It has shortened the distance<br />
between the policy and program development process being undertaken by the<br />
central agencies and the local delivery agencies, which are typically regional<br />
branches <strong>of</strong> government authorities or community-based agencies. However,<br />
in practice much <strong>of</strong> this potential benefit has been significantly blunted by<br />
the existence <strong>of</strong> overly complex bureaucratic processes and a lack <strong>of</strong> consistent<br />
policy and strategic direction, both at the state/territory and federal level<br />
(Homel, 2005b).<br />
For example, in a review <strong>of</strong> the Safer Cities and Shires Program developed and<br />
implemented by the Victorian state government during the late 1990s, Cherney<br />
(2004) attributes many <strong>of</strong> the program’s implementation flaws to a lack <strong>of</strong><br />
commitment by the central agencies responsible for leading the initiative to<br />
establish adequate support and collaborative program delivery mechanisms.<br />
He also identified as a key problem a lack <strong>of</strong> consistent leadership and an<br />
unwillingness to devolve resources, authority and decision-making powers to<br />
the local inter-agency partnerships responsible for actually implementing the<br />
local level initiatives.<br />
More recent experience shows that these problems can be overcome. Ongoing<br />
work by the Australian Institute <strong>of</strong> Criminology (AIC) in partnership with<br />
the Western Australian Office <strong>of</strong> Crime Prevention (OCP) shows that while<br />
problems are very likely to recur when a centrally driven initiative seeks to<br />
promote local delivery, a process <strong>of</strong> continuous engagement and effective twoway<br />
communication can overcome the worst <strong>of</strong> these difficulties (Anderson<br />
& Homel, 2005; Anderson & Tresidder, 2008). Even when confronted with<br />
vast distances and a dispersed population, <strong>of</strong>ten in isolated communities, the<br />
Western Australian OCP is demonstrating that careful attention to effective<br />
ongoing communication with stakeholders and a commitment to the provision<br />
<strong>of</strong> strategic support can overcome many <strong>of</strong> the barriers to delivering centrallydriven<br />
initiatives at a local level.<br />
7. Partnership and Shared Outcomes<br />
The use <strong>of</strong> “partnership” arrangements is frequently seen as an integral<br />
component <strong>of</strong> the operation <strong>of</strong> multi-agency approaches. As already explained,<br />
under the partnership model service provision is not viewed in terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
core functions and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> separate agencies and interest groups,<br />
but in terms <strong>of</strong> how to best organize and run services to achieve those goals,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> where the service is sourced from, in order to achieve shared<br />
goals outcomes.<br />
However, there is a great deal <strong>of</strong> confusion over what the term “partnership”<br />
means in practice. The term is used widely to describe local structures such<br />
as those for planning, coordinating and delivering local crime prevention<br />
initiatives. But there is no one form that is seen as being most effective or<br />
appropriate in all circumstances (Joseph Rountree Foundation, 2003).<br />
Based on an extensive analysis <strong>of</strong> the operation <strong>of</strong> crime prevention partnerships<br />
in the UK, Gilling (2005) has suggested that the following characteristics are<br />
required to make a crime prevention partnership work:<br />
• A clear mission or purpose for the partnership, together with agreement on<br />
intended outcomes.<br />
• A solid level <strong>of</strong> trust between partner agencies.<br />
• Leadership, including resources from senior managers to enable<br />
partnerships to function.<br />
• Clear lines <strong>of</strong> communication and accountability at all levels, both across<br />
and within agencies.
30 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 31<br />
• Management that is focused on strategic as well as operational or<br />
project outcomes.<br />
• Partnership structures that are relatively small, businesslike and focused<br />
on crime prevention.<br />
• Expertise to ensure access to a good problem oriented knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
crime prevention.<br />
• Continuity in partner representation and participation, including<br />
good documentation.<br />
• Staff with enough time away from agency core business to provide input<br />
to the partnership.<br />
Effective partnerships can be hindered by differential power relationships<br />
between partner agencies. For example, there can be different reasons for<br />
participating in partnerships, with accompanying differences in resources and<br />
access to information. In a true partnership, information needs to be shared<br />
and used to enable all agencies to work together to develop crime prevention<br />
strategies relevant for a specific local community. This power differential<br />
between agencies on the ground can be counterproductive and lead to<br />
partnership in name only – rather than a useful and creative approach to crime<br />
prevention on a local level amongst equal partners (Homel, 2005a).<br />
8. Principles <strong>of</strong> Inclusiveness and Participation<br />
This final common feature, the focus on principles <strong>of</strong> inclusiveness and<br />
participation, is one that is slightly contentious. For the most part, communitybased<br />
crime prevention, built around the use <strong>of</strong> social developmental approaches,<br />
will be characterized by principles <strong>of</strong> inclusiveness and participation. These<br />
principles are explicit in the UN Guidelines for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (UN<br />
ECOSOC, 2002) and can be found in most other national and territory<br />
level crime prevention strategies. However, it is arguable that some crime<br />
prevention measures are in fact exclusionary (e.g., gated communities, some<br />
other forms <strong>of</strong> public security measures), even though the need to operate<br />
through partnerships and collaborative arrangements necessarily means that<br />
inclusiveness needs to be embraced.<br />
For example, Walsh (2008) describes the increasing use by local government<br />
authorities and other custodians <strong>of</strong> public space in the UK <strong>of</strong> a device called<br />
The Mosquito, a sonic repellent that is being used in a bid to drive teenagers out<br />
<strong>of</strong> public spaces and reduce the incidence <strong>of</strong> anti-social behaviour. Without<br />
going into the details <strong>of</strong> how this device works or <strong>of</strong> its ethical and legal basis,<br />
it is abundantly clear that its adoption as a strategy for dealing with incidents<br />
<strong>of</strong> anti-social behaviour is clearly not based on principles <strong>of</strong> inclusiveness<br />
and participation.<br />
There are other examples where these principles can fail, producing quite<br />
unforeseen and unintended consequences. For example, when a team <strong>of</strong><br />
researchers from the RAND Corporation in the USA attempted to undertake<br />
a replication <strong>of</strong> the Boston youth gun violence reduction initiative (Kennedy<br />
et al., 2001) in South Central Los Angeles, a large number <strong>of</strong> unexpected<br />
problems led to its ultimate failure. In the words <strong>of</strong> the RAND researchers:<br />
…the intervention was not implemented as designed, and it never<br />
developed dynamically or in response to changing needs. Part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
reason stems from the reorganization <strong>of</strong> the LAPD gang crime units<br />
in response to a scandal involving some gang unit <strong>of</strong>ficers who planted<br />
evidence and used excessive force. Also, the project did not succeed in<br />
getting working group participants, who referred to it as the ‘RAND<br />
study’ or the ‘RAND project’, to view it as their own and seek to<br />
continue it. No single agency emerged to take charge <strong>of</strong> the project and<br />
carry it forward, perhaps because <strong>of</strong> limited resources for the work. (Tita<br />
et al., 2003, p. 12)<br />
In other words, it seems as though there was a reluctance to own a new initiative<br />
that was not really seen as locally appropriate or developed. Further, there was<br />
evidence that the systemic changes that were required to implement such an<br />
innovative program were not supported, either politically or financially. In this<br />
sense, the RAND initiative failed to encourage inclusiveness and participation<br />
in the same way that the original Boston initiative had done. In many respects,<br />
the original Boston project could be described as an organically developed<br />
theory driven strategy rooted heavily in the local community in which it<br />
was implemented. The RAND replication appears to have failed to take into<br />
account the distinctive differences (both physical and demographic) between<br />
the original setting and the replication site. Key among these characteristics<br />
would seem to have been the principles <strong>of</strong> participation and inclusiveness.<br />
Some Conclusions and Suggested Lessons for Canada<br />
Having identified a number <strong>of</strong> features common to crime prevention programs<br />
across the world and discussed some examples <strong>of</strong> good and bad practice in<br />
relation to their application, it is worth summarizing some <strong>of</strong> preconditions<br />
for an effective crime prevention program before considering what may be<br />
relevant to the Canadian crime prevention experience.
32 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 33<br />
It is suggested that there are essentially six conditions for good crime prevention<br />
action. These are:<br />
1. A practical grasp <strong>of</strong> crime prevention theory.<br />
2. Strong and consistent leadership and supportive governance structures.<br />
3. A capacity to manage collaborative multi-agency action.<br />
4. Outcome focused performance measurement systems.<br />
5. An applied commitment to evidence-based practice and<br />
research/evaluation.<br />
6. Effective communication processes designed to promote engagement<br />
and sustainability.<br />
Hopefully, most <strong>of</strong> these items should be self-explanatory when viewed<br />
from the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> the preceding observations, but some require some<br />
additional explanation.<br />
The first is to do with the role <strong>of</strong> theory in designing and implementing a<br />
good crime prevention intervention. As Kurt Lewin (1951, p. 169) said, “there<br />
is nothing so practical as a good theory”. In the case <strong>of</strong> crime prevention,<br />
Pawson and Tilley (2003) have been more direct. They suggest that essentially<br />
all programs are theories in the sense that they are informed speculations<br />
on what is likely to work to produce the result we are looking for. Further,<br />
since programs are embedded, active, and are open systems, they exhibit the<br />
necessary qualities <strong>of</strong> a good theory in that they are testable and contestable.<br />
John Eck (2005) has extended this argument by suggesting that getting the<br />
theory right really does matter, and that relevant crime data in its own right<br />
will not reveal the most appropriate interventions while using sound theory<br />
will. Theory helps to understand problems and interpret outcomes and as<br />
such, theory testing is critical to lesson learning on crime prevention.<br />
The second condition worth discussing is governance and leadership. The term<br />
“governance” deals with the processes and systems by which an organization<br />
operates. The word relates to older English and French notions <strong>of</strong> “steering”,<br />
and can be contrasted with the traditional top-down approach <strong>of</strong> governments<br />
driving or controlling society. When combined with the issue <strong>of</strong> strong and<br />
consistent leadership, this provides the framework within which good crime<br />
prevention policy and programs can flourish.<br />
The enemy <strong>of</strong> good leadership and governance structures is a tendency for<br />
governments to continually reorganize the manner in which crime prevention<br />
work is delivered. While it is important to review and refresh crime prevention<br />
practice in order to ensure that it is based on the best available evidence and<br />
is as effective and efficient as possible, change also requires time to achieve its<br />
maximum impact.<br />
Finally, issues to do with using effective communication to promote engagement<br />
and sustainability may require some explanation. As was observed above, a<br />
lack <strong>of</strong> effective communication processes has inhibited the effectiveness <strong>of</strong><br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> numerous crime prevention programs across the world. For example,<br />
poor communication can hamper the sustainability <strong>of</strong> working partnership<br />
arrangements. It can also prevent the flow <strong>of</strong> information necessary for<br />
planning for the delivery <strong>of</strong> programs and supporting resources, and can work<br />
against good performance measurement and program effectiveness monitoring.<br />
Overall, ineffective communication can be a critical flaw for crime prevention<br />
action, not least because the process <strong>of</strong> crime prevention is essentially an<br />
exercise in social change.<br />
What Lessons are There for Canada Today?<br />
Canada is now implementing the Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention<br />
led by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC, 2007). The<br />
following brief observations are made based on very limited exposure to its<br />
implementation processes.<br />
First, while it is apparent that there is a good commitment to collaborative<br />
working and significant resourcing (about $64 million per year), the Canadian<br />
funding scheme is still only for development funds, not long-term programs.<br />
This focus on short-term “seed” funding is premised on an anticipation that<br />
other agencies or orders <strong>of</strong> government or the private or not-for-pr<strong>of</strong>it sectors<br />
will support continuing crime prevention activity. However, experience around<br />
the world suggests that this approach can cause some disquiet, particularly<br />
among local government authorities who fear being left to find the resources<br />
necessary for continuing the effort when the initial funding ends. This has<br />
the potential to inhibit program effectiveness by reducing the willingness to<br />
undertake long-tem initiatives.<br />
At the same time, the current shift at the federal level to an emphasis on<br />
identifying and addressing individual risk factors rather than underlying<br />
structural causes <strong>of</strong> crime can also work against a commitment to long-term<br />
prevention. It is also apparent that the strategy was failing to achieve consistent<br />
buy-in from all <strong>of</strong> the Provinces, with the most notable exception being Alberta.<br />
The absence <strong>of</strong> any major participant from a national strategy, such as this,
34 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience 35<br />
inevitably has the potential to undermine the strategy’s overall effectiveness<br />
and credibility.<br />
Based on experiences <strong>of</strong> similar or related crime prevention strategies across the<br />
world, and the evidence about their potential for positive long-term impacts on<br />
the community’s experience <strong>of</strong> crime, it is argued that Canada’s national crime<br />
prevention agenda will succeed if there is:<br />
• A committed national leadership operating within a coherent and flexible<br />
policy framework.<br />
• Evidence-based strategies and practices that are focused on results and<br />
efficiently monitored and openly reported on.<br />
• Responsive partnership arrangements with governance mechanisms<br />
respectful <strong>of</strong> specific communities, priorities and existing experience.<br />
• Long-term adequate resourcing informed by good data about problems<br />
and strategically appropriate responses.<br />
• A commitment to undertaking workforce and organizational development<br />
and the active dissemination <strong>of</strong> good practice knowledge.<br />
• A strategy for promoting an active and engaged community crime<br />
prevention agenda.<br />
These are the elements that must be assured if Canada is to develop an effective<br />
and sustainable national crime prevention strategy. However, experience has<br />
proven time and again that even the best policies and programs are incapable<br />
<strong>of</strong> implementing themselves. Without ongoing commitment and adequate<br />
support based on good research and effective monitoring, the latest Canadian<br />
initiative may also become yet another footnote in the international history <strong>of</strong><br />
stop-start crime prevention efforts.<br />
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Volume 3: pages 41–65<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
New Labour and Crime<br />
Prevention in England and Wales:<br />
What Worked?<br />
Enver Solomon<br />
Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies<br />
King’s College London, UK<br />
Résumé<br />
Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 1997, le gouvernement travailliste a<br />
entrepris une réforme de la justice pénale sans précédent dans l’histoire<br />
britannique moderne. Tous les organismes de justice pénale ont fait l’objet<br />
d’une évaluation et d’une réforme dans une tentative « d’être efficace contre<br />
le crime et les causes du crime ». Il y a également eu des investissements<br />
importants pour étendre la portée du système de justice pénale. Le bilan du<br />
Parti du travail, cependant, a été mitigé. Un examen des progrès accomplis<br />
sur la réduction de la criminalité, la lutte contre les comportements<br />
antisociaux et l’augmentation du nombre d’infractions traitées par le<br />
système pénal révèle que fournir un modèle efficace de contrôle et de<br />
prévention de la criminalité s’est avéré extrêmement difficile. Un certain<br />
nombre d’enseignements importants sont identifiés pour les praticiens et<br />
les décideurs politiques au Canada. Les dangers d’un contrôle centralisé et<br />
de cibles trop précises, les conséquences de la création de silos à l’intérieur<br />
de silos, la nécessité d’un équilibre entre la prévention et la répression, le<br />
besoin de se prémunir contre l’expansionnisme et de reconnaître les limites<br />
des activités de la justice pénale, et l’importance d’incorporer une véritable<br />
approche basée sur les éléments de preuve sont tous mis en évidence. La<br />
principale leçon à tirer est que des stratégies situationnelles efficaces de<br />
contrôle et de prévention peuvent faire une différence. Mais, adresser la<br />
victimisation des jeunes exige une plus grande compréhension des causes<br />
de la criminalité et du désordre social, et il est préférable d’aborder la<br />
question par des interventions sociales plutôt que pénales.
42 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 43<br />
Abstract<br />
Since coming to power in 1997, the UK Labour government has embarked<br />
on a “root and branch reform” <strong>of</strong> criminal justice unprecedented in modern<br />
British history. All criminal justice agencies have been subject to wide<br />
ranging review and reform in an attempt “to be tough on crime and the<br />
causes <strong>of</strong> crime”. There has also been substantial investment to expand the<br />
reach <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system. Labour’s record, however, has been<br />
mixed. An examination <strong>of</strong> progress on crime reduction, tackling anti-social<br />
behaviour and increasing the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences dealt with by the criminal<br />
justice system reveals that delivering a more effective model in crime control<br />
and prevention has proved extremely challenging. A number <strong>of</strong> important<br />
lessons are identified for practitioners and policy makers in Canada. The<br />
dangers <strong>of</strong> over centralized control, the perils <strong>of</strong> targets, the creation <strong>of</strong> silos<br />
within silos, the need to balance prevention and enforcement, and guarding<br />
against expansionism, recognizing the limits <strong>of</strong> criminal justice activity and<br />
embedding a genuine evidence based approach are all highlighted. The<br />
primary lesson from the English and Welsh experience is that effective<br />
situational crime control and prevention strategies can make a difference,<br />
but tackling levels <strong>of</strong> youth victimization requires greater understanding<br />
<strong>of</strong> the causes <strong>of</strong> crime and disorder, and is best addressed by resorting to<br />
social rather than criminal justice interventions.<br />
Introduction<br />
Law and order is <strong>of</strong>ten considered to have been one <strong>of</strong> the Labour government’s<br />
success stories. Significant falls in the <strong>of</strong>ficial rate <strong>of</strong> crime in England and<br />
Wales and record police numbers – two <strong>of</strong> the legacies the government<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten highlights – have pleased many <strong>of</strong> its supporters while discomforting<br />
its opponents. 1 On the international stage, the government is also feted for<br />
creating local crime prevention partnerships, implementing strategies to tackle<br />
persistent and prolific <strong>of</strong>fenders, and creating multi-agency teams to prevent<br />
youth <strong>of</strong>fending. It is not uncommon for delegations from other English<br />
speaking countries to visit on fact finding missions. Canada has particular<br />
interest in the UK experience – for instance in April and May 2008 there were<br />
separate visits from the British Colombia and Ontario governments.<br />
1 It is important to note that this article focuses on England and Wales, although the information on<br />
expenditure refers to the United Kingdom as a whole, owing to the way the data is compiled. Scotland<br />
and Northern Ireland have separate and distinct criminal justice systems, with their own courts, agencies,<br />
legislation and executives.<br />
Criminal justice reform has certainly been at the heart <strong>of</strong> New Labour’s public<br />
policy agenda. During its first time in <strong>of</strong>fice between 1997 and 2001, the<br />
focus was very much on a “root and branch reform” <strong>of</strong> youth justice to prevent<br />
<strong>of</strong>fending and tackle what Labour described as the emergence <strong>of</strong> “an excuse<br />
culture” (Home Office, 1997). Having been elected for a second term, the<br />
focus switched to more ambitious wide ranging change to deliver “the most<br />
comprehensive reform <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system since the war” (Labour<br />
Party, 2001, Renewing Public Services section). Since then, the pace <strong>of</strong> change<br />
has been relentless. In the seven years between 2001 and 2008, there have<br />
been four overarching criminal justice plans – a ten year plan in 2001 (Home<br />
Office, 2001), a five year plan in 2004 (Home Office, 2004a), a series <strong>of</strong> wide<br />
ranging policy reforms in 2006 (Home Office, 2006a) and another five year<br />
plan in 2008 (Home Office, 2008a). There have also been various strategies<br />
on anti-social behaviour, policing, community safety, prisons and probation<br />
and violent crime. At the same time, there has been the introduction <strong>of</strong> a huge<br />
array <strong>of</strong> crime-related pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation. According to one recent estimate,<br />
between 1997 and 2004 nearly 50 Acts <strong>of</strong> Parliament were passed relating to<br />
crime, disorder, policing, criminal justice and punishment (Loader, 2006).<br />
Hyperactive law making and endless policy strategising have been a central<br />
feature <strong>of</strong> the last 10 years.<br />
So what should be made <strong>of</strong> Labour’s criminal justice reform agenda? Has it<br />
delivered a new, more effective model in crime control and prevention? What<br />
have been the successes and failures? Put bluntly, has it all worked? This article<br />
attempts to answer those questions. It draws on policy analysis conducted for<br />
two reports – Ten Years <strong>of</strong> Criminal Justice Under Labour: An Independent<br />
Audit (Solomon, Eades, Garside, & Rutherford, 2007) and Ten Years <strong>of</strong><br />
Labour’s Youth Justice Reforms: An Independent Audit (Solomon & Garside,<br />
2008) – that made independent assessments based on <strong>of</strong>ficial data analyzing<br />
the key targets and priorities that Labour set for itself. In considering what<br />
the successes and failures have been, the article draws out the learning from<br />
the bold, ambitious attempt to overhaul the criminal justice system that was<br />
initially led by Tony Blair and more recently has been taken up by his successor<br />
Gordon Brown. It examines progress in three key areas: crime reduction, the<br />
so-called “justice gap” and “anti-social behaviour”. A number <strong>of</strong> key learning<br />
points are identified for policy makers and practitioners to consider and draw<br />
on in their own work. The article also looks at the extent to which the learning<br />
has been recognized in the latest criminal justice policy strategies developed in<br />
recent months by the Brown government.
44 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 45<br />
Labour’s Vision<br />
In the run up to the 1997 general election, law and order was a key electoral<br />
battleground. Labour successfully repositioned itself as the party that was<br />
“tough on crime, tough on the causes <strong>of</strong> crime”. Its election manifesto stated:<br />
On crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in punishing crime,<br />
but also tackling its underlying causes – so, tough on crime, tough on<br />
the causes <strong>of</strong> crime, different from the Labour approach <strong>of</strong> the past and<br />
the Tory policy <strong>of</strong> today. (Labour Party, 1997, We Will be Tough on<br />
Crime and Tough on the Causes <strong>of</strong> Crime section)<br />
This classic piece <strong>of</strong> political triangulation – putting distance between both<br />
the “s<strong>of</strong>t on crime” label accusation levelled at “old” Labour and the “prison<br />
works” formula <strong>of</strong> the Conservatives – was an important factor in New Labour’s<br />
rise to power. Indeed, it signified that Labour had repositioned itself as the new<br />
law and order party <strong>of</strong> British politics.<br />
Once in power, Labour initially adhered to the strict spending plans <strong>of</strong> the<br />
former Conservative government which limited its ability to dramatically<br />
shift the direction <strong>of</strong> criminal justice policy. However, this did not prevent<br />
ministers from embarking on a flurry <strong>of</strong> activity to reform youth justice.<br />
Within less than two months, six consultation documents on youth crime were<br />
published (Newburn, 2002). The major proposals were brought together in<br />
the government’s flagship legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which<br />
set out the key elements <strong>of</strong> what has been described as the “new youth justice”<br />
(Goldson, 2000): the establishment <strong>of</strong> the Youth Justice Board (YJB); the<br />
creation <strong>of</strong> locally accountable multi-agency youth <strong>of</strong>fending teams (YOTs);<br />
the replacement <strong>of</strong> cautions with a new reprimand and final warning scheme;<br />
and the restructuring <strong>of</strong> non-custodial penalties available to the youth court.<br />
For the first time, the reforms contained an overarching mission for the whole<br />
youth justice system. Section 37 <strong>of</strong> the Crime and Disorder Act stated, “It<br />
shall be the principal aim <strong>of</strong> the youth justice system to prevent <strong>of</strong>fending by<br />
children and young persons”. Controversially, the 1998 Act also reduced the<br />
age <strong>of</strong> criminal responsibility to ten, one <strong>of</strong> the lowest in Western Europe, by<br />
abolishing the principle <strong>of</strong> doli incapax, the presumption that a child aged<br />
between 10 and 13 is incapable <strong>of</strong> committing a criminal <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
During Labour’s first term in <strong>of</strong>fice, youth justice was a major priority. Between<br />
1998 and 2001, there were four separate acts <strong>of</strong> parliament that introduced new<br />
legislation concerning the youth justice system: the Crime and Disorder Act<br />
1998; the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which created youth<br />
<strong>of</strong>fender panels; the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which<br />
introduced restorative cautioning; and the Criminal Justice and Police Act<br />
2001, which extended child curfew schemes to children under the age <strong>of</strong> 16.<br />
After the 2001 election, attention moved to other areas in an attempt to deliver<br />
a more radical set <strong>of</strong> reforms which had been mapped out in a ten year plan<br />
for criminal justice. That plan set the ambitious aim <strong>of</strong> a “comprehensive<br />
overhaul <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system to lever up performance in catching,<br />
trying, convicting, punishing and rehabilitating <strong>of</strong>fenders” (Home Office,<br />
2001, p. 7). A “justice gap” had opened up during the 1980s and 1990s, the<br />
document claimed. The criminal justice system had not kept up with rises in<br />
crime. Too few <strong>of</strong> what were dubbed “persistent <strong>of</strong>fenders” were being caught<br />
and convicted. Labour embarked on a series <strong>of</strong> major reforms, supported by<br />
substantial additional investment to create an effective criminal justice system<br />
that could “drive down crime” (Home Office, 2001).<br />
The year 2004 saw the concurrent publication <strong>of</strong> two overlapping five year<br />
strategies: one for the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2004a) and one<br />
for the Home Office (2004b). Following the appointment <strong>of</strong> John Reid as<br />
Home Secretary, a third plan was published in July 2006, with the expressed<br />
intention <strong>of</strong> building a criminal justice system that put the “law abiding<br />
majority at its heart” (Home Office, 2006a, p. 2). These various overlapping<br />
plans and strategies differ in important respects. Those published in 2004 and<br />
2006, for instance, demonstrate a far greater preoccupation with “anti-social<br />
behaviour” than that <strong>of</strong> 2001. 2 As a result, a degree <strong>of</strong> confusion at the level <strong>of</strong><br />
implementation has been inevitable. However, a number <strong>of</strong> core assumptions<br />
about the criminal justice system and its role are apparent from the numerous<br />
plans for law and order reform. The assumptions are that:<br />
1. Crime levels and trends are significantly influenced through the operation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system, and an appropriately resourced and effectively<br />
organized criminal justice system will lead to lower levels <strong>of</strong> crime. This has<br />
been a key driver behind the government’s numerous reforms and the record<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> investment in both areas.<br />
2 Anti-social behaviour is mentioned 36 times in the 2006 plan, 21 times in the 2004 criminal justice plan,<br />
and 129 times in the 2004 Home Office plan. The 2001 plan makes only five, largely incidental, references<br />
to it.
46 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 47<br />
2. The traditional scope <strong>of</strong> criminal justice activities needs to widen to address<br />
the new forms <strong>of</strong> crime and crime-like behaviours that are the result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
changed society we live in. The anti-social behaviour and “Respect” agendas<br />
are the obvious result <strong>of</strong> this concern with crime-like behaviours.<br />
3. The effective management <strong>of</strong> crime requires the various criminal justice<br />
agencies to expand into areas <strong>of</strong> policy not traditionally considered part<br />
<strong>of</strong> their remit. This is best illustrated by the focus on early and rapid<br />
intervention, and the development <strong>of</strong> programs such as summer “Splash”<br />
schemes for youth in high crime areas and Youth Inclusion and Support<br />
Programmes (YISPs) to identify children who are “at risk” <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending.<br />
4. A welfare approach to dealing with children and young people who <strong>of</strong>fend<br />
should be replaced by one which relies far more on punishment – what<br />
has been described as the development <strong>of</strong> a “punitive turn” or a “new<br />
punitiveness” in youth justice (Goldson, 2000; Pratt, Brown, Brown,<br />
Hallsworth, & Morrison, 2005). This was made clear in the White Paper<br />
No More Excuses (Home Office, 1997), which stated “… punishment is<br />
important to signal society’s disapproval <strong>of</strong> criminal acts and deter <strong>of</strong>fending.<br />
It is the appropriate response to children and young people who wilfully<br />
break the law” (para. 5.1).<br />
5. A commitment to systemic managerialism and central control. This is<br />
reflected in the Public Service Agreements and national targets that have<br />
driven the reform agenda. Performance against these targets has been key<br />
to delivering change. This new approach seeks efficiency savings due to<br />
downward pressure on budgets, the setting <strong>of</strong> clear priorities and targets<br />
across public services, and the introduction <strong>of</strong> competitive tension into the<br />
public sector (McLaughlin, Muncie, & Hughes, 2001).<br />
These assumptions are touched on at different points in this article.<br />
The Money and the Infrastructure<br />
Initially, Labour chose to take a prudent approach to public sector spending<br />
abiding by the spending plans <strong>of</strong> the previous Conservative administration.<br />
This meant that criminal justice agencies did not receive a significant injection<br />
<strong>of</strong> extra funds until 2001. However, when the spending did get underway, it<br />
was extremely generous. Between 2001 and 2005, there was a 6.5% annual<br />
growth in spending on law and order (Emmerson & Frayne, 2005). Labour<br />
claimed it was the biggest injection <strong>of</strong> new resources for 20 years. By 2007-<br />
08, the criminal justice system in England and Wales received just under<br />
£23 billion, nearly 50 billion Canadian dollars, a third more than it received<br />
ten years previously (Solomon et al., 2007).<br />
Where did it go? A large part <strong>of</strong> the additional funding, nearly two thirds,<br />
was for the 43 police forces in England and Wales, which received an annual<br />
real terms increase in spending <strong>of</strong> just under 4 per cent between 2001 and<br />
2006. This largely went toward the recruitment <strong>of</strong> police <strong>of</strong>ficers. Since 2000,<br />
when numbers had been in decline, there has been a remarkable increase<br />
from just under 125,000 <strong>of</strong>ficers to more than 141,000 in 2007. However,<br />
and perhaps surprisingly, probation has had the largest real terms growth in<br />
funding followed by youth justice (see Figure 1). The extra funds for probation<br />
were largely for increases in support staff and the creation <strong>of</strong> a centralized<br />
probation directorate.<br />
Given that youth justice was a key focus <strong>of</strong> reform, it is not surprising that<br />
there have been substantial increases in expenditure. Total spending on youth<br />
justice increased by £267.2 million (around 540 million Canadian dollars)<br />
between 2000 and 2007, a real terms increase <strong>of</strong> 45 per cent. This was initially<br />
Figure 1: Percentage changes in cash and real (GDP deflated) spending on the<br />
main criminal justice agencies, 2000-2001 to 2006-2007<br />
Youth Justice<br />
Police<br />
Crown Prosecution<br />
Service<br />
HM Courts<br />
Services<br />
Prisons<br />
Probation<br />
Cash change<br />
Real change<br />
-20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%<br />
Sources: DCA, 2007; Home Affairs Committee, 2007; Home Office, 2006b; Home Office, 2007.
48 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 49<br />
to fund the creation <strong>of</strong> the new Youth Offending Teams and a national Youth<br />
Justice Board (YJB) to oversee the youth justice system and purchase custodial<br />
accommodation for children. The YJB has accounted for just over two-thirds<br />
<strong>of</strong> spending on youth justice, the majority <strong>of</strong> which has been to pay for secure<br />
accommodation for the increasing number <strong>of</strong> children in custody (the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> children in prison has been no less than 2,600 since 2000). Overall, the<br />
prison population has grown massively under Labour – at the end <strong>of</strong> June<br />
2008 it was at 83,200, just over 150 per 100,000 <strong>of</strong> the population. Since<br />
Labour came to power in 1997, when the prison population stood at just over<br />
60,000, it has increased by more than a third.<br />
By 2004, the government was spending 2.5 per cent <strong>of</strong> its national income<br />
on law and order – a larger proportion than ever before. Moreover, according<br />
to an analysis by the Labour government’s Strategy Unit, it was spending<br />
proportionately more on law and order than any other country in the<br />
industrialised nations <strong>of</strong> the OECD, including the United States and major<br />
European countries such as France, Germany and Spain (Prime Minister’s<br />
Strategy Unit, 2006).<br />
The substantial increase in spending contributed to the creation <strong>of</strong> important<br />
new partnership structures designed to deliver a different approach to crime<br />
control and prevention. The most important have been the local Crime and<br />
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and the Youth Offending Teams<br />
(YOTs). Both were established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which<br />
represented what many have considered to be a momentous shift in the way<br />
crime is governed because it appeared to represent a move towards a holistic<br />
prevention paradigm. Garland (2000), for example, described it as a “preventive<br />
turn” reflecting an “epistemological break” with the past.<br />
CDRPs, also known as Community Safety Partnerships, are partnerships<br />
between the police, local authorities, the Probation Service, health authorities,<br />
the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses. There are currently 375<br />
in England and Wales. The responsible authorities are under a statutory duty to<br />
ensure that the key agencies come together to work in partnership and carry out<br />
an audit <strong>of</strong> local crime, disorder and misuse <strong>of</strong> drugs every three years. Using<br />
the information arising from this audit and based on consultation with local<br />
communities, they then formulate a strategy for prevention in the local area.<br />
The other key crime prevention partnerships are the 156 Youth Offending<br />
Teams (YOTS) designed to work with children who are given a youth justice<br />
sanction and also to prevent “at risk” children from entering the youth justice<br />
system. They are locally owned, accountable multi-agency partnerships<br />
between the police, probation, health, education and children’s services and in<br />
some cases housing. YOTs are supported with central guidance and funding<br />
from the Youth Justice Board, which is co-sponsored by the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice<br />
and the Department for Children, Schools and Families.<br />
It was widely hoped that the creation <strong>of</strong> both YOTs and CDRPs would provide<br />
an exemplary model <strong>of</strong> how to do crime prevention as opposed to endless law<br />
enforcement. As Crawford (1998) stated, “They <strong>of</strong>fer a fertile soil in which a<br />
more progressive criminal justice policy, one which turns away from the punitive<br />
populism <strong>of</strong> recent years, could begin to establish itself and flourish” (p. 4).<br />
Crime Reduction<br />
The primary purpose <strong>of</strong> the increased investment, multiple criminal justice<br />
plans and structural reforms was to ensure a sustained reduction in the <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
crime rate, as measured by the annual British Crime Survey (BCS). 3 A target<br />
was set by the Home Office in agreement with the Treasury to deliver a 15 per<br />
cent reduction in BCS measured crime in the five years to 2007-2008. Targets<br />
were also set to reduce the so-called “volume crimes” <strong>of</strong> burglary by 25 per cent<br />
and vehicle crime by 30 per cent over a five year period. Crime and Disorder<br />
Reduction Partnerships were expected to focus their activity on cutting these<br />
volume crimes. In addition, there was also a Youth Justice Board target to<br />
reduce self-report youth <strong>of</strong>fending.<br />
On the face <strong>of</strong> it, Labour’s record on crime has been impressive. Aggregate<br />
BCS-measured crime has been falling since the mid-1990s. The most recent<br />
annual BCS figure, published in July 2008, estimated total crime against private<br />
households in the categories it measured at 10.1 million <strong>of</strong>fences annually<br />
(Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker, 2008). This compares with an estimated<br />
16.7 million <strong>of</strong>fences annually in 1997, a fall <strong>of</strong> 39 per cent (Figure 2). The<br />
government has met its targets <strong>of</strong> a fifteen percent reduction in BCS measured<br />
crime in the five years to 2007-2008. Since 2002-2003, BCS measured crime<br />
has fallen by 18 per cent. However, it is important to look at BCS trends over<br />
a longer time period.<br />
3 The BCS is currently based on a sample <strong>of</strong> almost 50,000 people living in private households in England<br />
and Wales. These individuals are asked about their experience <strong>of</strong> being a victim <strong>of</strong> certain types <strong>of</strong> crimes<br />
over the course <strong>of</strong> the previous 12 months. The main <strong>of</strong>fences covered by the BCS are vandalism, burglary,<br />
vehicle-related thefts (including bicycles), other household thefts, theft from the person, common assault,<br />
wounding and robbery. The BCS provides a more reliable estimate <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences it covers than that given<br />
by police recorded data. But the range <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences covered by the BCS is narrower than the police data. It<br />
also underestimates some <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences it covers (domestic violence, for example).
50 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 51<br />
Figure 2: Trends in all BCS crime, 1981 to 2007–2008<br />
Number <strong>of</strong> incidents (000s)<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
1981<br />
1983<br />
1987<br />
Source: Adapted from Kershaw, Nicholas, & Walker (2008).<br />
1991<br />
1993<br />
1995<br />
1997<br />
1999<br />
2001/02 ints<br />
2002/03 ints<br />
2003/04 ints<br />
2004/05 ints<br />
2005/06 ints<br />
2006/07 ints<br />
2007/08 ints<br />
In 1981, the first year that the BCS was carried out, the survey measured a<br />
total <strong>of</strong> just over 11 million <strong>of</strong>fences. This figure rose through the 1980s and<br />
1990s, to 15 million in 1991 and nearly 20 million in 1995. Since then, it has<br />
been on a long-term decline. When Labour came to power in 1997, it stood at<br />
16.7 million, falling to 12.6 million in 2001–2002 at the end <strong>of</strong> Labour’s first<br />
term and the beginning <strong>of</strong> its second. Labour, in other words, inherited an<br />
already declining BCS trend when it won the 1997 election.<br />
In the five years between 1997 and 2001–2002, the period roughly<br />
corresponding to Labour’s first term, the overall BCS crime rate fell by 22 per<br />
cent (Simmons, 2002). One way <strong>of</strong> understanding Labour’s target for a 15 per<br />
cent reduction in BCS-measured crime for the five years following 2002–2003<br />
is that it is a target that asks it to be less successful than it was during its first<br />
term in <strong>of</strong>fice. It is a tribute to Labour’s political skills that it has been largely<br />
successful in presenting a rather unambitious target as a bold gesture.<br />
It is also notable that Labour’s more unambitious target was set at a time when<br />
its major criminal justice reforms and expenditure were getting underway. Just<br />
as Labour was gearing up for a major program <strong>of</strong> criminal justice investment<br />
and reform – which it claimed would deliver major dividends in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
falling crime – it set a target to do worse overall than it had done during its<br />
first term, when finances were much tighter. In this light, Labour’s increased<br />
criminal justice expenditure and major structural reforms appear rather less<br />
prudent, and more questionable, than is <strong>of</strong>ten thought. It also raises questions<br />
about the impact <strong>of</strong> these reforms on crime levels.<br />
When the government’s Strategy Unit reviewed crime levels based on<br />
modeling, it concluded that 80 per cent <strong>of</strong> the reduction in the <strong>of</strong>ficial crime<br />
rate since 1997 was the result <strong>of</strong> economic, not criminal justice, factors (PM<br />
Strategy Unit, 2006). This assessment is in keeping with the assessment <strong>of</strong><br />
many criminologists, who argue that economic trends, employment levels and<br />
relative income inequality, alongside technological developments and broader<br />
cultural and social changes, are the main influencers <strong>of</strong> crime trends (Reiner,<br />
2007). On the other hand, the prevention partnerships could be credited with<br />
achieving 20 per cent <strong>of</strong> the reduction, although much <strong>of</strong> this does seem to<br />
be linked to situational crime prevention that promoted greater home and<br />
vehicle security. According to the BCS, between 1999 and 2006 domestic<br />
burglaries fell by 43 per cent and vehicle crime by 36 per cent, far exceeding<br />
government targets (Solomon et al., 2007). In both cases improvements in<br />
security – perhaps more so than any partnership action – have been a major<br />
contributor to the overall falls (see Home Office, 2006c; Walker, Kershaw, &<br />
Nicholas, 2006). As the Home Office’s (2006c) annual report on crime noted,<br />
households with simple security measures like deadlocks and window locks<br />
were ten times less likely to be the victims <strong>of</strong> burglary.<br />
The record on youth crime is much less impressive. The Home Office has<br />
conducted a number <strong>of</strong> self-report youth surveys since the early 1990s which<br />
provide an indication <strong>of</strong> trends in self-reported <strong>of</strong>fending by children and<br />
young people aged between 10 and 25 years old. They show that it has been<br />
stable at between 19 and 22 per cent in the 13 years between 1992 and 2005<br />
(Graham & Bowling, 1995; Flood-Page, Campbell, Harrington, & Miller,<br />
2000; Budd, Sharp, & Mayhew, 2005; Wilson, Sharp, & Patterson, 2006).<br />
It is striking to note that there is no indication that the creation <strong>of</strong> the YJB,<br />
YOTs and the greater focus on youth <strong>of</strong>fending, particularly in Labour’s first<br />
term between 1997 and 2001, had any impact on reducing self-reported youth<br />
<strong>of</strong>fending. At best, all that can be said is that the wide-ranging reforms have<br />
contributed to a continuing stabilization <strong>of</strong> self-reported youth <strong>of</strong>fending at<br />
the level the government inherited when it came to power in 1997. It might
52 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 53<br />
equally be argued that all the expenditure and activity in this area has had<br />
no measurable impact. Given the long-term trends in self-reported youth<br />
<strong>of</strong>fending, many may draw this conclusion. This inevitably raises the question<br />
<strong>of</strong> the purpose <strong>of</strong>, and prudence involved in, the various youth justice reforms<br />
and the increased expenditure that accompanied them.<br />
The Justice Gap<br />
The 1997 Labour Party election manifesto declared:<br />
The number <strong>of</strong> people convicted has fallen by a third, with only one<br />
crime in 50 leading to a conviction. This is the worst record <strong>of</strong> any<br />
government since the Second World War – and for England and Wales<br />
the worst record <strong>of</strong> any major industrialized country. (We Will be Tough<br />
on Crime and Tough on the Causes <strong>of</strong> Crime section)<br />
The disparity between crime and conviction became known as “the justice<br />
gap”. Narrowing the justice gap by increasing the number <strong>of</strong> suspected<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences that result in an individual being cautioned, convicted or otherwise<br />
sanctioned – known as “<strong>of</strong>fences brought to justice” – has been a key priority<br />
for the New Labour government and a driving force behind the activities <strong>of</strong><br />
the crime reduction partnerships, particularly the police. Forces across the<br />
country were given specific sanction detection targets to ensure the justice gap<br />
was narrowed.<br />
An <strong>of</strong>fence is considered to have been brought to justice “when an <strong>of</strong>fender<br />
has been cautioned, convicted or had the <strong>of</strong>fence taken into consideration by<br />
the court” (Home Office, 2006c, p. 84). Penalty notices for three notifiable<br />
disorder <strong>of</strong>fences – causing harassment, alarm or distress; destroying or<br />
damaging property (damage under £500); and retail theft (under £200<br />
in value) – and formal warnings for the possession <strong>of</strong> cannabis were also<br />
categorized as “<strong>of</strong>fences brought to justice” following their introduction<br />
nationally in 2004. This broad range <strong>of</strong> categories contributed to an increased<br />
target <strong>of</strong> 1.25 million <strong>of</strong>fences brought to justice by 2007-2008.<br />
The target was met a year ahead <strong>of</strong> the deadline – by the end <strong>of</strong> 2006,<br />
1.4 million <strong>of</strong>fences had been so-called “brought to justice”. However, the<br />
target was not being met as a result <strong>of</strong> increases in successful convictions, but<br />
through increased cautions, Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs), and formal<br />
warnings for cannabis possession; these made up half <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences brought<br />
to justice. As a proportion <strong>of</strong> the total number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences brought to justice,<br />
successful convictions have actually fallen, from 69 per cent in 2003 to 53 per<br />
cent in 2006. Overall, the number <strong>of</strong> cautions, PNDs and formal warnings for<br />
cannabis possession have increased steadily since 2003.<br />
There are widespread concerns that the “justice gap” target has had negative<br />
unintended consequences. Firstly, there is evidence that increasing numbers <strong>of</strong><br />
children are being drawn into the criminal justice system unnecessarily. This<br />
trend is particularly apparent in recent police arrest data, with children identified<br />
as easy targets. The former head <strong>of</strong> the Youth Justice Board (YJB), Pr<strong>of</strong>essor<br />
Rod Morgan, has remarked that because the majority <strong>of</strong> crimes committed by<br />
children are <strong>of</strong> a public nature, <strong>of</strong>ten in the streets or open spaces, arresting<br />
children for the police is like “picking low-hanging fruit” (Solomon et al., 2007,<br />
p. 40). Offences which would previously have been dealt with informally and go<br />
unrecorded were attracting a formal response, reflected in the recorded figures<br />
for the number <strong>of</strong> young people entering the youth justice system. Between<br />
2002-2003 and 2006-2007, there was a 28% increase in the number <strong>of</strong> children<br />
and young people given a youth justice sanction (Solomon et al., 2007).<br />
For the police, the impact <strong>of</strong> the target has been to wholly undermine the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional judgement and discretion previously exercised by individual<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers. In order to meet the sanction detection targets, <strong>of</strong>ficers’ hands have<br />
been tied, resulting in some quite ridiculous cases. In one incident, a man was<br />
cautioned for being found “in possession <strong>of</strong> an egg with intent to throw”. In<br />
another, a child was arrested for throwing a slice <strong>of</strong> cucumber from a tuna<br />
sandwich at another youngster. Such cases prompted the Chief Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Constabulary, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, to urge a rethink. In his recent review<br />
<strong>of</strong> policing, he stated “The consequence <strong>of</strong> poor pr<strong>of</strong>essional judgement,<br />
combined with existing performance management arrangements, are that<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers are encouraged to criminalise people for behaviour which may have<br />
caused <strong>of</strong>fence, but the underlying behaviour would be better dealt with in a<br />
different way” (Flanagan, 2008, p. 57).<br />
Therefore, the fact that more than 1.25 million <strong>of</strong>fences have been “brought to<br />
justice” has not happened without unintended consequences. Primarily, it has<br />
resulted in significant net widening, whereby behaviours and actions which<br />
previously would not have been dealt with by criminal justice agencies have<br />
been subject to formal legal sanctions. It is also questionable whether anything<br />
<strong>of</strong> great value has been achieved. There are still only three convictions for<br />
every 100 estimated crimes in England and Wales (Solomon et al., 2007).<br />
Whether this corresponds to what most members <strong>of</strong> the public would consider<br />
justice seems at best a moot point.
54 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 55<br />
Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour<br />
Tony Blair first wrote about anti-social behaviour (ASB) in a newspaper<br />
article in 1988. “None <strong>of</strong> us should escape responsibility”, he wrote. “For we,<br />
collectively, determine the values <strong>of</strong> our society. When a sense <strong>of</strong> community<br />
is strong, that adds its own special pressure against anti-social behaviour”<br />
(The Times, April 12, 1988). Ten years later, the Crime and Disorder Act<br />
introduced a number <strong>of</strong> measures to tackle anti-social behaviour, including<br />
the Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour Order (ASBO). This was reinforced by measures<br />
in the 2002 Police Reform Act and the 2003 Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour Act. In<br />
addition, the launches <strong>of</strong> the “Together Campaign” (October 2003) and the<br />
“Respect Action Plan” (January 2006) have reaffirmed Labour’s commitment<br />
to tackling ASB. For Tony Blair, tackling ASB became something <strong>of</strong> a personal<br />
crusade, touring the country to urge practitioners to use the powers provided<br />
by the legislation (Blair, 2003). Consequently, tackling ASB became a central<br />
pre-occupation for Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.<br />
ASB is defined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as “behaving in a manner<br />
that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more<br />
persons not <strong>of</strong> the same household as himself” (HM Government, 1998,<br />
chapter 1.1). In practice, it is a broad and subjective umbrella term covering<br />
a wide range <strong>of</strong> behaviours and activities. This has made it difficult, if not<br />
impossible, to develop a reliable and robust data set on its prevalence and trends.<br />
A “one day count” <strong>of</strong> anti-social behaviour, conducted in September 2003,<br />
came up with a total <strong>of</strong> 66,107 “reports <strong>of</strong> ASB” in one day, equating to 16.5<br />
million incidents per year. The Home Office itself appeared ambivalent about<br />
the status <strong>of</strong> the results, warning that “reports are not the same as incidents <strong>of</strong><br />
anti-social behaviour” (Solomon et al., 2007, p. 44).<br />
The main tool for dealing with these behaviours has been the Anti-<strong>Social</strong><br />
Behaviour Order (ASBO) which is a civil order available to the courts; it<br />
can also be used by the criminal courts following a criminal conviction. The<br />
government did not set an explicit target for the number <strong>of</strong> ASBOs issued.<br />
Instead, it set a national target to reduce the percentage <strong>of</strong> people who perceive<br />
ASB to be “a very or fairly big problem” to below 21 per cent, based on data<br />
collected as part <strong>of</strong> the annual British Crime Survey (Solomon et al., 2007).<br />
This target has been met, but there are a myriad <strong>of</strong> problems with defining and<br />
measuring ASB. The <strong>of</strong>ficial data on ASB perception reflects seven different<br />
types <strong>of</strong> so-called anti-social behaviour: “abandoned or burnt-out cars”; “noisy<br />
neighbours or loud parties”; “people being drunk or rowdy in public places”;<br />
“people using or dealing drugs”; “teenagers hanging around on the streets”;<br />
“rubbish or litter lying around”; and “vandalism, graffiti and other deliberate<br />
damage to property”.<br />
The government has not <strong>of</strong>fered a satisfactory explanation for the choice <strong>of</strong><br />
these seven categories <strong>of</strong> ASB, nor why it has alighted on seven categories<br />
in particular. It is notable, for instance, that “speeding traffic”, reported in a<br />
government study <strong>of</strong> ASB as “the most widely perceived individual problem”,<br />
is not included in the government’s preferred measure <strong>of</strong> ASB perception.<br />
Indeed, <strong>of</strong> the top four types <strong>of</strong> perceived anti-social behaviour identified by<br />
the government study, only “rubbish or litter lying around” is included in the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial measure (others were “cars parked inconveniently or abandoned” and<br />
“dog fouling”) (Wood, 2004).<br />
There are clearly questions about the usefulness <strong>of</strong> the target and whether<br />
a subjective amorphous category provides the basis for robust, informed<br />
and evidence based policy making. In addition, it is debatable whether the<br />
government action and activity has actually made a difference to any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
anti-social behaviour issues that most concern people. Well over 10,000 Anti-<br />
<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour Orders have been issued – nearly half <strong>of</strong> them to children,<br />
but there have been high levels <strong>of</strong> breach; research has found that for many<br />
young people, they are regarded as a “badge <strong>of</strong> honour” (Youth Justice Board,<br />
2006). Clearly, the brash attempt led by Tony Blair to use criminal justice<br />
agencies to regulate behaviour by imposing civility through coercion has had<br />
a limited negative effect.<br />
Lessons from England and Wales<br />
The ambition to overhaul criminal justice in England and Wales has been<br />
very high; there has been significant extra investment, and major changes are<br />
evident. But claims <strong>of</strong> success have at times been overstated by the Labour<br />
government. In reality, its record is mixed. Despite record investment, there<br />
has not been a steep change in outcomes. Crime and victimization levels,<br />
particularly amongst young people, remain high and the proportion <strong>of</strong> crimes<br />
dealt with is still extremely low. At the same time, there has been notable<br />
success in dealing with the volume crimes <strong>of</strong> burglary and vehicle crime.<br />
Overall, the <strong>of</strong>ficial crime rate as measured by the British Crime Survey has<br />
declined. However, there are a number <strong>of</strong> important lessons to be learned from<br />
the New Labour reform program.
56 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 57<br />
1. The Perils <strong>of</strong> Targets<br />
It has become abundantly clear that centrally directed targets are counter<br />
productive. They distort priorities and resource allocation, result in unintended<br />
consequences and do not necessarily make for more effective delivery.<br />
Critically, they impose a suffocating straitjacket on the work <strong>of</strong> criminal<br />
justice practitioners, undermining their pr<strong>of</strong>essional judgement, knowledge<br />
and good practice. Performance indicators also impose a great burden on<br />
crime reduction partnerships, reducing their capacity to respond to local<br />
needs. In practice, partnerships have had to focus on complying with national<br />
performance indicators in order to serve national political ends rather than on<br />
meeting local needs.<br />
Local partnerships need to be given space and authority, and encouraged to<br />
focus on local priorities. New Labour, in its drive to ensure effective delivery,<br />
has adopted a much too heavy handed centralised approach. Impatience at<br />
the pace <strong>of</strong> change has resulted in an over-bureaucratised delivery framework<br />
characterised by regular performance review cycles and stringent reporting<br />
frameworks. A much lighter touch from the centre is far preferable.<br />
2. The Creation <strong>of</strong> Silos Within Silos<br />
The challenge <strong>of</strong> achieving effective partnerships is not to be underestimated.<br />
It is not just a case <strong>of</strong> passing legislation or creating the necessary structural<br />
framework. There needs to be a cultural shift too. Far too <strong>of</strong>ten, CDRPs have<br />
been characterised by lack <strong>of</strong> organizational trust, desire to protect budgets,<br />
unwillingness to share information and conflicting interests (Crawford,<br />
2007). Rather than breaking down silos, they have created silos within silos.<br />
This has particularly been the case with services geared towards children and<br />
young people.<br />
Several different agencies have responsibility for different aspects <strong>of</strong> youth<br />
crime prevention. Despite the creation <strong>of</strong> multi-agency youth <strong>of</strong>fending<br />
teams, information on families and children who are deemed to be at risk<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending, or who are known to the criminal justice agencies but not<br />
subject to a criminal justice sanction, is not always shared. This leads to a<br />
fragmented picture <strong>of</strong> individual needs. Furthermore, the variety <strong>of</strong> agencies<br />
involved means it is difficult to establish who has responsibility for outcomes<br />
<strong>of</strong> individuals who have yet to be subject to a criminal justice disposal, or<br />
have completed a disposal and have left the youth justice system. Conversely,<br />
children who are in the youth justice system can be treated differently from<br />
other children, with mainstream agencies preferring to leave them to be dealt<br />
with by YOTs.’<br />
3. Balancing Enforcement and Prevention –<br />
Why Who Leads Matters<br />
There is clearly a need to ensure that the prevention logic does not become<br />
captured by an enforcement approach. Labour set out to embed more effective<br />
crime prevention strategies. However an ideological commitment to being<br />
tough on crime, not just its causes, quickly resulted in enforcement trumpeting<br />
prevention. This is evident from the increasing number <strong>of</strong> children and young<br />
people who have been drawn into the criminal justice system (Solomon &<br />
Garside, 2008) and the longer custodial sentences imposed for minor <strong>of</strong>fences<br />
committed by adults (Hedderman, 2008). The attempt to tackle anti-social<br />
behaviour has also been characterised by a harsh enforcement-led approach to<br />
increase the number <strong>of</strong> Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour Orders rather than emphasizing<br />
the need to put in place multi-agency packages <strong>of</strong> support to address the causes<br />
behind the behaviour.<br />
If prevention is to be the central focus, there needs to be a political will and<br />
commitment to hold <strong>of</strong>f from pulling the enforcement lever, especially when<br />
a major crime panic hits the media headlines. Putting lead responsibility in<br />
the hands <strong>of</strong> a department that does not oversee criminal justice management,<br />
or at least having joint sponsorship is one way to avoid the domination <strong>of</strong><br />
an enforcement agenda. Labour has always given the Home Office lead<br />
responsibility for crime prevention. Arguably, it should at least be shared with<br />
the Department for Communities and Local Government. Youth justice was<br />
also in the Home Office. However, in 2007 responsibility was moved to the<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice and a new Department <strong>of</strong> Children, Schools and Families.<br />
This has ensured that the latest youth crime action plan has a far greater<br />
prevention focus (HM Government, 2008).<br />
4. Guard Against Expansionism<br />
Widening the traditional scope <strong>of</strong> criminal justice activities to encompass new<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> crime-like behaviours should be given very careful consideration. The<br />
lesson from the UK is that it does not result in tangible benefits in public<br />
behaviour and order but simply extends the criminal justice net, resulting in<br />
greater numbers being criminalized, particularly children and young people<br />
(Solomon & Garside, 2008).
58 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 59<br />
Defining what constitutes “anti-social behaviour” is also fraught with<br />
difficulties. For New Labour, it has become whatever the government says it<br />
means. This has allowed enormous scope for the authorities to target whatever<br />
problem they consider to be <strong>of</strong> interest at any given point in time. Such a<br />
subjective and amorphous category has resulted in a politically driven quest to<br />
use coercive measures to impose civility.<br />
5. A Genuine Evidence-Based Approach<br />
Despite declaring a commitment to evidence based policy making soon<br />
after entering government, New Labour has not followed this through. The<br />
independent evaluation <strong>of</strong> its early Crime Reduction Programme quickly<br />
became embroiled in the politics <strong>of</strong> government with the Home Office<br />
reluctant to publish negative evaluation findings. A desire to secure the best<br />
political outcomes was clearly incompatible with a commitment to following<br />
the evidence base. Many criminologists were left feeling let down and<br />
disheartened (Hope & Walters, 2008).<br />
Developing effective crime prevention policies, however, requires a genuine<br />
commitment to learning from the evidence. It means using knowledge more<br />
effectively even if the findings from research are politically uncomfortable.<br />
Ultimately, it requires politicians to resist allowing political imperatives to<br />
interfere with research findings, however unpalatable they may be.<br />
6. Invest to Deliver<br />
A commitment to crime prevention requires a commitment to invest long<br />
term in effective programs. Much <strong>of</strong> New Labour’s investment has been in the<br />
creation <strong>of</strong> partnership structures and mechanisms for interagency working.<br />
A great deal has also been spent on increasing the number <strong>of</strong> police <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
and the wider policing family. Ironically, there has been less investment in<br />
prevention programs. This is best illustrated by the fact that just 5 per cent <strong>of</strong><br />
the Youth Justice Board’s budget is for prevention work.<br />
Labour chose not to create dedicated budgets at either the local or national<br />
level for crime prevention programs. It did, however, invest in neighbourhood<br />
renewal initiatives and early years support for families and children. Arguably,<br />
crime prevention that brings together work across government departments<br />
and local agencies requires a distinct budget that is backed up by a long term<br />
funding commitment. Instead, the Office for Criminal Justice Reform was set<br />
up to take forward the work on the justice gap and anti-social behaviour. It<br />
did not have any funding to direct to crime prevention programs. Had Labour<br />
set up an Office for Crime Prevention, the priorities and outcomes could have<br />
been rather different.<br />
7. Understand the Limitations <strong>of</strong> Criminal Justice and<br />
Set Realistic Expectations<br />
Tooling up the criminal justice system to bear down on crime has been central<br />
to New Labour’s approach. It has sought to extend the system’s reach to address<br />
a wider range <strong>of</strong> behaviours. The assumption has been that criminal justice<br />
reform can deliver significant crime reduction dividends. However, there are<br />
limitations to what the police and other criminal justice agencies can achieve.<br />
It is therefore necessary to set clear expectations about the role and purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system in preventing crime rather than relying on it to<br />
solve complex social and economic problems.<br />
Rethinking Policy<br />
It is to Labour’s credit that in the 12 months since Gordon Brown took over<br />
from Tony Blair, there has been a reassessment <strong>of</strong> the approach taken to<br />
tackling crime and public disorder. Whilst not all the lessons identified above<br />
have been learned, some <strong>of</strong> them have at least been recognized and policy has<br />
been accordingly reconfigured.<br />
The Home Office has accepted some <strong>of</strong> the criticism <strong>of</strong> the “<strong>of</strong>fences brought to<br />
justice” target. Although it has not publicly acknowledged that it has resulted<br />
in more people being unnecessarily drawn into the criminal justice system, it<br />
recognizes that the target has imposed too much central control on the work<br />
<strong>of</strong> individual police <strong>of</strong>ficers. The government concedes that greater discretion<br />
should be given to Crime and Disorder Partnerships to determine priorities,<br />
stating that:<br />
Successful delivery <strong>of</strong> the Government’s vision cannot be imposed<br />
simply through top-down performance management, and the strategy is<br />
therefore to develop a criminal justice operating framework that provides<br />
local services with greater flexibility to determine how this vision is to be<br />
delivered effectively and efficiently. (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 3)<br />
Generally, the government now acknowledges that the target-setting culture<br />
has been too heavy handed. The new “<strong>of</strong>fences brought to justice” target for<br />
2008-11 subdivides data into three sub-categories – serious violent and sexual
60 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 61<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences, serious acquisitive crime, and other crime – so that it can readily<br />
be seen precisely which parts <strong>of</strong> the justice gap are being narrowed. Local<br />
areas are allowed to determine which “other crimes” to focus on in order<br />
to ensure greater responsiveness to community concerns. To guard against<br />
children being criminalized, an additional target has been set to consider,<br />
among other things, how many children and young people are entering the<br />
criminal justice system for the first time. A recent police reform paper also<br />
proposes freeing up <strong>of</strong>ficers and supporting them to use greater discretion<br />
(Home Office, 2008b).<br />
The government is also seeking to rebalance its approach to youth crime<br />
by taking “a ‘triple track’ approach <strong>of</strong> enforcement and punishment where<br />
behaviour is unacceptable, non-negotiable support where it is most needed,<br />
and better and earlier prevention” (HM Government, 2008, p. 1). The new<br />
Youth Action Plan sets out detailed proposals to extend early intervention<br />
programs with children and families to prevent crime. It ambitiously intends<br />
to “set in motion a step-change in the delivery <strong>of</strong> early targeted support for<br />
young people and families, encouraging the delivery <strong>of</strong> services which focus<br />
on early intervention for families with children at greatest risk <strong>of</strong> becoming the<br />
high-rate <strong>of</strong>fenders <strong>of</strong> the future” (HM Government, 2008, p. 31).<br />
The Brown government has subtly shifted away from tackling anti-social and<br />
disorderly behaviour by children and young people through coercive measures<br />
to significantly expanding the early intervention agenda. The focus is now<br />
firmly on prevention by providing targeted support through mainstream,<br />
locally governed social services. Although enforcement is still part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
equation, prevention is seen as the most effective means <strong>of</strong> tackling youth<br />
crime. Indeed, the Brown government has set an explicit target to provide<br />
additional funding and expert support to at least 40 families in each local<br />
authority where children are known to have behavioural problems and to be<br />
in need <strong>of</strong> assistance.<br />
Conclusions<br />
Labour’s goal to reform criminal justice to be “tough on crime, tough on the<br />
causes <strong>of</strong> crime” has been hugely ambitious. The scale <strong>of</strong> the investment, the<br />
rapidity <strong>of</strong> the reforms and the political energy and attention given to them has<br />
been unprecedented in modern British history. On paper, it appears to have<br />
had a significant impact. Overall crime rates have fallen dramatically. Yet the<br />
same decline has taken place in most other western nations. Arguably, crime<br />
would have declined had Labour published only one criminal justice plan and<br />
made just a few basic reforms. So, in conclusion, what should be the messages<br />
that others take away from the New Labour reforms?<br />
Firstly, it is important to recognize that effective crime prevention is more<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten than not linked to what happens with the economy. In explaining the<br />
recent decline in crime, the head <strong>of</strong> research in the Home Office, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor<br />
Paul Wiles, highlighted a decade <strong>of</strong> growth and prosperity as a key factor<br />
(Travis, 2008). Regardless <strong>of</strong> what policies are adopted, if the economy is<br />
buoyant crime will fall. This, however, does not mean that the scope and scale<br />
<strong>of</strong> crime prevention strategies are not important.<br />
Situational crime prevention has certainly had an impact in the UK in<br />
contributing to substantial falls in vehicle crime and burglary. Initiatives to<br />
improve home security and to encourage car manufacturers to “design out<br />
crime” have played a part in reducing what a decade ago were major concerns<br />
in all areas <strong>of</strong> the country. The work <strong>of</strong> partnerships which have prioritized<br />
these volume crimes has also been instrumental in focusing resources and coordinating<br />
effective action.<br />
Yet, despite these successes, youth disorder and <strong>of</strong>fending continues to be<br />
a problem. In many inner city areas, the age <strong>of</strong> perpetrators and victims <strong>of</strong><br />
violent street crime involving weapons has declined from the mid-twenties to<br />
late teens to the late teens to mid/early teens (Squires, Silvestri, Grimshaw, &<br />
Solomon, 2008). Recently, Labour has come to realize that taking a simple<br />
enforcement approach to the problem fails to address the needs <strong>of</strong> the families<br />
and communities most at risk. It has also come to understand that extending<br />
the remit <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice system to capture anti-social behaviours,<br />
which in the past would have been dealt with informally, is counterproductive.<br />
Yet, there is still a belief that more effective use <strong>of</strong> police resources or tough<br />
punishment can make a difference. Prevention has yet to be firmly placed<br />
outside the criminal justice arena and in the hands <strong>of</strong> welfare agencies.<br />
Labour initially balanced the scales far more towards being tough on crime.<br />
Gordon Brown is now attempting to rebalance them more towards tackling<br />
the causes <strong>of</strong> youth crime through a concerted focus on early intervention.<br />
He has yet to signal a desire to do the same for adult <strong>of</strong>fending. The primary<br />
lesson for those looking in on the English and Welsh experience is that effective<br />
situational crime control and prevention strategies can make a difference,<br />
but tackling levels <strong>of</strong> youth <strong>of</strong>fending and victimization requires greater<br />
understanding <strong>of</strong> the causes <strong>of</strong> crime and disorder, and is best addressed by<br />
resorting to social rather than criminal justice interventions.
62 IPC Review 3 New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What Worked? 63<br />
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Budd, T., Sharp, C., & Mayhew, P. (2005). Offending in England and Wales:<br />
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Home Office. (2001). Criminal justice: The way ahead. London:<br />
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Volume 3: pages 67–70<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Commentary from the<br />
Co-Chairs <strong>of</strong> the National<br />
Municipal Network for<br />
Crime Prevention<br />
Patrice Allard<br />
Ville de Montréal<br />
Christiane Sadeler<br />
Regional Municipality <strong>of</strong> Waterloo<br />
The articles by Homel and Solomon in this volume raise the question <strong>of</strong> what<br />
we can learn from recent experiences in England and Wales, as well as Australia<br />
and New Zealand. First, it should be noted that Canada is not a newcomer in<br />
this policy area. In fact, since the international conference on crime prevention<br />
in Montreal in 1989, many local authorities have taken leadership in the<br />
prevention <strong>of</strong> crime, victimization and fear <strong>of</strong> crime, and have encouraged<br />
multi-sector partnerships, citizen involvement, situational crime prevention<br />
programs, and social development approaches. But these initiatives tend to<br />
happen in isolation and to lack a broader political framework and orientation<br />
to establishing goals and objectives across all orders <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
In this sense, Canada stands at a distance from the experiences <strong>of</strong> other<br />
countries where a national political commitment to crime prevention<br />
preceded the implementation <strong>of</strong> local programs and partnerships. When<br />
national priorities are established and include measurable targets <strong>of</strong> change,<br />
investments to foster and support local communities tend to follow more<br />
easily. This is crucial because municipalities are the order <strong>of</strong> government<br />
closest to the experiences <strong>of</strong> public safety and security <strong>of</strong> their residents. The<br />
top-down model <strong>of</strong> policy and programmatic change has the advantage <strong>of</strong> a<br />
shared vision, political commitment and focused investment. It also has some<br />
disadvantages, as demonstrated by both Homel and Solomon. The key is that
68 IPC Review 3 Commentary from the Co-Chairs <strong>of</strong> the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention 69<br />
communities are more responsive to local needs and priorities, and central<br />
governments sometimes run roughshod over these concerns.<br />
In England and Wales, as indeed is the case in Canada, the notion <strong>of</strong><br />
Crime Prevention through <strong>Social</strong> Development (CPSD) has inspired many<br />
organizations. In many cases, CPSD has animated organizations to work<br />
together to develop partnerships and bring together people that formerly had<br />
little experience in sharing a vision, let alone information and resources. This<br />
approach “by and for communities” involves a process <strong>of</strong> empowerment, and<br />
can help build social capital in communities. But this process is not automatic,<br />
and there can be resistance from social and justice service sectors over resources<br />
and power. The challenge is to ensure that the goals <strong>of</strong> crime prevention are<br />
incorporated into organizations, and to sustain this long enough to be able to<br />
affect system change and measure impacts.<br />
Both Homel and Solomon conclude that one <strong>of</strong> the conditions for effective<br />
crime prevention is the capacity to manage collaborative multi-agency actions.<br />
This begins with an agreement that enforcement alone cannot address<br />
the complex needs <strong>of</strong> the communities and families most at risk. While<br />
investments in reactive and enforcement-based policies and programs may<br />
be seen to be expedient, they cannot be expected to accomplish the work<br />
necessary for effective crime prevention in local communities. In fact, they<br />
may detract from other opportunities. Solomon outlines the drift <strong>of</strong> the British<br />
Labour government from a “tough on crime, tough on causes” approach to a<br />
mainly enforcement-based vision that criminalizes an increasing number <strong>of</strong><br />
people, including children and youth. Such coercive measures can be counterproductive,<br />
both in terms <strong>of</strong> financial costs, and <strong>of</strong> the impact they have on the<br />
trust and confidence <strong>of</strong> the community.<br />
Fourteen Canadian municipalities from coast to coast have come together,<br />
with the support <strong>of</strong> the Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (at the University<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ottawa), to form the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention.<br />
We would be well served to heed some <strong>of</strong> the conclusions that have been<br />
drawn by Solomon and Homel. Firstly, it can’t be stated forcefully enough<br />
that political will is key for the success <strong>of</strong> crime prevention. Homel explains<br />
that “the focus on short term (seed) funding is premised on an anticipation<br />
that other agencies (...) will pick up any need for continuing crime prevention<br />
activity”. Of course, this is not necessarily the case because <strong>of</strong> competing<br />
demands or a lack <strong>of</strong> appreciation for their role in crime prevention.<br />
This means that local politicians must ensure “strong and consistent<br />
leadership and supportive governance structures” (Homel) and that “local<br />
partnerships (…) be given space and authority, and encouraged to focus on<br />
local priorities” (Solomon).<br />
These and other lessons from international experiences are already reflected<br />
in some Canadian crime prevention policies such as those <strong>of</strong> the Province<br />
<strong>of</strong> Québec 1 and, more recently, the Alberta crime prevention action plan. 2<br />
Importantly, both <strong>of</strong> these policies recognize the leading role and responsibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> municipalities in crime prevention. These policies make a vital connection<br />
between crime prevention and interventions in response to local issues in<br />
public safety and security. But they cannot be accomplished without senior<br />
orders <strong>of</strong> government collaborating with and supporting local governments in<br />
their development efforts. Public safety and security need focused, committed,<br />
evidence based investments that support a vision <strong>of</strong> a reduction and prevention<br />
<strong>of</strong> crime, victimization and fear <strong>of</strong> crime for all.<br />
For the National Municipal Network for Crime Prevention, a key lesson<br />
emerges from reflecting on the experiences <strong>of</strong> other countries: the importance <strong>of</strong><br />
dedicated and flexible resources. Long term and sustainable resources are needed<br />
to implement significant projects in communities affected by crime, but we<br />
also need resources to evaluate what is being done in order to ensure efficiency,<br />
effectiveness and sustainability. Finally, these resources need to be based on<br />
a common vision <strong>of</strong> crime prevention while remaining flexible enough to be<br />
adaptable to local concerns. There must be “a much lighter touch from the<br />
centre” as Solomon says, but we cannot expect crime prevention collaborations<br />
and initiatives in municipalities to prevail without national and provincial<br />
commitment and support.<br />
In many municipalities across the country, there is a clear dedication to public<br />
safety and security, but <strong>of</strong>ten the tools to accomplish the task are limited.<br />
What is now needed is a national strategy that acknowledges and supports the<br />
ground level while remaining flexible with regards to its application. We need<br />
a commitment from all orders <strong>of</strong> government to move beyond jurisdictional<br />
debates and focus on the vital impact that crime, victimization and the fear <strong>of</strong><br />
crime have on the quality <strong>of</strong> life <strong>of</strong> all communities.<br />
The fourteen municipalities that have come together to form the National<br />
Municipal Network for Crime Prevention have continued to exchange<br />
experiences. We have learned that we are more similar than different. Some<br />
actions are specific to the local con<strong>text</strong>, but all speak to the vital need for<br />
1 See www.msp.gouv.qc.ca/prevention/prevention.asp?txtSection=publicat&txtCategorie=politique<br />
2 See www.justice.gov.ab.ca/safe/
70 IPC Review 3<br />
a long term multi-sector vision that supports targeted local engagement and<br />
initiatives, monitors their impact and is resilient to political shifts. Dialogues<br />
between all orders <strong>of</strong> government are crucial for initiating and sustaining<br />
prevention approaches in communities across Canada. Based on the experiences<br />
<strong>of</strong> other countries, it seems likely that these conversations need local energy<br />
and commitment (bottom up) as well as a national vision and supports from<br />
central orders <strong>of</strong> government for local initiatives (top down). We are ready.<br />
Are you?<br />
Volume 3: pages 71–73<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Commentary from the Provincial/<br />
Territorial Perspective<br />
Beth Ulrich<br />
Director, Crime Prevention Unit,<br />
Community Justice Branch, Manitoba Justice &<br />
Co-Chair, Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working<br />
Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention<br />
Canada’s Provinces and Territories are committed to addressing their local<br />
crime and victimization issues. More and more provincial/territorial interdepartmental<br />
committees are developing strategic responses to crime and<br />
victimization problems related to areas such as youth, poverty and exclusion,<br />
gangs and drug prevention, violence against women, auto theft, early childhood<br />
development, Aboriginal justice, and many others. Local programs and policies<br />
are then designed, funded and implemented. This work is resulting in the<br />
development and implementation <strong>of</strong> crime prevention strategies and initiatives<br />
across the country.<br />
At times there is alignment and support from a national strategy, and the<br />
work is done in collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Centre or<br />
other Federal agencies. At other times, the Provinces or Territories operate<br />
independently from a national framework. These local initiatives do not<br />
always form the basis <strong>of</strong> a newsworthy announcement nor are they necessarily<br />
woven together or presented as an overall crime prevention strategy, yet the<br />
work is underway.<br />
There is almost universal agreement that this work must be knowledgebased,<br />
and the shift towards evidence-based approaches to “what works” is<br />
permeating policy discussions at various community and government tables.<br />
But, moving in this direction will require a great deal more attention at both<br />
the local and national levels to what is needed to accomplish this task. As<br />
Homel and Solomon suggest on the basis <strong>of</strong> their research, the minimal<br />
requirements for success include: vision and leadership, adequately funded
72 IPC Review 3 Commentary from the Provincial/Territorial Perspective 73<br />
and sustainable organizational structures, technical assistance and training,<br />
access to appropriate data, and supports for the development <strong>of</strong> collaborations<br />
and partnerships. We must also be leery about whether “model programs”<br />
from elsewhere can be easily transferred and replicated in the various regions<br />
<strong>of</strong> Canada. What works “there” may not work here, and we need to be<br />
constantly attentive to the need to respect the concerns and priorities <strong>of</strong> diverse<br />
communities and groups, as well as agreements and treaties with communities<br />
and other governments.<br />
and programs are informed by research. The provinces and territories will<br />
continue to create and support local strategies. Perhaps together, with support<br />
from the National Crime Prevention Centre and other federal partners, we<br />
could imagine a future that includes a robust social safety net that helps assure<br />
prevention in the long term, coupled with specific model interventions for<br />
high risk individuals and communities.<br />
The current global fiscal crisis will impact each province and territory in<br />
different ways. Departments that are key to developing social and economic<br />
strategies will need to become strong allies with Justice to review opportunities<br />
to pool resources that will yield multiple positive outcomes; the Justice<br />
department alone can not affect long term social change. The UK experience<br />
as explained by Solomon and Homel, as well as an abundance <strong>of</strong> other research,<br />
informs us that it is comprehensive approaches that integrate the contributions<br />
<strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> key social sectors that will create the long term social fabric<br />
necessary to prevent crime and victimization.<br />
These approaches require collaboration between all orders <strong>of</strong> government and,<br />
given their different roles and responsibilities, and the pressures they face, this<br />
will be a huge challenge. While we work to create long term strategies, we<br />
must also implement specific initiatives that focus on high risk <strong>of</strong>fenders and<br />
those at risk <strong>of</strong> re-victimization. Involvement <strong>of</strong> the justice system and law<br />
enforcement will be key in this respect.<br />
One message is clear in the work <strong>of</strong> both Homel and Solomon: the tendency<br />
for prevention policy to swing like a pendulum between social or structural<br />
approaches and individual or developmental approaches must stop. We<br />
need to develop and implement a dual track process. Research supports<br />
the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> each approach and highlights the necessity to invest in<br />
comprehensive approaches that address individual, community and structural<br />
risk and protective factors. To implement these approaches effectively, there<br />
must be coordination between all orders <strong>of</strong> government; long term funding;<br />
technical support for practitioners; flexible policies to meet the unique needs<br />
<strong>of</strong> the provinces and territories; and support for collaborative partnerships.<br />
Canada is fortunate to have within its borders institutions such as the<br />
International Centre for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (Montréal) and the Institute<br />
for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (at the University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa), as well as many<br />
local experts from various backgrounds who can help ensure that policies
Volume 3: pages 75–79<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Blueprint for Effective<br />
Crime Prevention in Canada:<br />
The National Crime<br />
Prevention Strategy<br />
Daniel Sansfaçon, PhD, & Lucie Léonard<br />
National Crime Prevention Centre<br />
The articles by Peter Homel and Enver Solomon describe some <strong>of</strong> the major<br />
international experiences in recent years in the design and implementation <strong>of</strong><br />
national crime prevention strategies – they also provide a stimulating overview<br />
<strong>of</strong> what they feel can be learned from these experiences, and <strong>of</strong> what might be<br />
most relevant to Canadian practitioners and decision-makers.<br />
Both authors attempt to identify some <strong>of</strong> the common themes in contemporary<br />
crime prevention, and some <strong>of</strong> the lessons from these experiences that could<br />
be applied to Canada’s current situation. Homel assesses a number <strong>of</strong> national<br />
strategies, with an emphasis on recent developments in Australia and England<br />
and Wales. He identifies a number <strong>of</strong> features <strong>of</strong> modern prevention, including:<br />
multi-sectoral action based on the use <strong>of</strong> multiple interventions, focused<br />
analysis, and evidence based interventions with a strong outcome focus and<br />
an emphasis on locally “driven” initiatives. Solomon focuses primarily on<br />
assessing the UK’s experience under the Labour government, which took<br />
power in 1997. He identifies a number <strong>of</strong> areas where Canada might pr<strong>of</strong>it<br />
from observing others. These include lessons related to: setting centrally<br />
directed targets, creating organizational silos within silos, using evidencebased<br />
approaches, attempting to balance enforcement and prevention and<br />
addressing the “implementation gap”.<br />
How do these international experiences apply to the Canadian situation or,<br />
in other words, what should Canada learn from others? In this con<strong>text</strong>, it is<br />
useful to provide an overview <strong>of</strong> recent developments <strong>of</strong> the National Crime
76 IPC Review 3 Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention in Canada 77<br />
Prevention Strategy, particularly its attempt to promote and support evidencebased<br />
crime prevention in Canada.<br />
Crime prevention is a relatively recent policy and program domain in Canada.<br />
The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) was established in 1998 as the<br />
responsibility centre in the Canadian federal government in crime prevention.<br />
Its main role is to develop policy knowledge and to administer funding<br />
programs under the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) which is the<br />
main prevention policy framework <strong>of</strong> the federal government. It is important<br />
to emphasize that the NCPS is not the only policy framework or funding<br />
program with crime prevention implications in the federal government: one<br />
could also think for example <strong>of</strong> the Family Violence Initiative (Public Health<br />
Agency), the National Anti-Drug Strategy (Justice and Health Canada), the<br />
Urban Aboriginal Strategy (Human Resources), the Youth Justice Initiative<br />
(Justice Canada) or many initiatives in the RCMP (for example, on youth<br />
intervention). While the NCPC has a mandate to coordinate and provide<br />
some coherence between these various initiatives, it cannot replace or act in<br />
lieu <strong>of</strong> these other sectors <strong>of</strong> government.<br />
Furthermore, provinces have the possibility <strong>of</strong> adopting their own strategies.<br />
Some may complement the NCPS, but they need not necessarily as provinces<br />
have a direct responsibility for the administration <strong>of</strong> justice, health, education<br />
and social services. The province <strong>of</strong> Québec paved the way with the adoption<br />
<strong>of</strong> its city-focused strategy in the early 2000s. Other provinces, especially<br />
Alberta, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, have more recently adopted crime<br />
reduction and prevention strategies, sometimes more influenced by the UK<br />
experience in crime prevention, reduction and community safety.<br />
There are national, provincial, territorial and municipal strategies and<br />
approaches to crime prevention in Canada. The positive aspects are that they<br />
all pursue a prevention agenda and that, when taken together, they may well<br />
have contributed to the overall decline in recorded crime rates in Canada since<br />
the early 1990s. The federal government, through the NCPC, provides national<br />
leadership, but there remains a great deal <strong>of</strong> variation between administrations<br />
and jurisdictions, and communities and practitioners may have very different<br />
views <strong>of</strong> what prevention is and <strong>of</strong> how it should be delivered on the ground.<br />
The NCPS itself has changed quite significantly over the decade. Originally<br />
conceptualized as a broad Crime Prevention through <strong>Social</strong> Development<br />
(CPSD) approach that was largely based on community mobilization, it is now<br />
a more focussed and evidence-based strategy. In effect, the renewed National<br />
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) is based on the following four principles<br />
described in its Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention (2007) 1 :<br />
1. strengthening partnerships across all sectors and systematically<br />
integrating crime prevention with enforcement, corrections and other<br />
relevant interventions;<br />
2. promoting effective crime prevention through the use <strong>of</strong> the evidence base;<br />
3. focusing on specific priorities and groups; and<br />
4. achieving measurable results.<br />
More specifically, the NCPS aims to support evidence-based interventions that<br />
address modifiable risk factors known to be related to <strong>of</strong>fending among those<br />
who are most at risk for delinquency. This translates in particular in a specific<br />
focus on: children between the ages <strong>of</strong> 6-11, youth between the ages <strong>of</strong> 12-17<br />
and young adults between 18-24 who present multiple risk factors.<br />
These directions were chosen based on evidence and demonstrable results for<br />
crime prevention, particularly in the areas <strong>of</strong> youth at-risk <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending. There<br />
is a good degree <strong>of</strong> agreement among crime prevention specialists in Canada<br />
and around the world that longitudinal studies following cohorts <strong>of</strong> children<br />
from birth, as well as rigorous evaluation studies, have helped identify risk<br />
factors for later delinquency. In particular, it is well established that early onset<br />
<strong>of</strong> delinquent behaviour, especially when combined with other risk factors such<br />
as having criminalized parents and/or being from a dysfunctional family, and<br />
early aggressiveness and problem behaviour in school, significantly increase<br />
the likelihood <strong>of</strong> being arrested at early adolescence; thus the need to focus on<br />
early prevention with children and youth aged 6-11.<br />
Adolescents who have been in contact with the police prematurely (before age<br />
10), who have delinquent friends, or who have problems related to substance<br />
use and abuse are at higher risk to become adult <strong>of</strong>fenders; thus the focus<br />
on the 12-17 age group, especially if they have already been in contact with<br />
the justice system. And young adults 18-24 who, in addition to these past<br />
experiences, are under-educated, unemployed, and demonstrate addictive use<br />
<strong>of</strong> substances are at significant risk <strong>of</strong> entering a lifelong criminal trajectory.<br />
Preventing these at-risk children and youth from entering a life <strong>of</strong> crime is the<br />
overarching goal <strong>of</strong> the NCPS.<br />
These directions were also established on the basis <strong>of</strong> reliable evidence with<br />
respect to promising interventions. Many different institutes around the world<br />
1 See www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/cp/_fl/ncps-blu-prin-eng.pdf
78 IPC Review 3 Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention in Canada 79<br />
have identified such programs through meta-analyses <strong>of</strong> evaluation studies <strong>of</strong><br />
their effectiveness. For example, for children below the age <strong>of</strong> 12, Stop Now<br />
and Plan (SNAP) or the Boys and Girls Clubs’ mentoring programs have been<br />
recognized as model programs. For adolescents, Multisystemic Therapy (MST)<br />
and Fast Track are examples <strong>of</strong> promising interventions. And for young adults,<br />
Quantum Opportunities is an example <strong>of</strong> a promising intervention. On the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> an analysis <strong>of</strong> the existing scientific literature, and considering the<br />
Canadian con<strong>text</strong>, the NCPC has decided to give priority to funding twelve<br />
model or promising programs that target these groups and address known risk<br />
factors associated with crime and <strong>of</strong>fending.<br />
This said, very few <strong>of</strong> these interventions have been rigorously tested in<br />
Canada, so their impacts are not well known. Furthermore, evaluation studies<br />
have not always identified the key elements <strong>of</strong> the processes that make these<br />
programs work. For example, more needs to be learned about the specific<br />
characteristics <strong>of</strong> successful interventions (con<strong>text</strong>, duration, intensity) or<br />
the type <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionals or organizations required to deliver them and, in<br />
particular, what and when to adapt them to best respond to the needs and<br />
priorities <strong>of</strong> local communities.<br />
Having adopted a strong focus on demonstrable results, and being very<br />
conscious <strong>of</strong> the need to build longer-term sustainability for the most effective<br />
programs, the NCPC has built an internal evaluation capacity to oversee<br />
multi-site evaluation studies <strong>of</strong> the priority model and promising projects.<br />
These evaluation studies, using the most rigorous available designs (whenever<br />
possible a quasi-experimental design with comparable control group and<br />
longitudinal follow-up <strong>of</strong> the clients) will aim to measure the effectiveness<br />
(impacts) and cost-effectiveness (in selected cases) <strong>of</strong> these interventions. Once<br />
effectiveness has been well established and more is known about “the how”,<br />
the NCPC will work with its partners to identify appropriate ways to ensure<br />
that these interventions are sustained.<br />
A good policy translates into concrete and effective action, so bridging<br />
the “implementation gap” is possibly the most challenging task in crime<br />
prevention. Adopting an evidence-based strategy presents many challenges<br />
for communities and practitioners: the knowledge base may not be accessible<br />
to them and they may not have the tools or experience to implement model<br />
and promising programs; they must also overcome the traditional resistance<br />
to adopting models that do not have local roots. As such, active knowledge<br />
transfer and dissemination <strong>of</strong> practical knowledge on effective crime prevention<br />
practices are fundamental elements <strong>of</strong> the NCPC’s focus and activities.<br />
More specifically, the NCPC conducts a series <strong>of</strong> activities designed to promote,<br />
disseminate and foster the successful use <strong>of</strong> the knowledge base <strong>of</strong> effective<br />
practices. The NCPC will continue to build its knowledge base, from research<br />
reports reviewing the knowledge in a given domain, to fact sheets on evaluated<br />
programs designed to inspire practice. But publications, whether physical or<br />
electronic, can only go so far in helping to build the capacity <strong>of</strong> practitioners<br />
and communities. In response, the NCPC also organizes a series <strong>of</strong> interactive<br />
knowledge transfer and dissemination activities aimed at its own program<br />
managers (who work directly with communities), its provincial and territorial<br />
partners, and community-based organizations.<br />
The implementation <strong>of</strong> the NCPS rests in particular on funding purposefully<br />
selected promising and model programs in multiple sites, and the NCPC<br />
is keenly aware that practitioners require information and support. So the<br />
NCPC: makes available detailed information to funding recipients on these<br />
promising and model programs (implementation fact sheets); organizes very<br />
focused training sessions steered by a duo composed <strong>of</strong> a developer and a<br />
deliverer <strong>of</strong> a given promising or model program; ensures that the funding<br />
agreement includes a provision for in-depth training and continuous followup<br />
<strong>of</strong> the service providers; orchestrates communities <strong>of</strong> practice both for<br />
program managers within the Centre, and for recipient organizations in order<br />
to ensure that practitioners in various parts <strong>of</strong> the country benefit from the<br />
experience <strong>of</strong> others; and schedules yearly knowledge to practice seminars on<br />
specific issues such as youth gangs, evaluation in Aboriginal communities, and<br />
youth at-risk.<br />
In conclusion, the NCPC remains committed to continuing to play an active<br />
and collaborative role in the development and implementation <strong>of</strong> a national<br />
crime prevention strategy for Canada, and to continuing to work in partnership<br />
with the Provinces and Territories, municipal orders <strong>of</strong> government, and with<br />
communities and organizations interested in contributing to the goal <strong>of</strong> a safer<br />
and more secure Canada. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)<br />
is attempting to address the challenges and difficulties described by Homel<br />
and Solomon in a number <strong>of</strong> ways including the development <strong>of</strong> effective<br />
crime prevention policies, a commitment to evidence-based practices, selective<br />
interventions, a focus on evaluation, and by achieving strategic partnerships<br />
and local collaboration to deliver good and sustainable crime prevention.
Volume 3: pages 81–86<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Lessons for Canadian Crime<br />
Prevention: Cultural Shifts<br />
and Local Flexibilities<br />
Margaret Shaw<br />
International Centre for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (ICPC)<br />
This volume <strong>of</strong> the IPC Review contains two very significant articles, written<br />
from the privileged position <strong>of</strong> hindsight by two very skilled observers. Peter<br />
Homel’s Lessons for Canadian crime prevention from recent international<br />
experience and Enver Solomon’s New Labour and crime prevention in England<br />
and Wales: What worked? <strong>of</strong>fer a wealth <strong>of</strong> experience and advice based primarily<br />
on the recent history <strong>of</strong> criminal justice and prevention initiatives in Australia<br />
and England and Wales. In 2008, ICPC published its first International Report<br />
on Crime Prevention & Community Safety 1 , providing an opportunity to assess<br />
the evolution, maturation and growth <strong>of</strong> crime prevention internationally.<br />
These articles <strong>of</strong>fer some valuable detail and commentary on some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
international trends identified in that report.<br />
Enver Solomon is a political scientist whose analysis draws on his recent<br />
“independent audits” <strong>of</strong> ten years <strong>of</strong> criminal justice and youth justice reforms<br />
in England and Wales, under Tony Blair’s Labour government. Peter Homel<br />
has the dual distinction <strong>of</strong> having undertaken a major evaluation <strong>of</strong> the Crime<br />
Reduction Programme in England and Wales, which formed a crucial part <strong>of</strong><br />
Tony Blair’s crime strategy, and <strong>of</strong> evaluating and observing many <strong>of</strong> Australia’s<br />
recent crime prevention initiatives, as well as some <strong>of</strong> those in New Zealand<br />
and the US. This enables him to reflect on the comparative advantages and<br />
disadvantages <strong>of</strong> central government intervention in crime and its prevention.<br />
In the late 1990’s England and Wales was seen as a poster child for crime<br />
prevention in place <strong>of</strong> “endless law enforcement”. The enactment <strong>of</strong> mandatory<br />
Local Crime Reduction Partnerships and Youth Offending Teams provided as<br />
1 Visit http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org.
82 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention: Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities 83<br />
Adam Crawford suggested, “a fertile soil in which a more progressive criminal<br />
justice policy (…) could begin to establish itself and flourish” (see Solomon,<br />
p. 49). What followed was, Solomon outlines, ten years <strong>of</strong> “hyperactive law<br />
making and endless policy strategizing”, with almost 50 pieces <strong>of</strong> crime-related<br />
legislation, four major criminal policy plans and numerous strategies affecting the<br />
police, youth justice, probation, community safety and anti-social behaviour.<br />
Officially recorded crime has indeed declined markedly in England and Wales<br />
since the mid 1990’s, but the decline began in fact before the advent <strong>of</strong> all this<br />
activity, and has occurred in most other Western nations as well. In 2006,<br />
England and Wales was spending more per capita on “public order and safety”<br />
than any other OECD country, and there has been a massive increase in the<br />
prison population and child and young <strong>of</strong>fenders, and, especially since 2004,<br />
an obsession with “anti-social behaviour”.<br />
Solomon identifies five core assumptions underlying all this activity:<br />
1. Crime levels and trends are significantly influenced by the criminal<br />
justice system;<br />
2. The criminal justice system needs to address a wider range <strong>of</strong> “crime-like”<br />
behaviours because <strong>of</strong> “changes” in society;<br />
3. Criminal justice agencies need to expand their remit into non-traditional<br />
areas such as early intervention and “at risk” populations;<br />
4. A welfare approach to children and young people should be replaced by<br />
one relying more on punishment; and<br />
5. Systematic public managerialism, driven by national targets for crime<br />
reduction, is the best way to achieve efficiency and results.<br />
His analysis concludes that a buoyant economy has probably been the major<br />
factor in the fall in crime over the ten year period (as was partly the case in<br />
the crime drop in America), although crime prevention has had some impact.<br />
A major characteristic <strong>of</strong> crime prevention in England and Wales, for a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> historical reasons, has been its focus on situational prevention. Utilized<br />
by local crime prevention partnerships, this has been effective in reducing<br />
residential burglary and car theft. The dominance <strong>of</strong> situational prevention,<br />
with its notions <strong>of</strong> rational choice and control, and the relative neglect <strong>of</strong> a more<br />
balanced approach to prevention, help to explain the failure to understand the<br />
behaviours <strong>of</strong> young people, and the obsession with anti-social behaviour. A<br />
more balanced approach, which gives greater attention to social and community<br />
interventions, targeting the conditions <strong>of</strong> poor and disadvantaged communities,<br />
might have reduced the need to enlarge the net <strong>of</strong> “crime-like” behaviours.<br />
Solomon concludes that the current government now recognizes that a<br />
simple enforcement approach does not address the needs <strong>of</strong> families and<br />
communities, and that the Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour Order (ASBO) is now seen<br />
as counterproductive. In effect there has been too great a focus on control<br />
rather than prevention, on being “tough on crime” rather than on its causes,<br />
and not enough expenditure on social interventions. The irony is that much<br />
international prevention with young people at risk is based on the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
including excluded populations, and <strong>of</strong>ten working through informal social<br />
controls, rather than using coercion and further exclusion (ICPC, 2008).<br />
Peter Homel’s article starts from the premise that levels <strong>of</strong> reported crime<br />
and victimization in most developed countries, including Canada, have<br />
consistently declined over the past ten or more years, in parallel with the<br />
growth <strong>of</strong> interest and investment in crime prevention by those countries. He<br />
acknowledges the collective wisdom that perhaps some 20% <strong>of</strong> that decline can<br />
be attributed to prevention programs, and examines eight key characteristics<br />
<strong>of</strong> effective crime prevention strategies and programs in developed countries.<br />
Essentially, these common components are about the methodology <strong>of</strong><br />
prevention, including collaborative multi-agency action, partnership<br />
models, problem-focused and evidence-based approaches, and centrally<br />
driven and locally delivered practice. They have required the emergence <strong>of</strong><br />
new governance structures for managing crime prevention, and a shift in<br />
traditional methods requiring pooled budgets, negotiated partnerships, greater<br />
client participation in service delivery, shared service responsibility, innovative<br />
community consultation, and the development <strong>of</strong> shared databases and viable<br />
performance measures.<br />
Homel sees the Boston youth homicide reduction project, and the ongoing<br />
Australian Pathways to Prevention project, as illustrating the power and<br />
effectiveness <strong>of</strong> such methodological approaches. However, he also provides<br />
clear analysis <strong>of</strong> the implementation failure <strong>of</strong> the world’s most ambitious<br />
central prevention initiative, the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP)<br />
in England & Wales. These included: the lack <strong>of</strong> suitably qualified staff;<br />
high staff turnover; inadequate technical and strategic advice from central<br />
government; and inadequate project management, competency and skills.<br />
What is encouraging is his assessment that these lessons about implementation<br />
and process have influenced subsequent national crime prevention programs,<br />
notably the recent National Community Crime Prevention Programme in<br />
Australia which has avoided such implementation failure and maintained<br />
good central – regional relationships.
84 IPC Review 3 Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention: Cultural Shifts and Local Flexibilities 85<br />
The slippery concept <strong>of</strong> evidence-based policy has also been shown, argues<br />
Homel, to be much more complex than its initial proponents suggested, since<br />
it entails agreements on the nature <strong>of</strong> evidence, and strategic ways <strong>of</strong> creating<br />
and measuring it. In the CRP, there was too great an emphasis on formal<br />
research evidence, rather than on other types <strong>of</strong> evidence about how programs<br />
worked, and what their outcomes were. He makes a useful distinction between<br />
performance measurement and evaluation as two valuable aides to informing<br />
crime prevention policy and practice: the former assists with the day-to-day<br />
management <strong>of</strong> programs, while the latter informs overall decisions about<br />
programs and policies.<br />
There are a number <strong>of</strong> strategic lessons from these experiences that are<br />
important for Canada. For example:<br />
• A strong deterrent justice system is not sufficient to prevent crime – an<br />
effective and well-funded justice system does not guarantee reductions in<br />
crime or increased community safety and quality <strong>of</strong> life. The economy,<br />
social and environmental conditions and other factors are also important<br />
and likely to impact crime levels, and responding to those will save justice<br />
and social costs. The experience <strong>of</strong> South Africa provides a stark example<br />
<strong>of</strong> a country living under extreme security conditions, and with tough and<br />
deterrent criminal justice, which has so far failed to impact the levels <strong>of</strong><br />
serious violent crime over the past twelve years. The recently launched<br />
Action for a Safe South Africa 2 argues that the justice system would collapse<br />
if all crimes were dealt with, and a broader preventive approach is seen as the<br />
only solution.<br />
• The dangers <strong>of</strong> target-setting and managerial approaches are well<br />
demonstrated. They can be counterproductive, and reduce flexibility and<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional judgment.<br />
• Too much focus on crime can contribute to increasing anxieties and<br />
expectation <strong>of</strong> the government’s role and capacity to intervene – crime in<br />
England and Wales is down, but levels <strong>of</strong> fear remain high.<br />
• The focus <strong>of</strong> crime prevention policies should be on creating safe communities<br />
rather than reducing or deterring crime. This requires long-term funding,<br />
not just pilot or demonstration projects.<br />
2 See www.safesouthafrica.org.za<br />
• “Imposing civility by coercion”, as in the case <strong>of</strong> Anti-<strong>Social</strong> Behaviour<br />
Orders in England and Wales, is a mistake which has been costly in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> increased justice interventions, as well as going against principles<br />
<strong>of</strong> inclusion. The City <strong>of</strong> Bogota, by contrast, has clearly demonstrated<br />
how a culture <strong>of</strong> civility can be created through the use <strong>of</strong> innovative and<br />
participatory approaches, including clowns. The use <strong>of</strong> social mediators in<br />
public spaces in France <strong>of</strong>fers another example. International standards are<br />
being increasingly applied in many countries. The UN Guidelines for the<br />
Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (2002) stress the importance <strong>of</strong> the inclusion <strong>of</strong> young<br />
people, especially those most likely to be involved in the justice system, not<br />
their demonization.<br />
• Governments can learn from the experience <strong>of</strong> other countries. While policy<br />
does not always travel well, and it is important to look at and adapt programs<br />
to local con<strong>text</strong>s and circumstances, some good lessons about process,<br />
implementation, and evaluation have been learnt from recent experiences.<br />
• Other countries and regions with rather different experiences from developed<br />
countries, such as South Africa, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Trinidad &<br />
Tobago or Chile can provide some valuable lessons about good practices.<br />
• It is important to innovate, and to set realistic expectations about the likely<br />
impacts <strong>of</strong> interventions. As Homel points out, research evidence is just<br />
one source <strong>of</strong> knowledge; the messiness <strong>of</strong> actual project implementation,<br />
the knowledge and energies <strong>of</strong> practitioners, and the timelines <strong>of</strong> policy<br />
makers also affect outcomes and impacts. There should still be room for<br />
innovation, not just replication <strong>of</strong> proven “examples”.<br />
• The growing importance <strong>of</strong> modern “tools” for data collection and<br />
analysis, such as observatories <strong>of</strong> crime and social problems, and the use <strong>of</strong><br />
local community safety audits to support local and regional multi-sector<br />
partnerships and coordinating bodies.<br />
• Crime happens locally – the importance <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> subsidiarity – <strong>of</strong><br />
the devolution <strong>of</strong> both powers and resources to local levels. This has been<br />
very effectively demonstrated in Colombian and Brazilian cities, but with<br />
strong central government support – financial, technical, and normative.<br />
Much <strong>of</strong> the experience distilled in these articles, and ICPC’s (2008)<br />
International Report, points to the learning curve <strong>of</strong> governments trying<br />
to work in very different ways from the past, after centuries <strong>of</strong> national
86 IPC Review 3<br />
responsibility for crime and safety. It underlines the emergence <strong>of</strong> a quite<br />
different way <strong>of</strong> looking at, and responding to the individual, community,<br />
social and economic problems which can lead to crime and victimization,<br />
and <strong>of</strong> understanding the complexities <strong>of</strong> working out that new approach. As<br />
ICPC’s (2008) International Report underlines, there is very clear progress<br />
in understanding the need for crime prevention internationally, and how it<br />
can be undertaken. Prevention is not a static concept; it is constantly evolving<br />
and it requires the continuing development <strong>of</strong> a widening range <strong>of</strong> sectors,<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essionals, practitioners, communities, and tools.<br />
There is some irony in the fact that Solomon suggests that part <strong>of</strong> the failure<br />
in England and Wales to tackle youth behaviours and <strong>of</strong>fending is because<br />
there has been too little emphasis on addressing its underlying structural<br />
causes (until recently the major objective <strong>of</strong> the federal Canadian approach),<br />
and too much focus on reducing victimization and re-<strong>of</strong>fending (closer to the<br />
current federal Canadian approach). Peter Homel makes a similar point that<br />
the National Crime Prevention Centre’s 2007 Blueprint for Effective Crime<br />
Prevention places greater stress on risk factors rather than underlying causes.<br />
While it adheres to some <strong>of</strong> the principles outlined in the 2002 UN Guidelines<br />
for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime, not all those principles are included, nor is the<br />
emphasis in both the 1995 and 2002 UN guidelines adopted by ECOSOC, on<br />
the importance <strong>of</strong> local government, and the role <strong>of</strong> local actors, including city<br />
governments and the police, in partnership with local populations.<br />
YOUTH AND<br />
COLLECTI V E<br />
VIOLENCE<br />
References<br />
International Centre for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (ICPC). (2008).<br />
International report on crime prevention and community safety.<br />
Montreal: International Centre for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime.<br />
United Nations Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Council (UN ECOSOC). (1995).<br />
Guidelines for the prevention <strong>of</strong> urban crime. Resolution 1995/9, Annex.<br />
New York: UN ECOSOC.<br />
United Nations Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Council (UN ECOSOC). (2002).<br />
Guidelines for the prevention <strong>of</strong> crime. 11 th Commission on the<br />
prevention <strong>of</strong> crime and criminal justice. Resolution 2002/13, Annex.<br />
New York: UN ECOSOC.
Volume 3: pages 89–116<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Gang Violence Among Youth<br />
and Young Adults: (Dis)Affiliation<br />
and the Potential for Prevention<br />
Melanie Bania<br />
PhD Candidate, Department <strong>of</strong> Criminology<br />
Research Associate, Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa<br />
Résumé<br />
Les taux de violence et les incidents liés aux gangs de jeunes ne sont<br />
pas distribués au hasard; ils sont perpétrés et vécus par un petit nombre<br />
de personnes et concentrés dans les quartiers les plus vulnérables aux<br />
difficultés économiques et à l’exclusion sociale. Cet article examine les<br />
dispositions socio-économiques actuelles et leur influence, autant sur la<br />
répartition des possibilités <strong>of</strong>fertes aux adolescents et aux jeunes adultes<br />
que sur leur perception d’être dans une position d’exclusion. Ce sentiment<br />
de désaffiliation sociale motive la participation de plusieurs dans des<br />
gangs de rue. Il est proposé que la réponse à la violence liée aux gangs et<br />
à l’utilisation des armes à feu parmi les adolescents et les jeunes adultes<br />
devra aller au-delà des stratégies courantes de répression et de prévention<br />
qui mettent l’accent sur les caractéristiques des individus et des quartiers<br />
défavorisés afin de prendre une approche préventive plus « sociale ». La<br />
situation dans la ville de Toronto au cours des dernières années est utilisée<br />
pour illustrer les principaux thèmes de l’argument.<br />
Abstract<br />
Rates and incidents <strong>of</strong> gang-related youth violence are not randomly<br />
distributed; they are perpetrated and experienced by a small number <strong>of</strong><br />
people, and concentrated in areas <strong>of</strong> our cities that are the most vulnerable<br />
to economic hardship and social exclusion. This article examines current
90 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 91<br />
socio-economic arrangements and how they affect both the distribution<br />
<strong>of</strong> opportunities available to youth and young adults, and their perception<br />
<strong>of</strong> being in a position <strong>of</strong> relative exclusion. This sense <strong>of</strong> social disaffiliation<br />
motivates the involvement <strong>of</strong> many in gangs. It is argued that the response<br />
to gun and gang violence among youth and young adults will have to go<br />
beyond current repressive and preventive strategies that focus on the<br />
characteristics <strong>of</strong> individuals and neighbourhoods, and take a more “social<br />
approach” to prevention. The situation in the city <strong>of</strong> Toronto over the past<br />
few years is used to illustrate the main themes <strong>of</strong> the argument.<br />
Introduction 1<br />
High-pr<strong>of</strong>ile outbursts <strong>of</strong> gun and gang-related violence across Canada in<br />
recent years have drawn a wave <strong>of</strong> attention to the problem <strong>of</strong> gang-related<br />
and youth violence. There is some debate as to whether gang involvement<br />
and gang-related violence among youth are actually on the rise. As we will<br />
see, there are a number <strong>of</strong> definitional and methodological issues that make it<br />
difficult to know exactly where Canada stands in this regard.<br />
The primary focus <strong>of</strong> this article, however, is not on whether the level <strong>of</strong> gun<br />
and gang violence among youth and young adults has been increasing or<br />
decreasing in our major urban centres. The focus, rather, is on how to make<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> the nature and origins <strong>of</strong> collective violence among youth and young<br />
adults in recent times. We begin with the observation that rates <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
are not randomly distributed; they are perpetrated and experienced by a small<br />
number <strong>of</strong> people, and concentrated in areas <strong>of</strong> our cities that are characterized<br />
by economic hardship and social marginalization. This suggests the need<br />
to examine current socio-economic arrangements and how they affect the<br />
distribution <strong>of</strong> opportunities afforded certain youth and young adults, and the<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> social disaffiliation that can lead some young people to get involved<br />
in gangs.<br />
We then turn to a discussion <strong>of</strong> whether the current responses to gang violence<br />
among youth and youth adults are effective in addressing the factors at play.<br />
I will argue that we must go beyond current repressive and reactive responses<br />
and strategies that focus on the characteristics and “risk factors” <strong>of</strong> individuals<br />
and neighbourhoods, and take a more “social approach” to prevention. This<br />
will require that we shift our focus and resources from responses that tend to<br />
“blame the victim” (Ryan, 1976), and recognize the need for a broad-based<br />
solution that reduces relative inequality and relieves some <strong>of</strong> the frustration<br />
caused by our social, economic and political arrangements (Hastings, 2003;<br />
Websdale, 2001). The situation in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto over the past few years<br />
will be used to illustrate some <strong>of</strong> these themes.<br />
What We Know About Gangs in Canada: A Brief Overview<br />
It is difficult to determine the extent <strong>of</strong> gang activity in Canada, or whether<br />
we are actually witnessing a rise in the violence that is attributable to gang<br />
members. This is due in part to a lack <strong>of</strong> definitional clarity and consistency<br />
around terms such as “gang”, “gang violence” and “youth”, limitations in<br />
gang-related data and statistics, and a general lack <strong>of</strong> Canadian research in<br />
this area (Chettleburgh, 2007; Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2006;<br />
Public Safety Canada, 2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). The terms “youth”,<br />
“street”, “major”, and “urban” are <strong>of</strong>ten used interchangeably when referring<br />
to “gangs”, and have been associated with a wide range <strong>of</strong> behaviours, from<br />
loitering to school-yard fights, swarmings, common assaults, drug dealing,<br />
rape, prostitution, drive-by shootings, shootouts and homicides (CISC, 2006;<br />
Federation <strong>of</strong> Canadian Municipalities, 1994).<br />
In 2003, Chettleburgh conducted the first national survey <strong>of</strong> police agencies<br />
on the issue <strong>of</strong> youth gangs. Sixty-three out <strong>of</strong> the 264 police agencies who<br />
completed the survey indicated that “youth gangs” 2 were active in their<br />
jurisdiction in 2002. Police executives identified 434 active “youth gangs” and<br />
a total <strong>of</strong> 7000 active “youth gang members” under the age <strong>of</strong> 21, 50% <strong>of</strong><br />
whom were under the age <strong>of</strong> 18, and 6% <strong>of</strong> whom were girls. For the most<br />
part, gangs were reported to be internally ethnically diverse, with varying<br />
concentrations <strong>of</strong> African-Canadian, First Nation, Indo-Canadian, Asian-<br />
Canadian and Caucasian members depending on their geographical location<br />
(Chettleburgh, 2003).<br />
1 Unless otherwise specified, the word “gang” refers to groups that have at least some organizational/<br />
leadership structure, and that are involved in committing criminal and violent acts in order to gain power<br />
and recognition and/or control certain areas <strong>of</strong> unlawful activity (Montreal Police Service, 2004). The<br />
phrase “youth and young adults” refers to those who are currently in their adolescence and in what is now<br />
referred to as “early adulthood” – the period that straddles adolescence and adulthood (up to age 25) when<br />
important transitions in the life course occur (see Gaudet, 2007).<br />
2 “Youth gang” was defined as “a group <strong>of</strong> youth or young adults in your jurisdiction, under the age <strong>of</strong> 21 that<br />
you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify or classify as a gang.<br />
As part <strong>of</strong> this definition, we ask you to exclude motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs,<br />
and other exclusively adult gangs” (Chettleburgh, 2003, p. 5).
92 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 93<br />
More recently, CISC (2006) reported a total <strong>of</strong> 344 “street gangs” and 11,900<br />
“street gang members” 3 active in 166 urban, rural and Aboriginal reserve areas<br />
across the country. 4 It reported that the majority <strong>of</strong> “street gang members” in<br />
Canada are between 21 and 30 years old, with a range as broad as 16 to 46<br />
years. Most Canadian gangs have members that are considered “youth” in<br />
legal terms, as well as adult members – only about 6% <strong>of</strong> Canadian gangs<br />
are composed exclusively <strong>of</strong> members aged 17 and under (CISC, 2006).<br />
CISC (2006) reports a relatively stable number <strong>of</strong> street gangs and street<br />
gang members in Canada over the past 10 years, with the majority operating<br />
in large urban centres. Gang activities were reported to consist primarily <strong>of</strong><br />
street-level illicit drug trafficking and prostitution, but to also involve weapons<br />
trafficking, robbery, home invasions, extortion and fraud, as well as both<br />
strategic violence (planned or organized incidents to increase the gang’s pr<strong>of</strong>its,<br />
gains and criminal capabilities) and tactical violence (more opportunistic,<br />
reactive or expressive incidents that can sometimes lead to unintentional or<br />
collateral harm to the public) (CISC, 2006).<br />
This gives us a preliminary picture <strong>of</strong> gang activity in Canada, but differences<br />
in focus and terminology (i.e., “youth gangs” versus “street gangs”), definitions,<br />
and methodologies result in a slightly disjointed description that is further<br />
limited by its reliance on the perspectives <strong>of</strong> law enforcement agencies and<br />
intelligence alone.<br />
Violence and Homicide in Toronto<br />
and Links to Guns and Gangs<br />
It can be useful, and somewhat more telling, to look at what we know<br />
about youth violence and gang-related violence at the local level, such as<br />
within a city like Toronto. 5 According to Statistics Canada, the rate <strong>of</strong><br />
police recorded violent crime in Toronto has dropped 9% since 1992,<br />
compared to 14% for all <strong>of</strong> Canada (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &<br />
Fraser, 2008). However, in 2004, for the first time, youth (i.e., those<br />
3 The CISC defines a “street gang member” as “someone who is involved (directly or indirectly) in gangmotivated<br />
crime”, and who has been identified as a gang member through at least two <strong>of</strong> the following<br />
means: reliable source information (i.e., fellow/rival gang member, legitimate community resources); police<br />
surveillance; self-report/admission; court findings; common and/or symbolic gang definition (i.e., gang<br />
paraphernalia, tattoos, clothing, etc.). We return to more <strong>of</strong> the CISC methods and findings later on.<br />
4 Data sources included the 2005 and 2006 CISC Integrated Provincial Threat Assessments, law enforcement<br />
agency materials and interviews, academic research, and intelligence from the Automated Criminal<br />
Intelligence Information System (ACIIS).<br />
5 References to “Toronto” represent the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) <strong>of</strong> Toronto (as defined by Statistics<br />
Canada), which includes a number <strong>of</strong> police forces. References to the “City <strong>of</strong> Toronto” refer specifically to<br />
that which falls under the jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the Toronto Police Service.<br />
12-17 years old) charged with violent crime in Toronto outnumbered those<br />
charged with property crime, which is unusual in Canada (Janhevich, Johnson,<br />
Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). 6<br />
The rate <strong>of</strong> homicide in Toronto has remained relatively stable over the past<br />
30 years (1977-2007) at about 2.5 per 100,000 people, which is close to the<br />
national average (Gartner & Thompson, 2004; Li, 2008). However, the risk<br />
<strong>of</strong> homicide victimization for some groups – in particular males, young people,<br />
and black Torontonians – has gone up (Gartner & Thompson, 2004):<br />
• Males accounted for 73% <strong>of</strong> all homicide victims during and after the<br />
1990s, compared to about 64% <strong>of</strong> all victims from 1974-1989.<br />
• Since 1998, the average age <strong>of</strong> homicide victims has been 33 and 40% <strong>of</strong><br />
victims are under the age <strong>of</strong> 25, compared to an average age <strong>of</strong> 37 in the<br />
1970s (when 25% <strong>of</strong> victims were under age 25).<br />
• The homicide rate per 100,000 black Torontonians is almost 5 times<br />
greater than the average overall homicide rate per 100,000 population.<br />
The information available on homicide <strong>of</strong>fenders is less complete. Gartner<br />
and Thompson (2004) have not been successful in obtaining police files for<br />
years after 1991, and the data available from Statistics Canada does not provide<br />
detailed information on <strong>of</strong>fender characteristics, such as ethnic background. 7<br />
Nonetheless, police reports show that the number <strong>of</strong> youth (those 12-17 years<br />
old) charged with homicide 8 in Toronto has increased in recent years. For<br />
example, 33 youth were charged with homicide between 1992 and 2002, but this<br />
increased to 37 for the much shorter period between 2003 and 2007 (Statistics<br />
Canada, Uniform Crime Reports). Youth have also become an increasing<br />
proportion <strong>of</strong> all persons charged with homicide in Toronto (Statistics Canada,<br />
UCR). That said, these numbers must be interpreted with caution, since they<br />
do not take into account the possible effects <strong>of</strong> population change.<br />
Finally, Gartner and Thompson (2004) have further shown that the<br />
characteristics <strong>of</strong> homicides in Toronto have changed over the past 30 years.<br />
The proportion <strong>of</strong> homicides committed in public spaces and those committed<br />
with guns were significantly greater between 1993-2003 than in the 1970s and<br />
6 This data should be interpreted with caution as it is subject to police discretion and may reflect police<br />
activity more than actual rates <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending.<br />
7 There is a long-standing debate in Canada around the potential benefits and harms <strong>of</strong> systematically coding<br />
for race variables in crime statistics (see Gabor, 1994; Roberts & Doob, 1997). It is therefore difficult to<br />
obtain information on <strong>of</strong>fending by ethnic group simply because “race” or “ethnic background” is not<br />
coded in national crime data, except for with regards to Aboriginals.<br />
8 Includes charges for first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter.
94 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 95<br />
1980s; the proportion <strong>of</strong> homicides committed in the course <strong>of</strong> robberies or sexual<br />
assaults have not increased. Furthermore, there was a marked increase in gunrelated<br />
homicides in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto in 2005, dubbed “The Year <strong>of</strong> the Gun”<br />
by the media: 51 <strong>of</strong> the 79 (65%) homicides were gun-related, which is more than<br />
double the number <strong>of</strong> gun-related homicides in 2004 (Toronto Police Service,<br />
2006). There also appears to have been a relatively high number <strong>of</strong> homicides<br />
and gun-related homicides in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto since 2005 (see Table 1).<br />
Table 1. Homicides and gun-related homicides in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto, 1997-2007<br />
Total Homicides Gun-Related Homicides % Gun-Related Homicides<br />
2007 84 43 51%<br />
2006 71 34 48%<br />
2005 79 51 65%<br />
2004 64 24 38%<br />
2003 66 32 49%<br />
2002 65 28 43%<br />
2001 59 33 56%<br />
2000 59 25 42%<br />
1999 48 18 38%<br />
1998 56 13 23%<br />
1997 60 24 40%<br />
Sources: Toronto Police Annual Reports.<br />
Though there appears to be some trends in homicide characteristics in the<br />
City <strong>of</strong> Toronto, is it difficult to determine the extent to which they are linked<br />
to gang violence among youth and young adults. CISC (2006) reports a total<br />
<strong>of</strong> 80 street gangs in the Greater Toronto Area, noting that they are highly<br />
engaged in firearm-related incidents, but providing no additional detail or<br />
explanation. Information on gang-related homicides reported by Statistics<br />
Canada is available at the provincial level only, and is limited by a change<br />
in the definition <strong>of</strong> what constitutes a “gang-related” homicide that occurred<br />
in 2005. 9<br />
9 Before 2005, police were asked if a homicide was “gang-related”. In 2005, the question was amended to<br />
allow for specification <strong>of</strong> whether the homicide was: (a) confirmed as gang-related, or (b) “suspected” as<br />
gang-related. It is unknown if “suspected” gang-related incidents were included in numbers prior to 2005;<br />
the criteria used for making the distinction are not readily available (see Li, 2008).<br />
Survey research conducted by Wortley and Tanner (2004) provides some<br />
insight into the involvement <strong>of</strong> some youth and young adults in gangs and<br />
violence in Toronto. Their work showed that 11% <strong>of</strong> high school students aged<br />
14 to 20 years and 27% <strong>of</strong> the street youth aged 14 to 24 years claimed that<br />
they had been a “gang” member at some point in their life. However, a portion<br />
(31% <strong>of</strong> students and 8% <strong>of</strong> street youth) could be considered “social” members<br />
<strong>of</strong> a “gang” rather than “criminal” members – the activities they described as<br />
part <strong>of</strong> their gang affiliation were more “social”, such as hanging out with<br />
other gang members or playing sports within the “gang” con<strong>text</strong>. Only 4% <strong>of</strong><br />
the high school students and 15% <strong>of</strong> the street youth in the study sample who<br />
reported a “gang affiliation” could be considered current members <strong>of</strong> a criminal<br />
gang. An additional 3% <strong>of</strong> the students and 9% <strong>of</strong> the street youth reported<br />
being the former member <strong>of</strong> a criminal gang (Wortley & Tanner, 2004).<br />
Current criminal gang members had much higher rates <strong>of</strong> self-reported<br />
involvement in crime and violence over the past 12 months than any other<br />
group (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). For example:<br />
• Nearly 91% <strong>of</strong> current criminal gang members reported being involved in<br />
a fight, compared to 27.5% <strong>of</strong> social gang members and 26.5% <strong>of</strong> those<br />
never involved in a gang.<br />
• 51.4% <strong>of</strong> current criminal gang members reported selling drugs 10 times<br />
or more, compared to none <strong>of</strong> the social gang members and 2.1% <strong>of</strong> those<br />
never involved in a gang.<br />
• 11.3% <strong>of</strong> current criminal gang members reported sexually assaulting<br />
someone, compared to none <strong>of</strong> the social gang members and 0.3% <strong>of</strong> those<br />
never involved in a gang.<br />
• 68.3% <strong>of</strong> current criminal gang members reported having carried a gun or<br />
a knife, compared to 11.8% <strong>of</strong> social gang members and 11.2% <strong>of</strong> those<br />
never involved in a gang.<br />
For the most part, those who had never been in a gang, or who were current<br />
or former social members <strong>of</strong> a gang, were relatively uninvolved in criminal<br />
activities. The criminal involvement <strong>of</strong> former criminal gang members over<br />
the past year was much higher, but still nowhere near the level <strong>of</strong> involvement<br />
<strong>of</strong> current gang members. Current gang members were also much more likely<br />
to report experiencing various types <strong>of</strong> criminal victimization than any other<br />
group (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). For instance, among the high school
96 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 97<br />
students who reported currently being in a gang, 79% reported being physically<br />
assaulted and 45% being assaulted with a weapon in the past year, compared<br />
to 35% (for physical assault) and only 5% (for assault with a weapon) <strong>of</strong> those<br />
who have never been in a gang (Wortley & Tanner, 2004).<br />
These findings are consistent with a survey conducted by Erickson and her<br />
colleagues (2006) who found that among the 14-17 year old males in their<br />
Toronto sample, 4.2% <strong>of</strong> the students, 32.5% <strong>of</strong> those who left school, and<br />
60.3% <strong>of</strong> youth detainees reported having carried or carrying a gun in the<br />
past year. 10 The strongest predictor <strong>of</strong> gun violence among male students and<br />
detainees was gang fighting, while selling crack/cocaine was the strongest<br />
predictor <strong>of</strong> gun violence among those who left school. A similar survey <strong>of</strong><br />
14-17 year old girls in Toronto showed that among those who left school and<br />
detainees, 21.2% reported carrying a gun and 52.2% reported carrying a<br />
knife; 39.5% reported carrying a weapon (club/stick, knife or gun) as a result<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence experienced by them or others close to them (Erickson et al., 2006).<br />
As with the young men, gang fighting significantly increased the likelihood <strong>of</strong><br />
gun-related violence among young women; involvement in the drug market,<br />
however, did not (Erickson et al., 2006).<br />
Concentrations <strong>of</strong> Risk<br />
Research on urban violence shows that it is not randomly distributed; it is<br />
perpetrated and experienced by a small number <strong>of</strong> people, and concentrated<br />
in the areas <strong>of</strong> our cities that are the most vulnerable to economic hardship<br />
and social marginalization (see Fitzgerald, Wisener, & Savoie, 2004; Gannon,<br />
2006; Perreault, Savoie, & Bédard, 2008; Savoie, 2008; Savoie, Bedard, &<br />
Collins 2006). Furthermore, violence within and between gangs is far more<br />
prevalent than gang-related harms to the public (CISC, 2006; Chettleburgh,<br />
2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005).<br />
About 16% <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenders between the ages <strong>of</strong> 12 and 21 (inclusively) can be<br />
considered “chronic <strong>of</strong>fenders” (i.e., those with 5 or more incidents that led<br />
to a charge and a referral to court), and these individuals are responsible for<br />
nearly 60% <strong>of</strong> all court referrals for their age group (Carrington, Matarazzo,<br />
& deSousa, 2005). As previously mentioned, youth who identify being in a<br />
criminal gang also report significantly greater levels <strong>of</strong> criminal activity and<br />
violent <strong>of</strong>fending than non-gang-involved youth, as well as a greater levels <strong>of</strong><br />
10 These rates are higher than those <strong>of</strong> a male sample in Montreal, where 2.8%, 17.6% and 48.6% <strong>of</strong><br />
students, those who left school, and detainees, respectively, reported having carried or carrying a gun in<br />
the past year.<br />
victimization (Wortley & Tanner, 2004). CISC (2006) further contends that<br />
gun violence is much more prevalent among street gangs comprised mostly <strong>of</strong><br />
young men 30 years <strong>of</strong> age and under.<br />
Geo-coding exercises examining the relationships between the distribution <strong>of</strong><br />
crime and the socio-economic and demographic makeup <strong>of</strong> Canadian cities<br />
show that crime and violence tend to be concentrated in certain areas <strong>of</strong> our<br />
cities, and tend to be highest in neighbourhoods characterized by economic<br />
disadvantage, high mobility 11 and social disorganization 12 (see Fitzgerald,<br />
Wisener, & Savoie, 2004; Gannon, 2006; Savoie, 2008; Savoie, Bedard,<br />
& Collins 2006). A recent examination <strong>of</strong> the distribution <strong>of</strong> youth crime<br />
in Montreal shows that rates <strong>of</strong> violent crime among youth were higher in<br />
neighbourhoods characterized by a higher proportion <strong>of</strong> low-income earners,<br />
visible minorities, and residents lacking a high school diploma (Perreault,<br />
Savoie, & Bédard, 2008). Though geo-coding studies have certain important<br />
limitations 13 , it is fairly clear that some areas <strong>of</strong> our cities are more vulnerable<br />
to violence than others. Finally, as reported by CISC (2006), most gangs<br />
operate in distinct territories and most gang violence occurs in and around the<br />
low-income communities in which members live.<br />
It is difficult to obtain a complete and reliable picture <strong>of</strong> the location and<br />
distribution <strong>of</strong> gang-related violence in Toronto. There have not been any<br />
geo-coding exercises in Toronto, and current data sources are limited by<br />
various challenges. Nonetheless, a number <strong>of</strong> initiatives have contributed some<br />
information on Toronto neighbourhoods, and on their relative levels <strong>of</strong> gun<br />
and gang-related activity. In April 2004, the United Way <strong>of</strong> Greater Toronto<br />
(UWGT) and the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto created the Strong Neighbourhoods Task<br />
Force. The goal was to develop an action plan for neighbourhood revitalization<br />
in Toronto (UWGT, 2005). Its first task was to determine the areas <strong>of</strong> the city<br />
that were the least advantaged in terms <strong>of</strong> the quality <strong>of</strong> life <strong>of</strong> their residents<br />
(Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). Statistical information on the<br />
location and use <strong>of</strong> essential services and socio-demographic census data were<br />
used to determine levels <strong>of</strong> neighbourhood need (UWGT, 2005).<br />
11 “Mobility” refers to the percentage <strong>of</strong> the population in a neighbourhood living at another residence one<br />
year prior to the Census (Fitzgerald, Wisener, & Savoie, 2004). American research has linked “residential<br />
mobility” with higher crime rates through reduced guardianship and/or local social involvement<br />
(Sampson, 1993).<br />
12 “<strong>Social</strong> disorganization” refers to a decrease in the influence <strong>of</strong> social rules over behaviour, taken from the<br />
work <strong>of</strong> Sampson (1993) and Sampson & Lauritsen (1994).<br />
13 Geo-coding studies rely solely on incidents recorded by the police, raising some concern around issues <strong>of</strong><br />
underreporting and <strong>of</strong> police bias. Second, it is unclear whether we would witness significantly different<br />
patterns in “homicide” if that variable was disaggregated to reflect different types <strong>of</strong> homicide, such as<br />
gang-related homicide versus spousal and domestic homicide, for example.
98 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 99<br />
Around the same time, in March <strong>of</strong> 2004, Mayor Miller announced his<br />
Community Safety Plan which emphasized neighbourhood-level actions to<br />
address gun and gang violence among youth (Community Safety Secretariat,<br />
2004). Based on available data, the City designated 13 <strong>of</strong> its neighbourhoods<br />
as “priority neighbourhoods” on the basis <strong>of</strong> their “high needs” in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
gun violence, social and economic disadvantage, and poor access to services<br />
(Community Safety Secretariat, 2004). 14 That said, there are some concerns<br />
regarding the methodology used to identify and select these “13 priority<br />
neighbourhoods”. The City was unable to obtain the cooperation <strong>of</strong> the Toronto<br />
Police Service in gaining access to information on incidents <strong>of</strong> gun and gangrelated<br />
violence within the city, so they had to rely on an inventory <strong>of</strong> media<br />
accounts <strong>of</strong> the location and nature <strong>of</strong> gun crimes in Toronto (IPC, 2007).<br />
This raises important concerns regarding possible media misrepresentation<br />
and/or selection bias, and makes it more difficult to assess the validity <strong>of</strong> the<br />
City’s designation <strong>of</strong> these “priority neighbourhoods”.<br />
Finally, in January <strong>of</strong> 2006, following the high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile shooting death <strong>of</strong><br />
bystander Jane Creba, a Tri-Level Committee on Guns and Violence was formed,<br />
comprised <strong>of</strong> senior representatives from the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto, the Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ontario and the Federal Government (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &<br />
Fraser, 2008). This included the creation <strong>of</strong> the Tri-Level Indicators Group<br />
(TLIG) to bring together local, provincial and federal data to obtain a better<br />
picture <strong>of</strong> the quality <strong>of</strong> life within the 13 priority neighbourhoods and to<br />
chart progress in addressing the “risk factors” for crime and violence within<br />
them (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). The indicators they used<br />
included the number <strong>of</strong> youth involved in gangs, youth convictions for violent<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences and drug <strong>of</strong>fences, school drop-out rates and literacy rates, youth<br />
unemployment, family income, and the number <strong>of</strong> youth involved in sports,<br />
recreation and volunteer activities (see TLIG, 2006).<br />
The TLIG (2006) data show that 4,511 City <strong>of</strong> Toronto youth under the<br />
age <strong>of</strong> 18 were admitted to secure pre-trial detention, secure custody, and<br />
community supervision (i.e. probation) during the 2004-2005 fiscal year. 15<br />
More importantly:<br />
• 2,332 (51.7%) <strong>of</strong> them resided in the “13 priority neighbourhoods”, where<br />
2,179 lived in the other 127 neighbourhoods <strong>of</strong> the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto;<br />
14 Visit http://www.torontopaye.ca/PriorityAreas.pdf for a map <strong>of</strong> the 13 priority neighbourhoods.<br />
15 Information on youth admissions and “gang alerts” was generated by the Youth Offender Information<br />
Tracking System maintained by the Youth Justice Services <strong>of</strong> the Ontario Ministry <strong>of</strong> Children and Youth<br />
Services (Tri-Level Indicators Group, 2006).<br />
• 45 youth from the priority neighbourhoods were identified by police or<br />
correctional staff with a “gang alert”, compared to 35 youth from the other<br />
127 neighbourhoods; and<br />
• 231 youth from the priority neighbourhoods were admitted for violent<br />
and/or weapons/firearms <strong>of</strong>fences in contrast to 299 for the rest <strong>of</strong><br />
the City.<br />
This information suggests that when compared to the 127 other neighbourhoods<br />
in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto, the “13 priority neighbourhoods” account for a<br />
disproportionate amount <strong>of</strong> Toronto’s young <strong>of</strong>fenders, “gang alerts”, and<br />
youth committing violent and/or weapons/firearm <strong>of</strong>fences. Though <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
data such as these are always subject to limitations <strong>of</strong> bias and subjectivity,<br />
they are consistent with other findings that violence is disproportionately<br />
perpetrated and experienced by a relatively small number <strong>of</strong> people and is<br />
concentrated in certain areas <strong>of</strong> our cities.<br />
Making Sense <strong>of</strong> Gun and Gang Violence Among<br />
Youth and Young Adults in Recent Times<br />
Gang members in Canada come from a variety <strong>of</strong> ethnic, demographic and<br />
socio-economic backgrounds (Chettleburgh, 2003; CISC, 2006). However,<br />
the majority <strong>of</strong> gang members seem to come from groups that suffer from<br />
the greatest levels <strong>of</strong> inequality, disadvantage, and social marginalization<br />
(Chettleburgh, 2003; CISC, 2006; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). Canadian<br />
research shows that some <strong>of</strong> these youth have been exposed to violence since<br />
childhood, and many are struggling with mental health and substance abuse<br />
problems. Their motivation for joining a street gang can range from seeking<br />
money to looking for prestige, protection, and a sense <strong>of</strong> belonging (Dorais<br />
& Corriveau, 2006; Totten, 2000; Wortley & Tanner, 2005; as well as the<br />
articles by Corriveau and Totten in this volume). Gun and gang violence<br />
among youth and young adults should therefore be considered in the con<strong>text</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> the socio-economic conditions and structural arrangements that influence<br />
the lives <strong>of</strong> young people, and on the social con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> gun and gang violence<br />
among youth and young adults.<br />
The Attributes <strong>of</strong> (Dis)Affiliation<br />
In his work on issues relating to social cohesion, crime and insecurity, Castel<br />
(1995) identifies a continuum <strong>of</strong> social integration that is based on measures<br />
<strong>of</strong> social affiliation along two axes: (1) work, and the economic position<br />
associated with it; and (2) social relations, meaning one’s interaction with –
100 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 101<br />
and level <strong>of</strong> attachment to – others, and to mainstream society groups and<br />
institutions (see Graph 1).<br />
Graph 1. Continuum <strong>of</strong> <strong>Social</strong> Integration<br />
Adapted from Janhevich, Bania, & Hastings (2008).<br />
Castel (1995) argues that in our current global capitalist economy, one’s status<br />
within society is increasingly determined by the attributes attached to “work”,<br />
and less by other aspects <strong>of</strong> identity such as heritage and family history. At the<br />
same time, the very nature <strong>of</strong> the post-industrial, global capitalist economy<br />
has led to increasingly problematic relations to “work”. These are manifested<br />
by (Castel, 1995):<br />
1. A destabilization <strong>of</strong> the “middle-class” due to the increasing difficulty <strong>of</strong><br />
obtaining a full-time, permanent salaried position and the certainty and<br />
stability that come along with this.<br />
2. The emergence <strong>of</strong> a certain “peripheral” group caught in a cycle <strong>of</strong> shortterm<br />
and unstable part-time minimum wage jobs or welfare dependence,<br />
either because they are too old or not skilled enough for training but too<br />
young to retire, or because they are youth who are under or over qualified<br />
for the work that is available to them; and<br />
3. A deficit <strong>of</strong> “spots” within the mainstream social structure associated with<br />
social usefulness and public recognition.<br />
Castel (1995) insists that those most affected are youth, especially the less<br />
educated and non-skilled youth and young adults who have fewer options for<br />
integration into the labour market. The decline in manufacturing industries<br />
and in “good” working class jobs (i.e., secure and unionized jobs), affects them<br />
the most (Castel, 1995; see FitzGerald, Stockdale, & Hale, 2003; Websdale,<br />
2001). Many are left with “McJobs” (Ritter & Anker, 2002) as their only<br />
option – those unstable, low-paying service sector jobs that promise very little<br />
in the way <strong>of</strong> career development or advancement. This lack <strong>of</strong> integration<br />
into the workforce can result in disqualification for civic/political integration<br />
and for broader social integration (Castel, 1995). When combined with other<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> social marginalization, such as a lack <strong>of</strong> meaningful ties with family<br />
and friends, discrimination based on gender, race/ethnicity, ability, and/or the<br />
stigma <strong>of</strong> having been in conflict with the law (see Davies & Tanner, 2003),<br />
some youth and young adults are left with a sense <strong>of</strong> exclusion and pessimism<br />
about the future (Chettleburgh, 2007; Totten, 2000; Wortley & Tanner,<br />
2005). Castel (1995) calls this group the “surnuméraires”, the “excess baggage”<br />
who may seek prosperity and stability, but who are stuck in a social “no man’s<br />
land” and are doubtful that it is achievable. Given their lack <strong>of</strong> integration<br />
into the workforce and into mainstream society, these youth <strong>of</strong>ten give up on<br />
traditional means <strong>of</strong> “success” and adopt survival strategies that are based in<br />
the present, on living “day to day” (Castel, 1995).<br />
There are indications that the economic position and sense <strong>of</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong><br />
certain groups have been getting relatively worse in Canada, and that this may<br />
influence involvement in gangs. Canada is experiencing growing inequality<br />
with increasing disparity between high and low-income families (Heisz,<br />
2005). Young men in Canada have felt this income inequality most acutely,<br />
despite general increases in educational attainment for this group (Beaujot<br />
& Kerr, 2007). The relative economic position <strong>of</strong> men aged 16-29 years in<br />
Canada has declined over the past twenty years both in terms <strong>of</strong> their rate <strong>of</strong><br />
full-time employment and in their earnings, while the economic position <strong>of</strong><br />
older men and <strong>of</strong> women <strong>of</strong> all ages has remained relatively stable (Beaujot<br />
& Kerr, 2007). There has also been an increase in the spatial polarization <strong>of</strong><br />
low-income families into distinct neighbourhoods (Heisz, 2005). In Toronto,<br />
the number <strong>of</strong> higher poverty neighbourhoods increased dramatically over<br />
the past twenty years (from 30 in 1981 to 120 in 2001), and “poor” families<br />
are increasingly concentrated in neighbourhoods with a high proportion <strong>of</strong><br />
families living in poverty (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). There has also been a
102 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 103<br />
60% increase in the number <strong>of</strong> youth living in higher poverty neighbourhoods<br />
over the twenty-year period from 1981-2001 (UWGT & CCSD, 2004).<br />
Furthermore, 87-90% <strong>of</strong> the employable population in “very high” to “high”<br />
poverty neighbourhoods in Toronto are working, compared to 93% for the<br />
rest <strong>of</strong> the city (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). The high poverty levels in these<br />
communities are likely linked to residents having less stable and lower-paying<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> part-time work (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). This is despite evidence<br />
that the percentage <strong>of</strong> residents in Toronto’s “higher” poverty neighbourhoods<br />
without a high school diploma dropped from 46.5% in 1991 to 33% in 2001<br />
(UWGT & CCSD, 2004). Within this spatial polarization, there is also an<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> ghettoization <strong>of</strong> visible minority “poor” (Heisz, 2005; Hou & Picot,<br />
2003). Visible minority families now account for 77.5% <strong>of</strong> the total “poor”<br />
family population in higher poverty neighbourhoods in Toronto, compared to<br />
37.4% in 1981 (UWGT & CCSD, 2004). Finally, there is evidence that black<br />
men living in Toronto’s predominantly black neighbourhoods are more likely<br />
to be unemployed than any other group living in an ethnic enclave (Hou &<br />
Picot, 2003). 16<br />
Link to Gang Involvement and Violence<br />
Castel (1995) argues that those who feel the least connected to a valuable<br />
and valued role in the economy, the lowest sense <strong>of</strong> attachment to others,<br />
and the most pessimistic about their chances for improving their situation<br />
in the future (i.e., those in the lower left quadrant <strong>of</strong> Graph 1) are the most<br />
likely to <strong>of</strong>fend, as well as most likely to become chronic <strong>of</strong>fenders. Relative<br />
economic deprivation and social marginalization have indeed been linked to<br />
gang membership. Gangs are seen as a “fast-track” to the material goods and<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> belonging some disaffiliated youth crave (see Chettleburgh, 2007;<br />
Decker, 2004; Sutherland, 1947). These themes were prominent in Wortley<br />
and Tanner’s (2005) Toronto Street Gang Pilot Project, a series <strong>of</strong> 102 face-t<strong>of</strong>ace<br />
interviews with Toronto youth (aged 16-24 years) who have been identified<br />
(or self-identified) as being part <strong>of</strong> a gang:<br />
We made lots <strong>of</strong> money sellin drugs and stealin and ripping people <strong>of</strong>f.<br />
I got to buy stuff I could not get with no job at McDonalds (21-yearold<br />
male).<br />
16 “Ethnic enclaves” are defined as census tracts with at least 30% <strong>of</strong> the population from a single visible<br />
minority group (Hou & Picot, 2003).<br />
Nobody respects some guy flippin burgers or wearing some stupid ref<br />
shirt at Foot Locker. I make real cheddar in the gang, we are our own<br />
bosses, and we get plenty more respect from people cause <strong>of</strong> money we<br />
got… (22-year-old male).<br />
It’s like us against the world. We respect each other, support each other.<br />
Nobody in the outside world helps, or cares, so it is up to us. That’s it<br />
man. Family (20-year-old male).<br />
What chance has a guy like me got in the real world. A poor black guy?<br />
… teachers don’t think you can do the work. Nobody’s gonna give me<br />
a job. So I’ll get paid and live in another way, in another world where<br />
I get respect and nobody cares what I look like or where I come from.<br />
I know I’ll probably die young or go to jail, but what other chance is<br />
there? (22-year-old male).<br />
The competition for limited resources, pr<strong>of</strong>itable markets and social status<br />
that emerges within a climate <strong>of</strong> deprivation and exclusion has further been<br />
linked to gun violence in urban centres (see Daly & Wilson, 1988 and 1997).<br />
Research reveals that acts <strong>of</strong> “strategic” or “instrumental” violence, such as<br />
those relating to heists and robbery, tend to occur in the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> competition<br />
for material wealth, whereas more “tactical” or “expressive” forms <strong>of</strong> gunrelated<br />
violence, such as homicide, occur mostly in the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> competition<br />
for social status (Wilson & Daly, 1985).<br />
Imagining a Better Response to Gun and Gang<br />
Violence Among Youth and Young Adults<br />
The most common response to youth violence, and especially in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence perpetrated by members <strong>of</strong> youth gangs, is suppression by the<br />
criminal justice system (Chettleburgh, 2007; Wortley & Tanner, 2005).<br />
These responses focus on identifying persistent <strong>of</strong>fenders and aggressively<br />
enforcing laws as they apply to these individuals (Chettleburgh, 2007).<br />
Critics suggest that these enforcement strategies alone have little effect on<br />
rates <strong>of</strong> crime and victimization, and can lead to unintended consequences<br />
and counter-productive impacts on individuals and communities, including:<br />
increasing the cohesiveness <strong>of</strong> a neighbourhood gang and its attractiveness<br />
to vulnerable youth in the face <strong>of</strong> high pr<strong>of</strong>ile and aggressive police activity;<br />
undermining the reputation and legitimacy <strong>of</strong> the police when few arrests<br />
actually turn into serious charges; and creating a damaging cycle <strong>of</strong> release<br />
and imprisonment <strong>of</strong> young adults, especially young males (Chettleburgh,
104 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 105<br />
2007; Decker, 2004; United Nations, 2006; Wortley & Tanner, 2005). That<br />
is not to say that there is no role for enforcement. When the emphasis is<br />
placed on neighbourhood level problem-solving and coordination between<br />
criminal justice and other agencies, reductions in gang-related crime and<br />
violence can occur (see Braga & Kennedy, 2002). However, these benefits are<br />
likely to be temporary unless the structural con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> the underlying problem<br />
is addressed.<br />
This has led to increasing attention to “the promise <strong>of</strong> prevention” and to a<br />
shift to the “community” as a new partner in prevention initiatives (Cohen,<br />
1985; Crawford, 1998; Garland, 2001; Hastings & Jamieson, 2001; Hughes,<br />
2007; Jamieson, 2008). The focus in Canada has been placed mainly on<br />
Crime Prevention Through <strong>Social</strong> Development (CPSD) initiatives that seek<br />
to address the factors that place young people at “risk”, and enhance the factors<br />
that can provide some protection or resiliency to individuals, families and<br />
communities (see Birbeck, 2005; Hastings, 1998).<br />
There are three main variants <strong>of</strong> CPSD, as identified by Hastings (1998):<br />
• the developmental approach: focused on addressing the individual risk<br />
factors associated with persistent <strong>of</strong>fenders;<br />
• the community approach: focused on local problem-solving through<br />
mobilization and partnerships; and<br />
• the social approach: focused on addressing and reducing patterns <strong>of</strong><br />
stress, inequality and relative deprivation.<br />
In Canada, the focus has largely been on developmental and community<br />
approaches to crime prevention (see Birkbeck, 2005; National Crime<br />
Prevention Council, 1997; National Crime Prevention Centre, 2007).<br />
However, investment in prevention initiatives pales in comparison to the<br />
ever-expanding resources going towards the suppression <strong>of</strong> gang violence in<br />
Canada through enforcement. The policies and practices that have emerged<br />
in the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto since 2004 are but one example.<br />
In Toronto, Mayor Miller introduced the Community Safety Plan (CSP)<br />
in 2004 in an attempt to “balance” criminal justice responses with a<br />
more “preventive” approach (Miller, 2004, p. 1). The primary focus <strong>of</strong><br />
the Plan was youth violence, particularly guns and gangs within the<br />
13 priority neighbourhoods. The CSP is coordinated by the Community<br />
Safety Secretariat and overseen by the Mayor’s Panel on Community<br />
Safety. In 2004, the Panel’s membership included the Mayor, two city<br />
councillors, three provincial government ministers, the federal minister<br />
for infrastructure and communities, the chairs <strong>of</strong> the two school boards<br />
as well as a youth and a community representative (Community Safety<br />
Secretariat, 2004). The main goals were to create positive opportunities<br />
for marginalized youth who live in the 13 priority neighbourhoods and to<br />
strengthen neighbourhoods through problem-solving partnerships under the<br />
guise <strong>of</strong> Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs) (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina,<br />
& Fraser, 2008).<br />
The NATs focus on integrating City service planning and delivery from a<br />
neighbourhood perspective (Toronto Community Housing, 2006). They<br />
describe their priorities as: increasing the equitable participation <strong>of</strong> racialized<br />
(and especially African-Canadian) youth by identifying and reducing<br />
systemic barriers; creating and maintaining safe spaces that support healthy<br />
youth development; providing meaningful youth engagement opportunities<br />
that build resilience; and harmonizing standards and policies in City service<br />
delivery as it pertains to youth (Toronto Community Housing, 2006).<br />
Building on the Community Safety Plan, the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto launched the<br />
Making a Safe City Safer strategy in 2007. It focuses on five key areas: (1)<br />
gun control, (2) victims <strong>of</strong> violence, witnesses and their families, (3) violence<br />
against young women and girls, (4) the youth justice sector, and (5) skills<br />
development, training and employment (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &<br />
Fraser, 2008; Miller, 2008). Also, in January <strong>of</strong> 2006, in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the<br />
shooting death <strong>of</strong> Jane Creba, all three orders <strong>of</strong> government came together<br />
to form the Tri-Level Committee on Guns and Violence (IPC, 2007). The aim<br />
was to bring together various representatives from the City <strong>of</strong> Toronto, the<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> Ontario and the federal government to share information and<br />
resources relating to the challenges posed by youth gangs in Toronto (IPC,<br />
2007). Other than the ongoing work <strong>of</strong> the Tri-Level Indicators Group, which<br />
was previously discussed, very little information is available on the progress or<br />
other activities <strong>of</strong> this Committee.<br />
Both the provincial and federal governments have invested funds in<br />
various developmental and social approaches in Toronto since then, mostly<br />
geared towards improving skills training and job opportunities for youth.<br />
These include:<br />
• The Ontario Youth Challenge Fund, created in February 2006 with $15<br />
million towards funding <strong>of</strong> local training and job programs for at-risk youth<br />
in Toronto’s 13 priority neighbourhoods (Office <strong>of</strong> the Premier, 2006); and
106 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 107<br />
• The Youth Opportunities Strategy, launched in 2006 to provide funding for<br />
800 summer jobs for youth from Toronto’s priority neighbourhoods, youth<br />
outreach workers, and a school-based prevention and diversion program<br />
to keep at-risk youth in school (Ontario Ministry <strong>of</strong> Children and Youth<br />
Services, 2007).<br />
At the federal level, an $11.1 million Youth Gang Prevention Fund was<br />
established in January 2007. Housed within the National Crime Prevention<br />
Centre, the fund was created to provide financial support to community<br />
level programs across Canada that address individual, family, school and<br />
community “risk and protective factors” associated with youth violence and<br />
gang membership; programs that work with youth to help them exit gangs;<br />
and programs that provide ex-gang members with the support needed to avoid<br />
returning to the gang lifestyle. Much <strong>of</strong> the focus is on equipping Canadian<br />
youth with the supports they need to resist joining or returning to gangs<br />
(Public Safety Canada, 2007).<br />
However, the money invested in these initiatives does not compare to the<br />
ever-expanding resources going towards the suppression <strong>of</strong> gang violence in<br />
Toronto. For example, in 2005, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) announced<br />
the new Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), which included<br />
the hiring <strong>of</strong> 450 new police <strong>of</strong>ficers (TPS, 2008). In January <strong>of</strong> 2006, the<br />
province <strong>of</strong> Ontario announced an additional 150 <strong>of</strong>ficers for TAVIS and<br />
another $5 million in annual funding over 3 years. The province has also<br />
spent $26 million towards the creation and implementation <strong>of</strong> a new state<strong>of</strong>-the-art<br />
Operations Centre for a provincially-led Anti-Guns and Gangs Task<br />
Force in Toronto that brings police and prosecutors together under one ro<strong>of</strong><br />
(Ministry <strong>of</strong> the Attorney General, 2005; Office <strong>of</strong> the Premier, 2007).<br />
In contrast, Toronto’s Community Safety Secretariat is comprised <strong>of</strong> one Project<br />
Manager and a few staff (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). A large<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the Secretariat’s work therefore involves seeking and securing funds<br />
and resources (both human and material) from other orders <strong>of</strong> government,<br />
community partners and the private sector, including for programs and projects<br />
conducted under the Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs). Though the<br />
Secretariat has had some success in leveraging resources, long-term funding<br />
and sustainability remain a great concern (see Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, &<br />
Fraser, 2008).<br />
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the nature and quality <strong>of</strong> the<br />
relationship between the Community Safety Plan and the Toronto Police Service,<br />
or the extent to which the activities <strong>of</strong> one take into account the planning<br />
and activities <strong>of</strong> the other. The fact that the City has not yet been successful<br />
in obtaining crime and violence data from the TPS for its planning exercises<br />
points to a serious gap in collaboration and coordination. The same can be<br />
said for the various prevention initiatives being introduced in Toronto by<br />
different orders <strong>of</strong> government. There are indications that consultations and<br />
collaboration are not taking place (IPC, 2007), which leads to serious concerns<br />
regarding the comprehensiveness and integration <strong>of</strong> various prevention efforts<br />
within the city.<br />
What we are left with, then, is a social problem in need <strong>of</strong> a broad-based<br />
and well-coordinated solution that includes mechanisms to address and relieve<br />
the inequality caused by our social, economic and political arrangements, but<br />
that is dealt with mainly through criminal justice and enforcement (Hastings,<br />
2003; Websdale, 2001).<br />
Conclusion<br />
Developmental prevention policies and programs for marginalized youth are<br />
unlikely to make a significant difference – and could even accentuate the<br />
frustration – if current labour market conditions are not addressed (Castel,<br />
1995). What is the use <strong>of</strong> encouraging youth to “maximize their potential”<br />
or <strong>of</strong> spending resources on preparing them for the workforce if they are<br />
unlikely to find adequate employment? Similarly, placing a focus on the<br />
dynamics within neighbourhoods fails to acknowledge the broader sociopolitical<br />
and economic factors (i.e., lack <strong>of</strong> affordable housing, poverty, (un)<br />
employment, racism, exclusion, etc.) that are beyond the jurisdiction and<br />
control <strong>of</strong> local “communities”, but that play a significant role in challenges<br />
<strong>of</strong> crime and safety (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1998; Hastings & Jamieson,<br />
2001; Hughes, 2007). In this sense, we may be setting the “community”<br />
up to fail, and setting the stage for increased frustration and resentment<br />
(Hastings & Jamieson, 2001).<br />
If we are serious about addressing the issue <strong>of</strong> gang involvement and violence<br />
among youth and young adults, we need a comprehensive, coordinated approach<br />
that addresses underlying issues <strong>of</strong> child poverty, inadequate housing, barriers<br />
to education, unemployment, mental health, racism and discrimination. The<br />
recent Review <strong>of</strong> the Roots <strong>of</strong> Youth Violence report, prepared for the Province<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ontario and released in November <strong>of</strong> 2008, reiterates this (see Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ontario, 2008).
108 IPC Review 3 Gang Violence Among Youth and Young Adults 109<br />
Why, then, do we continue to rely on all other types <strong>of</strong> strategies that focus<br />
mainly on criminal justice and individual level “risk factors”? Ryan (1976)<br />
argues that “blaming the victim” in this way serves to justify action that is<br />
designed to change society’s “victim” and its “symptoms” rather than society<br />
itself. Hastings (1998 and 2007) argues that we <strong>of</strong>ten start with solutions<br />
that protect our vested interests, then work backwards to legitimize them.<br />
Developmental and community streams <strong>of</strong> crime prevention are “safe”,<br />
tangible responses, but we end up with what organizations and communities<br />
are willing and able to do with their limited resources, rather than what needs<br />
to be done (Hastings, 1998 and 2007).<br />
In this sense, our current political responses remain largely expressive and<br />
focused on managing public perceptions and expectations, rather than on<br />
responding adequately to the complexities <strong>of</strong> the issue at hand (Cohen, 1985;<br />
Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Jones, 2003). A shift to a more comprehensive,<br />
equitable and long-term solution requires greater awareness <strong>of</strong> the complexities<br />
surrounding issues <strong>of</strong> crime and safety, and the political will to tackle these<br />
issues head on. It also requires more access to the knowledge, skills and<br />
resources to accomplish what needs to be done, as opposed to expending<br />
resources on “solutions” that can be done within our current mindset and<br />
budgets (Hastings, 1998). A more effective response to the challenges posed by<br />
youth involvement in gangs in Canada begins with the tools and data needed<br />
to study this phenomenon more appropriately. This includes developing clear<br />
and measurable indicators to help guide our objectives, target our efforts, and<br />
serve as benchmarks for assessing our success.<br />
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whoWeHelp/reports/strongNeighbourhoods.php
Volume 3: pages 117–134<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
La violence dans l’univers<br />
des gangs : du besoin de<br />
protection à la construction<br />
identitaire masculine 1<br />
Patrice Corriveau<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>esseur adjoint au département de criminologie<br />
Université d’Ottawa<br />
Abstract<br />
Violence and anti-social behaviour are not the only components within the<br />
dynamics <strong>of</strong> street gangs. That said, the use <strong>of</strong> violence in the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
gangs seems to be trivialized, encouraged by peers, and to some extent<br />
institutionalized through the violent initiation rituals involved in becoming<br />
a full gang member. This article will examine how the violence perpetrated<br />
by youth as part <strong>of</strong> their association with a gang is in many respects a<br />
fundamental aspect <strong>of</strong> their social relations, given their struggle for wider<br />
social integration and recognition. To do so, we first deal with the different<br />
approaches developed by researchers to explain violence in gangs. Next,<br />
we examine the reasons why some youth may turn to gangs and examine<br />
factors that may affect the level <strong>of</strong> violence surrounding their participation.<br />
Three such reasons will be addressed: the feeling <strong>of</strong> exclusion, the need<br />
for protection, and the search for a male identity. Finally, options to<br />
improve preventive interventions in order to tackle both this violence and<br />
the emergence <strong>of</strong> gangs will be explored, focusing on social rather than<br />
individual-level interventions.<br />
1 Un grand merci mes collègues Jean-François Cauchie et Michel Dorais pour leur relecture et conseils,<br />
de même qu’à Ross Hastings pour m’avoir incité à m’intéresser à cette facette des gangs de rue. Merci<br />
finalement aux évaluateurs pour leurs judicieux commentaires.
118 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 119<br />
Résumé<br />
La violence et les comportements anti-sociaux ne sont pas constitutifs<br />
des gangs de rue. En revanche, l’usage de la violence y semble banalisée,<br />
encouragée par les pairs et institutionnalisée dans une certaine mesure par<br />
l’entremise des rituels initiatiques pour devenir membre à part entière du<br />
gang. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous étudierons en quoi cette violence<br />
des jeunes perpétrée dans le cadre de leur association au gang (et non aux<br />
actes individuels de violence) est à plusieurs égards fondatrice de liens<br />
sociaux pour ces jeunes en difficulté d’intégration et de reconnaissances<br />
sociales. Pour se faire, nous aborderons tout d’abord les différentes<br />
approches développées par les chercheurs afin d’expliquer la violence au<br />
sein des gangs pour ensuite nous attarder aux raisons qui incitent un jeune<br />
à se tourner vers un gang et qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur le niveau de<br />
violence entourant son adhésion. Trois d’entre elles seront spécifiquement<br />
examinées : à savoir le sentiment d’exclusion, le besoin de protection et la<br />
quête d’une identité masculine. Finalement, quelques pistes de réflexion<br />
seront exposées en vue d’améliorer les interventions préventives pour<br />
faire face à cette violence et à l’émergence des gangs, lesquelles mettent<br />
l’accent sur des actions globalisantes et sociales plutôt qu’à des prises en<br />
charge individualisante.<br />
Introduction<br />
La violence est-elle constitutive des gangs de rue? Et quand bien même y seraitelle<br />
présente, peut-on la limiter à l’univers des gangs? N’est-elle pas par ailleurs<br />
fondatrice de liens sociaux et autres formes de reconnaissance et d’intégration?<br />
Médias et dirigeants politiques soulignent régulièrement la violence des<br />
gangs de rue, ces derniers étant devenus à leurs yeux le premier vecteur de la<br />
violence urbaine et de l’insécurité dans nos quartiers. Nul ne saurait nier que<br />
les gangs de rue soient impliqués dans plusieurs formes de violence et actes<br />
jugés anti-sociaux, ne serait-ce que par la nature de certaines de leurs activités<br />
délictueuses, comme le proxénétisme ou le trafic de drogue par exemple. Et<br />
bien que la violence et les comportements anti-sociaux ne soient pas l’apanage<br />
des gangs – la violence ayant toujours été associée à la jeunesse en général, les<br />
jeunes garçons plus particulièrement (Muchembled, 2008), il n’en demeure<br />
pas moins que le gang de rue apparaît comme un environnement où la violence<br />
est banalisée, voire encouragée par les pairs et qu’à cet égard, les gangs de rue<br />
se différencient des simples ‘bandes d’amis’ par exemple (Stretesky et Pogrebin,<br />
2007). Nombreuses sont d’ailleurs les recherches qui soulignent que les gangs<br />
de rue sont plus enclins à commettre des crimes et délits violents que les jeunes<br />
en général, y compris ceux qui y sont épisodiquement associés (Gordon et al.,<br />
2004; Thornberry et al., 1993; White et Manson, 2006).<br />
Or, étudier et comprendre les liens qui unissent les gangs de rue à la violence<br />
n’est pas si évident qu’il n’y parait de prime abord. D’une part, le concept<br />
de violence est en soi difficile à cerner, la violence des uns n’équivalant pas<br />
toujours à celle des autres. Alors que certains estiment que les simples gestes<br />
d’intimidation d’un gang dans un quartier constituent une forme de violence,<br />
pour d’autres, la violence correspond ni plus ni moins aux actes criminels<br />
commis par les protagonistes. 2 Plusieurs études sont ainsi venues montrer<br />
que les activités délictueuses et la violence demeurent proportionnellement<br />
minimes dans l’ensemble des activités d’un gang de rue, Sanchez-Jankowski<br />
(1991 et 1994) et Spergel (1995) affirmant même que la « criminalité » des gangs<br />
demeure peu fréquente et que seul un faible pourcentage des jeunes membres<br />
de gangs de rue aboutit à une criminalité sévère et soutenue (Spergel, 1995).<br />
D’autre part, il n’existe aucun consensus entourant la définition de ce qu’est<br />
un gang de rue et sur les individus qui le composent. 3 Le phénomène des<br />
gangs, son membership et la nature des activités qui en découlent, notamment<br />
l’usage de la violence, sont fluides, labiles (Dorais et Corriveau, 2009; Hamel,<br />
Cousineau et Vézina, 2008). Qui plus est, « si la criminalité et la délinquance<br />
représentent ce qui les distingueraient le plus des autres types de gangs (bandes<br />
d’amis, compagnons de travail, etc.), on constate, dans les faits, que ce n’est<br />
pas si facile de les départager entre eux » (Perreault, 2005a, p. 58), des groupes<br />
perçus comme in<strong>of</strong>fensifs (une bande d’amis par exemple) pouvant tout aussi<br />
bien commettre des actes très violents et criminalisables. Comme le signalent<br />
Sanchez-Jankonski (1991) ainsi que White et Mason (2006), la plupart<br />
des adolescents, qu’ils fassent partie d’un gang ou non, s’engagent dans des<br />
activités similaires, notamment les actes de violence. Il est par ailleurs difficile<br />
de déterminer si les actes de violence ou d’incivilité reprochés ont été perpétrés<br />
dans le cadre des activités du gang, et non à titre individuel. Par exemple,<br />
comment savoir si une bagarre entre deux jeunes découle de leur appartenance à<br />
un gang et non d’un quelconque malentendu, comme cela arrive fréquemment<br />
durant l’adolescence?<br />
2 Pour une excellente réflexion sur la violence et la violence des jeunes plus particulièrement, voir Mucchielli,<br />
2004, 2006 et 2008.<br />
3 Voir notamment Covey, Menard et Franzese, 1992; Howell, 1994; Parks, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Ball et<br />
Curry, 1995; Decker et Van Winkle, 1996; Shelden, Tracy et Brown, 1996; Hamel et al., 1998; Sanchez-<br />
Jankowski, 2003; Perreault, 2005a; Sullivan, 2005; White, 2008.
120 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 121<br />
Dans le cadre de cet article, nous nous restreindrons à étudier la violence des<br />
jeunes perpétrée dans le cadre de leur association au gang (et non aux actes<br />
individuels de violence), c’est-à-dire la violence telle qu’elle est instrumentalisée<br />
(voire institutionnalisée) par le groupe. Par gang, nous désignerons, dans un<br />
but heuristique et à l’instar de Sullivan (2005), un regroupement d’individus<br />
partageant des codes et des règles de conduites relativement bien définis, et des<br />
signes et des symboles distinctifs qui viennent montrer leur appartenance au<br />
groupe. Le gang possède également un leadership apparent. Mais, afin de les<br />
distinguer des groupes sportifs et autres ‘bandes d’amis’, nous suivons Sullivan<br />
(2005) en reconnaissant un engagement dans la commission d’actes illégaux,<br />
considérés ici comme violence (commerce de drogue, proxénétisme, taxage<br />
scolaire, etc.). En ce sens, nous sommes conscients que ces différentes variables,<br />
qui nous aident à concevoir ce qu’est un gang, varient à la fois dans le temps, selon<br />
les circonstances et d’un gang à un autre. Néanmoins, cette définition générale<br />
nous aide à mieux saisir les diverses fonctions jouées par la violence à l’intérieur de<br />
ces gangs. Tout d’abord, nous examinerons brièvement les différentes approches<br />
développées par les chercheurs pour expliquer la violence au sein des gangs.<br />
Ensuite, nous présenterons certaines fonctions que semble jouer la violence dans<br />
l’univers du gang pour finalement, en guise de conclusion, exposer quelques<br />
pistes de réflexion en vue d’améliorer les interventions préventives pour faire<br />
face à cette violence et à l’émergence des gangs.<br />
Quelques approches explicatives de<br />
la violence dans l’univers des gangs<br />
Lorsqu’il est question d’aborder la question de la violence au sein des gangs,<br />
différentes théories sont avancées par les chercheurs. 4 Pour les uns, si la<br />
violence est prédominante dans l’univers des gangs c’est essentiellement parce<br />
que ces regroupements d’individus sont constitués de jeunes délinquants<br />
(Gerrard, 1964; Yablonsky, 1962). Ainsi, les membres d’un gang seraient<br />
« par nature » violents, et c’est pour cette raison qu’ils sont recrutés par les<br />
gangs. Cette explication, on le conçoit bien, tient difficilement la route puisque<br />
partout où le phénomène des gangs de rue est avéré en Occident, ce sont<br />
systématiquement les gens issus des quartiers défavorisés qui en constituent le<br />
membership. Très peu à voir donc avec une quelconque nature criminelle ou<br />
délinquante. D’ailleurs, les premières études sur les gangs de l’École de Chicago<br />
dans les années 1920/30 ont très bien montré l’impact de la désorganisation<br />
sociale et de la pauvreté dans l’adhésion de certains jeunes à des gangs, le<br />
« problème » ne résidant pas dans la « nature » des gens qui peuplent ces zones<br />
de pauvreté mais plutôt dans les facteurs structurels (exclusion, chômage, etc.).<br />
Cloward et Ohlin (1960) considèrent pour leur part que c’est principalement<br />
la structure des opportunités (légitimes et illégitimes) des différents quartiers<br />
de la ville qui explique la présence grandissante de gangs dans les milieux<br />
urbains défavorisés.<br />
Poussant plus loin cette logique d’une « nature délictueuse », que l’on pourrait<br />
découvrir à l’aide de facteurs de risque, d’autres chercheurs considèrent que les<br />
nouveaux adhérents aux gangs sont recrutés en fonction de leur propension à<br />
commettre un jour des actes illégaux et violents, la structure du gang venant<br />
exacerber ce côté délinquant qu’ils auraient déjà en eux (Decker et Van Winkle,<br />
1996; Gordon et al., 2004). Ainsi, ces chercheurs s’attardent à montrer que<br />
les membres des gangs de rue sont, en règle générale, davantage criminalisés<br />
avant même de faire partie intégrante du gang et, qu’une fois dans le gang,<br />
ces activités violentes et criminelles s’intensifient (Gordon et al., 2004). Les<br />
effets de la socialisation des pairs et la transmission des valeurs du gang<br />
sont alors avancés pour expliquer cette recrudescence de violence et d’actes<br />
antisociaux. Intéressant à certains égards, notamment en ce qui a trait aux<br />
processus de socialisation, ces études négligent cependant le caractère subjectif<br />
du processus de criminalisation, c’est-à-dire que si les jeunes issus de certains<br />
milieux sont davantage criminalisés, c’est aussi parce que l’attention policière y<br />
est plus présente et soutenue que dans les autres quartiers non reconnus pour la<br />
présence de gangs. Car, faut-il le rappeler, près de 99% des Canadiens avouent<br />
avoir commis des actes réprimés par le Code criminel canadien (Gabor, 1994),<br />
une étude montréalaise soulignant également que près de 80% des 3000<br />
adolescents questionnés (toutes classes sociales confondues) ont admis avoir<br />
enfreint le Code criminel (LeBlanc, 1983).<br />
C’est en opposition avec ces visions essentialistes de la violence chez ces jeunes<br />
que d’autres chercheurs estiment que les membres des gangs ne sont pas<br />
différentiables des autres jeunes. C’est plutôt la culture (sous-culture) du gang<br />
qui les incitent à adhérer aux valeurs du gang, notamment l’usage de la violence<br />
pour se faire reconnaître, pour se défendre, pour gagner le respect de l’autre,<br />
pour imposer leur loi, etc. Évidemment, ce ne sont pas tous les jeunes issus des<br />
gangs qui adhéreront avec la même intensité à cette culture du gang, l’identité<br />
d’un jeune en tant qu’individu et membre d’un gang restant fluide, c’est-à-dire<br />
que « young people have multiple identifications, and can be simultaneously<br />
gang members and non-gang members » (White, 2008, p. 149). Certains s’y<br />
lanceront à fond et finiront peut-être par en faire une « carrière » délinquante<br />
au sens beckerien. Pour d’autres, le gang ne sera qu’une passade dans leur vie,<br />
laquelle leur aura permis de se découvrir et de se faire reconnaître par des pairs.<br />
4 Voir à ce sujet Sanchez-Jankowski, 2003; Thornberry et al. 1993.
122 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 123<br />
En d’autres termes, les raisons pour rejoindre un gang et s’y impliquer sont<br />
plurielles, circonstancielles et variables dans le temps et selon les individus. 5<br />
Parmi les nombreuses raisons qui incitent un jeune à se tourner vers un gang<br />
et qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur le niveau de violence entourant son<br />
adhésion, trois ont retenu notre attention suite aux entretiens réalisés auprès<br />
d’une cinquantaine d’intervenants sociaux, communautaires et policiers –<br />
essentiellement des villes de Québec et de Montréal, à savoir le sentiment<br />
d’exclusion, le besoin de protection et la quête d’une identité masculine (ces<br />
facteurs étant présents de façon variable et suivant différents degrés d’intensité<br />
selon les jeunes concernés). 6<br />
La formation d’un gang, un moyen<br />
de lutter contre l’exclusion<br />
Bien que multiples et complexes, les facteurs sociaux qui poussent les jeunes à<br />
intégrer un gang renvoient souvent à l’incapacité pour ces derniers de s’intégrer<br />
complètement à la société, que ce soit sur le marché du travail ou à l’école.<br />
Au Canada (comme aux États-Unis d’ailleurs), les gangs de rue se composent<br />
majoritairement de jeunes de familles issues de l’immigration ou encore de<br />
jeunes appartenant à des groupes minoritaires en difficulté d’intégration sociale<br />
et économique (pauvreté, con<strong>text</strong>e familial difficile, exclusion et discrimination<br />
qu’ils subissent ou estiment subir dans le milieu du travail ou à l’école). 7<br />
C’est d’ailleurs essentiellement pour cette triste raison de discrimination<br />
socio-économique des communautés ethniques que les gangs se composent<br />
majoritairement de jeunes issus de ces communautés. Ce n’est en effet pas un<br />
hasard si partout en Amérique du Nord, les gangs sont formés de jeunes issus<br />
de quartiers défavorisés, où les minorités visibles sont surreprésentées (Dorais<br />
et Corriveau, 2009).<br />
Les gangs regroupent ainsi un grand nombre de jeunes qui ont parfois vu<br />
leurs parents et leurs entourages familiaux trimer dur pour s’intégrer à la<br />
société québécoise et canadienne, sans pour autant obtenir les résultats ou les<br />
5 White (2008, p. 151) souligne par exemple qu’en Australie, “ethnicity (a distinct cultural identity) <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
forms the core <strong>of</strong> social relationships, but then intersects with variables such as geography (specific locality),<br />
age (mainly teenagers, but up to mid-twenties), size (sheer number <strong>of</strong> people who congregate at any point<br />
in time), affiliation (with people from similar cultural backgrounds) and familiarity (<strong>of</strong> one’s immediate<br />
neighbors, peers and acquaintances)”.<br />
6 Le matériel empirique utilisé dans la rédaction de cet article provient d’un travail de recherche de quatre<br />
années ayant mené à la publication de deux ouvrages sur la prostitution juvénile organisée par l’entremise<br />
des gangs de rue : Dorais, M. et Corriveau, P. (2006). Jeunes filles sous influence. Montréal : VLB; Dorais,<br />
M. et Corriveau, P. (2009). Gangs and girls. Montréal/Toronto : McGill/Queen’s University Press.<br />
7 Belitz et Valdez, 1997; Spergel, 1995; Covey, Menard et Franzese, 1992; Trasher, 1927.<br />
succès escomptés (Dorais et Corriveau, 2009). Le gang apparaît alors comme<br />
un lieu compensatoire d’intégration. Appartenir à un gang s’avère un gage<br />
de respect et de reconnaissance par les pairs, tout en permettant parfois des<br />
gains financiers non négligeables par l’entremise de la commission de certaines<br />
activités illicites. Cela signifie parfois user de comportements violents ou<br />
encore commettre certains délits perçus comme violence par le reste de la<br />
société. En d’autres termes, s’intégrer à un gang devient, pour plusieurs jeunes<br />
en mal d’intégration, une « solution » acceptable, du moins à court terme. Les<br />
chercheurs Perreault et Bibeau (2003) ont d’ailleurs souligné les différentes<br />
difficultés liées au processus d’immigration. En outre, certains canadiens issus<br />
de familles d’immigrants éprouvent encore le sentiment d’être traités comme<br />
des immigrants et ce, même si leur famille est établie au Canada depuis plus<br />
d’une génération. En manque de repères collectifs et donc de reconnaissance<br />
sociale, plusieurs de ces jeunes luttent pour à nouveau se sentir accepter et<br />
reconnu par leurs pairs, par des autrui qu’ils considèrent significatifs. Un<br />
défi difficile quand on sait combien les situations d’échec (familial, scolaire,<br />
affectif, pr<strong>of</strong>essionnel) tendent aujourd’hui à être de plus en plus ressenties,<br />
par ceux qui en sont victimes, comme autant de disqualifications individuelles<br />
(Van Campenhoudt et al., 2005, p. 26).<br />
Suivant cette logique, le phénomène des gangs de rue, et la violence qui en<br />
découle parfois, est surtout lié à une (més)adaptation socio-économique de<br />
certains jeunes, souvent de groupes ethniques, en recherche de reconnaissance<br />
et d’appartenance : les problèmes familiaux, la pauvreté, l’absence de contact et<br />
de reconnaissance des institutions publiques étant des facteurs d’exaspération.<br />
Le gang, dira alors Cohen (1955), devient l’échappatoire par excellence, le<br />
lieu où les jeunes ont l’impression de pouvoir affronter ensemble ces mêmes<br />
difficultés d’intégration, et ceci sur la base de règles qui sont les leurs. En<br />
d’autres termes, nos entretiens ont montré que la volonté de ces jeunes de se<br />
regrouper entre pairs provenait surtout du désir de résoudre les problèmes<br />
auxquels ils sont confrontés (besoin d’argent, menaces du monde extérieur,<br />
etc.), d’une incompréhension du « système », d’une recherche de substitut à la<br />
famille jugée incapable de résoudre ces problèmes. 8 Comme l’ont souligné les<br />
intervenants, le gang leur propose du même coup des moyens pour évacuer<br />
leurs frustrations à l’égard de ce sentiment d’exclusion, notamment en usant de<br />
la violence, voire en leur permettant de compter sur des pairs pour commettre<br />
certains délits, définis comme violence par le reste de la société.<br />
8 Perreault (2005) regroupe ces raisons en quatre catégories : 1- le gang est un groupe d’amis qui partagent<br />
des réalités communes; 2- le gang constitue une nouvelle famille qui comprend le jeune et peut l’aider; 3- le<br />
gang représente une défense personnelle; et 4- le gang constitue une occasion de faire de l’argent.
124 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 125<br />
La formation d’un gang, un moyen de protection<br />
Paradoxalement, cette implication dans des actes de violence renvoie<br />
simultanément à un exutoire face à la frustration vécue ou ressentie (sentiment<br />
d’être rejeté, exclu, stigmatisé des institutions sociales), à un besoin de<br />
protection (protection face à l’univers des gangs) mais aussi à un besoin de<br />
reconnaissance et d’intégration. Aussi, nombreux sont les membres des gangs<br />
de rue à souligner que leur adhésion au gang découle d’abord d’un besoin<br />
de protection face à d’autres groupes « ennemis ». Le gang n’est donc pas en<br />
soi instigateur de la violence. Plusieurs intervenants mentionnent au contraire<br />
qu’il émane généralement d’une peur anticipée de la violence des autres et/<br />
ou d’un sentiment d’exclusion sociale, réel ou perçu. À cet égard, il importe<br />
de rappeler que la violence des gangs est principalement de deux ordres : soit<br />
elle se produit à l’intérieur même du gang parce qu’imputable à la volonté<br />
des membres d’éviter une éventuelle dissolution du gang 9 ou liée au rituel<br />
initiatique, soit elle provient de conflits inter-gangs. Pour Decker et Van<br />
Winkle (1996), ce besoin de protection constitue d’ailleurs l’un des principaux<br />
facteurs d’adhésion au gang.<br />
Faut-il le rappeler, les premiers gangs de rue états-uniens, tels que nous<br />
les connaissons aujourd’hui (soit les héritiers des Bloods et des Crips), ont<br />
pris naissance suite à des agressions racistes de jeunes blancs sur des jeunes<br />
afro américains. Aussi, avant d’être eux-mêmes <strong>of</strong>fensifs et violents, ces<br />
regroupements de jeunes afro américains avaient comme fonction la défense<br />
contre les attaques racistes dont ils étaient les cibles. 10 Par la suite, ces groupes<br />
de jeunes sont entrés en conflit récurrents les uns envers les autres pour<br />
finalement devenir les gangs que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire<br />
des regroupements d’adolescents et de jeunes adultes souvent identifiables à<br />
leurs couleurs fétiches (le bleu ou le rouge), aux différents logos qu’ils exhibent<br />
ou encore aux graffitis et autres objets qui marquent leur territoire. Toutefois,<br />
l’association au gang n’est pas que symbolique, elle peut pour certains jeunes<br />
se transformer souvent en un désir réel de contrôler un territoire ou certaines<br />
activités spécifiques, désir qui se reflète ensuite dans l’engagement des individus<br />
dans ces activités illicites et parfois teintées de violence (distribution de la<br />
drogue dans certaines zones de la ville).<br />
Comme nous le disions dans notre dernière recherche, de défensifs, les gangs<br />
sont d’autant plus aisément devenus <strong>of</strong>fensifs que des jeunes hommes qui se<br />
9 La cohésion du gang dépendrait alors du sentiment de crainte qu’il inspire à l’endroit de ses membres.<br />
10 Voir Alonso “Black street gangs in Los Angeles: A history”, http://www.streetgangs.com/history/hist01.<br />
html. Site consulté le 12 septembre 2008.<br />
sentent injustement marginalisés, discriminés ou exclus peuvent en venir à<br />
considérer des moyens « alternatifs » pour se faire justice, pour créer leur propre<br />
justice et pour assurer leur subsistance de façon plus ou moins illégale (Dorais<br />
et Corriveau, 2009). Qui plus est, une fois protégé par les autres membres du<br />
gang, l’individu se retrouve dans une situation difficile, voire impossible lorsqu’il<br />
s’agit de refuser d’user à son tour de la violence pour protéger un confrère en<br />
danger ou qui se sent menacé. Une fois le pied posé dans l’engrenage, le jeune<br />
ne peut plus faire marche arrière : la peur de l’agression incitant à l’agression<br />
et ainsi de suite.<br />
La formation d’un gang, la mise en<br />
avant de l’identité masculine<br />
Cependant, outre ce besoin de protection et de sécurité, et plus encore qu’une<br />
réponse à une (més)adaptation sociale, nous croyons que le gang constitue<br />
une véritable sous-culture de domination et d’identification masculines, où la<br />
violence en tant que valeur virile est prisée par les pairs. Le gang apparaît en<br />
effet comme l’endroit par excellence de la valorisation des valeurs considérées<br />
masculines. Il représente cet univers (un lieu de passage) où les jeunes garçons<br />
croient découvrir ce qu’est être un homme et comment le devenir. Être un<br />
homme, c’est pour eux : susciter le respect en prouvant son endurance physique,<br />
c’est montrer une certaine insensibilité émotionnelle, c’est être performant et<br />
actif sexuellement, c’est rejeter à divers degrés l’autorité institutionnelle, c’est<br />
enfin, ne pas avoir peur d’utiliser la violence pour se faire valoir, reconnaître<br />
(Dorais et Corriveau, 2006, 2009). 11 Plusieurs recherches montrent d’ailleurs<br />
que les jeunes membres de gangs voient dans leurs pairs les plus aguerris des<br />
figures et des modèles de réussite par le respect et la crainte qu’ils imposent, la<br />
richesse qu’ils exhibent et leur succès auprès de la gente féminine. Le gang vient<br />
ainsi satisfaire, chez bons nombres d’entre eux, leurs besoins d’identification<br />
à ce qu’ils définissent comme des modèles de réussite (Dorais et Corriveau,<br />
2009; Perreault, 2005b; Perreault et Bibeau, 2003). Le gang « constitue un<br />
lieu et un lien socialisant très attirant pour les jeunes » dira Tichit (2003,<br />
p. 65), où le sentiment d’appartenance au groupe permet à ces jeunes de sortir<br />
de leur isolement en leur <strong>of</strong>frant un espace collectif d’identification. 12 Perrault<br />
(2005, p. 59) constate à cet égard que si les jeunes se tiennent en gang, « c’est<br />
d’abord pour avoir du plaisir et pour être en meilleure position pour séduire<br />
11 Perreault (2005b, p. 104) avance une hypothèse fort intéressante à propos du rapport à la violence des<br />
jeunes membres de gangs : « Alors que les jeunes de la rue sont davantage portés à retourner la violence<br />
contre eux par leurs pratiques autodestructrices, les jeunes des gangs de rue l’utilisent contre le ‘système’ et<br />
leurs ennemis. Ils extériorisent la violence au moyen de leurs pratiques antisociales ».<br />
12 Selon Perreault et Bibeau (2003), le gang, loin d’être le symbole univoque d’une dérive sociale des jeunes,<br />
est plutôt un lieu privilégié de création du lien social.
126 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 127<br />
l’autre sexe. Le gang se présente d’abord comme un espace de socialité, un lieu<br />
d’appartenance et d’identification des pairs, qui fait l’envie des uns et qui est<br />
craint par les autres ».<br />
Ainsi, loin de nier l’existence de la violence ou encore de banaliser celle-ci dans<br />
les dynamiques qui entourent les gangs de rue, nous concevons que le gang peut<br />
à la fois être fortement positif pour l’individu mais également l’entraîner dans<br />
un cercle vicieux de la violence et de la délinquance en tant que violence (viols,<br />
vols, drogues, etc.). Et bien que ce ne soit pas la criminalité et la délinquance<br />
qui attirent ces jeunes, « le passage qui se présentait au départ comme une issue<br />
de secours, une issue vers le succès, se dévoile, dans les faits, pour plusieurs,<br />
tel un cul-de-sac dans lequel on se retrouve très tôt coincé. Le tous pour un,<br />
un pour tous devient la règle et on est prêt, devant n’importe quelle situation,<br />
à défendre et à venger les siens pour sauver l’honneur face aux membres des<br />
groupes ennemis » (Perreault, 2005a, p. 60). Blondin (1995) croit pour sa part<br />
que certains d’entre eux ont à ce point banalisé la violence qu’ils en viennent<br />
à trouver « normal » la délinquance et la violence qui règnent dans l’entourage<br />
du gang. L’utilisation de la violence devient alors une façon comme une autre<br />
de se faire valoir, d’être reconnu par les pairs et d’imposer une certaine forme<br />
de « respect ».<br />
C’est dans cette optique que Perreault (2005a, p. 64) conclut à juste titre que<br />
« faire partie de la gang, c’est accepter de s’identifier à un certain niveau de<br />
violence, même si, au début, on peut très bien ne pas être tout à fait conscient<br />
des implications graves liées à cette violence ». La violence joue ici un rôle dans<br />
le marquage identitaire chez ces jeunes.<br />
From this perspective, the gang provides a forum or ready-made<br />
opportunity structure within which to engage in what is felt to be<br />
exhilarating activity. Fighting is fun; and gangs provide an avenue to<br />
increase the thrill factor beyond the norm. Violence can be seen to<br />
be attractive and desirable in its own right, as well as being linked to<br />
instrumental purposes. (White et Mason, 2006, p. 68)<br />
Cette culture de la violence est d’ailleurs institutionnalisée dans les rituels<br />
initiatiques. En effet, règle générale, l’intégration d’une recrue passe par la<br />
commission d’un acte de violence à l’égard d’un ennemi ou à l’encontre d’une<br />
institution civile, ou encore en subissant cette violence en étant battu par les<br />
membres de son propre gang, rituel communément nommé le « punching<br />
initiation » ou PI. Chez les jeunes filles plus spécifiquement, cette violence<br />
initiatique prend principalement deux formes suivant le « statut » qu’on leur<br />
attribue dans le gang : soit l’initiation se résume, à l’instar des garçons, à<br />
la participation à la commission d’un délit ou d’une bagarre avec des filles<br />
de gangs rivaux, soit il s’agit d’un « gang bang » initiatique, appelée aussi le<br />
« sex-in » 13 ou le « roll-in » 14 (Burris-Kitchen, 1997; Chesney-Lind et Shelden,<br />
2004; Miller, 2001; Schalet et al., 2003). Selon Molidor (1996), ces rituels<br />
initiatiques violents servent à la fois à humilier la jeune fille et surtout, à<br />
la dissuader de vouloir un jour trahir le gang. Subi ou non, le gang bang,<br />
comme forme de violence initiatique, permet « de rappeler aux hommes qui y<br />
participent, et aux femmes qui le subissent, la hiérarchie sociale, sexuelle et de<br />
genre qui existe », et se doit d’exister, au sein du gang, où le gang demeure un<br />
univers à domination masculine (Dorais et Corriveau, 2006, p. 25).<br />
En somme, nous croyons que l’expression de la violence, quelle qu’elle soit, est<br />
intimement liée à la quête d’identité masculine chez plusieurs jeunes hommes,<br />
pas seulement ceux impliqués dans les gangs. Appartenir à un gang, c’est<br />
devenir « quelqu’un » à leurs yeux et aux yeux des autres. C’est acquérir un<br />
certain statut social et, par le fait même, gagner du respect, face à soi d’abord,<br />
face aux pairs ensuite. Et ce sentiment d’appartenance, est-il important de<br />
le mentionner, se développe autour d’une socialisation homosociale, quasi<br />
exclusive aux hommes : le gang se veut un monde d’hommes et de virilité mis<br />
en place et dominé par les hommes pour le bénéfice des hommes (Dorais et<br />
Corriveau, 2009).<br />
Et, bien que variant d’un groupe à un autre, les rituels initiatiques, toujours<br />
empreints de violence, conservent généralement la même fonction : évaluer la<br />
loyauté et le courage, où la capacité à subir ou générer de la violence est perçue<br />
par les pairs comme une source de prestige et de notoriété. L’initiation soutient<br />
donc à la fois une logique d’acquisition de respect et de pouvoir, mais aussi la<br />
confirmation de son identité de mâle, d’homme viril. Nos données montrent<br />
en effet que ces rituels viennent d’abord confirmer l’identité de genre des jeunes<br />
garçons, la souffrance corporelle confirmant à l’ensemble du groupe la virilité<br />
de la recrue qui ne craint pas de souffrir pour le gang (Dorais et Corriveau,<br />
2009). Dans les gangs, seuls comptent vraiment les garçons et l’expression de<br />
leur virilité (ou du moins ce qu’ils perçoivent comme telle). Pour Perreault<br />
(2005b, p. 104), « il n’y a pas de place pour celui ou celle qui ne montre pas<br />
d’aptitudes pour l’action et la bagarre ». C’est pourquoi l’initiation comporte<br />
si souvent un déni du corps au pr<strong>of</strong>it du gang. La recrue doit démontrer qu’elle<br />
13 Le « sex-in » se distingue du gang bang non initiatique en ce sens qu’il constitue, per se, l’expérience<br />
sexuelle de groupe spécifiquement liée au rituel initiatique, alors que le gang bang renvoie à l’ensemble des<br />
relations sexuelles à plusieurs qui n’ont plus nécessairement à voir avec la phase initiatique.<br />
14 Le « roll-in » consiste pour la jeune femme à tirer un dé, lequel déterminera le nombre de ses partenaires<br />
sexuels. Le gang bang est parfois appelé le « run-train ».
128 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 129<br />
est prête à endurer la souffrance et la violence qui entoure la « vie » à l’intérieur<br />
du gang.<br />
En somme, le gang devient une véritable microsociété homosociale, un lieu<br />
où l’affirmation virile devient essentielle pour le jeune désireux d’y adhérer.<br />
Un monde de gars, pensé, créé et géré par eux, où il importe de montrer qui<br />
est le plus fort, le plus intimidant, le plus susceptible d’être respecté (Dorais<br />
et Corriveau, 2009), la violence (contre autrui ou à l’encontre des institutions<br />
civiles) devenant un paramètre incontournable dans l’affirmation de soi.<br />
Quelques pistes de réflexion vers l’action<br />
Plusieurs facteurs ont donc été avancés pour expliquer les raisons qui poussent<br />
certains jeunes à adhérer à un gang de rue et à user de la violence pour y être<br />
acceptés. Lors du colloque Création d’un réseau québécois d’échanges : les jeunes<br />
et les gangs de rue faut plus qu’en parler !, qui s’est tenu au Québec les 13 et 14<br />
février 2003, les intervenants ont par exemple souligné l’effritement du tissu<br />
social, les pertes des valeurs familiales, l’isolement social et la tendance des<br />
adolescents à admirer les modèles délinquants comme facteurs explicatifs de<br />
l’implication à un gang de rue. Pour Lanctôt et Leblanc (1996), les jeunes qui<br />
se tournent vers les gangs ont certaines prédispositions individuelles à le faire,<br />
comme l’attrait de la violence, l’imprévisibilité, une éducation déficiente, des<br />
difficultés scolaires et familiales, une mauvaise estime de soi, une perception<br />
idéalisée de la vie dans les gangs et une vision noire de la réalité liée au manque<br />
d’opportunités sociales. À cela Hamel et Brisebois (2005) ajoutent que la<br />
plupart de ces jeunes ont un faible contrôle de leurs émotions et sont animés<br />
par la quête de sensations fortes, sensations que peut procurer la violence et la<br />
délinquance qui entourent la vie au sein d’un gang de rue.<br />
Sans nier l’existence de ces facteurs de risque, il importe cependant de rester<br />
prudent en ce qui a trait à l’usage qui peut en découler. Comme le signale à<br />
juste titre White (2008), il faut éviter de les utiliser à des fins de pronostic car<br />
l’attention portée vers ces facteurs de risque néglige de les recon<strong>text</strong>ualiser dans<br />
l’histoire de vie de l’individu. 15<br />
By their nature, these kinds <strong>of</strong> risk assessment tools fail to capture<br />
the historical dynamics <strong>of</strong> societies. The tools reinterpret certain<br />
characteristics as representing the failings <strong>of</strong> individuals. This is because<br />
they are constructed on the basis <strong>of</strong> individualized data, rather than<br />
analysis <strong>of</strong>, for example, how state policy affects particular groups. The<br />
15 Le lecteur est à ce sujet invité à consulter l’article de Bania (2009) dans ce numéro.<br />
structured formation <strong>of</strong> specific groups and individuals, as the outcome<br />
<strong>of</strong> inequality, discrimination and the absence <strong>of</strong> opportunity, is basically<br />
lost in such analysis. (White, 2008, p. 156)<br />
C’est dans cette optique que nous estimons que la violence des gangs et les<br />
comportements délictueux (en tant que violence) qui y sont souvent associés<br />
restent d’une part un moyen pour plusieurs de ces jeunes d’accéder à ce que<br />
d’autres ont déjà, c’est-à-dire l’intégration socio-économique. 16 Et d’autre part,<br />
une façon de s’affirmer en tant qu’homme 17 à l’intérieur d’une micro société<br />
homosociale et machiste où la violence en tant qu’acte de virilité engrange le<br />
respect des pairs. L’implication dans un gang se doit alors d’être interprétée<br />
en partie comme une échappatoire à des situations jugées discriminatoires et<br />
exclusives sur le plan social et pr<strong>of</strong>essionnel, la violence permettant à plusieurs<br />
de ces jeunes d’évacuer leurs frustrations et, parallèlement, de créer une<br />
nouvelle conscience collective bien à eux.<br />
On peut dès lors affirmer que la violence perpétrée lors des rituels initiatiques<br />
vient rappeler ce ras-le-bol généralisé à l’égard de la société, tout en au proposant<br />
aux jeunes un nouveau cadre normatif où ils auront l’opportunité d’élaborer de<br />
nouveaux liens de solidarité entre eux. Ce n’est donc pas le fruit du hasard si les<br />
gangs se forment sur une base élective, les jeunes ayant le sentiment de vivre les<br />
mêmes difficultés d’intégration. En plus de leur rappeler qu’ils partagent tous<br />
un passé similaire, le gang propose aux jeunes une nouvelle cohésion sociale<br />
et un nouveau système de valeur où la violence occupe une place intégrative.<br />
Lorsqu’il est question d’intervention ou de prévention, on met souvent l’accent<br />
sur la violence des gangs en tant que déficience, personnelle ou collective,<br />
alors qu’il faudrait davantage réfléchir cette violence en termes de besoins<br />
d’intégration et de reconnaissance, besoins que la société et ses institutions<br />
n’arrivent pas à combler auprès de ces jeunes.<br />
Intégration socio-économique, voire pr<strong>of</strong>essionnelle d’un côté, mais également<br />
intégration identitaire de l’autre, car parallèlement à cette nécessité d’inclure<br />
ces jeunes sur le marché du travail et/ou à l’école, nous avons mis en lumière<br />
que le monde des gangs s’avère aussi une manière pour ces jeunes de percevoir<br />
la société, ses symboles de réussite et ce que doit être un homme. Le gang <strong>of</strong>fre<br />
16 En guise d’exemple, soulignons simplement qu’en 2001, « sur les 48 720 personnes d’origine africaine<br />
vivant au Québec, 24 % avaient au moins un diplôme universitaire, pour 14 % des Québécois. Le taux<br />
de chômage des Africains s’établissait à 21 % comparativement à 8% pour l’ensemble de la population<br />
québécoise. Quant à leur revenu moyen, il était de 18 500 $ comparativement à 27 000 $ chez les<br />
Québécois ! » (Le fil des événements, 11 mai 2006).<br />
17 Il existe évidemment plusieurs façons de s’affirmer en tant qu’homme et celle-ci peut paraître éthiquement<br />
contestable.
130 Revue de l’IPC 3 La violence dans l’univers des gangs 131<br />
à plusieurs d’entres eux des figures d’appartenance et des modèles auxquels<br />
ils peuvent et veulent s’identifier (les enjeux identitaires selon Perreault,<br />
2005a et 200b). Or, ces modèles de réussite présentent souvent des visions<br />
problématiques de la réussite et de ce qu’est être un homme, la violence et le<br />
machisme devenant souvent des règles à suivre pour être respecté par autrui.<br />
Voilà pourquoi il faut proposer de nouveaux modèles de réussite à ces jeunes<br />
afin de modifier cette perception qu’ils ont de la masculinité et de ce qu’il faut<br />
faire pour gagner le respect de l’autre.<br />
Autrement dit et à la lumière de ce qui vient d’être présenté, on comprendra<br />
que les pistes d’intervention et de prévention qui ne miseront que sur les<br />
« facteurs de risque » liés à l’individu – lesquels se révèlent souvent n’être que<br />
des symptômes de la problématique – seront vouées à l’échec ou à des succès<br />
limités et temporaires. L’implication de jeunes dans l’univers des gangs de<br />
rue renvoie, nous venons de le voir, davantage à des problématiques sociales<br />
(difficulté d’intégration sur le marché du travail, discrimination, chômage,<br />
etc.), qui nécessitent des actions globalisantes et sociales, qu’à des individus<br />
problématiques en soi et nécessitant une prise en charge individualisante. Ces<br />
interventions auprès des individus, bien que nécessaires et utiles, restent bien<br />
insuffisantes pour réparer (combler) certaines injustices vécues ou perçues<br />
comme telles par ces jeunes sur le plan de l’intégration socio-économique et<br />
pour leur <strong>of</strong>frir des figures de réussite autres que celles, machistes et souvent<br />
violentes, proposées par les membres de gang.<br />
Nourri par des médias en quête de sensationnalisme et des orientations<br />
politiques discriminatoires, le rejet social et pr<strong>of</strong>essionnel exprimés à l’égard<br />
de ces jeunes incitent plusieurs d’entre eux à se définir et à agir, au moins<br />
partiellement 18 , en opposition avec le reste de la collectivité. La majorité de ces<br />
jeunes associés à l’univers des gangs, est-il nécessaire de le rappeler, ressentent<br />
les mêmes besoins, valeurs et aspirations que les autres jeunes de la société<br />
canadienne. Comme le soulignait déjà Thrascher en 1927 dans son étude sur<br />
les gangs de Chicago, le but de ces jeunes n’est pas tant d’être violent, de<br />
commettre des actes délictueux ou encore d’être hors la loi mais bien de se<br />
recréer un monde où ils se sentent inclus et appréciés. Dès lors, les pistes d’action<br />
se doivent de passer par l’intégration sociale, économique et pr<strong>of</strong>essionnelle de<br />
ces jeunes et par notre capacité à leur <strong>of</strong>frir des figures alternatives de réussite<br />
auxquelles ils pourront s’identifier. Et cette acceptation débute inévitablement<br />
par une modification du regard médiatique, politique et institutionnel que l’on<br />
porte sur ces jeunes, notamment en faisant preuve d’ouverture et d’acceptation<br />
18 Comme mentionné précédemment, ils s’en rapprochent en effet considérablement à plusieurs égards :<br />
intégration socio-économique, quête de réussite, etc.<br />
face à leurs habillements, attitudes et comportements, qui dérangent parfois<br />
moins par leur déviance que par leur différence.<br />
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Volume 3: pages 135–156<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Aboriginal Youth and Violent<br />
Gang Involvement in Canada:<br />
Quality Prevention Strategies<br />
Mark Totten, M.S.W., R.S.W., Ph.D.<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Thornberry, T., Krohn, M, Lizotte, A., & Chard-Wierschem, D. (1993).<br />
The role <strong>of</strong> juvenile gangs in facilitating delinquent behavior. Journal<br />
<strong>of</strong> Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30, 75-85.<br />
Thrasher, F. M. ([1927]/1963). The gang: A study <strong>of</strong> 1,313 gangs in Chicago.<br />
Chicago: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press.<br />
Tichit, L. (2003). Gangs juvéniles et construits ethniques dans le con<strong>text</strong>e<br />
américain. Criminologie, 36(2), 57-68.<br />
Van Campenhoudt, L., Chaumont, J.-M., & Fransen, A. (2005). La méthode<br />
d’analyse en groupe. Paris : Dunod.<br />
White, R. (2008). Disputed definitions and fluid identities: The limitations<br />
<strong>of</strong> social pr<strong>of</strong>iling in relation to ethnic youth gangs. Youth Justice, 8(2),<br />
149-161.<br />
White, R., & Mason, R. (2006). Youth gangs and youth violence:<br />
Charting the key dimensions. Australian and New Zealand Journal<br />
<strong>of</strong> Criminology, 39(1), 54-70.<br />
Yablonsky, L. (1962). The violent gang. New York: Macmillan.<br />
Résumé<br />
Il y a une épidémie de violence des gangs de jeunes Autochtones dans<br />
certaines parties du Canada d’aujourd’hui et ces jeunes s’entretuent et se<br />
suicident à des taux qui dépassent ceux de tout autre groupe au Canada.<br />
Cet article présente un aperçu de la situation actuelle et décrit cinq grandes<br />
voies d’adhésion aux gangs et à leur violence pour les jeunes Autochtones.<br />
L’utilisation d’approches qui ont été démontrées inefficaces est ensuite<br />
décrite et critiquée. L’auteur plaide pour un passage à une approche de<br />
prévention et de santé publique qui traite les voies d’adhésion aux gangs<br />
et à leur violence et décrit certaines approches qui ont fait leurs preuves.<br />
L’auteur conclut que le refus d’agir dès maintenant se traduit par une<br />
situation qui va s’aggraver très rapidement puisque le taux de natalité des<br />
Autochtones est en explosion et que la population « à risque » doublera au<br />
cours de la prochaine décennie.<br />
Abstract<br />
There is an epidemic <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal youth gang violence in some parts <strong>of</strong><br />
Canada today, and young Aboriginal gang members are killing each other<br />
and committing suicide at rates that exceed those <strong>of</strong> any other group in<br />
Canada. This paper provides an overview <strong>of</strong> the current situation, and<br />
describes five major pathways to violent gang involvement for Aboriginal<br />
youth. It then goes on to describe and critique the use <strong>of</strong> approaches<br />
that have been proven not to work. It argues for a shift to a public health<br />
approach that addresses the pathways to gang violence, and describes some<br />
evidence-based models that have been proven to work. The conclusion is
136 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 137<br />
that a failure to act now will result in things getting much worse very shortly<br />
since the Aboriginal birth rate is exploding and the population “at risk” in<br />
many areas will double within the next decade.<br />
Introduction<br />
Overview <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal Youth Gangs in Canada<br />
The focus <strong>of</strong> this paper is on Aboriginal youth gang members aged 12-30 years.<br />
In Canada, it is estimated that twenty-two percent <strong>of</strong> known gang members<br />
are Aboriginal, and that there are between 800-1000 active Aboriginal gang<br />
members in the Prairie provinces (Astwood Strategy Corporation, 2004; CISS,<br />
2005; CSC, 2001a and 2003; Totten, 2008).<br />
Aboriginal youth gangs are visible groups that come together for pr<strong>of</strong>it-driven<br />
criminal activity and severe violence. They identify themselves through the<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> a name, common brands/colours <strong>of</strong> clothing, and tattoos to<br />
demonstrate gang membership to rival gangs. Gang-related communication<br />
rituals and public display <strong>of</strong> gang-like attributes are common (Gordon, 2000;<br />
Totten, 2000 and 2008). Membership is fluid, there is a lack <strong>of</strong> organization<br />
and structure, and many <strong>of</strong> these gangs operate independently in small cells.<br />
Status is gained through the ability to make large amounts <strong>of</strong> cash and<br />
engage in serious violence. Aboriginal gangs tend to be intergenerational and<br />
rely on violent entry and exit rituals to protect the gang from outsiders. The<br />
organization <strong>of</strong> these gangs varies in terms <strong>of</strong>: the structure and hierarchical<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> the gang; the gang’s connection to larger, more serious organized<br />
crime groups; the sophistication and permanence <strong>of</strong> the gang; the existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> a specific code <strong>of</strong> conduct or set <strong>of</strong> formal rules; initiation practices; and<br />
the level <strong>of</strong> integration, cohesion, and solidarity between the gang’s members<br />
(Mellor, MacRae, Pauls, & Hornick, 2005; Totten, 2008).<br />
Membership commitment can be measured in a hierarchical ranking system<br />
within the gang. Often, there is not one person who directs other members,<br />
although older members have more influence compared to young members<br />
(CISC, 2006; Mellor et. al., 2005). Leaders (also called King Pins, Bosses,<br />
Presidents or Captains) actively promote and participate in serious criminal<br />
activity. These males are generally in their late twenties or early thirties.<br />
Veterans (also called Heavies or Higher-Ups) decide which criminal activities<br />
the gang will participate in and are considered to be faithful in their loyalty to<br />
the gang. Along with leaders, they are responsible for settling internal conflicts<br />
within the gang. Core members (also called Regular Members, Associates<br />
or Affiliates) usually have been with the gang since it started, and are<br />
experienced, proven members. Most gang leaders require prospective recruits<br />
to meet certain criteria and perform serious crimes <strong>of</strong> violence before they are<br />
allowed membership into the gang. These youth want to prove themselves<br />
and rise through the ranks; they <strong>of</strong>ten earn serious money for gangs. To gain<br />
entry, a recruit generally requires sponsorship. It is common for recruits to<br />
“do minutes”, that is to survive a beating at the hands <strong>of</strong> some gang members.<br />
Strikers (also called Soldiers) are also highly likely to engage in serious acts <strong>of</strong><br />
violence. Females who participate in Aboriginal gangs are for the most part<br />
treated as sexual slaves and are forced to play tertiary roles (look-out for the<br />
police, dealing drugs, sex trade work, carrying drugs and weapons). Often,<br />
they are traded amongst gang members for coercive sex.<br />
The Aboriginal Burden <strong>of</strong> Suffering in Canada<br />
First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples comprise 4% <strong>of</strong> the population <strong>of</strong><br />
Canada, or approximately 1,325,000 people (Statistics Canada, 2008). The<br />
majority lives in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and in the Northern<br />
Territories, and almost one-half <strong>of</strong> the Aboriginal population now live in urban<br />
areas. The proportion <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal peoples is increasing rapidly compared to<br />
every other group in Canadian society, and their average age is much younger<br />
than the rest <strong>of</strong> the population.<br />
Most Aboriginal young people who grow up in high-risk environments do<br />
not become gang-involved – they have positive school and community<br />
supports, and particular protective individual attributes like perseverance<br />
and determination. Yet, Aboriginals experience a disproportionate burden <strong>of</strong><br />
suffering, and this helps explain their participation in gangs. Factors related<br />
to this include racism, colonization, marginalization and dispossession; the<br />
loss <strong>of</strong> land, traditional culture, spirituality and values; and the breakdown <strong>of</strong><br />
community kinship systems and Aboriginal law. Psycho-social problems are<br />
linked to these factors, including:<br />
• Entrenched and severe poverty, and overcrowded and substandard housing<br />
(Bittle, Hattem, Quann, & Muise, 2002; Dooley, Welsh, Floyd, Macdonald,<br />
& Fenning, 2005).<br />
• High numbers <strong>of</strong> placements into child welfare, mental health and other<br />
institutions (Blackstock, Trocme, & Bennett, 2004; Grekul & LaBoucane-<br />
Benson, 2006; Trevethan, Auger, Moore, MacDonald, & Sinclair, 2002).
138 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 139<br />
• Alcohol and drug abuse: one quarter to two thirds <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal<br />
young people in remote communities inhale gasoline. The incidence<br />
<strong>of</strong> Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) is very high (Canada,<br />
House <strong>of</strong> Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, 1990;<br />
RCAP, 1996).<br />
• Low educational attainment and high rates <strong>of</strong> school drop-out and unemployment,<br />
which block conventional means <strong>of</strong> achieving success and bonding to<br />
broader Canadian society (RCAP, 1996; Statistics Canada, 2001).<br />
• Ill-health and suicide: the suicide rate for young Aboriginals in many<br />
communities is approximately six times higher than the rate for non-<br />
Aboriginals (Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Shah, 1990;<br />
Statistics Canada, 2001; York, 1990).<br />
• High rates <strong>of</strong> criminalization: Aboriginals are significantly over-represented<br />
at all stages <strong>of</strong> the justice system (Brzozowski, Taylor-Butts, & Johnson, 2006;<br />
Calverley, 2007; Dauvergne, 2008; Dauvergne & Li, 2006; Li, 2007).<br />
• High rates <strong>of</strong> violence, where family violence, sexual assault, child witnessing<br />
<strong>of</strong> spousal violence, and homicide involving Aboriginals as both perpetrators<br />
and victims are serious concerns. On-reserve violent crime rates are elevated<br />
for both youth and adults. Youth are accused <strong>of</strong> committing homicides on<br />
reserve at about 11 times the rate <strong>of</strong> youth elsewhere in Canada (Brzozowski<br />
et al., 2006; Calverley, 2007; Dauvergne, 2008; Dauvergne & Li, 2006;<br />
Li, 2007).<br />
Understanding Forms <strong>of</strong><br />
Aboriginal Youth Gang Violence<br />
Aboriginal youth gang violence is different than that exhibited by other youth<br />
gangs in Canada. Rates <strong>of</strong> internalized violence, including suicide, drug<br />
overdose, and self-injurious behaviors are far higher than externalized criminal<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> violence. Preliminary Canadian data from the Prince Albert and<br />
Regina projects (Totten, 2009a and 2009b) suggest that far more Aboriginal<br />
youth gang members die from suicide and drug overdoses than homicide.<br />
These data also point to extremely high rates <strong>of</strong> other forms <strong>of</strong> self-injurious<br />
behaviours such as slashing and burning, particularly among young Aboriginal<br />
women. Most acts <strong>of</strong> physical violence in Aboriginal youth gangs are motivated<br />
by revenge, retaliation, and reputation (Kelly & Totten, 2002), and the result<br />
is that young Aboriginal men are killing other young Aboriginal men.<br />
Most females who are gang-involved have personal relationships with male<br />
gang members, and those who do not become involved through sexual<br />
exploitation, forced prostitution, and sexual trafficking. Gang members use<br />
many forms <strong>of</strong> violence to initiate girls into and maintain their involvement in<br />
sex trafficking. Most girls are “gang-banged” as part <strong>of</strong> initiation into gangs.<br />
In some communities, family members socialize girls into the sex trade. This<br />
is a common way for families to make money and the practice is perceived as<br />
legitimate employment.<br />
In general, there is a poor fit between traditional, perpetrator-orientated<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> instrumental and expressive violence, and violence exhibited by<br />
Aboriginal gangs. The process behind Aboriginal youth gang violence involves<br />
a number <strong>of</strong> identifiable steps:<br />
1. Members feel loose bonds to the gang and there is fluid membership. Most have<br />
a fatalistic outlook on life, believing that they will die in the near future.<br />
2. Members perceive a threat from a rival gang: this increases gang cohesion<br />
and solidifies temporary membership. The threat is <strong>of</strong>ten irrational, given the<br />
high degree <strong>of</strong> trauma most members have suffered. Intergenerational family<br />
ties are important, and <strong>of</strong>ten one family is at war with another family.<br />
3. An incident takes place which sparks an escalation <strong>of</strong> gang violence.<br />
4. The gang responds in a chaotic and violent manner, similar to the process <strong>of</strong><br />
spontaneous combustion. The fact that most gang members have cognitive<br />
impairments due to FASD contributes to the impulsive and unplanned<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> the violence.<br />
5. The other gang retaliates. In this tinderbox-like environment, escalating<br />
violence affects the identities <strong>of</strong> those involved. This helps to spread gangs<br />
across neighbourhoods and reserves and increases membership.<br />
Collective and individual violence by Aboriginal gang members, whether<br />
directed internally or at other gangs:<br />
• produces more collective violence through the processes <strong>of</strong> threat and<br />
unpredictable combustion;<br />
• increases solidarity <strong>of</strong> gang members for a brief time, serving to unite them<br />
against a common enemy by increasing their dependence on each other<br />
and/or disciplining members;
140 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 141<br />
• perpetuates gang values, norms, and the conditions <strong>of</strong> membership;<br />
• reinforces familial ties in marginalized and transient communities; and<br />
• provides members with a structure and sense <strong>of</strong> purpose, combating<br />
hopelessness and a sense <strong>of</strong> powerlessness over their lives.<br />
Members talk about feeling a sense <strong>of</strong> honour, self-respect, and self-esteem<br />
when they engage in violence (Totten, 2009a and 2009b). It can also motivate<br />
some members to exit the gang when the violence reaches levels that are<br />
unacceptable to them. Finally, it can function to impede efforts to settle<br />
land claims, implement self-government, and address the criminalization <strong>of</strong><br />
Aboriginals (researchers have identified some <strong>of</strong> these factors in African and<br />
Latino gangs, including Decker, 1996; Klein, 1971 and 1995; Sanders, 1993).<br />
Pathways into Violent Gang<br />
Involvement for Aboriginal Youth<br />
A pathways approach is useful in identifying the primary mechanisms through<br />
which Aboriginal youth find themselves involved in violent gang activity. Some<br />
gang members are located on one primary pathway; others become gang-involved<br />
through a number <strong>of</strong> different pathways. Aboriginal youth are more vulnerable<br />
to these conditions compared to other youth and therefore are at greater risk <strong>of</strong><br />
going down these paths. Evidence supporting the existence <strong>of</strong> these pathways<br />
comes from initial data analyses from the Prince Albert Warrior Spirit Walking<br />
Gang Project and the Regina Anti-Gang Services Project (Totten, 2009a and<br />
2009b) involving a combined sample <strong>of</strong> approximately 150 youth, along with the<br />
few Canadian studies on this issue (for example, Dickson-Gilmore & Laprairie,<br />
2005; Kelly & Totten, 2002; Totten, 2008; Weatherburn, Fitzgerald, & Hua,<br />
2003). There are five main pathways, each <strong>of</strong> which is briefly described below.<br />
The first pathway into gang violence is violentization, the process through<br />
which survivors <strong>of</strong> extreme physical child maltreatment and neglect become<br />
predators and prey in adolescence. When Aboriginal children suffer these forms<br />
<strong>of</strong> harm, they are at high risk for reduced academic attainment, neurological<br />
impairment, and restricted language development. They are more likely to have<br />
personality disorders, impaired psycho-social development, and internalizing<br />
and externalizing symptoms. Suffering chronic and repeated sexual trauma<br />
throughout childhood is also a key driver into gang life. Typical victims experience<br />
multiple types <strong>of</strong> exploitation within a single year, including sexual abuse,<br />
commercial sex work and trafficking. These children are most <strong>of</strong>ten abused by<br />
male family members or men who know them. More girls are victims, although<br />
many male youth who participate in violent gang activities report having been<br />
sexually abused (Totten, 2009a and 2009b). This betrayal <strong>of</strong> trust and abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
power is aggravated in many communities by sexist beliefs that promote the early<br />
sexualization <strong>of</strong> girls.<br />
The second key pathway into violent gang life is experiencing multiple out-<strong>of</strong>home<br />
placements in child welfare and correctional facilities (Kelly & Totten,<br />
2002; Totten, 2000 and 2008). These facilities are prime recruiting grounds<br />
for gang members, and a significant number <strong>of</strong> gang members report that they<br />
only became gang-involved following placement in such facilities (Totten, 2008a<br />
and 2008b). Currently, one in ten Aboriginal children are in foster care and<br />
group homes compared to one in two hundred non-Aboriginals. Today, there<br />
are about 28,000 Aboriginal youth in care, a number three times the total at the<br />
height <strong>of</strong> the operation <strong>of</strong> residential schools (Blackstock et al., 2004; Trocme,<br />
Knoke, & Blackstock, 2004). The main reason Aboriginal kids are brought into<br />
care is neglect, including severe poverty, substance abuse by parents, and poor<br />
housing (Trocme, 2005). In Canada, most Aboriginal children are placed in<br />
White settings, where it is very difficult to learn about Aboriginal teachings and<br />
develop a cultural identity. Thus, many Aboriginal children in care experience<br />
culture loss and are at high risk <strong>of</strong> gang recruitment and sexual exploitation as<br />
a way to feel loved and survive. Growing up in care <strong>of</strong>ten results in attachment<br />
disorders, which magnify the impact <strong>of</strong> childhood maltreatment.<br />
The third pathway reflects the lifelong impact <strong>of</strong> brain and mental health disorders<br />
that result from prolonged childhood trauma and FASD, and <strong>of</strong> the accompanying<br />
developmental impairments and emotional vulnerability. These leave Aboriginal<br />
children with little time and energy to grieve their losses. Suffering severe abuse<br />
is directly related to experiencing mental health problems such as Post-Traumatic<br />
Stress Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Depression, and Bipolar<br />
Disorder. Major childhood losses and disrupted attachments can result in youth<br />
who don’t want to feel anything because it hurts too much. Many Aboriginal<br />
gang members who engage in violence have a state <strong>of</strong> “terminal” thinking that<br />
leads them to focus on survival only. Their wounds are so pr<strong>of</strong>ound that their<br />
souls are barely alive. Many young Aboriginal gang members hide behind the<br />
armour <strong>of</strong> violence and emotional detachment; their sense <strong>of</strong> security, safety<br />
and trust is never developed. Hardy and Laszl<strong>of</strong>fy (2005) theorize that the net<br />
impact is a state <strong>of</strong> psychological homelessness wherein unresolved and buried<br />
grief results in monstrous acts <strong>of</strong> rage which camouflage deep-rooted sorrow.<br />
The fourth pathway revolves around the social exclusion and devaluation<br />
related to social class, race, sexual orientation, and gender. Colonization and<br />
forced assimilation have resulted in the disintegration <strong>of</strong> family units, and the
142 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 143<br />
loss <strong>of</strong> language, culture, economic status, and parenting capacity in many<br />
communities. The loss <strong>of</strong> cultural identity, combined with social and economic<br />
marginalization, fuels gang violence. Gang-related activities <strong>of</strong>fer employment<br />
and income for many members. Some Aboriginal girls are vulnerable to gang<br />
involvement, and can become sexually exploited and trafficked in urban<br />
settings because they can not meet their basic needs.<br />
The final pathway relates to the development <strong>of</strong> hyper-masculinities and<br />
sexualized femininities. Violence is used to construct masculinity, and sexuality<br />
to construct femininity. For male gang members, the experience <strong>of</strong> prolonged<br />
sexual abuse at the hands <strong>of</strong> men relates directly to the construction <strong>of</strong> violent<br />
gang identities. Many young men who were abused around the time that they<br />
reached puberty report having deep-seated fears about their sexual identities.<br />
They report feeling responsible for the abuse because they became sexually<br />
aroused; many believe that they must be gay because they “had sex” with<br />
men. Violence compensates for these threats to heterosexuality (Totten, 2000,<br />
2009a, and 2009b). Even for male gang members who have not suffered violent<br />
trauma, the elimination <strong>of</strong> traditional means <strong>of</strong> achieving masculinity (such<br />
as supporting families through hunting and trapping) is compensated for by a<br />
hyper-masculine exertion <strong>of</strong> power and control over women and children (Blagg,<br />
2000). Aboriginal girls in gangs negotiate gender roles outside <strong>of</strong> traditional<br />
femininity – the gang is a space to “do gender differently” (Campbell, 1991).<br />
These pathways can intersect to form compounding challenges for some<br />
Aboriginal youth. Pathway four, for example, can be associated with all<br />
other pathways.<br />
Quality Violence Prevention, Intervention<br />
and Suppression Approaches<br />
Although there are many Canadian gang prevention, intervention and<br />
suppression initiatives, few focus exclusively on Aboriginal youth, and most<br />
have not been adequately evaluated. It is hoped that this situation will change<br />
in the near future, given that the National Crime Prevention Centre is currently<br />
funding a number <strong>of</strong> multi-year projects, all with robust evaluation designs.<br />
We do nevertheless have some basis for determining what types <strong>of</strong> programs<br />
or approaches are likely to fail or to succeed.<br />
What Doesn’t Work?<br />
In Canada, unproven gang suppression strategies have won out over evidencebased<br />
treatment and prevention, and scarce resources are usually spent on<br />
“get tough” approaches. The approaches described below are proven to be<br />
ineffective and should be stopped.<br />
• Gang suppression program evaluations have found mixed results. These<br />
programs seek to prosecute and convict gang members, especially gang<br />
leaders. Although effective in decreasing gang-related crime in the short<br />
term, they fail to address psychosocial issues such as child maltreatment,<br />
mental health, substance abuse, education and employment. Suppression<br />
initiatives should only be utilized to complement a range <strong>of</strong> interventions.<br />
• Incarcerating gang members does not reduce future criminal behaviour (Aos,<br />
Miller, & Drake, 2006). Studies in the U.S.A. and Canada demonstrate<br />
that locking up gang members increases the chances <strong>of</strong> re-<strong>of</strong>fending and<br />
staying in the gang (Benda & Tollet, 1999; Nafekh, 2002; Nafekh & Stys,<br />
2004; Olson, Dooley, & Kane, 2004). Grouping early onset, high-risk<br />
youth together increases the negative bonding amongst members and leads<br />
to even more entrenched anti-social and criminal behaviour. Individualized<br />
approaches in facilities work best (such as cognitive-behavioural individual<br />
and family therapy), but gains are only maintained if adequate resources<br />
are provided to support long-term transition into the community<br />
following release.<br />
• Curriculum-based prevention programs targeting youth at-risk for gang<br />
involvement, such as the American Gang Resistance Education and Training<br />
program (G.R.E.A.T.) and the D.A.R.E. program effect modest, shortterm<br />
change. However, follow-up studies have found program participants<br />
to be as likely as non-participants to become gang members in the longterm<br />
(Esbensen & Osgoode, 1999; Esbensen, Osgood, Taylor, Peterson, &<br />
Freng, 2001; NIJ, 1998; U.S. Surgeon General, 2001).<br />
• Traditional detached-worker programs are ineffective and can do more harm<br />
than good by increasing gang cohesion (Klein, 1995). Modern detachedworker<br />
programs have included curriculum components addressing<br />
consequences <strong>of</strong> gang involvement, peer pressure, and substance abuse. These<br />
programs remain ineffective unless they are integrated into a comprehensive<br />
and coordinated community-wide approach.<br />
• Community development approaches founded on the premise that there is a<br />
singular and cohesive “Aboriginal community” do not work. In reality, there<br />
are many competing interests in most reserves and urban neighbourhoods,<br />
and divisions reflecting religious and spiritual lines, access to income and
144 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 145<br />
wealth, gender, clans and ethnicities, family and gang allegiances. Programs<br />
must effectively engage these subgroups and address the concerns and<br />
priorities <strong>of</strong> each.<br />
• Child welfare models that bring youth into care are replicating Canada’s<br />
sad legacy <strong>of</strong> Residential Schools. Grouping teens with varying degrees <strong>of</strong><br />
antisocial conduct and attitudes in child welfare facilities leads to delinquency<br />
training. Negative attention-forcing behaviour is highly resistant to change:<br />
reprimands serve as rewards because they are reinforced by the reaction <strong>of</strong><br />
peers. Longitudinal studies repeatedly show association with deviant peers<br />
is the strongest correlate <strong>of</strong> escalation in problem behaviors in adolescence.<br />
Children living in group care face much higher risks <strong>of</strong> being victimized<br />
by bullying, sexual abuse, physical restraints by staff, and ultimately being<br />
criminalized. A lack <strong>of</strong> permanency planning contributes to many Aboriginal<br />
children being moved from placement to placement, which contributes to<br />
attachment problems and deep-rooted feelings <strong>of</strong> rejection and shame.<br />
What Works?<br />
Evidence-based approaches are presented below along the five key strategic<br />
areas identified by the National Working Group on Crime Prevention (2007)<br />
as elements <strong>of</strong> success: collaboration and problem-solving partnerships,<br />
concentrating investments on highest needs, developing and sustaining<br />
community capacity, adequate and sustained supports and resources, and<br />
public engagement. Lessons learned from three Canadian projects currently<br />
being evaluated by this author are included in the discussion. All three projects<br />
have mainly Aboriginal staff teams, many <strong>of</strong> whom have past experience in<br />
gangs, the sex trade and street life; Elders are employed in each project as<br />
well. All are gender-responsive, culturally competent, and have the capacity to<br />
respond 24 hours a day, year-round. These programs are:<br />
• The Warrior Spirit Walking Project, delivered by the Prince Albert Outreach<br />
Program Inc., targets 12-20 year-old Aboriginal gang members and youth<br />
at high-risk <strong>of</strong> gang membership. The Circle <strong>of</strong> Courage model (Brendtro,<br />
Brokenleg, & Van Bockern, 2002) is the foundation for this program.<br />
• The North Central Community Association’s Regina Anti-Gang Service<br />
project (RAGS) targets 16-28 year-old gang leaders and their partners and<br />
family members. Core services are based upon the Wraparound and Multi-<br />
Systemic Therapy models (Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, Rowland, &<br />
Cunningham, 1998).<br />
• The Vancouver Aboriginal Youth – Vancouver Police Department Working<br />
Group Creating Healthy Aboriginal Role Models (CHARM) Project targets<br />
youth aged 12-18 years in East Vancouver who are most at risk <strong>of</strong> being<br />
recruited into gangs. All core services are based upon principles <strong>of</strong> positive<br />
youth development and asset building.<br />
Collaboration and Problem-Solving Partnerships<br />
Community-wide, cross-sectoral strategies are required to address the multiple<br />
factors related to gang violence. Silos separating sectors, including Indian and<br />
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), must come down. There are excellent models<br />
from other parts <strong>of</strong> the world that can provide inspiration (see Capobianco,<br />
2006; Capobianco, Shaw, & Dubuc, 2003). In the U.S.A., Spergel’s (1995)<br />
Comprehensive Gang Model is a good example <strong>of</strong> a community-wide response<br />
to gangs. The model assumes that the youth gang problem can be explained by<br />
a lack <strong>of</strong> social opportunities and social disorganization within a community,<br />
where contributing factors such as poverty, institutional racism, poor social<br />
policies, and a lack <strong>of</strong> or misdirected social controls are important. It consists<br />
<strong>of</strong> five core strategies which flow from an integrated and team-oriented<br />
problem solving approach using secondary and tertiary prevention. These<br />
strategies include: community mobilization; social intervention; provision<br />
<strong>of</strong> academic, economic, and social opportunities; gang suppression; and<br />
facilitating organizational change and development (Howell, 2000; OJJDP,<br />
2006; Spergel, 1995). The Little Village Project in Chicago has shown the<br />
most positive outcomes <strong>of</strong> any comprehensive gang intervention program 1<br />
(Spergel, 2006; Spergel et al., 2003). The Project, which involved 200 youth,<br />
was credited with a significant decrease in the number <strong>of</strong> self-reported <strong>of</strong>fences<br />
and arrests over a two-year period, including arrests for violent crimes. Results<br />
indicated that gang members who participated in more individual counseling<br />
sessions were more likely to reduce involvement in gang activities. The hardcore<br />
gang youth demonstrated the most significant decreases in arrests, but there<br />
was not a major decrease in the overall gang crime in the Village. This could<br />
be due to a number <strong>of</strong> factors, including the fact that many gang members in<br />
Little Village did not participate in the project.<br />
Partnerships are also required to develop new models <strong>of</strong> child welfare and<br />
Aboriginal justice. Aboriginal leaders and various levels <strong>of</strong> government must<br />
1 Data consisted <strong>of</strong> 127 individual interviews between Time I and Time III, monthly activity reports to<br />
the Chicago Police Dept., gang member surveys and self-reports, project worker summary reports, field<br />
observations, focus group findings, and police arrest and incident data. These data were compared to data<br />
collected during a three year pre-project period, and with two control groups obtained through arrests <strong>of</strong><br />
non-targeted young people at program entry.
146 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 147<br />
develop effective mechanisms for sharing information. This begins with the<br />
early identification and support <strong>of</strong> high-risk children and families, in order<br />
to provide intensive programs and practices that maintain permanent family<br />
connections for all children. Family empowerment and connectedness should<br />
be targeted in a flexible manner; the goal is to have a continuum <strong>of</strong> connections<br />
and to repatriate kids to their home environments. A proven method to reduce<br />
reliance on residential placement and keep youth in their neighbourhoods<br />
with intensive supports is the Wraparound Process. There are many examples<br />
<strong>of</strong> the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> this approach with Aboriginal peoples in other countries<br />
(for example, see Wyles, 2007). Today, however, the INAC Child and Family<br />
Services Program gives 22% less funding per child than provincially-funded<br />
child welfare agencies.<br />
New models <strong>of</strong> youth justice are also required. Incarceration <strong>of</strong>ten takes place<br />
before youth are recruited into gangs, or, it serves to increase gang cohesion<br />
and membership for those who are already gang-involved. The Canadian<br />
Aboriginal Justice Strategy has not reduced rates <strong>of</strong> crime, victimization, and<br />
incarceration among Aboriginals. The Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) has<br />
a special set <strong>of</strong> criteria and measures for Aboriginal youth, but Provinces and<br />
Territories are not always implementing the Act as intended. Unless we can<br />
dramatically reduce the number <strong>of</strong> young Aboriginals who are incarcerated,<br />
gang violence will only increase.<br />
New collaboration and problem-solving partnerships must be culturally and<br />
gender competent; this goes beyond “cultural awareness” (knowledge about a<br />
group) and “cultural sensitivity” (some level <strong>of</strong> experience with another group).<br />
The Medicine Wheel is an important symbol in Aboriginal teachings; it is a<br />
circular, holistic approach as opposed to the linear approach used in many<br />
Western settings. Aboriginal ways <strong>of</strong> learning place communal generosity<br />
and sharing above individualistic and materialistic gain. The Wheel is highly<br />
valued by the Prince Albert, Regina and Vancouver gang projects as an<br />
approach to preventing violence and supporting gang-involved youth to figure<br />
out their journey in life. However, not all youth want or have a connection to<br />
traditional teachings. In such cases, these projects support youth in exploring<br />
other spiritual avenues, such as faith-based alternatives. The principle <strong>of</strong><br />
gender responsiveness is also highly valued in these projects, and addressing<br />
the unique needs <strong>of</strong> females is prioritized. These young women need nonpunitive,<br />
strength-based and non-hierarchical, relationship-based programs.<br />
It can be dangerous to mix both genders <strong>of</strong> high-risk youth in the same<br />
program – many females report physical, sexual and verbal abuse by young<br />
men in facilities, and that hyper-sexualized relations with male peers and<br />
staff are common (Totten, 2002 and 2004a). There are excellent examples<br />
<strong>of</strong> quality programs in Ontario youth justice that address these concerns (see<br />
Covington, 2003; Myhand & Kivel, 1998).<br />
Concentrating Investments on Highest Needs<br />
The best way to prevent Aboriginal youth gang violence is to intervene early in<br />
the lives <strong>of</strong> children (ages 0-6) and families who are at greater risk <strong>of</strong> negative<br />
outcomes, where children may be exhibiting early onset aggression. One proven<br />
approach is in-home, culturally competent public health nurse visitation with<br />
young, high-risk mothers over the long term, using the “Families First” model<br />
(Browne et al., 2001). If implemented in an intensive manner, physical child<br />
abuse and neglect can be reduced by as much as 80% in high-risk communities<br />
(Duggan et al., 2004; Olds et al., 1998).<br />
Comprehensive FASD prevention programs are also required, as are school<br />
readiness and family literacy programs, infant stimulation and Head Start<br />
programs, and other health promotion programs. The best way to address the<br />
sexual exploitation and trafficking <strong>of</strong> gang-involved Aboriginal girls and women<br />
is to prevent child sexual abuse and implement broad-based education programs<br />
to confront sexism and the early sexualization <strong>of</strong> girls. Gender inequalities<br />
can be reduced by engaging women in positions <strong>of</strong> power and leadership in<br />
individual communities (NWAC, 2007). Finally, quality programs for men<br />
who sexually abuse should be implemented in a comprehensive manner (see<br />
CSC, 1997 and 2001b; Macgregor, 2008).<br />
The cultural competencies <strong>of</strong> schools can be enhanced by increasing the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> Aboriginal teachers and administrators, teaching traditional language<br />
acquisition, reducing the suspension and expulsion <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal students,<br />
and reshaping the curriculum to reflect Aboriginal approaches to knowledge<br />
and teachings. Primary schools are excellent places where children can safely<br />
work on grief and trauma; creative arts techniques and play therapy are proven<br />
interventions (see Crenshaw & Garbarino, 2007; Sklarew, Krupnick, Ward-<br />
Wimmer, & Napoli, 2002). Schools are also good venues to implement quality<br />
suicide prevention programs (see White & Jodoin, 2004).<br />
Developing and Sustaining Community Capacity<br />
We must address the link between individual life experiences and the social<br />
and economic inequalities experienced by Aboriginal people. Strategies must<br />
confront the lack <strong>of</strong> social opportunities and the social disorganization that
148 IPC Review 3 Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada 149<br />
characterizes many communities. Gang-related activities <strong>of</strong>fer employment<br />
and a good income; we cannot reduce gang violence without replacing the lost<br />
income and jobs which gangs provide to members. Quality programs include<br />
those that confront low educational attainment, unemployment, poverty,<br />
unstable and crowded housing conditions, high residential mobility and<br />
substance abuse. Programs must respond to the many competing interests on<br />
many Reserves and urban neighbourhoods. There is a sound body <strong>of</strong> evidence<br />
supporting the relationship between Aboriginal self-government and positive<br />
outcomes. Efficient settlement <strong>of</strong> land claims is directly related to improving<br />
the overall standard <strong>of</strong> living for Aboriginal peoples (Capobianco, 2006;<br />
Capobianco et al., 2003; Blackstock & Trocme, 2005).<br />
Adequate and Sustained Supports and Resources<br />
Most gang-related resources go to law enforcement and corrections – yet,<br />
things will not get better until more resources are dedicated to prevention.<br />
This means re-dedicating existing resources and getting players in the justice<br />
sector to behave differently. There is much resistance to doing this. One small<br />
example is the proven ineffectiveness <strong>of</strong> the RCMP curriculum-based drug<br />
and gang prevention programs (Ennett & Tobler, 1994; U.S. Surgeon General,<br />
2001). This money should be reinvested in proven school-based programs<br />
involving police such as the intensive mentoring, supervision and support <strong>of</strong><br />
very high-risk students and their families, beginning in elementary school<br />
(Schumacher & Kurz, 1999; Totten, 2004b). Although the most effective<br />
method <strong>of</strong> preventing youth gang involvement is reducing child maltreatment,<br />
the vast majority <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal child welfare funds go to strategies that don’t<br />
work, such as placements in residential facilities. Money can be saved by closing<br />
some facilities and investing the savings in intensive, home-based programs.<br />
Finally, we should extend National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) funding<br />
for Aboriginal gang prevention projects far beyond 2011, and assure that other<br />
prevention initiatives have long-term funding and robust evaluations.<br />
Public Engagement<br />
In Canada, few seem to care about the burden <strong>of</strong> suffering <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal<br />
youth. Young gang members, most <strong>of</strong> whom have survived trauma in<br />
childhood, are committing suicide and killing each other at alarmingly high<br />
rates – and things will only get worse with the rapidly shifting demographics<br />
in many communities. There are thousands <strong>of</strong> missing and sexually trafficked<br />
Aboriginal girls in this country, many <strong>of</strong> whom are gang-involved. But, the<br />
average Canadian faces little or no risk <strong>of</strong> being harmed by young Aboriginal<br />
gang members, who arguably are killing the Aboriginal part <strong>of</strong> themselves.<br />
Public education is required to confront the huge gap between what we are<br />
currently doing to address gang problems and what the evidence says works.<br />
The Federal Public Apology in June 2008 and the Residential School Truth<br />
and Reconciliation Commission present excellent opportunities to engage<br />
the Canadian public on the unique historic, social and economic con<strong>text</strong><br />
enveloping Aboriginal youth gang violence.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Aboriginal youth gang violence in Canada has reached epidemic levels in many<br />
communities. If we fail to act now, we will pay dearly within the next decade.<br />
Many remote and urban communities in Western Canada will have double<br />
the number <strong>of</strong> young Aboriginal men within the next ten years – it is these<br />
male youth who are most at risk <strong>of</strong> gang involvement. Prevention strategies<br />
must interrupt the main pathways into gang violence, including serious and<br />
prolonged child maltreatment, long-term institutionalization in child welfare<br />
and youth justice facilities, brain and mental health disorders caused by<br />
trauma and FASD, social exclusion and devaluation, and the development <strong>of</strong><br />
violent and sexualized gender identities. In general, there is a poor fit between<br />
traditional theories <strong>of</strong> violence and that exhibited by Aboriginal gangs. These<br />
models do not incorporate factors related to loss, trauma and developmental<br />
impairments, nor do they focus on historic, social and economic conditions.<br />
Most <strong>of</strong> our current strategies to address youth gang violence are not based on<br />
sound evidence. Repression approaches are very costly and do not <strong>of</strong>fer longterm<br />
solutions; in fact, a substantial body <strong>of</strong> evidence suggests that law and<br />
order approaches actually increase gang activities. We should shift our focus<br />
and our supports to more proven and promising ways <strong>of</strong> addressing Aboriginal<br />
youth gang violence.<br />
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Trocme, N., Knoke, D., & Blackstock, C. (2004). Pathways to the<br />
overrepresentation <strong>of</strong> aboriginal children in Canada’s child welfare<br />
system. <strong>Social</strong> Service Review, 78(4), 577-601.<br />
VIOLENCE<br />
AGAINST<br />
WOMEN<br />
United States Surgeon General. (2001). Youth violence: A report <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Surgeon General. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Health<br />
and Human Services.<br />
Weatherburn, D., Fitzgerald, J., & Hua, J. (2003). Reducing aboriginal<br />
overrepresentation in prison. Australian Journal <strong>of</strong> Public<br />
Administration, 62(3), 65-73.<br />
White, J., & Jodoin, N. (2004). Aboriginal youth: A manual <strong>of</strong> promising<br />
suicide prevention strategies. Calgary, AB: Centre for Suicide<br />
Prevention.<br />
Wyles, P. (2007). Success with Wraparound: A collaborative, individualized,<br />
integrated, & strength-based model. Youth Studies Australia, 26(4),<br />
45-53.<br />
York, G. (1990). The dispossessed: Life and death in native Canada. London:<br />
Vintage U.K.
Volume 3: pages 159–177<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Community Collaboratives as<br />
a Strategy to Engage Regional<br />
Government in the Prevention<br />
<strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women<br />
Julie Pehar<br />
Peel Committee on Sexual Assault<br />
Christine Sevigny<br />
Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse<br />
Résumé<br />
Les réponses pénales à la violence faite aux femmes tendent à être<br />
réactives et orientées vers le contrevenant. D’autre part, les initiatives<br />
préventives ne donnent que peu d’attention à l’importance de la prise<br />
en compte du genre (gender mainstreaming) dans leurs pratiques et<br />
politiques. Les actions des gouvernements centraux à l’égard de la violence<br />
faite aux femmes ne reflètent que rarement une analyse des causes<br />
systémiques du problème ou un engagement pour les types de solutions<br />
nécessaires pour améliorer la sécurité des femmes. Plusieurs ont donc<br />
tourné leur attention à tenter d’influencer les politiques et pratiques au<br />
niveau local et, plus particulièrement, à essayer d’assurer une approche<br />
systématique à l’intégration de l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes<br />
dans la planification, la mise-en-œuvre et l’évaluation des programmes<br />
et services municipaux ou régionaux. Cet article décrit l’émergence d’une<br />
telle tentative dans la Région de Peel en Ontario (Canada) sous la forme de<br />
collaboration communautaire entre de nombreuses agences qui œuvrent<br />
dans le domaine de la violence faite aux femmes. La discussion met l’accent<br />
sur leur succès et sur certains des défis auxquels ils et elles font face et<br />
termine en proposant des recommandations pour améliorer l’efficacité et<br />
la durabilité de la collaboration communautaire dans ce domaine.
160 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 161<br />
Abstract<br />
Criminal justice responses to violence against women have tended to be<br />
reactive and <strong>of</strong>fender-focused and crime prevention initiatives have paid<br />
relatively little attention to gender mainstreaming. Central government<br />
action in this area seldom reflects a broad analysis <strong>of</strong> the systemic root<br />
causes <strong>of</strong> the problem, or a commitment to the types <strong>of</strong> solutions needed<br />
to be effective in improving the safety <strong>of</strong> women. In response, many<br />
have turned their attention to attempting to influence local policies and<br />
practices and, more specifically, to trying to assure gender mainstreaming<br />
in the planning, delivery and evaluation <strong>of</strong> municipal or regional programs<br />
and services. One approach is the emergence <strong>of</strong> community collaboratives<br />
that bring together agencies and advocates active in the area <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
against women. Using a case study <strong>of</strong> two community collaboratives in<br />
Peel Region, Ontario (Canada) this article describes their emergence and<br />
their attempts to influence the practices <strong>of</strong> the Regional Government. The<br />
discussion focuses on some <strong>of</strong> their successes and on some <strong>of</strong> the challenges<br />
they face, and concludes with recommendations for improving the efficacy<br />
and the sustainability <strong>of</strong> community collaboratives.<br />
Introduction<br />
According to the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World<br />
Conference on Women in 1995:<br />
Violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
objectives <strong>of</strong> equality, development and peace. Violence against women<br />
both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women <strong>of</strong> their<br />
human rights and fundamental freedoms. (para 112)<br />
Yet, designing and implementing an effective response to violence against<br />
women is proving difficult, in part because <strong>of</strong> the emphasis <strong>of</strong> central<br />
governments on justice-oriented and <strong>of</strong>fender-based responses. Such<br />
approaches fail to acknowledge that interpersonal violence is linked to the<br />
social, political and economic structures in which individuals live or to see<br />
that violence prevention initiatives will only be effective if they address these<br />
structural factors (Hayes, 2006).<br />
Addressing violence against women requires an integrated approach by<br />
all levels <strong>of</strong> government, and must include a commitment to “gender<br />
mainstreaming”, or the incorporation <strong>of</strong> a gender lens into all aspects and all<br />
stages <strong>of</strong> the planning, delivery and evaluation <strong>of</strong> public policy. This has been<br />
espoused as necessary and critical to ensuring that the “needs and differential<br />
experiences <strong>of</strong> women and girls (and men and boys) are taken into account at<br />
all stages <strong>of</strong> community safety planning, especially at the local level” (Shaw<br />
& Capobianco, 2004, p. 3). Women’s voices must be present and supported<br />
as integral components <strong>of</strong> the governance in attempts to address violence<br />
against women. Structures and processes must allow women to participate<br />
in an effective and inclusive manner in the design, delivery and evaluation <strong>of</strong><br />
initiatives that address community safety and the problem <strong>of</strong> violence against<br />
women. In addition, local municipal and regional governments must recognize<br />
their enormous potential to affect programs and services in a meaningful way<br />
using the knowledge and research available on crime risk and protective factors<br />
as they pertain to violence against women (Johnson, 2007).<br />
One response is the emergence <strong>of</strong> community collaboratives. These initiatives<br />
usually involve cooperative relations among and between advocates, activists<br />
and agencies involved in responding to violence against women. This article<br />
focuses on two community collaboratives in Peel Region (Ontario, Canada).<br />
It describes the emergence <strong>of</strong> these collaboratives, and discusses some <strong>of</strong> their<br />
successes and some <strong>of</strong> the challenges they face in their attempt to achieve<br />
gender mainstreaming within Regional Government planning and activities.<br />
Collaboratives: An Adaptation to Challenging Times<br />
Collaboratives have been defined as “a group <strong>of</strong> community leaders who use an<br />
inclusive strategy to establish shared goals and agree to use their personal and<br />
institutional power to achieve them” (Institute for Educational Leadership,<br />
2008, p. 3). Gray (1989) highlights that “collaboration is a process through<br />
which parties who see different aspects <strong>of</strong> a problem constructively explore their<br />
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited visions<br />
<strong>of</strong> what is possible” (p. 5, as cited in Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996, p. 605).<br />
Collaboration is further “characterized by mutual benefit, interdependence,<br />
reciprocity, concerted action and joint production” (Abramson & Rosenthal,<br />
1995, p. 1479 as cited in Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996, p. 605). Armed with<br />
a collective mandate and formal partner agreements, collaboratives are seen<br />
as credible and can attract and involve a wide range <strong>of</strong> community experts<br />
and resources. In an environment where resources are limited and government<br />
functions are increasingly decentralized, the trend toward collaboratives has<br />
been labelled the “devolution revolution” (Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996,<br />
p. 602) Inter-organizational community-based collaboratives are seen as a<br />
strategic response to a changing social work agenda, and a means for local
162 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 163<br />
health and social service organizations, community leaders and neighbourhood<br />
businesses to improve their access to resources and decision-making processes<br />
(Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996).<br />
There are two collaboratives active in the area <strong>of</strong> violence against women in the<br />
Peel Region – the Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse (PCAWA) and the<br />
Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA) – which have been operating for<br />
almost 25 and 20 years, respectively. In our view, the established partnerships<br />
and a history <strong>of</strong> working relationships with the municipality, combined with<br />
a roster <strong>of</strong> successful initiatives, have encouraged the increasing support <strong>of</strong><br />
municipal leaders for gender mainstreaming in attempts to respond to violence<br />
against women.<br />
Peel’s response to issues <strong>of</strong> violence against women has broadened over time to<br />
extend the focus beyond a single problem and toward affecting social change<br />
by utilizing a comprehensive, integrative anti-racism/anti-oppression approach.<br />
As articulated by Together We Can (2009), “reform will not succeed unless<br />
collaboratives give serious attention to the inclusion <strong>of</strong> diverse groups, drawing<br />
upon their cultural strengths and ensuring equal opportunity for people <strong>of</strong> all<br />
backgrounds”. Often, municipal governments are simultaneously engaged in<br />
a multitude <strong>of</strong> services and programs that address issues <strong>of</strong> violence against<br />
women yet do not recognize the broad links between social, economic and<br />
health services as they impact women’s lives and safety. Engaging participation<br />
from and partnership with the municipal government has been a deliberate<br />
strategy by the collaboratives in attempting to get involved in policy and program<br />
development, and to encourage the types <strong>of</strong> complex and multi-departmental<br />
regional approaches that will contribute to ending violence against women.<br />
Community collaboratives can be fragile. Together We Can (2009) describes<br />
the collaborative process as “non linear” and emphasizes that “collaboratives<br />
are a spiral process, where they <strong>of</strong>ten take several steps forward and then<br />
double back to address earlier unresolved issues.” Being in a collaborative is<br />
a journey in patience, frustration, insecurity and complete exuberance where<br />
collective voice is <strong>of</strong>ten delicate and powerful all at once. Bailey and McNally<br />
Koney (1996) add that collaboratives are <strong>of</strong>ten faced with dilemmas that<br />
reflect competing realities: “a dilemma, unlike a problem, presents different<br />
approaches to an issue. Whereas a problem tends to have a good and bad or<br />
right and wrong solution, a dilemma usually represents multiple truths with<br />
degrees <strong>of</strong> rightness and wrongness” (p. 4). As with many conflicts that arise in<br />
collective work, these dilemmas cannot be treated and resolved as if they were<br />
problems – they must be managed (Bailey & McNally Koney, 1996).<br />
Collaborative work on violence against women, and attempts to partner<br />
with municipal governments, face a number <strong>of</strong> challenges, including limited<br />
funding, misunderstandings and misinformation, personal biases, stereotypes<br />
and entrenched systemic sexism, racism and other forms <strong>of</strong> oppression.<br />
The combination <strong>of</strong> traditional approaches to crime and caution around<br />
entering the realm <strong>of</strong> private, domestic or sexual behaviours can also generate<br />
resistance to gender mainstreaming work. Collaboratives are entities that must<br />
continually adapt to challenges, some <strong>of</strong> which are expected and others that<br />
are unforeseen.<br />
Nevertheless, the government in Peel Region is including longstanding<br />
community collaboratives in their attempts to broaden the scope <strong>of</strong> antiviolence<br />
work. Through a case study <strong>of</strong> Peel Region, this article will address:<br />
• The nature <strong>of</strong> collaborative partnerships between Peel regional government<br />
and two community collaboratives, the Peel Committee Against Woman<br />
Abuse (PCAWA) and the Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA).<br />
• The dynamics <strong>of</strong> a deepening relationship between the regional government<br />
and the two community collaboratives.<br />
• The critical role <strong>of</strong> Women in Cities International (WICI) and the skills<br />
and increased capacity that PCAWA and PCSA have acquired as a result <strong>of</strong><br />
participation with WICI.<br />
• The strategies that are being used to ensure the successful integration<br />
<strong>of</strong> equity tools and gender mainstreaming principles in the municipal<br />
government’s programs, services and internal operations, and the challenges<br />
that come along with these initiatives.<br />
The Collaboratives <strong>of</strong> Peel Region<br />
A Snapshot <strong>of</strong> Peel Region<br />
Peel Region is a large urban and rural geographical expanse, situated directly<br />
west <strong>of</strong> Toronto, Ontario. It is comprised <strong>of</strong> two cities, Mississauga and<br />
Brampton and one town, Caledon. Peel has a two-tier governance system<br />
including regional and local governments. Peel also has three mayors, one for<br />
each city and town. At present, all three mayors are women, and a higher than<br />
average number <strong>of</strong> elected counselors in Peel are also women (58% compared<br />
to the national average <strong>of</strong> 22%).<br />
According to 2006 Census data, the population <strong>of</strong> Peel is 1,159,405 people,<br />
and is 51% female and 49% male (The <strong>Social</strong> Planning Council <strong>of</strong> Peel, 2007).
164 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 165<br />
Peel Region is ethno-racially and culturally diverse:<br />
• 43% <strong>of</strong> Peel’s population are immigrants compared to the Provincial<br />
average <strong>of</strong> 27%;<br />
• There are 93 ethnic groups in Peel, with 60 different languages<br />
spoken; and<br />
• 50% <strong>of</strong> Peel’s population consists <strong>of</strong> people from racialized communities.<br />
Peel Region is one <strong>of</strong> the top ten fastest growing Regions in Canada, and<br />
from 2001 to 2006, it was the second fastest growing Region in Ontario,<br />
with 34,000 people moving into Peel Region each year (The <strong>Social</strong> Planning<br />
Council <strong>of</strong> Peel, 2007). This poses significant challenges to the service system<br />
in its attempts to provide truly accessible and inclusive services. One <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ongoing barriers to meeting the service needs <strong>of</strong> residents in Peel is the “Fair<br />
Share” allocation <strong>of</strong> provincial funding support, which is not reflective <strong>of</strong> the<br />
reality <strong>of</strong> Peel’s growth patterns:<br />
Provincial funding for social services has not kept pace with the growth<br />
<strong>of</strong> regions in the [geographical areas surrounding Toronto] or with<br />
increasing ethno-cultural diversity, which have both contributed to<br />
significant increases in need. Indeed, Peel receives less than half <strong>of</strong> what<br />
some municipalities received when viewed on a per capita funding basis<br />
for the province. (Fair Share Task Force, 2009)<br />
Wait times for subsidized housing for applicants who have experienced<br />
domestic violence have increased to 1-3 years compared to the originally<br />
intended wait <strong>of</strong> 1-2 months. In Peel, wait times for subsidized housing for<br />
adults and families is the longest in the Province and is currently 21 years<br />
(Region <strong>of</strong> Peel Housing, 2009).<br />
As for crime rates, Peel Regional Police annual statistical reports for Mississauga<br />
and Brampton indicate that from 2003 to 2007, domestic disputes have<br />
increased by 35.4% and sexual assaults have increased by 18.5%. These rates<br />
remind us that in an increasingly borderless world, gender-based violence is a<br />
wide-spread and socially tolerated form <strong>of</strong> human rights violations, and “both<br />
reflects and reinforces inequities between men and women and compromises<br />
the health, dignity, security and autonomy <strong>of</strong> its victims” (United Nations<br />
Population Fund, 2005 as cited in Johnson, 2006, p. 8).<br />
Meet the Collaboratives<br />
The Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse (PCAWA) and the Peel Committee<br />
on Sexual Assault (PCSA) operate as community collaboratives in Peel Region.<br />
Both have a combination <strong>of</strong> core funding and project funding and engage<br />
multiple community partners representing a wide variety <strong>of</strong> human service<br />
sectors, including education, health, police, legal, crown attorneys, victim<br />
witness, child witness, victim services, sexual assault services, counseling,<br />
family services, housing, shelters, children’s aid, Ontario Works, ethnospecific,<br />
seniors and youth. Initiatives range from the development <strong>of</strong> Regional<br />
best practices and protocols, to cross-sectoral training, service coordination,<br />
referral practices, resource development, pr<strong>of</strong>essional development and<br />
training, networking, relationship building, public education, advocacy, and<br />
media relations.<br />
The Peel Committee Against Woman Abuse was first established in 1984<br />
when a group <strong>of</strong> individuals from various Violence Against Women agencies<br />
came together to consider ways <strong>of</strong> working collaboratively towards the<br />
elimination <strong>of</strong> violence against women in the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel. In the early<br />
years, PCAWA’s core operations consisted <strong>of</strong> networking, advocating for<br />
increased funding, raising public awareness through education and outreach<br />
campaigns, community development, and building the organizational capacity<br />
<strong>of</strong> the membership. PCAWA has since grown in size and scope, reflecting the<br />
needs and capacities <strong>of</strong> its members and the diverse communities they serve.<br />
PCAWA’s membership now consists <strong>of</strong> close to 40 agencies and organizations.<br />
It currently has two full-time staff; additional staff are hired on contract to<br />
implement individually-funded projects when they arise. Currently, it is not an<br />
independently incorporated organization and relies on having a lead or trustee<br />
organization to manage its funds.<br />
The Peel Committee on Sexual Assault (PCSA) formed in 1989 when<br />
a consortium <strong>of</strong> multi-disciplinary pr<strong>of</strong>essionals came together to work<br />
collaboratively to establish a comprehensive and effective community response<br />
to sexual violence. In 1992, Trillium Health Centre became the Regional<br />
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Treatment Centre for Peel Region.<br />
Shortly after, in 1995, the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Health and Long Term Care provided<br />
core funding for PCSA to operate as a part <strong>of</strong> Trillium Health Centre’s<br />
Women’s and Children’s Health System, and the Ministry <strong>of</strong> the Attorney<br />
General funded the Sexual Assault/Rape Crisis Centre <strong>of</strong> Peel.
166 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 167<br />
PCSA’s goal is to enhance interagency and community co-operation and<br />
collaboration and to promote, enhance and maintain a continuum <strong>of</strong> education,<br />
prevention, service delivery, research and social change initiatives. PCSA<br />
operates as a community collaborative and has 25 signatory members. Like<br />
PCAWA, the core operations consist <strong>of</strong> networking, advocating for increased<br />
and supplemental funding, raising public awareness through education and<br />
outreach campaigns, community development, and building the organizational<br />
capacity <strong>of</strong> the membership. It is currently staffed by one full-time coordinator<br />
and one part-time administrative assistant. Contingent on project funds,<br />
consultants are occasionally hired to work on specific initiatives.<br />
PCAWA and PCSA operate from a common framework that provides a<br />
foundation for understanding issues and experiences, and also serves as a tool<br />
for problem-solving. The Integrative Feminist Anti-Racism/Anti-Oppression<br />
Framework is an approach that is woman-centred and focuses on the lives<br />
and realities <strong>of</strong> women and marginalized people. It affirms women’s right to<br />
contribute to, and to determine, the social, political and economic changes<br />
in their lives. It affirms their right to safe spaces in the groups, agencies, and<br />
institutions they encounter in their lives. This framework also recognizes that<br />
racism and oppression are systemic within our institutions, both formally and<br />
informally, intentionally and unintentionally. It recognizes that power and<br />
privilege exist and that these are based on skin colour, sexual orientation, class,<br />
gender, age, faith, and ability, and that these privileges are institutionalized<br />
and help maintain unequal relationships between people and groups. An<br />
Integrative Feminist Anti-Racism/Anti-Oppression Framework recognizes that,<br />
while violence against women cuts across all communities <strong>of</strong> women, it always<br />
happens in a social and historical con<strong>text</strong>.<br />
This framework is further supplemented by an intersectional approach<br />
(Crenshaw, 1994) that analyzes how gender, race, class, sexuality and other<br />
social and cultural identities intersect to create a system <strong>of</strong> multiple forms <strong>of</strong><br />
oppression. This requires that members <strong>of</strong> both collaboratives also consider their<br />
own lives in the light <strong>of</strong> an intersectional framework, to see who they are, how<br />
they are connected and how they are also participants in systems <strong>of</strong> oppression.<br />
It is important to recognize that the process <strong>of</strong> developing and fostering this<br />
understanding is complex and transformative, and it can be challenging to<br />
make the necessary changes to move towards more equitable systems and<br />
relations. This framework, and the insistence that women and girls must be<br />
distinctly named and included in any crime prevention initiative, are the rudder<br />
that steers the collaboratives in their work, whether internally, within partner<br />
agencies, amongst the community or when engaging in political consultation.<br />
Groundwork with Peel Municipal/Regional Government<br />
The PCAWA and PCSA have been around long enough to build trusting<br />
relationships with regional partners. The Region <strong>of</strong> Peel was an early supporter<br />
<strong>of</strong> collaborative work and <strong>of</strong> the community working together to end woman<br />
abuse, and participates in a number <strong>of</strong> work groups and community projects<br />
in areas such as public health, sexual health, housing, Ontario Works, mental<br />
health, childcare, early child development, youth, and police services.<br />
The Region has contributed directly to the governance <strong>of</strong> both collaboratives<br />
through the allocation <strong>of</strong> staff representatives and financial resources.<br />
Furthermore, the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel currently provides core financial support to<br />
PCAWA, which illustrates the value the Region places on the outcome-based<br />
and community-driven model <strong>of</strong> work adopted and practised by PCAWA.<br />
This level <strong>of</strong> participation has ensured that the collaboratives receive current<br />
information on related regional programs and have direct access to some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
supports and resources <strong>of</strong>fered by the Region. There have been many successful<br />
partnership projects over the past twenty years between the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel and<br />
the two collaboratives, some <strong>of</strong> which are still in place. One such example is<br />
the Building Blocks Project, which developed an anti-violence resource for<br />
service providers and parents to use with children. Member organizations <strong>of</strong><br />
the collaboratives, including the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel’s Public Health Department,<br />
participated in its development and production. More recently (and four years<br />
after its initial production), the Public Health Department reached out to the<br />
collaboratives in order to revise the tool and reproduce and redistribute it to<br />
the community. Another successful undertaking was the partnership created<br />
between the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel’s Public Health Department and the collaboratives<br />
to provide awareness raising and educational initiatives to service providers in<br />
Peel on the topic <strong>of</strong> sex work. This also resulted in the adoption <strong>of</strong> new protocols<br />
within both the PCSA and PCAWA for the inclusion <strong>of</strong> sex trade workers.<br />
Yet, despite the longstanding relation between the collaboratives and the<br />
Region, and some successful ventures, a pattern <strong>of</strong> unidirectional influence was<br />
apparent. The Region’s support was largely financial, advisory and in the form<br />
<strong>of</strong> staff support for working groups, making the collaboratives the recipients<br />
<strong>of</strong> support and information from the Region. There was no forum through<br />
which the expertise or equity-based philosophy <strong>of</strong> the collaboratives could be<br />
captured in any Regional planning or programming. In 2006, participation in<br />
a national project and in a United Nations Conference would be the catalyst<br />
for monumental change in Peel.
168 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 169<br />
Women in Cities International<br />
As in many Western countries, ground level work on women’s safety and<br />
equity in Canada and in Peel Region specifically is <strong>of</strong>ten carried out in<br />
isolation and with much energy expanded on organizational survival and<br />
meeting the immediate service needs <strong>of</strong> women and their children. Often,<br />
knowledge exchange and involvement in broader global advocacy is not within<br />
our practical reach or part <strong>of</strong> the focus <strong>of</strong> funding priorities. Our introduction<br />
to Women in Cites International (WICI) would <strong>of</strong>fer us the opportunity to<br />
position ourselves on the international stage and enable us to examine the<br />
work in Peel in relation to similar work that was happening globally.<br />
In 2006, Women in Cities International, funded by Status <strong>of</strong> Women Canada,<br />
circulated a call for proposals for a project entitled “Building Partnerships<br />
for Local Action on Women’s Safety.” WICI is an international network <strong>of</strong><br />
partners concerned with gender equity issues and the place <strong>of</strong> women in cities.<br />
It seeks to disseminate information on issues related to gender equality, the role<br />
<strong>of</strong> women in cities, and the application <strong>of</strong> a gender approach in community<br />
and municipal decision-making and public policy processes. This network acts<br />
as a consultant to local, national, and international governments in promoting<br />
policies and programs that take gender into account, foster the greater<br />
participation <strong>of</strong> women, and increase the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> actions undertaken<br />
by women’s organizations at the community level. The Building Partnerships<br />
for Local Action on Women’s Safety project aimed to facilitate the involvement<br />
<strong>of</strong> women’s organizations in the public policy process and increase sustainable<br />
working relationships between public bodies and communities by developing<br />
and implementing a new partnership model in six pilot communities in Canada.<br />
Peel was accepted as one <strong>of</strong> the six pilot sites (along with Williams Lake, BC;<br />
Regina, SK; Bellechasse, QC; Kuujjuaq, NU; and Charlottetown, PEI) and<br />
began a multi-year initiative with WICI to learn to partner effectively with<br />
our Municipal government and raise awareness <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming and<br />
ultimately facilitate its implementation. The conclusion <strong>of</strong> the second year <strong>of</strong><br />
this project involved Peel region’s participation in the UN-Habitat Conference,<br />
the World Urban Forum III (WUF3).<br />
Since the mid 1970s, the United Nations has been experiencing a ground<br />
swell <strong>of</strong> women-led advocacy around issues <strong>of</strong> women’s safety and political<br />
participation. At that time, the United Nations supported the UN Environmental<br />
Program (UNEP), which struggled to differentiate the complex intersection<br />
<strong>of</strong> environmental and habitat issues (Lee-Smith, 2006). The result was the<br />
formation <strong>of</strong> the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS),<br />
which, in 2002 became United Nations Habitat (UN-Habitat), a full fledged<br />
program <strong>of</strong> the United Nations (Lee-Smith, 2006). The tireless advocacy <strong>of</strong><br />
many feminists and their allies to highlight women’s unique experience <strong>of</strong><br />
their environment and habitat fostered a growing consciousness <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong><br />
women to own, control and inherit property, as well as their role in governance<br />
and community development, including safety. The World Urban Forum III<br />
took place in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada in June 2006 and was the<br />
meeting ground for the Women in Cities International pilot site directors, as<br />
well as thousands <strong>of</strong> women’s organizations from around the world.<br />
The WUF3 was dedicated to examining rapid urbanization in a world where<br />
half <strong>of</strong> humanity lives in cities and where, over the next 50 years, that proportion<br />
is expected to reach two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the global population. Most <strong>of</strong> this urban<br />
growth is taking place in developing countries, but wealthier nations are also<br />
experiencing problems <strong>of</strong> rapid urbanization such as crumbling infrastructure,<br />
smog, and social exclusion. The Region <strong>of</strong> Peel’s Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Health<br />
and both collaborative directors traveled to Vancouver for the WUF3. The<br />
Forum brought together experts from around the world representing all<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> government, local authorities, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental<br />
organizations, international organizations, community groups,<br />
urban and business pr<strong>of</strong>essionals, academics, students, and national and<br />
international associations. For five days, thousands <strong>of</strong> participants from more<br />
than 150 nations discussed, debated and shared experiences about how to make<br />
our cities better places to live. Canada’s participation featured Peel Region,<br />
along with the other five Canadian pilot sites, as models <strong>of</strong> communities<br />
working effectively with their municipal government. The experience provided<br />
the collaboratives with strategies to continue to broaden their influence with<br />
the Region. Participation in this event provided PCAWA and PCSA with<br />
a stronger rationale and an evidence-based foundation on which to begin<br />
changing the unidirectional nature <strong>of</strong> their relationship with the Region and<br />
introduced both the collaboratives and the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel to the fundamental<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming in local governance.<br />
Gender Mainstreaming in Peel Region<br />
Upon returning from the World Urban Forum in June 2006, PCAWA,<br />
PCSA and the regional Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Health developed new strategies as<br />
to how to influence discussions about gender mainstreaming at the regional<br />
level. Coincidentally, the Region was in the midst <strong>of</strong> developing a three-year<br />
Regional Strategic Plan (2007-2010), for which it was soliciting stakeholder<br />
input. Both collaboratives participated in the stakeholder sessions to attempt
170 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 171<br />
to push for gender analysis at the Regional planning level. While input was<br />
graciously received at that time, the priorities <strong>of</strong> the Regional Strategic Plan did<br />
not reflect gender specifically, but rather referred to gender within the con<strong>text</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> a grouping <strong>of</strong> diverse communities and vulnerable people. Response to this<br />
omission by the collaboratives was swift. A joint letter was prepared which<br />
represented the collective disappointment <strong>of</strong> over 40 community agencies.<br />
The Region <strong>of</strong> Peel responded by inviting PCSA and PCAWA to a meeting with<br />
senior administrators, including the Regional Chair, the Chief Administrative<br />
Officer and two commissioners (Health and Human Services). At this<br />
unprecedented meeting, a series <strong>of</strong> recommendations for a “Gender Strategy”<br />
were made. The following recommendations were presented by PCSA and<br />
PCAWA to the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel:<br />
• A commitment to developing and establishing a gender strategy in the 2007-<br />
2010 Strategic Plan.<br />
• A resourced staff person or consultant to implement the “gender strategy”<br />
for Peel Region tied to the strategic priorities and plan.<br />
• The adoption and application <strong>of</strong> an agreed upon gender equity tool through<br />
which the Region considers the impacts <strong>of</strong> gendered experiences <strong>of</strong> diverse<br />
groups <strong>of</strong> women.<br />
• The development <strong>of</strong> an accountability process that engages diverse<br />
women and women’s groups within Peel to ensure the success <strong>of</strong> the<br />
gender strategy.<br />
• The development <strong>of</strong>, and support for, a Women’s Advisory Council to ensure<br />
structured community participation by diverse women and women’s groups<br />
to advise the Region on issues <strong>of</strong> concern.<br />
• The expansion <strong>of</strong> financial support from Peel region to gender specific work<br />
through support <strong>of</strong> the PCSA and PCAWA collaboratives.<br />
Shortly following this meeting, two <strong>of</strong> the recommendations were adopted<br />
by the Region: a senior staff person from the Region was assigned to work in<br />
partnership with the collaboratives on issues <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming, and<br />
a commitment was made to identifying and using a gender equity tool. The<br />
Region was not questioning “why” gender mainstreaming was critical, but<br />
acknowledging that they needed the collaboratives’ help in understanding<br />
“how” we could successfully work together to achieve it. This was indeed a<br />
turning point in our work together and has been the foundation and centre <strong>of</strong><br />
our work since.<br />
Following several brainstorming meetings over several months, we collectively<br />
agreed to proceed by exploring the adoption <strong>of</strong> a gender equity tool. We discussed<br />
how to integrate such a tool, and in particular the existing one developed by<br />
the City <strong>of</strong> Ottawa, into regional strategic processes at all levels. Additionally,<br />
work with senior regional staff began to identify and align pre-existing work<br />
at the Region which was addressing some <strong>of</strong> the individual, relationship and<br />
social/systemic factors identified by the World Health Organization as key risk<br />
factors for violence (Krug et al., 2002).<br />
The work with the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel in the prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women<br />
remains a case study “in motion”, as it is still largely in its infancy. The<br />
relationship with and support from WICI was the catalyst from which the<br />
well-established collaboratives gained the momentum necessary to work with<br />
the Region in a richer and more reciprocal way. The gender mainstreaming<br />
approach has provided a sound, evidence-based vehicle for PCAWA and PCSA<br />
in working towards integrating gender as a dimension in planning, policy and<br />
service delivery in Peel Region.<br />
Successes and Challenges<br />
Recognizing and Integrating Gender<br />
According to Shaw and Capobianco (2004), “over the past few years the<br />
need for gender to be taken into account at all policy levels has been clearly<br />
articulated[…] There is now some evidence <strong>of</strong> greater understanding <strong>of</strong> the<br />
need to put gender into crime prevention” (p. 3). The absence <strong>of</strong> a gender<br />
analysis in political discourse contributes to the invisibility <strong>of</strong> private violence<br />
that is perpetrated by friends, acquaintances and intimate partners and<br />
family members in the privacy <strong>of</strong> homes. The systemic variables involved in<br />
global violence against women and children are critical targets <strong>of</strong> effective<br />
crime prevention and safe, sustainable cities. Gender mainstreaming, or<br />
the incorporation <strong>of</strong> gender into all areas <strong>of</strong> public policy, was formally<br />
promoted by the United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing<br />
in 1995. It requires that governments ensure that women participate in<br />
political decision-making (Shaw & Andrews, 2005). Central to the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
women’s empowerment and voice is an approach that walks with women from<br />
dependence to autonomy. According to Whitzman (2006):<br />
The people who are most vulnerable to violence can become experts in<br />
what is needed to make their communities safer. They need to be listened
172 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 173<br />
to, given the resources to help themselves, and empowered to make<br />
positive decisions for themselves and the people they care for. (p. 25)<br />
In Peel Region, we have met with considerable successes in the area <strong>of</strong><br />
naming gender and introducing concepts <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming, though<br />
there is still much work to be done. Successes include the broadening <strong>of</strong> a<br />
gender equity approach into a multi-focal strategy that recognizes intersecting<br />
oppressions and is more inclusive. Also, there is an increasing understanding<br />
on the part <strong>of</strong> funders <strong>of</strong> the priority <strong>of</strong> addressing violence against women and<br />
<strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> consulting with women-centred service agencies around<br />
their future funding priorities. There is a growing acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
notions <strong>of</strong> equity and inclusion and most community initiatives have a strong<br />
“diversity” component. Lastly, initiatives such as those supported by WICI<br />
and Status <strong>of</strong> Women Canada highlight the connection between global and<br />
local advocacy efforts and provide us with rare opportunities to position our<br />
Region in the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong> international advocacy.<br />
Despite these successes, we continue to face a number <strong>of</strong> challenges in the area<br />
<strong>of</strong> naming gender and successfully applying a gender mainstreaming approach.<br />
Woman abuse and sexual violence continue to remain outside the traditional<br />
notions <strong>of</strong> crime prevention. Many victims and advocates continue to place<br />
issues <strong>of</strong> woman abuse outside <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> “crime” – statistics around<br />
disclosure and accessing the criminal justice system for domestic violence<br />
and sexual assault reiterate the great number <strong>of</strong> victims who do not see the<br />
criminal justice system as providing them with just, nor, acceptable solutions.<br />
While the reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the scope <strong>of</strong> this case<br />
study, the relevance to our work in Peel is that the concept <strong>of</strong> preventive work<br />
around woman abuse and sexual violence is <strong>of</strong>ten secondary to the work <strong>of</strong><br />
providing adequate and valuable service to victims who are seeking support. In<br />
an environment where waiting lists, case overload and project-based funding<br />
prevail, education, advocacy and prevention initiatives are sparse, short-term<br />
and difficult if not impossible to adequately evaluate. Where communities are<br />
fortunate enough to have community collaboration, the participants typically<br />
lack the capacity to adequately or extensively evaluate the short or long-term<br />
efficacy and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> any given initiative.<br />
Regional Government: The Ideal Site<br />
for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Woman Abuse<br />
According to Hayes (2006), “it is at the local level and via local government<br />
that violence prevention policies and interventions may best be enacted, with<br />
municipal governments facilitating the coordination <strong>of</strong> local initiatives and<br />
supporting community initiatives” (p. 9). Gender mainstreaming approaches<br />
attempt to resource, coordinate and mainstream the many separate services<br />
that exist independently at the regional level <strong>of</strong> government (Hayes, 2006).<br />
UN-Habitat concurs that local government is a key player in strategies to<br />
fight violence against women and in making connections between women’s<br />
experiences <strong>of</strong> private and public violence.<br />
Governance includes the pivotal role <strong>of</strong> mayors and other municipal leaders<br />
in confronting increasing problems <strong>of</strong> community safety. Shaw (2001) argues<br />
that the twenty-first century will present a “huge challenge” for mayors and<br />
local government around emerging issues <strong>of</strong> urban migration, poverty, social<br />
exclusion, minority and immigrant populations, substance abuse and urban<br />
crime. Local governments are coming to view community safety as a human<br />
right and a necessary condition for full participation in civic life, and crime<br />
remains a debilitating threat to urban sustainability.<br />
The work in Peel Region highlights our success in partnering with local<br />
government around the issues <strong>of</strong> woman abuse and sexual assault. There is<br />
an ongoing commitment from PCAWA, PCSA and the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel to<br />
engage the regional leaders and the Region as the appropriate place to link<br />
all efforts to address the prevention <strong>of</strong> woman abuse. This is largely due to<br />
successes in working collaboratively with multiple sectors to engage in effective<br />
crime prevention.<br />
Challenges include the lack <strong>of</strong> a formal regional vision on crime reduction that<br />
is inclusive <strong>of</strong> a gender analysis, as well as the absence <strong>of</strong> a formalized process for<br />
the Region to engage in community consultation and to incorporate the input<br />
into operations. In addition, the community collaboratives, while formally<br />
structured, have difficulty in sustaining consistent partnerships due to a lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> funding, the turnover <strong>of</strong> leadership, changing membership, competing<br />
priorities and sometimes differing philosophies and ideologies.<br />
Financial and Ideological Support<br />
The financial sustainability <strong>of</strong> collaboratives remains tenuous and unstable.<br />
Both PCAWA and PCSA have some core funding, but they are largely influenced<br />
by external factors and the political climate <strong>of</strong> the day. This instability and the<br />
constant need to chase funding can result in staff turnover. Unfortunately, most<br />
collaboratives do not have a paid or formally structured coordinator position,<br />
and collaborative work is <strong>of</strong>ten taken on by dedicated staff as an add-on to full
174 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 175<br />
time work commitments. This compromises the sustainability <strong>of</strong> partnerships<br />
with regional government. Sustaining relationships and strategic objectives<br />
long enough to accomplish the formal integration <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming<br />
into regional policy becomes very difficult when staff and organizations are at<br />
constant risk.<br />
Another problem is the tendency for funding bodies to restrict support to<br />
project-based work. Without operational support, agencies scramble to meet<br />
the funder requirements, and <strong>of</strong>ten must apply staff resources and volunteers<br />
to short-term, unsustainable programs. There is usually relatively little hope <strong>of</strong><br />
having the capacity to maintain the project after the funding ends. In addition,<br />
non-incorporated agencies (like community collaboratives) require a lead<br />
agency to serve as the financial administrator for the funds. These agencies<br />
may be competing for the same funding. Despite assurances by funders<br />
that all proposals are considered separately and that they greatly encourage<br />
community partnerships, agencies may be afraid that partnering with others<br />
or that serving as a lead will compromise their chances <strong>of</strong> receiving funding.<br />
In addition, some initiatives are not defined as part <strong>of</strong> the core function <strong>of</strong><br />
the collaborative, and therefore are difficult to maintain. In Peel, the work<br />
<strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming is a relatively new initiative and has not received<br />
specific financial support. This additional work then becomes one <strong>of</strong> the many<br />
priorities <strong>of</strong> the collaboratives and is at times difficult to sustain in the face <strong>of</strong><br />
competing demands.<br />
Collaboratives such as PCAWA and PCSA are accountable to their member<br />
agencies and must exercise caution around messaging and media interaction.<br />
Mainstream organizations, who receive funding from a government body or<br />
with a visible public pr<strong>of</strong>ile, may not be agreeable to strong, critical messages<br />
about issues such as intimate relationships and sexual behaviours, and may be<br />
cautious about criticism <strong>of</strong> systemic and institutional discrimination. Gender<br />
neutrality seems to be a palatable reaction to the challenges <strong>of</strong> addressing the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> woman abuse, and this serves to hamper crime prevention efforts<br />
aimed at violence against women.<br />
Conclusions<br />
PCAWA, PCSA and the Region <strong>of</strong> Peel are well aware <strong>of</strong> the challenges that are<br />
inherent in this work. The future <strong>of</strong> the partnership between the collaboratives<br />
and the municipal government is rooted in a strong foundation. In the<br />
foreseeable future, it appears as if all partners are committed to investing in this<br />
gender mainstreaming initiative. Despite this optimism, we are also aware that<br />
resistance (both practically and ideologically) is common. While confronting<br />
this, it is critical that we continue to work towards building and nurturing the<br />
trust between the individuals and agencies involved, and recognize and utilize<br />
the support <strong>of</strong> allies within the municipal government. We also recognize that<br />
moving forward in Peel requires an ongoing commitment to an anti-racism/<br />
anti-oppression feminist framework as reflected in the “multi-focal approach”<br />
with the regional government. The collaboratives are working towards a<br />
sustainable strategy and a sustainable structure that can cope with changes to<br />
staffing, turn-over in political leaders and a varying political climate. The goals<br />
<strong>of</strong> the collaboratives are to have gender and other identities such as race, faith,<br />
sexual orientation, class and ability recognized, and to address and overcome<br />
the inequality that exists.<br />
The prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women remains on the margins for most<br />
local and regional governments. The private nature <strong>of</strong> woman abuse and sexual<br />
violence, and the tendency to blame victims rather that those perpetrating the<br />
violence, are a significant part <strong>of</strong> the problem (Johnson, 2007). Despite this,<br />
considerable advances have been made in the area <strong>of</strong> women’s safety, stranger<br />
assaults and public spaces. Unfortunately, far less has been accomplished in<br />
responding to the private nature <strong>of</strong> violence against women and the irrefutable<br />
connection to systemic conditions <strong>of</strong> gender inequality.<br />
In response, it is paramount that community collaboratives and their respective<br />
memberships work together to develop a shared vision to ensure successful<br />
community partnerships, project successes and credible relationships with<br />
funders. In essence, the evolution <strong>of</strong> solid partnerships between local/regional<br />
government and community service agencies serves to sustain the collective<br />
work <strong>of</strong> the regional government and the collaboratives.<br />
We know that our work in Peel Region is in its infancy but we have been<br />
successful in creating a space for dialogue and learning. Working with regional<br />
government requires a belief in the process <strong>of</strong> “relentless incrementalism” and<br />
the passion to persevere in the face <strong>of</strong> anything and everything that gets in the<br />
way <strong>of</strong> our vision to one day end violence against women.<br />
References<br />
Bailey, D., & McNally Koney, K. (1996). Interorganizational communitybased<br />
collaboratives: A strategic response to shape the social work<br />
agenda. <strong>Social</strong> Work, 41(6), 602-611.
176 IPC Review 3 Strategy to Engage Regional Government in the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Violence Against Women 177<br />
Crenshaw, K. (1994). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity<br />
politics, and violence against women <strong>of</strong> color. In M. A. Fineman & R.<br />
Mykitiuk (Eds.), The public nature <strong>of</strong> private violence: The discovery <strong>of</strong><br />
domestic abuse (pp. 93-120). New York: Routledge.<br />
Fair Share Task Force. (2009). The issue: Inequity hurts us all. Retrieved from<br />
http://www.fairsharetaskforce.com<br />
Fourth World Conference on Women. (1995). Beijing platform for action.<br />
Beijing, China – September. New York: Division for the Advancement<br />
<strong>of</strong> Women, Department <strong>of</strong> Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Affairs,<br />
United Nations.<br />
Hayes,T. (2006). Gender, local governance and violence prevention: Learning<br />
from international good practices to develop a Victorian model.<br />
Background Paper on Making the Links: Gender, Violence Prevention<br />
and Local Governance Project, University <strong>of</strong> Melbourne.<br />
Institute for Educational Leadership. (2008). Toolkit 1: Building effective<br />
community partnerships. Washington, DC: Office <strong>of</strong> Juvenile Justice<br />
and Delinquency Prevention, Office <strong>of</strong> Justice Programs, U.S.<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Justice. Retrieved from http://www.iel.org/pubs/sittap.<br />
html#toolkit1<br />
Johnson, H. (2006). Measuring violence against women: Statistical trends<br />
2006. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.<br />
Johnson, H. (2007). Preventing violence against women: Progress and<br />
challenges. Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime Review, 1, 69-88.<br />
Region <strong>of</strong> Peel Housing. (2009). How long do I have to wait for a subsidized<br />
housing unit in Peel? Retrieved from http://www.region.peel.on.ca/<br />
housing/social/faq/<br />
Shaw, M. (2001). The role <strong>of</strong> local government in community safety. Montreal:<br />
International Centre for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime.<br />
Shaw, M., & Andrews, C. (2005) Engendering crime prevention:<br />
International developments and the Canadian experience. Canadian<br />
Journal <strong>of</strong> Criminology and Criminal Justice, 47(2), 293-316.<br />
Shaw, M., & Capobianco, L. (2004). Developing trust: International<br />
approaches to women’s safety. Montreal: International Centre for the<br />
Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime.<br />
The <strong>Social</strong> Planning Council <strong>of</strong> Peel. (2007, March 13). Region <strong>of</strong> Peel:<br />
Population & dwellings, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.spcpeel.<br />
com/census%202006.pdf<br />
Together We Can. (2009). Improving results for children, youth, families,<br />
and neighborhoods: A rationale for the Community Collaborative<br />
Wellness Tool. Retrieved from http://www.togetherwecan.org/<br />
ccwtrationale-s.html<br />
Whitzman, C. (2006). Women and community safety: A retrospect and<br />
prospect. Women and Environments International Magazine, 70(7),<br />
24-27.<br />
Krug, E., Dahlberg, L., Mercy, J., Zwi, A., & Lozano, R. (2002). World<br />
report on violence and health. Geneva: World Health Organization.<br />
Lee-Smith, D. (2006). Women and UN-Habitat: A history. Women and<br />
Environments International Magazine, 70(7), 8-10.<br />
Peel Regional Police. (2008). Annual statistical reports, 2003-2007. Retrieved<br />
from http://www.peelpolice.ca/News/Publications.aspx
Volume 3: pages 179–200<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Venir en aide aux enfants<br />
exposés à la violence conjugale :<br />
évaluation d’un projet pilote de<br />
collaboration intersectorielle<br />
Myriam Dubé<br />
Chercheure, CRI-VIFF<br />
Raymonde Boisvert<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionnelle de recherche, CRI-VIFF<br />
Abstract<br />
Two health and social services networks in Montréal have been developing<br />
and implementing a protocol to guide intersectoral collaboration in cases<br />
<strong>of</strong> children exposed to domestic violence. The protocol specifies four welldefined<br />
types <strong>of</strong> collaboration: the exchange <strong>of</strong> information, personalized<br />
references, personalized transfers and clinical exchanges. Participants in<br />
the protocol come from six different institutional and community sectors:<br />
shelters for women victims <strong>of</strong> domestic violence, services geared towards<br />
abusive partners, Health and <strong>Social</strong> Services Centres, youth centres, Service<br />
Côté Cour, and the Montreal Police Services. This exploratory study assesses<br />
the implementation <strong>of</strong> the protocol in these two networks. The results show<br />
that an in-depth knowledge <strong>of</strong> the mandates <strong>of</strong> the various organizations<br />
and <strong>of</strong> how they function in practice is key to facilitating the implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the protocol by the participants. The author recommends involving a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> participants who are familiar with the two organizational cultures<br />
in question (community and institutional) in order to further help develop a<br />
common language that would facilitate future efforts in collaboration.
180 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 181<br />
Résumé<br />
Un protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la<br />
violence conjugale a été implanté dans le cadre d’un projet pilote prenant<br />
place à l’intérieur de deux réseaux de services sociaux et de santé à Montréal.<br />
Ce protocole présente quatre modalités bien définies de collaboration<br />
(échange d’informations, références personnalisées, transferts personnalisés<br />
et échanges cliniques) partagées par six partenaires provenant des secteurs<br />
communautaires et institutionnels, soit les maisons d’hébergement pour<br />
les femmes victimes de violence conjugale, les organismes pour conjoints<br />
ayant des comportements violents, les Centres de santé et de services<br />
sociaux, les centres jeunesse, Côté Cour et le Service de police de la Ville de<br />
Montréal. Une étude exploratoire dresse un constat de l’implantation dans<br />
ces deux réseaux. Les résultats montrent qu’une connaissance pratique et<br />
intégrée de l’articulation des mandats et du fonctionnement de l’ensemble<br />
des organisations facilite l’utilisation du protocole par l’ensemble des<br />
partenaires. La recherche d’un certain nombre d’acteurs qui connaissent<br />
les deux cultures organisationnelles (communautaire et institutionnel) afin<br />
de faciliter l’arrimage entre celles-ci par le partage d’un langage commun<br />
est une recommandation du présent rapport.<br />
Introduction 1<br />
Le partenariat et l’action intersectorielle sont des notions similaires mais non<br />
interchangeables, la première étant une condition nécessaire à la réalisation<br />
de la seconde. Lorsqu’on traite d’action intersectorielle, peu importe le<br />
champ du social où l’on se situe, on aborde inévitablement la notion d’un<br />
partenariat dans lequel s’inscrit « un rapport complémentaire et équitable »<br />
entre des structures, « différentes par leur nature, leur mission, leurs activités,<br />
leurs ressources et leur mode de fonctionnement, fondé sur un respect et une<br />
reconnaissance mutuelle des contributions et des parties impliquées dans un<br />
rapport d’interdépendance » (Panet-Raymond et Bourque, 1991 dans Savard,<br />
Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003, p. 24). Lorsque l’objectif de ce partenariat<br />
est de mettre en place un plan d’action global pour résoudre un problème<br />
1 Nous remercions chaleureusement les intervenantes et les intervenants qui ont accepté avec beaucoup<br />
d’affabilité de participer aux entrevues de recherche, malgré leur travail très prenant, mais combien<br />
essentiel, auprès des personnes qui vivent une situation de violence conjugale. Nous tenons aussi à<br />
remercier tous les membres du comité de suivi et des comités locaux d’implantation rattachés à la Table de<br />
concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal qui ont accepté généreusement de partager avec nous leurs<br />
réflexions, enrichissantes et constructives, autour du protocole et de cet article. Selon notre humble avis,<br />
c’est l’engagement de tous auprès des personnes vivant de la violence conjugale, et particulièrement auprès<br />
des enfants qui y sont exposés, qui va faire la différence dans la prévention de cette problématique en en<br />
déracinant la transmission intergénérationnelle.<br />
complexe (Ouellet, Paiement et Tremblay, 1995), on touche à la notion<br />
d’action intersectorielle. Et cette action est régie par plusieurs règles qui sont<br />
relativement formelles et structurées.<br />
Cette vision structurale de l’action intersectorielle se retrouve dans plusieurs<br />
recherches en sciences sociales (Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003). Dans<br />
chacun de ces domaines, des acteurs sociaux, soit des pr<strong>of</strong>essionnelles,<br />
proviennent du secteur communautaire et d’autres, du secteur institutionnel.<br />
Certains peuvent aussi avoir travaillé dans les deux milieux. Les études ont<br />
cherché à établir les facteurs qui influencent la nature des relations qui existent<br />
entre ces deux secteurs d’activités sociales. Ces facteurs peuvent être regroupés<br />
en deux catégories, les facteurs personnels et les facteurs organisationnels. Dans<br />
plusieurs études, on souligne les qualités humaines des partenaires impliqués<br />
dans l’action intersectorielle même si on reconnaît que ce ne sont pas là les seuls<br />
facteurs ayant une influence sur la qualité des relations entre les organismes<br />
(Clément, Tourigny et Doyon, 1999; Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003).<br />
L’écoute, les échanges respectueux, la transparence, la capacité de remettre<br />
ses propres idées en question facilitent l’action intersectorielle. Parmi d’autres<br />
facteurs clés, Lamoureux et Lesemann identifient : « les conceptions de la<br />
société véhiculées par l’intervenant de l’établissement public, ses sensibilités<br />
à la communauté, son empathie pour les gens qu’il côtoie, sa formation à une<br />
approche communautaire plutôt qu’unilatéralement clinique » (1988, p. 206<br />
dans Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003).<br />
Sur le plan organisationnel, plusieurs facteurs peuvent faciliter l’implication des<br />
différents partenaires. La formalisation d’une entente écrite, sous la forme d’un<br />
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle, précise les rôles, les responsabilités et<br />
les mandats de chacun des partenaires, de même que les modalités d’application<br />
de l’action intersectorielle. La participation à une table de concertation est une<br />
autre forme de formalisation des échanges entre partenaires (Panet-Raymond<br />
et Bourque, 1991 dans Savard, Turcotte et Beaudoin, 2003). De plus, la<br />
reconnaissance par les bailleurs de fonds des coûts engendrés par l’action<br />
intersectorielle est souvent perçue comme un facteur de succès sine qua none<br />
(Savard et Mayer, 2001). Certains <strong>text</strong>es sur le partenariat vont même pointer<br />
la participation des usagers et usagères comme un élément garant de son succès<br />
(René et Gervais, 2001).<br />
Con<strong>text</strong>e historique du protocole : d’hier à aujourd’hui<br />
En 2003, la Table de concertation en violence conjugale et l’Agence de la<br />
santé et des services sociaux décident de s’allier pour partager leur expertise
182 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 183<br />
et leur leadership respectif dans la création d’un protocole de collaboration<br />
intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale et dans<br />
l’implantation de celui-ci. Lors des premiers travaux du comité de suivi chargé<br />
de la création et de l’implantation du protocole, les membres, peu importe leur<br />
provenance organisationnelle, se sont entendus sur une définition commune<br />
de l’exposition des enfants à la violence conjugale.<br />
Ces débuts prometteurs se sont poursuivis au comité de suivi par le<br />
développement de quatre modalités de collaboration :<br />
1. L’échange d’informations est une discussion entre partenaires concernant la<br />
situation personnelle ou familiale d’une cliente ou d’un client et permettant<br />
de recueillir des informations, de connaître les services disponibles, de<br />
préciser une intervention, d’évaluer une situation, d’actualiser un plan<br />
d’intervention, etc.<br />
2. Les références personnalisées sont effectuées en vue de prendre contact<br />
avec un autre partenaire pour solliciter des services complémentaires ou<br />
supplémentaires. L’organisme demandeur peut demeurer saisi du dossier<br />
et peut conserver une responsabilité clinique dans le dossier. Il est à noter<br />
que l’intervenant et l’intervenante recevant une demande de référence<br />
personnalisée s’engage à émettre un accusé réception (téléphonique ou écrit)<br />
dans les 72 heures suivant la demande. De plus, l’endroit où rejoindre la<br />
cliente référée devra être spécifiquement indiqué afin d’assurer la sécurité<br />
et la protection. Dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement et des organismes<br />
pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, la clientèle prend contact<br />
avec l’organisme.<br />
3. Les transferts personnalisés sont réalisés en vue de prendre contact<br />
avec un autre partenaire pour solliciter des services complémentaires ou<br />
supplémentaires. L’organisme demandeur ne demeure plus saisi du dossier et<br />
ne conserve pas de responsabilité clinique dans le dossier.<br />
4. Les échanges cliniques favorisent la communication et la transmission<br />
d’informations pertinentes entre les intervenantes et intervenants impliqués.<br />
La collaboration entre les partenaires devrait permettre des échanges<br />
cliniques visant l’amélioration des services <strong>of</strong>ferts aux familles aux prises avec<br />
la violence conjugale. Lorsque jugées à propos, la présence et la participation<br />
de la cliente ou du client sont favorisées. Des plans de services individualisés<br />
peuvent aussi être élaborés par les partenaires impliqués en vue de coordonner<br />
et d’harmoniser les interventions. Ceux-ci peuvent être modifiés en tout<br />
temps pour tenir compte de circonstances nouvelles. Dès que plus d’un<br />
partenaire est impliqué, les échanges cliniques sont recommandés. Ceci<br />
devient une stratégie d’intervention supplémentaire. Ces échanges doivent<br />
se dérouler dans la confidentialité et la sécurité des familles.<br />
Il est à noter que, dans chaque cas, un formulaire d’autorisation dûment signé<br />
par la cliente/le client est nécessaire.<br />
Ces modalités, étant les assises mêmes du protocole de collaboration<br />
intersectorielle, sont d’ailleurs maintenant implantées, dans le cadre d’un projet<br />
pilote, depuis octobre 2006 sur deux territoires de la santé et des services sociaux<br />
à Montréal, soit le Centre de santé et de services sociaux (CSSS) Jeanne-Mance<br />
et le CSSS de la Montagne. Six différents partenaires, dans chacun des territoires<br />
couverts, ont accepté de participer à cette implantation, soit les maisons<br />
d’hébergement pour les femmes victimes de violence conjugale, les centres<br />
jeunesse, les organismes pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, les<br />
CSSS, Côté Cour et le Service de police de la ville de Montréal (SPVM).<br />
Cette implantation a démarré par une formation dont l’objectif principal était<br />
de favoriser la collaboration intersectorielle par l’utilisation du protocole dans<br />
les deux réseaux impliqués. Elle portait ainsi sur la problématique des enfants<br />
exposés à la violence conjugale, sur les mandats des organisations partenaires<br />
au protocole ainsi que sur les modalités du protocole et leur application. Les 10<br />
sessions de formation de deux jours ont permis de rejoindre 163 intervenantes et<br />
intervenants provenant des différentes organisations partenaires du protocole.<br />
Méthodologie<br />
Les objectifs spécifiques de cette étude exploratoire sont les suivants :<br />
• Identifier les difficultés résultant de l’application des modalités de<br />
collaboration et de référence<br />
• Identifier les conditions facilitatrices<br />
• Positionner les rôles, s’il y a lieu<br />
• Proposer des ajustements, si nécessaire, dans l’application du protocole.<br />
Dans le cadre de cette évaluation portant sur le projet pilote d’implantation<br />
du protocole, nous avons réalisé 12 entrevues avec des intervenantes et des<br />
intervenants qui ont à utiliser ce protocole. Nous avions prévu rencontrer six<br />
personnes qui avaient reçu la formation sur l’utilisation du protocole et six qui<br />
ne l’avaient pas reçue, soit deux par organisation (un formé et un non formé).<br />
Ces organisations étaient toutes rattachées aux territoires des deux CSSS où
184 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 185<br />
le projet pilote d’implantation du protocole avait lieu. Toutefois, il s’est avéré,<br />
dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement, dans celui des organismes d’aide pour<br />
conjoints ayant des comportements violents et dans le cas de Côté Cour, que<br />
tous les intervenantes et intervenants avaient reçu la formation. Nous avons<br />
donc interviewé huit intervenantes et intervenants qui avaient reçu la formation<br />
et quatre qui ne l’avaient pas suivie. L’objectif visé par les entrevues était de<br />
savoir si on utilisait ou non le protocole de collaboration lors des interventions,<br />
quels en étaient les motifs ainsi que de connaître le con<strong>text</strong>e d’utilisation dans<br />
lequel les modalités d’action prenaient place.<br />
Avec l’autorisation des participantes et des participants, les entrevues ont été<br />
enregistrées et ensuite retranscrites intégralement. Par la suite, une analyse<br />
thématique de contenu (Quivy et van Campenhoudt, 2006) a permis de dégager<br />
les principaux thèmes des entrevues qualitatives. Dans ce type d’analyse, la<br />
représentativité du contenu des discours à l’étude est assurée par le principe de<br />
saturation, c’est-à-dire que la cueillette de nouvelles données cesse lorsqu’aucun<br />
contenu nouveau n’apparaît, ce qui est le cas dans la présente étude. Un logiciel<br />
d’analyse de contenu, soit QSR NVIVO a été utilisé. La réduction des données<br />
a permis de structurer l’information en catégories selon les objectifs de la<br />
recherche. Le matériel a été ensuite organisé par thèmes et regroupé. Le guide<br />
de codification ainsi développé a permis d’analyser l’ensemble des verbatims<br />
des entrevues. En conformité avec le processus d’analyse qualitative, ce guide<br />
de codification a été élaboré par deux personnes indépendantes. Par ailleurs,<br />
la saturation de l’échantillon a été obtenue suite à l’analyse qualitative des 12<br />
entrevues quant aux catégories principales de ce guide, soit les informations sur<br />
le mandat de l’organisme, l’exposition à la violence conjugale, la connaissance du<br />
protocole et son utilisation.<br />
Résultats<br />
Mandat des organisations partenaires<br />
Le mandat des organisations consiste essentiellement à <strong>of</strong>frir de l’aide, soit aux<br />
femmes violentées dans le cas des maisons d’hébergement, aux victimes de<br />
violence conjugale et familiale dans le cas de Côté Cour, aux enfants en ce qui<br />
concerne les centres jeunesse, aux conjoints dans le cas des organismes pour<br />
conjoints ayant des comportements violents, à l’ensemble des citoyens dans le<br />
cas des CSSS et du Service de police.<br />
Le mandat des intervenantes qui <strong>of</strong>frent de l’aide aux femmes en maison<br />
d’hébergement est d’abord axé sur la sécurité des femmes et des enfants.<br />
Donc on <strong>of</strong>fre de l’hébergement d’urgence, en situation de crise aux<br />
femmes qui veulent soit quitter le domicile familial où il y a la violence<br />
ou du moins prendre un répit de ce qui arrive à la maison pour venir<br />
réfléchir dans un lieu sécuritaire. […] Chez nous, c’est notre mandat<br />
premier, les enfants. (Entrevue 7)<br />
Le service Côté Cour, pour sa part, vient en aide aux victimes de violence<br />
conjugale et familiale. Les intervenantes peuvent ainsi rencontrer des parents<br />
qui ont été violentés par leurs enfants, des enfants qui ont été violentés par leurs<br />
parents, mais environ 80 % des usagers sont des femmes victimes de violence<br />
conjugale. Le rôle des intervenantes qui y travaillent est de venir en aide aux<br />
victimes de violence conjugale qui ont porté plainte à la police et qui doivent<br />
composer avec le système judiciaire. Elles évaluent la situation de la femme,<br />
lui fournissent une aide psychosociale qui répond à ses besoins et font des<br />
recommandations au procureur de la Couronne. Elles collaborent également à<br />
un programme, qui existe depuis une dizaine d’années, nommé Communicaction<br />
qui <strong>of</strong>fre un service aux victimes dès la sortie de détention de l’accusé.<br />
Les centres jeunesse ont un mandat légal de protection pour les enfants qui<br />
vivent différents types de compromission à leur sécurité ou leur développement<br />
au sein du milieu familial.<br />
Moi je travaille pour la préservation de la famille. On est un petit<br />
département qui <strong>of</strong>fre des services pour garder les enfants dans leur<br />
milieu familial. Ça fait qu’on travaille avec les familles […] pour essayer<br />
de tout faire pour les garder ensemble. (Entrevue 6)<br />
Il existe aussi des services d’aide pour les auteurs de violence conjugale<br />
au sein desquels les intervenants croient à l’importance du protocole. Cette<br />
ressource communautaire a un rôle actif dans l’aide psychosociale apportée<br />
aux conjoints et participe aussi aux activités de sensibilisation et de formation<br />
de la relève et des collègues.<br />
… à travers la psychothérapie afin d’aider les hommes à changer leurs<br />
comportements violents dans un con<strong>text</strong>e intime et/ou familial. Alors<br />
notre mandat principal c’est l’intervention auprès des hommes violents<br />
[…] qui veulent entreprendre une démarche thérapeutique pour cesser<br />
d’agir d’une façon violente. (Entrevue 5)<br />
Les CSSS répondent à plusieurs mandats et <strong>of</strong>frent des :<br />
… services d’accueil, d’évaluation, d’orientation, de référence, de<br />
consultation auprès de la population. Donc je fais des suivis, des prises
186 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 187<br />
en charge avec des personnes qui viennent, qui nous sont référés soit par<br />
l’accueil psychosocial ou des fois par des organismes à l’extérieur. Donc<br />
c’est un suivi individuel. (Entrevue 9)<br />
Le service de police assure la sécurité psychologique, morale et physique de<br />
l’ensemble des citoyennes et des citoyens. Les situations de violence conjugale<br />
et familiale font partie des nombreux appels à la ligne d’urgence 911 sur l’île<br />
de Montréal. Un policier mentionne que les agents sociocommunautaires de<br />
quartier ont un rôle à jouer dans la prévention de la violence, entre autres,<br />
par l’établissement de liens avec les organismes communautaires du quartier<br />
(Entrevue 12).<br />
L’exposition à la violence conjugale : c’est quoi?<br />
Toutes les personnes interviewées parlent spontanément des éléments qui les<br />
amènent à penser qu’un enfant a été exposé à la violence conjugale. Qu’elles<br />
agissent directement auprès des enfants ou plutôt auprès de la famille ou des<br />
femmes; de façon unanime, elles rapportent des éléments similaires quant à<br />
l’exposition à la violence conjugale.<br />
Dans les maisons d’hébergement, les intervenantes vont être attentives aux<br />
signes présents chez l’enfant qui leur laissent voir qu’il vit les impacts de cette<br />
exposition à la violence conjugale, que celle-ci soit directe ou indirecte.<br />
Il y a des petits trucs des fois qui peuvent nous mettre la puce à l’oreille,<br />
mais c’est sûr que tous les enfants qui arrivent ici on prend déjà pour<br />
acquis qu’ils ont été témoins de la violence. (Entrevue 7)<br />
De même les travailleuses sociales des CSSS sont sensibles au fait que l’enfant<br />
ait pu être exposé à la violence subie par la mère et ce, même si cette dernière<br />
n’a pas tout à fait nommé la violence conjugale, ni identifié sur elle-même tous<br />
les effets de cette violence.<br />
Et des fois ça va être des femmes qui n’en ont pas conscience, ça va être<br />
plus la violence psychologique, elle va dire : « Je suis pas capable de voir<br />
mes amis, il se fâche pour un rien … il est très inégal dans son humeur »,<br />
mais sans me dire que c’est de la violence, et si elle a des enfants, moi, je<br />
me doute que l’enfant voit ça et ensuite je suis sensible à ça qu’un enfant,<br />
même en bas âge, il intériorise ça, …donc je vais le spécifier dans mon<br />
évaluation. (Entrevue 4)<br />
Les policiers, intervenants de première ligne, sont également sensibilisés au<br />
fait que des enfants soient exposés à la violence conjugale, qu’elle soit physique,<br />
verbale ou psychologique, et ils l’indiquent dans leur rapport. Ils transmettent<br />
les informations à Côté Cour qui, de cette façon, a accès aux renseignements<br />
portant sur le con<strong>text</strong>e de violence conjugale et sur le fait que des enfants<br />
étaient présents. Les propos des intervenantes de Côté Cour vont dans le<br />
même sens que ceux des policiers à l’effet qu’avant même l’implantation du<br />
projet pilote, elles avaient déjà accès aux informations transmises par ces<br />
derniers et elles pouvaient collaborer avec eux.<br />
Les organismes pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents ont<br />
une mission d’aide aux familles mais en passant par l’aide aux instigateurs de<br />
violence. Les intervenants de ces organismes croient que si un homme qui a<br />
des enfants accepte de suivre une thérapie pour régler un problème de violence,<br />
c’est à peu près certain que ses enfants ont été exposés à cette violence.<br />
Il est donc possible d’avancer que tout le monde interviewé a la même<br />
perception de l’exposition à la violence conjugale et ce, même si le niveau de<br />
connaissances varie quant à la complexité des effets de cette exposition. En<br />
effet, les intervenantes et intervenants peuvent détecter le fait qu’un enfant<br />
a été exposé en interrogeant le con<strong>text</strong>e de violence, et leur façon d’identifier<br />
l’exposition demeure pratiquement la même.<br />
Échange d’informations<br />
Les intervenantes et intervenants ont été questionnés quant à leur application du<br />
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle. Tout d’abord, ils devaient indiquer<br />
le type de modalités qu’ils étaient appelés à utiliser le plus souvent dans le cadre<br />
du protocole. Des entrevues, il ressort que les intervenantes et intervenants<br />
font surtout de l’échange d’informations. De fait, plusieurs interviewés (8 sur<br />
12) ont mentionné qu’ils utilisaient cette modalité et ce, la majorité du temps.<br />
Par exemple, dans une maison d’hébergement, les intervenantes sont souvent<br />
appelées à échanger des informations à propos des résidentes et ce, la majeure<br />
partie du temps, par téléphone.<br />
Au service de police, on utilise fréquemment le protocole car les patrouilleurs<br />
sont sensibilisés à la problématique de l’exposition à la violence conjugale.<br />
Leur rôle dans le protocole est surtout de transmettre l’information, en autant<br />
qu’elle soit demandée.<br />
Les CLSC [Centres locaux de services communautaires] n’ont pas accès<br />
au rapport de police […] mais on a l’autorisation de donner une petite
188 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 189<br />
narration de ce qui est arrivé. […] Le protocole, je le vois plus comme<br />
l’utilisation par chaque organisme qui se dit : les enfants sont là, il faut<br />
faire notre part de travail dans ça. (Entrevue 12)<br />
Du côté des CSSS, les échanges d’informations se font avec l’ensemble des<br />
partenaires au protocole et ce, dû à la diversité des services intégrés dans<br />
leur mandat.<br />
Les modalités souvent ça se fait par téléphone, les discussions… on a<br />
besoin davantage d’informations aussi sur la situation, des fois on a<br />
besoin de savoir est-ce qu’on peut laisser un message sur la boîte vocale<br />
de la personne, tu sais des petits détails comme ça, qui au niveau du<br />
scénario de protection sont importants à savoir. Donc, on contacte<br />
l’agent sociocommunautaire ou le policier qui a pris la demande, qui a<br />
pris… pour avoir plus d’informations. (Entrevue 9)<br />
Le service Côté cour utilise fréquemment l’échange d’informations.<br />
Par exemple, je rencontre une femme, je sais que la DPJ [Direction de<br />
la protection de la jeuness] ou Batshaw est déjà impliqué, madame se<br />
présente à la cour, elle veut absolument que la plainte soit retirée, elle<br />
ne veut pas témoigner, moi après évaluation, je vois que les enfants,<br />
il y a peut-être un risque de dangerosité, alors moi je vais transmettre<br />
l’information à l’intervenant de la DPJ que la plainte a été retirée,<br />
madame est retournée vivre avec son conjoint. Alors, c’est ce genre<br />
d’information là qu’on transmet. (Entrevue 3)<br />
Références personnalisées<br />
Même si l’échange d’informations est la modalité qui sert le plus souvent<br />
dans le cadre du protocole, on a parfois l’occasion de procéder à des références<br />
personnalisées. La moitié des participantes et participants aux entrevues (6<br />
sur 12) ont dit avoir déjà référé quelqu’un ou reçu une personne référée par un<br />
organisme partenaire.<br />
La référence personnalisée semble une modalité relativement utilisée par les<br />
policiers, du moins quand il s’agit de référer au CSSS. Rappelons qu’il existe<br />
un protocole de collaboration entre les CSSS et le SPVM.<br />
La grosse grosse majeure partie en violence conjugale, on va référer au<br />
CLSC. Par la suite, il y a une des personnes responsables dans chaque<br />
poste de quartier qui va s’assurer du suivi au niveau est-ce que le<br />
formulaire a été bien complété, est-ce que vous l’avez reçu? Il y a un lien<br />
qui se fait entre les deux. (Entrevue 8)<br />
La référence personnalisée semble aussi bien fonctionner du côté des CSSS à<br />
l’endroit des autres organismes.<br />
Si je reçois une demande et en cours de suivi, ça arrive aussi qu’on voit<br />
qu’il y a une situation c’est la violence qu’on est en train d’évaluer […]<br />
c’est le scénario de protection, c’est la prévention, et c’est de la référence<br />
aussi au secteur enfants. (…) Donc, c’est des suivis qui peuvent être plus<br />
longs, beaucoup plus longs. (Entrevue 9)<br />
Échanges cliniques et transferts personnalisés<br />
Cinq personnes mentionnent avoir fait des échanges cliniques dans certaines<br />
situations. Les échanges cliniques avec d’autres organismes partenaires du<br />
protocole sont plus courants en maison d’hébergement. Par exemple, une<br />
intervenante raconte qu’elle a eu à effectuer des échanges cliniques avec la<br />
Direction de la protection de la jeunesse (DPJ).<br />
On a eu des fois où on est allé, des fois où eux sont venus à la maison ici,<br />
puis qu’on s’est assis, le travailleur social, une intervenante de la maison<br />
d’hébergement avec une résidente pour parler de sa situation à elle,<br />
qu’est-ce qui va être mis en place par rapport à ses enfants, est-ce que je<br />
lui réfère la maison d’hébergement, qu’est-ce que la DPJ va <strong>of</strong>frir, pour<br />
voir si on ne dédouble pas une intervention là. (Entrevue 7)<br />
À l’intérieur des maisons d’hébergement, les intervenantes échangent aussi<br />
cliniquement avec des intervenantes d’autres organismes qui ne sont pas inclus<br />
présentement au protocole. Elles estiment que le protocole devrait inclure<br />
plus de partenaires qui seraient, eux aussi, qualifiés pour détecter la violence<br />
conjugale et voir si un enfant y est exposé.<br />
Seulement deux personnes ont parlé de transferts personnalisés, mais cela ne<br />
signifie pas que les autres n’utilisent pas cette modalité. Il semble que dans les<br />
maisons d’hébergement, le transfert personnalisé vers d’autres organismes<br />
partenaires fasse partie de leurs interventions.<br />
Si nous on doit transférer on va faire les démarches avec elle pour trouver<br />
un autre endroit, une autre maison d’hébergement. Ça, on le faisait déjà.
190 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 191<br />
Pour les CLSC, une femme qui quitte qui veut avoir quand même le<br />
suivi psychosocial… on essaie de rentrer en contact avec une personne<br />
au CLSC ou du moins on donne le numéro de téléphone, le nom d’une<br />
personne-ressource. Même chose pour la DPJ aussi, on accompagne les<br />
femmes même s’ils doivent faire un signalement ou qu’elles sont déjà<br />
suivies par la DPJ, on les accompagne à ce niveau là. Donc c’est déjà des<br />
choses qu’on faisait. (Entrevue 7)<br />
Perception en regard du protocole et de son applicabilité<br />
Nous avons voulu connaître la perception des intervenantes et intervenants<br />
interrogés à propos du protocole. La majorité d’entre eux ont identifié certains<br />
défis à relever dans son application. Cependant, ils ont aussi mentionné ce qu’ils<br />
considéraient comme des bénéfices ou des acquis. Ils ont également expliqué<br />
comment ils voyaient l’application du protocole dans leur organisme et s’ils<br />
le considéraient approprié dans leur intervention. Pour finir, ils ont fourni<br />
quelques pistes pour améliorer de façon générale l’utilisation du protocole.<br />
Quelques-uns ont relevé des résistances à travailler en partenariat, celles-ci<br />
touchant plus précisément l’éthique d’intervention.<br />
C’est drôle, c’est l’idéal de travailler en réseau mais ils ne savent pas si<br />
ça va se faire, compte tenu du volume, de la charge de travail, puis de la<br />
résistance aussi. Parce que c’est une toute autre manière de travailler. Il y a<br />
peut-être plus de résistance qu’on pense. Je pense qu’ici on attend de voir<br />
pour savoir jusqu’où on peut aller dans la circulation de l’information.<br />
La résistance elle serait plutôt là, c’est quoi les limites à la confidentialité,<br />
qu’est-ce qu’on peut partager, est-ce qu’on peut tant que ça faire des<br />
réunions sans que monsieur ou madame soient là? (Entrevue 2)<br />
Dans les maisons d’hébergement, on a aussi certaines réserves de nature<br />
éthique quant à l’utilisation du protocole dans le meilleur intérêt de la mère et<br />
de l’enfant.<br />
On veut améliorer la vie de l’enfant, mais on trouve souvent qu’on<br />
nous demande de donner plus qu’on veut parce que l’information<br />
qu’ils nous demandent … ça peut tourner mauvaisement pour la mère<br />
de l’enfant. […] Par exemple, si j’ai une femme qui frappe son enfant<br />
on ne va pas appeler la DPJ, on va travailler avec cette femme, on va<br />
travailler avec les problèmes dans la maison, le temps qu’elle est avec<br />
nous autres, on va essayer de travailler avec elle. Quand elle part de<br />
chez nous, c’est sûr et certain que si on trouve que son comportement<br />
n’est pas parti et ça a continué, c’est sûr et certain que la DPJ va être<br />
appelée. (Entrevue 1)<br />
Plusieurs répondantes et répondants déplorent la méconnaissance du protocole<br />
et trouvent difficile de collaborer avec des intervenantes et intervenants de<br />
d’autres organismes qui n’ont jamais ou guère entendu parler du protocole.<br />
J’ai vu un intervenant du centre jeunesse la semaine passée qui s’est<br />
présenté à la cour, puis on avait un dossier commun justement, et lui<br />
n’était pas au courant du tout du protocole enfant témoin. Il n’avait<br />
jamais entendu parler de ça. (Entrevue 3)<br />
Il semble que le rituel de passage d’une philosophie de travail en silo à une<br />
philosophie de collaboration intersectorielle qui se veut rassembleuse, comme<br />
le suggère le protocole, demande un changement de mentalité pour travailler<br />
en partenariat, malgré et avec les différentes façons d’intervenir. Et qui dit<br />
changement, dit temps.<br />
Je pense que c’est le temps, ce n’est pas du jour au lendemain que ça va<br />
rentrer dans les habitudes et dans les cultures de chaque organisme. Mais<br />
il faut qu’il y ait une volonté aussi de la part des cadres. (Entrevue 3)<br />
Dans certaines situations, on trouve difficile de concilier les mandats d’aide<br />
et de contrôle et cela complique la relation et diminue d’autant l’efficacité de<br />
la collaboration. Par exemple, dans les maisons d’hébergement, on tient à la<br />
collaboration, mais on n’est pas nécessairement prêt à tout dévoiler des usagères.<br />
Alors, comment concilier les différents mandats? On retrouve le même obstacle<br />
du côté des organismes d’aide pour les conjoints ayant des comportements<br />
violents qui, eux, n’ont pas un mandat de contrôle mais bien d’aide.<br />
Des comités sont mis sur pied afin que les organismes qui ont des philosophies<br />
d’intervention différentes, pour ne pas dire contraires, trouvent un<br />
terrain d’entente.<br />
Il y a un comité qui existe…pour améliorer justement la collaboration<br />
entre les deux organismes, parce que nous on travaille sur une base<br />
volontaire et la DPJ francophone et anglophone sont davantage sur une<br />
base non volontaire dans la vie des gens, des familles, sans que personne<br />
les ait appelés, on les a invités plutôt là. Donc, on avait souvent des<br />
difficultés de collaborer ensemble parce que nos mandats sont tous<br />
différents. (Entrevue 7)
192 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 193<br />
Malgré des difficultés identifiées lors de l’application du protocole, notamment<br />
du côté des centres jeunesse, on le trouve pertinent.<br />
Moi je vous dis très honnêtement, j’aime beaucoup ce genre de<br />
collaboration, ce protocole là à savoir, c’est nécessaire dans notre travail.<br />
Nous on en a besoin de ça. […] Parfois on manque d’outils, on manque<br />
de gens qui peuvent nous aider, nous supporter, nous encourager, dans<br />
l’intervention à faire […] On le déplore depuis beaucoup d’années, du fait<br />
de trop se retrouver seuls et quand on avait besoin de services externes,<br />
c’était toujours très long avant de pouvoir obtenir une évaluation, obtenir<br />
un suivi, obtenir… Puis je me dis plus on rend le service rapidement à<br />
l’enfant, puis si l’enfant a minimalement le potentiel, bien mon Dieu<br />
c’est intéressant. (Entrevue 10)<br />
En CSSS, on sentait aussi le besoin de pouvoir s’appuyer sur quelque chose<br />
de tangible afin que la communication passe entre les organismes. Dans ce<br />
con<strong>text</strong>e, le protocole semble contribuer à la concertation et à la continuité<br />
dans l’accès aux services. Dans les maisons d’hébergement, on le trouve utile<br />
pour sensibiliser les autres organismes à la problématique des enfants exposés.<br />
Oui, c’est ça, mon point de vue c’est que ça peut être positif pour<br />
davantage sensibiliser les autres organismes qui le sont peut-être même<br />
moins par rapport à la violence conjugale, les effets que ça peut avoir<br />
sur les enfants, l’importance d’<strong>of</strong>frir de la continuité dans leurs services,<br />
pour ça oui. Pour sensibiliser davantage, je vois que ça a un lien.<br />
(Entrevue 7)<br />
Malgré les défis à relever dans la collaboration entre les divers organismes<br />
partenaires, il ressort des entrevues que dans le cas des enfants exposés à la<br />
violence conjugale, les intervenantes et intervenants ont tendance à collaborer<br />
avec des intervenants et intervenantes de d’autres organismes qui ne sont pas<br />
impliqués dans le projet pilote.<br />
À la Direction de la protection de la jeunesse, on fait ainsi fréquemment<br />
appel aux hôpitaux dans les cas où l’enfant est exposé à la violence conjugale.<br />
… On s’assoit une table de 10 intervenants avec les parents où là on a<br />
vraiment une panoplie de services qui peut se mettre en place rapidement.<br />
Puis c’est fascinant à partir du moment où tout le monde est mobilisé<br />
autour du service à rendre à la famille. (Entrevue 10)<br />
Les maisons d’hébergement sont aussi en communication avec d’autres<br />
organismes et, semble-t-il, assez fréquemment avec les écoles et les CPE.<br />
…si les écoles ou les CPE étaient impliqués dans le projet comme<br />
partenaires par exemple, ça aurait été utilisé très souvent. Le seul endroit<br />
que j’aimerais le voir, comme j’ai dit plusieurs fois, c’est dans les écoles et<br />
les CPE. On travaille de la même manière qu’eux autres, avec l’acte signé<br />
par la mère qui nous donne le droit de parler pour elle, de parler de son<br />
cas avec l’école ou le CPE. (Entrevue 1)<br />
Les maisons d’hébergement traitent aussi avec l’Indemnisation des victimes<br />
d’actes criminels (IVAC) d’après cette même intervenante. « C’est un grand<br />
nombre de nos clientes qu’on réfère à l’IVAC, on fait une demande à l’IVAC.<br />
Oui, parce qu’être victime de violence conjugale, l’IVAC va payer pour le<br />
psychologique » (Entrevue 1). D’ailleurs, on pense sensiblement de la même<br />
façon du côté des ressources pour conjoints ayant des comportements<br />
violents. En effet, on juge aussi qu’il faudrait impliquer d’autres partenaires<br />
dans le projet, à tout le moins dans les comités.<br />
Je pense qu’il y a des joueurs qui sont pas présents qui peut-être auraient<br />
avantage, et c’est tout le réseau qui aurait avantage à les inviter à faire<br />
peut-être partie de ce comité local. Exemple, les écoles, écoles primaires,<br />
les CPE, centres de petite enfance, les maisons de transition, ce sont des<br />
partenaires qui sont impliqués, ils ont eu affaire avec des familles, avec<br />
des pères, avec des mères des enfants. (Entrevue 5)<br />
Afin de relever les nombreux défis qui jalonnent le travail en partenariat, les<br />
répondantes et répondants proposent des solutions ou des outils susceptibles<br />
de soutenir la collaboration entre les partenaires. Par exemple, on suggère<br />
de donner des exemples d’activités, en lien avec le protocole, qui ont bien<br />
fonctionné. Ces exemples serviraient à faire connaître les possibilités qu’il <strong>of</strong>fre<br />
à l’ensemble des partenaires.<br />
Un répondant croit qu’il est plus difficile d’implanter le protocole dans des<br />
organisations où il y a beaucoup de roulement de personnel et lorsqu’il y a<br />
plusieurs intervenantes et intervenants à rejoindre. À son avis, c’est moins<br />
complexe lorsque l’organisme est plus petit, car se dessine la possibilité<br />
d’entrevoir une autre façon de travailler en intervention.<br />
On est un petit organisme, c’est plus facile de transmettre, de disséminer<br />
de l’information. Je pense que premièrement implanter quelque chose de
194 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 195<br />
nouveau il faut avoir l’ouverture et l’ouverture d’esprit pour commencer à<br />
penser à des choses d’une façon un peu plus différente. Et l’implantation,<br />
et peut-être le futur succès de l’implantation du protocole ça va<br />
dépendre de ça je pense. Et que l’esprit derrière tout ça c’est qu’on fait<br />
une tentative de mieux aider les enfants et parallèlement les familles, les<br />
pères, les mères. Alors c’est un début d’échange entre partenaires, entre<br />
intervenants, et je pense que ça peut être un déclencheur de plusieurs<br />
échanges entre partenaires dans le futur. (Entrevue 5)<br />
Sensibiliser les intervenantes et intervenants au protocole par de la formation<br />
continue a également été mentionné. Ces formations contribueraient à favoriser<br />
une meilleure interprétation du protocole et aideraient à la compréhension des<br />
modalités d’action. Une version en anglais simplifierait aussi l’application du<br />
protocole et serait grandement appréciée du côté anglophone.<br />
Pour faciliter l’utilisation du protocole et qu’on ait le réflexe de le faire, il<br />
faudrait sans doute des outils qui peuvent être consultés d’un simple coup<br />
d’œil. De fait, tous les partenaires ont mentionné qu’il faudrait des outils dont<br />
le contenu est à la fois complet, facilement accessible, clair et d’application<br />
concrète, car certaines personnes ne comprennent pas toujours de la même<br />
façon toutes les modalités d’application.<br />
Discussion des résultats et recommandations<br />
Rappelons que les partenaires engagés dans le protocole de collaboration<br />
intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale proviennent<br />
de deux secteurs principaux d’intervention : le communautaire, auquel<br />
appartiennent les partenaires des maisons d’hébergement et des organismes<br />
pour conjoints ayant des comportements violents, et l’institutionnel, auquel se<br />
rattachent les partenaires des centres jeunesse, des CSSS, de Côté Cour et du<br />
SPVM. Donc, deux secteurs, deux façons différentes et complémentaires de<br />
concevoir l’intervention tant dans les objectifs que dans la philosophie sousjacente.<br />
À cet égard, il est plus que nécessaire de souligner l’implication, dans<br />
ce projet-pilote, de l’Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal<br />
et de la Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal qui a<br />
permis l’implantation de ce protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour<br />
les enfants exposés à la violence conjugale. Sans la volonté et le leadership<br />
décisionnels de ces deux pouvoirs politiques et sans la concertation entre ceuxci,<br />
le développement d’une véritable collaboration entre les divers secteurs<br />
d’intervention n’aurait pu se faire.<br />
Missions des partenaires : des réalités contrastées<br />
Un accent particulier a ainsi été mis sur les mandats des différentes<br />
organisations. Dans la collaboration intersectorielle, bien connaître le<br />
mandat des partenaires permet de mieux cerner les limites organisationnelles<br />
auxquelles font face l’ensemble de ceux-ci. Les résultats pointent l’importance,<br />
à cet égard, de pouvoir compter, au sein du protocole, des partenaires pivots,<br />
motivés par la collaboration intersectorielle dans l’intervention auprès des<br />
enfants exposés, qui, non seulement, connaissent très bien les rouages de<br />
leur organisation, mais peuvent, de surcroît, les communiquer simplement<br />
et efficacement aux autres partenaires. Les résultats sous-tendent aussi la<br />
pertinence d’intégrer des partenaires qui ont travaillé au sein de plus d’une<br />
culture organisationnelle et qui peuvent faciliter le développement de relations<br />
entre les acteurs de divers secteurs d’intervention. Les résultats de Lessard et<br />
coll. (2006) montrent d’ailleurs qu’une meilleure connaissance de l’ensemble<br />
des partenaires est une stratégie permettant de contourner les difficultés liées<br />
aux contingences légales et matérielles.<br />
Par ailleurs, les propos des participantes et participants travaillant en institution<br />
rapportent aussi l’importance d’intégrer des cadres, d’une part, intéressés à<br />
l’intervention auprès des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale, et d’autre part,<br />
actifs dans des postes stratégiques leur permettant d’exercer une influence sur<br />
les décisions qui se prennent à l’intérieur des organisations (sources d’accès au<br />
financement disponible dans l’organisation pour le dégagement d’intervenantes<br />
et d’intervenants qui travaillent à l’implantation du protocole, maintien de ce<br />
dossier dans les priorités de l’organisation, etc.).<br />
Le type de modalités utilisées dans le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle<br />
est aussi tributaire des mandats des différentes organisations. Certaines<br />
modalités d’action ne s’appliquent ainsi pas au travail de certains partenaires.<br />
Par exemple, les échanges cliniques qui ne conviennent pas au travail des<br />
policiers ne seront que très peu utilisés par eux. La modalité de références<br />
personnalisées de victimes vers des services sociaux et de santé, bien au<br />
contraire, fait partie de leur travail quotidien. L’utilisation de cette modalité<br />
en est ainsi structurée par une entente de collaboration <strong>of</strong>ficialisée entre le<br />
SPVM et les CSSS.<br />
Par ailleurs, pour les maisons d’hébergement et les organismes pour les conjoints<br />
ayant des comportements violents, l’échange clinique semble s’appliquer plus<br />
facilement à leur culture organisationnelle. Les milieux communautaires étant<br />
plus petits, ils ne sont pas soumis aux dédales administratifs qui alourdissent les
196 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 197<br />
démarches d’intervention intersectorielle. Ils peuvent être ainsi plus efficaces<br />
dans l’organisation de tels échanges.<br />
Les transferts personnalisés font aussi partie de la culture organisationnelle des<br />
organismes communautaires. On peut supposer que, contrairement aux CSSS<br />
qui <strong>of</strong>frent un très vaste éventail de services en santé et services sociaux sur<br />
place, les organismes communautaires ont la nécessité, pour mieux répondre<br />
aux besoins à long terme des usagers, d’effectuer des transferts personnalisés<br />
vers d’autres organismes.<br />
L’échange d’informations est fréquemment utilisé par l’ensemble des<br />
partenaires. Dans le cas du service Côté Cour, on a développé un réseau de<br />
communication avec l’ensemble des partenaires autant dans la réception que<br />
dans la transmission d’informations aidant à bien comprendre la situation des<br />
femmes victimes de violence conjugale et favorisant le dépistage des enfants<br />
exposés à cette violence.<br />
La sensibilisation et la formation sur la problématique<br />
des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale :<br />
un incontournable dans le travail en partenariat<br />
Le dépistage des enfants exposés à la violence conjugale est une initiative mise<br />
de l’avant par le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle. L’ouverture du<br />
protocole à d’autres partenaires que ceux initialement impliqués dans le projet<br />
pilote va demander une formation commune sur la problématique des enfants<br />
exposés qui est de plus mise à jour de façon constante, structurée, complète,<br />
vulgarisée et adaptable selon les besoins des personnes qui y assistent, de façon<br />
à ce qu’elle en rejoigne le plus grand nombre possible. De plus, cette formation<br />
nécessitera une mise en application concrète des différentes modalités du<br />
protocole à partir de situations réelles, demandant une intervention concertée<br />
entre partenaires et ce, afin que les acteurs suivant la formation puisse d’ors et<br />
déjà se les approprier.<br />
Les formations auront aussi tout avantage à être montées et animées par des<br />
gens de terrain qui ont une expertise en intervention auprès des enfants exposés<br />
à la violence conjugale. Comme les secteurs communautaire et institutionnel<br />
sont représentés dans ce protocole, il serait équitable et réaliste qu’ils le soient<br />
aussi au sein des formations le concernant. La qualité des échanges entre les<br />
formateurs, le travail de concertation qu’ils auront dû réaliser pour créer et<br />
donner la formation (contenu et contenant), les stratégies de collaboration qu’ils<br />
auront développées ensemble pour tenir compte du mandat de leur organisation<br />
et de leur philosophie d’intervention respective, permettront aux participantes<br />
et participants à la formation de s’ancrer dans le travail en partenariat.<br />
Les intervenantes et intervenants du secteur communautaire et institutionnel<br />
déplorent d’ailleurs la difficulté de travailler avec des philosophies<br />
d’intervention différentes qui découlent, entre autres, des mandats d’aide<br />
donnée sur une base volontaire et d’aide imposée par un contrôle judiciaire. À<br />
ce titre, les maisons d’hébergement, les organismes pour les conjoints ayant des<br />
comportements violents et les centres jeunesse ont tout intérêt à créer ensemble<br />
une formation. D’une part, l’expertise des partenaires du communautaire<br />
relativement à la problématique de la violence conjugale est indiscutable.<br />
D’autre part, la reconnaissance <strong>of</strong>ficielle de l’exposition à la violence conjugale,<br />
par le partenaire institutionnel, à titre de mauvais traitements psychologiques<br />
pouvant compromettre l’intégrité morale et le développement de l’enfant et,<br />
dans certains cas, entraîner d’autres problématiques ou y être concomitants,<br />
amène une autre façon de concevoir la famille aux prises avec la violence<br />
conjugale. Leur mandat respectif, leur façon d’intervenir et les objectifs qu’ils<br />
poursuivent, même s’ils diffèrent, n’en restent pas moins complémentaires, et<br />
méritent d’être arrimés par une compréhension en pr<strong>of</strong>ondeur et commune de<br />
l’exposition des enfants à la violence conjugale.<br />
Un second avantage de la formation donnée de façon intersectorielle, outre<br />
le fait de pouvoir réaliser que le travail en partenariat est une réalité possible,<br />
est de pouvoir s’identifier à sa propre organisation. Plusieurs participantes<br />
et participants ont mentionné que le protocole n’était pas connu au sein de<br />
leur milieu. À tout le moins, une piste de solutions peut être empruntée. Les<br />
personnes qui suivent la formation peuvent devenir des agents multiplicateurs<br />
de l’application du protocole dans leur milieu de travail. La formation, à cet<br />
égard, aura tout avantage à être répétée à intervalles réguliers, avec les mêmes<br />
personnes, si elles le désirent, tout en incluant de nouveaux individus, de façon<br />
à préserver les acquis, à faire de nouveaux apprentissages et à former le plus<br />
de gens possible. L’avantage de ceci est de pallier les nombreux roulements de<br />
personnel dans le secteur institutionnel et de la santé dus, entre autres, aux<br />
constantes réorganisations des structures établies.<br />
Outre la formation elle-même, les intervenantes et intervenants émettent la<br />
possibilité d’aménager le protocole pour leurs collègues de travail en créant<br />
des outils concrets et vulgarisés des différentes modalités sous l’angle de leurs<br />
mandats respectifs. Ces outils pourraient être aussi présentés à une diversité de<br />
partenaires, par le biais de la Table de concertation en violence conjugale de<br />
Montréal et de l’Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal, engagées
198 Revue de l’IPC 3 Venir en aide aux enfants exposés à la violence conjugale 199<br />
dans l’implantation du protocole. Ce travail en équipe autour d’outils a, par<br />
ailleurs, débuté depuis près d’un an dans deux sous-comités d’implantation du<br />
protocole, appelés comités locaux de collaboration intersectorielle, au CSSS de<br />
la Montagne et au CSSS Jeanne Mance. Des intervenantes et intervenants des<br />
six groupes partenaires se mobilisent à intervalles réguliers, non seulement pour<br />
y créer des outils pour vulgariser le protocole de collaboration intersectorielle,<br />
mais aussi pour y discuter de situations cliniques réelles et envisager des solutions<br />
possibles pour dénouer certaines difficultés et intervenir en partenariat dans le<br />
meilleur intérêt de l’enfant et de sa famille.<br />
Conclusion<br />
L’implantation d’un tel protocole, aussi structuré et impliquant autant de<br />
partenaires, est une première en Amérique du Nord (Harper, 2002). Le<br />
protocole de collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence<br />
conjugale est plus qu’une structure de collaboration entre divers secteurs, elle<br />
est une structure de partenariat qui nécessite de leur part une action collective<br />
d’intervention. La collaboration intersectorielle est l’étape préalable à cette<br />
action et pour qu’elle atteigne un engagement partenarial, il a fallu qu’elle<br />
soit régie par des balises à la fois explicites et implicites qui l’ont structurée; ce<br />
qu’est le protocole actuel. Ces balises peuvent être aménagées de façon souple,<br />
modifiées, ajustées selon les besoins de l’intervention, et supposent donc une<br />
qualité d’engagement dans l’action qui est omniprésente dans le partenariat.<br />
Partant de cette analyse, il est recommandé que le terme protocole de<br />
collaboration intersectorielle soit remplacé par celui d’action intersectorielle.<br />
Cette action intersectorielle est tributaire de la volonté d’engagement des<br />
partenaires dans l’intervention auprès des enfants exposés à la violence<br />
conjugale et d’une ouverture pour partager les connaissances théoriques et<br />
pratiques sur la problématique de même que les divers objectifs d’intervention<br />
et les façons d’intervenir, et ce même si elles diffèrent. De ce fait, l’implantation<br />
d’un protocole d’action intersectorielle, est aussi celle d’une philosophie<br />
d’intervention. Philosophie, qui se veut rassembleuse, parce qu’implantée<br />
pour décloisonner le travail en silo et l’ouvrir à un travail en complémentarité.<br />
Et qui dit philosophie d’intervention dit durée et constance afin de réussir<br />
à l’ancrer pour de bon dans les services sociaux et de santé, de même que<br />
dans tous les services susceptibles d’agir auprès des enfants exposés à la<br />
violence conjugale.<br />
Bibliographie<br />
Clément, M.-E., Tourigny, M., et Doyon, M. (1999). Facteurs liés à l’échec<br />
d’un partenariat entre un organisme communautaire et un CLSC : une<br />
étude exploratoire. Nouvelles pratiques sociales, 12(4), 45-64.<br />
Harper, É. (2002). Projets intersectoriels en matière de services pour les enfants<br />
exposés à la violence conjugale et les membres de leur famille. Recension des<br />
écrits et pistes d’action pour Montréal. Montréal : Rapport déposé à la<br />
Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal.<br />
Lessard, G., Lavergne, C., Chamberland, C., Damant, D., et Turcotte, D.<br />
(2006). Conditions for resolving controversies between social actors<br />
in domestic violence and youth protection services: Toward innovative<br />
collaborative practices. Children and Youth Services Review, 28, 511-<br />
534.<br />
Ouellet, F., Paiement, M., et Tremblay, P.-H. (1995). L’action intersectorielle,<br />
un jeu d’équipe. Montréal : Direction de la santé publique de<br />
Montréal-centre/CECOM de l’Hôpital Rivière-des-Prairies.<br />
Quivy, R. et Van Campenhoudt, L. (2006). Manuel de recherche en sciences<br />
sociales. Paris : Dunod.<br />
René, J.-F. et Gervais, L. (2001). La dynamique partenariale : un état de la<br />
question. Les enjeux du partenariat aujourd’hui. Nouvelles pratiques<br />
sociales, 14(1), 20-30.<br />
Savard, S. et Mayer, R. (2001). Le partenariat interorganisationnel dans<br />
le secteur de la petite enfance : le cas des projets financés par le<br />
Programme d’action communautaire pour les enfants. Revue<br />
canadienne de service social, 18(1), 107-130.<br />
Savard, S., Turcotte, D., et Beaudoin, A. (2003). Le partenariat et les<br />
organisations sociosanitaires du secteur de l’enfance, de la famille et de<br />
la jeunesse : une analyse stratégique. Nouvelles pratiques sociales, 16(2),<br />
160-177.
200 Revue de l’IPC 3<br />
Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal et Agence de<br />
la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal. (2004). Protocole de<br />
collaboration intersectorielle pour les enfants exposés à la violence<br />
conjugale. Les modalités de référence et de collaboration. Montréal :<br />
Table de concertation en violence conjugale de Montréal. Consulté<br />
le 15 janvier 2006, à : http://www.tcvcm.ca/images/docs/TCVCM_<br />
ProtocoleCollaboration_enfants_2004-06-17.pdf<br />
Volume 3: pages 201–222<br />
March/mars 2009<br />
www.ipc.uOttawa.ca<br />
Revue de L’<br />
IPC<br />
R E V I E W<br />
Concentrating Investments to<br />
Prevent Violence Against Women<br />
Holly Johnson & Jennifer Fraser<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Criminology & Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa<br />
Résumé<br />
Le Groupe de travail national sur la prévention de la criminalité (2007)<br />
recommande la « concentration des investissements sur les besoins les<br />
plus importants » comme un élément essentiel d’une stratégie nationale<br />
efficace en prévention. Nous examinons ce que cela veut dire pour la<br />
prévention de la violence contre les femmes en adressant trois grands<br />
défis : maintenir un engagement politique de haut niveau à l’égard du<br />
problème; développer un consensus sur des indicateurs appropriés pour<br />
décrire le problème et évaluer le succès de nos interventions; et assurer<br />
l’accès aux données nécessaires et à l’expertise technique pour bien les<br />
utiliser. Nous considérons les avantages qu’une approche systématique<br />
d’intégration de l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes (gender<br />
mainstreaming) pourrait apporter au maintient d’un engagement politique<br />
d’inclure une perspective de genre dans les initiatives préventives. Nous<br />
examinons aussi les quelques recherches qui ont étudié les expériences<br />
violentes vécues par des femmes dans des con<strong>text</strong>es où cette violence n’a<br />
pas traditionnellement été étudiée. Pour l’instant, nos outils diagnostiques<br />
et de collecte de données ne semblent pas en mesure d’inclure ces<br />
expériences. Une vision plus large de la gamme d’expériences violentes<br />
vécues par les femmes doit être intégrée dans les stratégies canadiennes<br />
de collecte de données. Ceci nous permettrait d’améliorer notre capacité<br />
de décrire la nature et l’étendu de cette violence et d’évaluer l’efficacité de<br />
nos interventions.
202 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 203<br />
Abstract<br />
The National Working Group on Crime Prevention (2007) recommends<br />
“concentrating investments on the highest needs” as an essential element<br />
<strong>of</strong> a successful national crime prevention strategy for Canada. This article<br />
reflects on what this means for the prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women<br />
by addressing three major challenges: sustaining high-level government<br />
commitment to preventing violence against women; achieving consensus<br />
on what constitutes appropriate indicators for measuring the nature and<br />
extent <strong>of</strong> the problem and evaluating success; and, ensuring access to<br />
relevant data and the technical expertise to use it effectively. We consider<br />
the benefits <strong>of</strong> gender mainstreaming for sustaining high-level commitment<br />
to including a gender perspective in violence prevention activities. We<br />
also pr<strong>of</strong>ile research that examines women’s experiences <strong>of</strong> violence in<br />
con<strong>text</strong>s where it is not traditionally studied and conclude that traditional<br />
diagnostic and data collection tools are not adequate to the task. A broader<br />
vision <strong>of</strong> where and how girls and women experience violence needs to be<br />
integrated into data collection strategies in Canada. This would enhance<br />
our capacity to assess the nature and prevalence <strong>of</strong> this violence and the<br />
effectiveness <strong>of</strong> interventions.<br />
Introduction<br />
Male violence against women has not fit easily within traditional crime<br />
prevention initiatives, most <strong>of</strong> which have tended to employ a gender-neutral<br />
perspective. Within analyses <strong>of</strong> gender-based violence, efforts to prevent male<br />
violence against women are <strong>of</strong>ten fragmented along two lines: intimate partner<br />
violence and women’s safety in public spaces (Shaw & Andrew, 2005). In<br />
addition, prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women initiatives face many <strong>of</strong> the<br />
same challenges as traditional crime prevention policies and programs: while<br />
promising prevention approaches have been developed, most are implemented<br />
on an ad hoc basis and face problems <strong>of</strong> sustainability.<br />
The National Working Group on Crime Prevention (NWG), sponsored by<br />
the Institute for the Prevention <strong>of</strong> Crime (IPC) at the University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa,<br />
identifies five key elements <strong>of</strong> a successful national crime prevention strategy<br />
for Canada (2007, p. 16-17):<br />
1. Collaboration and problem-solving partnerships;<br />
2. Concentrating investments on the highest needs;<br />
3. Developing and sustaining community capacity;<br />
4. Ensuring adequate and sustained supports and resources; and<br />
5. Fostering public engagement.<br />
This article will assess how the second <strong>of</strong> these elements, concentrating investments<br />
on the highest needs, can be accomplished in relation to the problem <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
against women. Table 1 lists the current situation, gaps, and recommendations<br />
outlined by the NWG (2007, p. 16-17) with respect to concentrating investments<br />
on groups or areas with the highest needs in crime prevention in general. The<br />
NWG makes a number <strong>of</strong> observations: successful prevention initiatives are<br />
not well-known; the nature <strong>of</strong> appropriate indicators for identifying crime<br />
problems continues to be debated; there are problems with access to data and<br />
to the diagnostic tools and data collection mechanisms required for targeting<br />
interventions and assessing progress; and, commitments to prevention initiatives<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten lose out to demands for resources for the operation <strong>of</strong> the criminal justice<br />
system. The NWG (2007) recommends that, in order to improve the capacity<br />
to concentrate investments on highest need areas and situations, we need clear<br />
and measurable indicators to serve as benchmarks for diagnoses and to assess the<br />
impacts <strong>of</strong> interventions, improved access to data, as well as the required training<br />
and technical assistance to make the best use <strong>of</strong> what is available.<br />
In this article we reflect on what is meant by “concentrating investments on<br />
highest needs” when it comes to formulating, implementing, and sustaining<br />
initiatives to prevent male violence against women. We highlight some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
challenges <strong>of</strong> sustaining an interest in the prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women,<br />
the difficulties related to achieving consensus on appropriate indicators for<br />
diagnosing problems and evaluating success, and major issues around access<br />
to the data needed to inform prevention efforts.<br />
Table 1: Concentrating investments on highest needs<br />
Current situation<br />
Gaps<br />
Recommendations<br />
• Recent National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) emphasis on evidence-led focused action;<br />
• Some important success stories;<br />
• Debates over appropriate indicators; and<br />
• Lack <strong>of</strong> required data.<br />
• Success stories not well-known;<br />
• Difficult to elicit a clear interest in prevention; and<br />
• Insufficient access to user-friendly data.<br />
• Identify clear and measurable indicators to serve as benchmarks for diagnoses<br />
and evaluations;<br />
• Assure user-friendly access to required data; and<br />
• Invest in training and technical assistance.<br />
Source: Adapted from NWG (2007, p. 16-17).
204 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 205<br />
Sustaining a Commitment to Prevention<br />
This section focuses on two major issues related to sustaining an interest in<br />
preventing violence against women: shifts in priority setting by various orders<br />
<strong>of</strong> government, and challenges to gender mainstreaming approaches. It also<br />
features an example <strong>of</strong> an academic/community partnership that has resulted<br />
in a sustainable violence prevention program for youth.<br />
Priority Setting<br />
Canada’s National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) was instituted in<br />
1998 with a mandate to oversee the development and implementation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
National Crime Prevention Strategy. At this time, three priority areas were<br />
identified: youth, Aboriginal people, and violence against women. In 2007,<br />
with an annual budget <strong>of</strong> $63 million, the NCPC refocused its work on four<br />
priority areas: (1) addressing early risk factors among vulnerable families and<br />
children and youth at risk; (2) responding to priority crime issues such as<br />
youth gangs and drug-related crime; (3) preventing recidivism among high<br />
risk groups; and (4) fostering prevention in Aboriginal communities (National<br />
Crime Prevention Centre, 2007).<br />
Violence against women is no longer listed as a specific priority for the NCPC.<br />
However, a program can qualify for funding if it can be demonstrated that<br />
it fits within one <strong>of</strong> these four priorities areas, for example violence against<br />
women in Aboriginal communities, or is an intervention aimed at preventing<br />
re<strong>of</strong>fending in cases <strong>of</strong> intimate partner violence. In addition, eleven specific<br />
programs are favoured for significant funding by the NCPC over the next five<br />
years (NCPC, 2008):<br />
1. Boys & Girls Club <strong>of</strong> Canada / Mentoring;<br />
2. Police Athletic League;<br />
3. Fast Track;<br />
4. Stop Now and Plan;<br />
5. Multisystemic Therapy;<br />
6. Life Skills Training;<br />
7. Leadership and Resiliency Program;<br />
8. Youth Inclusion Program;<br />
9. Quantum Opportunities Program;<br />
10. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care; and<br />
11. Circles <strong>of</strong> Support and Accountability.<br />
With this refocusing comes an emphasis on measureable results, project<br />
evaluations, and the development <strong>of</strong> a knowledge base on effective prevention<br />
practices that can be broadly disseminated (NCPC, 2007). This is an important<br />
role for a federal crime prevention agency, but the lack <strong>of</strong> specific commitment<br />
to funding for demonstration projects on violence against women is acutely<br />
felt, especially given the paucity <strong>of</strong> evaluations in this area in comparison to<br />
the numerous and extensive evaluations <strong>of</strong> programs aimed at preventing youth<br />
crime (Kruttschnitt, McLaughlin, & Petrie, 2004; Schewe, 2002).<br />
At the provincial level, Alberta and Nova Scotia have recently established<br />
coordinated, multi-agency provincial crime prevention initiatives in which<br />
the problem <strong>of</strong> violence against women and strategies for preventing<br />
it and responding to victims are conceptualized quite differently. The<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> reference for the Alberta government’s Crime Reduction and Safe<br />
Communities Task Force make no mention <strong>of</strong> gender as a vulnerability or risk<br />
factor for violence, and sexual assault is mentioned primarily in the con<strong>text</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
the sexual exploitation <strong>of</strong> children (see Government <strong>of</strong> Alberta, 2007). After<br />
six months <strong>of</strong> public consultation, the Task Force made 31 recommendations.<br />
Included among them is the expansion <strong>of</strong> specialized domestic violence courts,<br />
the expansion <strong>of</strong> provincial support for programs aimed at preventing domestic<br />
violence, and providing support for families that are victims <strong>of</strong> domestic<br />
violence (Government <strong>of</strong> Alberta, 2007). While a commitment to providing<br />
additional support for families and prevention programs is certainly promising,<br />
it is a curious choice <strong>of</strong> phrasing to identify “families” and not women and<br />
children as the primary victims <strong>of</strong> domestic violence. In the $468 million<br />
3-year Safecom Action Plan established to respond to these recommendations,<br />
family violence is not listed among the 11 priority areas to be tackled first. 1<br />
Framing the issue as one <strong>of</strong> “domestic” or “family” violence suggests that<br />
violence is age- and gender-neutral and fails to acknowledge that women and<br />
children are those at greatest risk <strong>of</strong> physical and sexual violence in private<br />
settings and who suffer the most serious consequences (Johnson, 2006).<br />
Sexual violence, the most gendered <strong>of</strong> crimes, is not mentioned in the Alberta<br />
government’s Action Plan, despite the fact that sexual violence affects almost<br />
500,000 women in Canada and about 54,000 women in Alberta each year<br />
(Gannon & Mihorean, 2005). A strategy to end violence in women’s lives<br />
must aim to address the gendered con<strong>text</strong>s in which this violence proliferates<br />
(Johnson, 2007). Experts argue that despite good evidence <strong>of</strong> the risk factors<br />
1 See http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=48560 for a chart <strong>of</strong> the<br />
recommendations and priorities.
206 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 207<br />
for violence and the social con<strong>text</strong>s in which violence occurs, the major<br />
underlying causes <strong>of</strong> male violence against women, such as the abuse <strong>of</strong> power<br />
and gender inequality, remain poorly understood by the public and are seldom<br />
effectively addressed in prevention efforts (Wolfe & Jaffe, 2001, p. 283). This<br />
situation is made worse when government funding bodies fail to accurately<br />
identify the nature <strong>of</strong> the problem and to link causes to appropriate solutions.<br />
In 2006, in response to concerns about rising violent crime and youth crime,<br />
the Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice <strong>of</strong> Nova Scotia created the Task Force on Safer Streets<br />
and Communities. Its mandate was to identify best practices and ways to<br />
support communities in their efforts to address conditions that contribute to<br />
crime (Government <strong>of</strong> Nova Scotia, 2007). Although violence against women<br />
was not listed among the 18 priority areas for action in the Task Force report,<br />
the government response specifically identified the importance <strong>of</strong> raising<br />
awareness and changing attitudes and misconceptions about family violence,<br />
sexual assault, and other forms <strong>of</strong> violence against women. The government<br />
report also recommends counselling for children who witness family violence;<br />
enhanced support for victims <strong>of</strong> family violence, intimate partner violence,<br />
and sexual assault to help prevent re-victimization; annual training for justice<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials responding to family violence; and, improved coordination <strong>of</strong> services<br />
in domestic violence cases.<br />
Government initiatives like these play an important leadership role in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
facilitating coordination among sectors and allocating resources to community<br />
groups and agencies working to prevent crime and improve community<br />
safety. However, priority setting by national and provincial crime prevention<br />
initiatives serves an equally important symbolic function. By identifying<br />
certain groups or crime problems as priorities, governments use their authority<br />
to construct some social problems as more worthy <strong>of</strong> attention than others.<br />
One example is the way in which combating youth crime involving guns and<br />
gangs has become a priority for the federal government, despite the fact that<br />
this problem is concentrated within a few specific communities and geographic<br />
areas, in contrast to intimate partner and sexual violence which affect large<br />
numbers <strong>of</strong> mainly women and children throughout the broader population.<br />
Women’s groups and community agencies continue to struggle to sustain a<br />
commitment to keeping the prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women on the<br />
public policy agenda.<br />
Despite these ongoing challenges, there have been some successes. One notable<br />
initiative in Canada is The Fourth R, an anti-violence program for youth that<br />
evolved out <strong>of</strong> academic/community partnerships within the University <strong>of</strong><br />
Western Ontario and the Thames Valley School Board in London, Ontario.<br />
Though the program was developed through funding from various federal<br />
and Ontario government agencies and is housed in the Centre for Prevention<br />
Science <strong>of</strong> the Centre for Addictions and Mental Health (CAMH), the<br />
expansion <strong>of</strong> The Fourth R to sites across Canada has been largely privately<br />
funded by the Royal LePage Shelter Foundation and a philanthropic family<br />
(Crooks, Wolfe, Hughes, Jaffe, & Chiodo, 2008).<br />
A rigorous evaluation <strong>of</strong> The Fourth R indicates that early intervention in high<br />
school settings through curriculum-based programming can have a positive<br />
impact on the knowledge, skills, and attitudes <strong>of</strong> adolescents concerning<br />
sexual and relationship violence (Crooks et al., 2008). Unlike many other<br />
prevention efforts that involve short-term or one-time interactions with young<br />
people in school settings, the key to the sustainability <strong>of</strong> The Fourth R is the<br />
curriculum-based nature <strong>of</strong> the program and the provision <strong>of</strong> training and<br />
pedagogical materials to teachers who deliver the program. As a result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
growing awareness and support for this program among high school teachers<br />
and administrators, The Fourth R has been integrated into the curriculum<br />
in more than 350 schools in Ontario and in schools in six other Canadian<br />
provinces (Crooks et al., 2008).<br />
Gender Mainstreaming<br />
Gender mainstreaming is one approach to sustaining efforts to prevent<br />
violence against women over the longer term; is designed to institutionalize<br />
gender concerns and to incorporate the safety and security <strong>of</strong> women into<br />
government policies and programs (Moser, 2008). British researcher Caroline<br />
Moser (2008) illustrates how the use <strong>of</strong> a gender mainstreaming approach<br />
at the local level provides a useful lens for examining how different types <strong>of</strong><br />
crimes are interrelated and how gender intersects with other social disparities,<br />
such as those based on ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation. Gender<br />
mainstreaming was established by the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action as the<br />
major global strategy for achieving gender equality and empowering women<br />
(United Nations, 1995). It is defined by the Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Council <strong>of</strong><br />
the United Nations as “the process <strong>of</strong> assessing the implications for women<br />
and men <strong>of</strong> any planned action…so that women and men benefit equally<br />
and inequality is not perpetuated” (UN Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Council,<br />
1997). Other definitions also incorporate gender equality in staffing, women’s<br />
participation in decision-making processes, and specific activities to empower<br />
women (Moser, 2008).
208 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 209<br />
Montreal has been a world leader in municipal action to prevent violence<br />
against women through the work <strong>of</strong> the Comité d’action femmes et sécurité<br />
urbaine (CAFSU – Women and Urban Safety Action Committee) which was<br />
formed in 1992 to focus on violence against women in public spaces, primarily<br />
through public awareness campaigns and safety audits. Also during this time,<br />
the city’s crime prevention program, Tandem Montreal, extended its mandate<br />
to include a women’s safety component (Michaud & Chappaz, 2002). The<br />
network Women in Cities International (WICI – Femmes et villes) developed<br />
out <strong>of</strong> the work <strong>of</strong> CAFSU to facilitate the exchange <strong>of</strong> information and<br />
provide advice to governments on gender issues and gender mainstreaming in<br />
the governance <strong>of</strong> cities. Since its inception, WICI has undertaken a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> activities to encourage gender equality in municipal governments and has<br />
developed nine key organizing themes on women’s safety. These incorporate the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> a gender-based approach, conducting safety audits and safety planning<br />
from a woman’s perspective, using research, and sharing good practices. 2<br />
In 2002, CAFSU and WICI released a report that encourages municipal<br />
governments to move away from a paternalistic/dependence to an<br />
empowerment/autonomy approach to women’s safety. Such an approach<br />
places women as the central point <strong>of</strong> reference for community safety<br />
issues, and is part <strong>of</strong> a comprehensive model that relies on communication<br />
with stakeholders, research and policy, safety planning and design, and<br />
community mobilization (Michaud & Chappaz, 2002). Also in 2002, the<br />
Montreal Declaration on Women’s Safety identified good local governance<br />
using a gendered approach as a key component to ensuring women’s safety.<br />
In collaboration with other partners, WICI has also produced publications<br />
to guide local action on addressing women’s safety concerns, on conducting<br />
safety audits, and on achieving gender equality through equal representation<br />
in municipal governments and decision making. An online exchange forum<br />
with women’s groups from five continents in 2006 resulted in a number <strong>of</strong><br />
key elements for ensuring gender mainstreaming in local governance<br />
(Michaud, 2007).<br />
Finally, WICI is currently helping to build partnerships between local women’s<br />
groups and their municipalities and to implement safety approaches that focus<br />
on marginalized women. With funding from Status <strong>of</strong> Women Canada, this<br />
project aims to provide training for the development and implementation <strong>of</strong><br />
safety audits in four Canadian cities (Montreal, Gatineau, Peel, and Regina)<br />
with a focus on Aboriginal women, elderly women, immigrant and minority<br />
2 For more information on WICI and the initiatives mentioned in this article, visit<br />
http://www.womenincities.org/english/sets_en/set_bienvenue_en.htm<br />
women, and women with disabilities. WICI is also undertaking a comparative<br />
study <strong>of</strong> safety audits, funded by the UN Safer Cities program.<br />
Another example <strong>of</strong> a Canadian city that has made steps to promote safety in<br />
public spaces is Saskatoon. In 2008, Saskatoon embedded Crime Prevention<br />
through Environmental Design (CPTED) into all city planning. Their<br />
Neighbourhood Safety Program uses a local area planning process to facilitate<br />
the participation <strong>of</strong> community members and stakeholders in the future <strong>of</strong> their<br />
own communities (Janhevich, Johnson, Vézina, & Fraser, 2008). While not<br />
explicitly targeting women’s safety concerns, the mainstreaming <strong>of</strong> CPTED<br />
into the city’s development plan could achieve positive results for the safety <strong>of</strong><br />
women in public spaces.<br />
Although these practices are encouraging, Moser (2008) cautions that gender<br />
mainstreaming has been largely unsuccessful in achieving gender equality<br />
because <strong>of</strong> failures <strong>of</strong> implementation, failure to follow through with good<br />
intentions, and political opposition based on gendered power relations.<br />
Selecting Appropriate Indicators<br />
The NWG (2007) argues that clear and measurable indicators are needed<br />
to serve as benchmarks for diagnosing crime problems and for evaluating<br />
programs and policies, and that a lack <strong>of</strong> consensus concerning the nature <strong>of</strong><br />
appropriate indicators has hindered progress in a number <strong>of</strong> areas. A related<br />
question pertains to how we measure success <strong>of</strong> violence prevention efforts.<br />
The ultimate goal <strong>of</strong> programs and initiatives designed to address violence<br />
against women is a reduction in violence, but by what measure? Should success<br />
be assessed only by measurable reductions in violent behaviour? If so, by what<br />
means and at what cost? In this section, we consider how new research about<br />
the manifestations <strong>of</strong> violence against women has revealed gaps in traditional<br />
indicators for problem identification and indicators <strong>of</strong> success for prevention<br />
efforts.<br />
The lack <strong>of</strong> consensus concerning the nature <strong>of</strong> appropriate indicators may<br />
pose a greater challenge to designing and sustaining initiatives to prevent<br />
violence against women than is the case for most other types <strong>of</strong> crime.<br />
Feminist researchers contend that ambiguities concerning the nature <strong>of</strong> sexual<br />
and intimate partner violence and the impact on victims, and the reluctance to<br />
acknowledge the very high incidence <strong>of</strong> male violence against women, continue<br />
to seriously undermine efforts to prevent and react effectively to these crimes<br />
(Kelly & Radford, 1996). It is well documented that substantial proportions
210 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 211<br />
<strong>of</strong> women in Canada and around the world experience violence and threats<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence in the form <strong>of</strong> sexual harassment, sexual assault, physical assault,<br />
stalking, and homicide (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005; Johnson, 1996). These acts<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence are not mutually exclusive and are perpetrated by male intimate<br />
partners, acquaintances, family members, and strangers with varying degrees<br />
<strong>of</strong> severity. Widespread beliefs that women are to some extent to blame for this<br />
violence make it difficult to achieve agreement on appropriate indicators for<br />
analyzing the manifestations and extent <strong>of</strong> the problem (Johnson, 2007). As a<br />
result, the process <strong>of</strong> designing appropriate diagnostic tools and data collection<br />
mechanisms for monitoring progress in preventing violence against women is<br />
still in its infancy.<br />
Despite slow progress in this area, Canada is recognized as a world leader<br />
in developing ways to interview women about violence that yield reliable<br />
and valid statistical data about women’s experiences, the consequences<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence for them, and their decisions to use criminal justice and social<br />
services (Johnson, Ollus, & Nevala, 2008, p. 13). In 1993, Statistics Canada<br />
conducted the first national survey dedicated to interviewing a random<br />
sample <strong>of</strong> women about their experiences <strong>of</strong> physical and sexual violence and<br />
sexual harassment (Johnson & Sacco, 1995). Modules <strong>of</strong> questions on spousal<br />
violence and stalking have been adapted to the ongoing General <strong>Social</strong> Survey<br />
(GSS) on Victimization which provides estimates <strong>of</strong> a wide range <strong>of</strong> crimes on<br />
a five year cycle, as well as a limited number <strong>of</strong> risk factors. However, the depth<br />
and breadth <strong>of</strong> questions on sexual assault have been reduced considerably<br />
from the 1993 survey, and sexual harassment has been eliminated entirely.<br />
While rates <strong>of</strong> spousal violence are calculated to cover a five-year period and<br />
are available at the national and provincial/territorial levels, rates <strong>of</strong> sexual<br />
assault are calculated for a one-year period and are available at the national<br />
level only.<br />
The telephone methodology used to interview women directly about their<br />
experiences <strong>of</strong> violence is cost-effective and produces good general coverage<br />
in countries with broad telephone ownership, but it is not without important<br />
limitations. Surveys conducted by telephone effectively exclude marginalized<br />
populations living in shelters, unstable housing, or on the street; those who<br />
cannot respond in English or French; and, cultural and linguistic minorities<br />
for whom telephone surveys are not a familiar medium for disclosing personal<br />
or sensitive experiences. In addition, there is no guarantee that the general<br />
risk indicators produced at the national aggregate level apply universally to<br />
excluded individuals. For example, one Australian study found that attitudes<br />
toward intimate partner and sexual violence varied according to the gender<br />
and ethnicity <strong>of</strong> respondents (Taylor & Mouzos, 2006). In Canada, there<br />
is a lack <strong>of</strong> understanding and adequate data about the cultural specificities<br />
related to women’s experiences <strong>of</strong> violence, particularly about the way in<br />
which discrimination and oppression based on gender, age, race, ethnicity,<br />
sexual orientation, and level <strong>of</strong> ability intersect to affect these experiences and<br />
their impacts.<br />
Coupled with the ambiguity that <strong>of</strong>ten surrounds beliefs about what<br />
constitutes harmful acts <strong>of</strong> violence against women is a limited understanding<br />
<strong>of</strong> where such violence occurs, who the perpetrators are, and who the victims<br />
are. Researchers who apply a gender analysis to forms <strong>of</strong> crime not typically<br />
considered under the banner <strong>of</strong> violence against women, such as street-level<br />
violence and gang violence, have discovered important links to various<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> violence against women. Mark Totten (2000) conducted in-depth<br />
interviews with marginal street-involved male youth in Ottawa in an attempt<br />
to understand their violent behaviour toward girlfriends. These young men<br />
made sense <strong>of</strong> their behaviour by subscribing to rigid patriarchal beliefs<br />
about men and women, and rationalized their violence as a legitimate way to<br />
control “their” women when they stepped outside stereotypical gender roles.<br />
These youth possessed limited means through which to construct a sense <strong>of</strong><br />
masculinity; violence was one way they could construct an identity as a “real<br />
man” and escape the oppression <strong>of</strong> a disadvantaged life with poor prospects<br />
for the future. The socialization <strong>of</strong> these youth occurred through many<br />
different means (e.g., media, military, sports, and peer groups), the majority<br />
had been abused by a father figure (80%), and a substantial proportion had<br />
been encouraged by a father figure to abuse women (43%). Additionally, all<br />
<strong>of</strong> the youth reported engaging in other criminal activity and substance abuse,<br />
most on a daily basis.<br />
Jody Miller (2008) examined how the structural inequalities that form<br />
racialized urban spaces <strong>of</strong> poverty affect young women’s experiences <strong>of</strong><br />
violence. Through in-depth interviews with 75 young African American<br />
men and women in disadvantaged St. Louis neighbourhoods rife with gang<br />
violence, criminal activity, and low collective efficacy, Miller (2008) provides<br />
a convincing argument for broadening the conceptualization <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
against women. Eighty-nine percent <strong>of</strong> young black women in her sample had<br />
experienced either sexual or gender harassment 3 , 61% had experienced physical<br />
violence in a dating relationship, and 54% had experienced some form <strong>of</strong> sexual<br />
3 Sexual harassment encompasses verbal, physical, and visual forms <strong>of</strong> unwanted sexual attention, including<br />
sexual comments, touching, or public exhibition <strong>of</strong> pornography. Gender harassment refers to behaviours<br />
that degrade or are insulting to women (Miller, 2008).
212 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 213<br />
victimization 4 (Miller 2008). This violence cannot be fully understood without<br />
considering the dynamics <strong>of</strong> male-female relationships in disadvantaged urban<br />
neighbourhoods. Miller (2008) proposes that gendered violence is perpetrated<br />
because it is culturally supported; historical and continuing racial oppression<br />
limits men’s access to legitimate means for constructing masculinity which<br />
then leads to the adoption <strong>of</strong> a street reputation, based on the “cool pose” 5<br />
and its associated violence. This violence is central to the identities <strong>of</strong> these<br />
young men and so they minimize the harm done to women by characterizing<br />
violence as “play”, engaging in victim-blaming, and defining violence in very<br />
narrow terms (Miller, 2008).<br />
In her work with young men in Columbia, Moser (2008) challenges traditional<br />
thinking in which domestic violence and street violence are approached as<br />
separate issues and demonstrates how intra-familial violence and urban<br />
violence are intricately linked. Not only do witnessing and directly experiencing<br />
domestic violence raise the risk <strong>of</strong> perpetration <strong>of</strong> violence among young men,<br />
but Moser (2008) describes how a lack <strong>of</strong> safety in violent homes helps to<br />
propel young men out <strong>of</strong> the house and onto the streets where they join gangs,<br />
turn to drugs, and become involved in robbery, attacks, and other crime.<br />
These groups <strong>of</strong> aggressive young men on the street have a negative impact<br />
on public safety, social cohesion, and social capital in the neighbourhood.<br />
Unless a gender analysis is applied to these interrelated problems, the situation<br />
is <strong>of</strong>ten misinterpreted as one solely <strong>of</strong> public safety, and responses formulated<br />
to address the problem fail to take into account women’s safety in the home<br />
and in public spaces.<br />
These studies should not be interpreted to suggest that gendered violence is<br />
only perpetrated in disadvantaged social spaces, but that factors like class and<br />
race influence the dynamics <strong>of</strong> the perpetration <strong>of</strong> violence against women.<br />
These and other studies demonstrate how, by employing a gender analysis<br />
to the priority problem <strong>of</strong> youth violence – typically considered a problem <strong>of</strong><br />
young men posing a threat to public safety – new information comes to light<br />
that has the potential to elevate women’s safety concerns on public agendas by<br />
illuminating the risks they face when interacting with these young men. This<br />
violence is unlikely to be recorded in police statistics, victimization surveys, or<br />
other common methods <strong>of</strong> problem identification in crime prevention. In order<br />
to be able to select indicators that are appropriate for accurately identifying<br />
4 Sexual victimization includes rape, attempted rape, gang rape, or pressured or coerced sex (Miller, 2008).<br />
5 The “cool pose” is a mask to conceal vulnerabilities that is characterized by control <strong>of</strong> emotions, alo<strong>of</strong>ness,<br />
toughness, and detachment for many black males (Majors & Billson, 1993; Miller, 2008).<br />
problems and measuring success, we must expand our knowledge <strong>of</strong> how and<br />
where these problems occur.<br />
While sexual harassment, intimate partner violence, and sexual violence are<br />
experienced by women <strong>of</strong> all socioeconomic statuses, ages, races, ethnicities,<br />
sexual orientations, and levels <strong>of</strong> ability, all women do not experience violence<br />
equally. The concept <strong>of</strong> “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1994) refers to the<br />
intersections <strong>of</strong> power (e.g., based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation)<br />
and oppression (e.g., prejudice, class stratification, gender inequality,<br />
heterosexist bias) that are thought <strong>of</strong> as key explanatory factors, rather than<br />
risk factors for violence (Bogard, 2005). A relevant Canadian example is the<br />
systemic victimization <strong>of</strong> Aboriginal women rooted in the historical process<br />
<strong>of</strong> segregating Aboriginal children from their families and communities in<br />
residential schools, where they were meant to unlearn their Aboriginal cultures<br />
in poor living conditions rife with psychological, physical, and sexual abuse<br />
(see Backhouse, 2008; McGillivray & Comaskey, 1999; Monture-Angus,<br />
1995 and 1999). This practice has contributed to the extremely high rates <strong>of</strong><br />
sexual and intimate partner violence against Aboriginal women in Canada<br />
today (Johnson, 2006).<br />
Totten (2000), Miller (2008), and Moser (2008) illustrate how violence<br />
against women is manifested in situations where youth criminality and<br />
gang violence proliferate. These studies show that gendered violence can be<br />
observed by looking in the spaces where it is generally not considered to be<br />
the major problem. They also indicate that diagnostic tools and data collection<br />
mechanisms used to assess the nature and extent <strong>of</strong> male violence against women<br />
must take into account the vast range <strong>of</strong> situations and con<strong>text</strong>s in which this<br />
violence occurs. Moser (2008) highlights the benefits <strong>of</strong> a “violence roadmap”<br />
approach which entails conducting a detailed gender analysis <strong>of</strong> violence and<br />
insecurity in the local area and identifying interconnections among them so<br />
that policymakers can identify appropriate solutions. This approach can help<br />
categorize manifestations <strong>of</strong> gender-based violence in con<strong>text</strong>s where it has not<br />
been identified as the primary concern. Diagnoses that focus solely on methods<br />
traditionally employed for problem identification will fail to adequately capture<br />
the range <strong>of</strong> women’s experiences <strong>of</strong> male violence and subsequently limit the<br />
range <strong>of</strong> strategies designed to address it.<br />
Access to Data<br />
The NWG (2007) recommends that, in order to improve our capacity to target<br />
problems and concentrate resources more effectively, it is important to ensure
214 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 215<br />
user-friendly access to relevant data and to provide sufficient training and<br />
technical assistance to those responsible for using this data. In this section, we<br />
discuss some <strong>of</strong> the issues related to using traditional research methodologies<br />
to study violence against women and explore some options for using new<br />
technologies and accessing untapped data sources to expand our knowledge<br />
in this area.<br />
The World Health Organization (WHO) finds it useful to conceptualize the<br />
interplay <strong>of</strong> risk factors for violence in an ecological model (see Figure 1).<br />
This model can be used to illustrate how intimate partner violence and sexual<br />
assault are influenced by factors at four separated but interconnected levels:<br />
1. The individual level (e.g., history <strong>of</strong> witnessing or experiencing violence,<br />
substance abuse);<br />
2. In relationships with others (e.g., peer support, patriarchal<br />
domestic relationships);<br />
3. In the community (e.g., concentrated poverty, norms supportive <strong>of</strong><br />
violence); and,<br />
4. Within society (e.g., social norms supportive <strong>of</strong> traditional gender roles,<br />
economic and gender inequality, tolerance for violence).<br />
This ecological model suggests that prevention programs and strategies need<br />
to target all four <strong>of</strong> these levels, and that relevant and appropriate data will be<br />
required in order to concentrate our efforts and assess their impact. There is a<br />
dearth <strong>of</strong> outcome evaluations for the prevention <strong>of</strong> violence against women,<br />
and most available evaluations focus on process and implementation <strong>of</strong><br />
programs targeted at the individual or relationship level. Much less evaluative<br />
work has been conducted on interventions aimed at the community or<br />
societal level. Clear evaluation methodologies are needed from the onset <strong>of</strong><br />
program implementation, in addition to a wide range <strong>of</strong> data for evaluating<br />
the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> prevention programs and strategies targeted at all levels<br />
(Barchechat & Sansfaçon, 2003).<br />
The ecological model is useful for conceptualizing interconnections among<br />
risk factors for violence at a general level, but the data required to diagnose<br />
the nature <strong>of</strong> violence against women in specific communities, or to assess the<br />
effectiveness <strong>of</strong> programs aimed at targeting these risk factors and correlates<br />
only exists in a limited and patchwork fashion. For example, in Canada,<br />
data from the General <strong>Social</strong> Survey on Victimization provide estimates at the<br />
national level (and to a limited extent provincial and territorial levels) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
prevalence <strong>of</strong> intimate partner violence and sexual assault and a very general<br />
Figure 1: WHO Ecological Model <strong>of</strong> the Risk Factors for Violence<br />
Societal Community Relationship Individual<br />
Source: Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano (2002).<br />
indication <strong>of</strong> individual-and relationship-level correlates. Despite very large<br />
samples and sophisticated methodologies, national surveys cannot provide<br />
estimates <strong>of</strong> the prevalence or manifestation <strong>of</strong> crime problems at the level <strong>of</strong><br />
municipalities or neighbourhoods. In addition, there is little or no information<br />
available about the community or societal level factors that help perpetuate<br />
such violence, such as attitudes and social norms supportive <strong>of</strong> violence.<br />
It is also unrealistic to expect municipalities and local communities to have the<br />
capacity and resources to conduct such surveys at the local level, particularly<br />
when national and provincial agendas do not consistency prioritize violence<br />
against women in their decisions on funding. Surveys on violence against<br />
women have not been conducted at the city level in Canada since the late<br />
1980s and early 1990s (Randall & Haskell, 1995; Smith, 1990) and are very<br />
rarely conducted at the local level (e.g., Hamner & Saunders, 1984 in Leeds,<br />
UK for example). While reference manuals are available to assist municipalities<br />
in conducting audits to identify crime and safety problems (European<br />
Forum for Urban Safety, 2007), the technical expertise required to gather<br />
and analyze detailed survey data is not likely to be readily available among<br />
municipal personnel, nor are the financial resources likely to be available<br />
in municipal budgets. There are also concerns that specialized surveys that<br />
interview women about their experiences <strong>of</strong> violence should not be undertaken<br />
without appropriate measures to ensure the safety <strong>of</strong> survey respondents and<br />
interviewers (Ellsberg & Heise, 2005).<br />
The NWG (2007) contends that regular victimization surveys are needed to<br />
uncover unreported crime and assess the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> interventions. But<br />
even these may not be sufficiently reliable to measure changes in the prevalence<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence against women accurately, given the reticence <strong>of</strong> women to disclose<br />
personal experiences. This reflects a number <strong>of</strong> factors, including fear <strong>of</strong><br />
retaliation from violent partners; social norms that can affect disclosure; and,<br />
language, cultural, and religious barriers (Johnson et al., 2008).
216 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 217<br />
One alternative might be to use indirect or proxy measures. For example,<br />
positive changes in knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about sexual and intimate<br />
partner violence, improvements to criminal justice policies and processes,<br />
or changes in community and societal responses are useful indicators <strong>of</strong><br />
progress in this area. Other plausible measures <strong>of</strong> progress include growth<br />
in the number <strong>of</strong> available services, improvements in training for police and<br />
prosecutors, increased budgets and funding, an increase in referrals among<br />
police and community agencies, an increase in interventions with children<br />
exposed to intimate partner violence, or a positive change in public awareness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the problem. The relative benefits <strong>of</strong> these as high level indicators <strong>of</strong> societal<br />
change in addressing male violence against women continue to be debated at<br />
the international level (UNODC, 2007; Walby, 2007). A case can be made<br />
for including each <strong>of</strong> these in indicators <strong>of</strong> progress in responding to and<br />
preventing violence against women, but the data needed for many <strong>of</strong> them<br />
remain either unavailable or difficult to access.<br />
British researchers Maddy Coy, Liz Kelly, and Jo Foord (2007) are working<br />
within a coalition <strong>of</strong> organizations in the United Kingdom called End Violence<br />
Against Women (EVAW), which has prevention as a central goal. They mapped<br />
geographically the violence against women services available in the UK and<br />
concluded that women face a “postcode lottery” in their access to support<br />
services. This technique revealed that one-third <strong>of</strong> local government regions<br />
in the UK have no specialized support services to respond to female victims <strong>of</strong><br />
violence. Most <strong>of</strong> the existing services address intimate partner violence, few<br />
services are geared to helping victims <strong>of</strong> sexual assault, and very few services<br />
are available specifically for ethnic minority women. The maps are useful for<br />
illustrating how resources are concentrated in major cities and for identifying<br />
areas that are particularly underserved. Because violence against women can<br />
result in severe physical and mental health consequences for victims, and<br />
because women tend to use multiple services, access to an array <strong>of</strong> medical and<br />
social services is integral to their recovery. Support services are also important<br />
for the public awareness and outreach prevention work they do in the local<br />
community. The authors note that the lack <strong>of</strong> services is particularly acute in<br />
England and Wales where local authorities are not guided by national strategies<br />
on service provision for violence against women, in contrast to Scotland where a<br />
commitment to ending violence against women has been made by the national<br />
government. This research is an excellent example <strong>of</strong> how new technologies<br />
can be used to assess progress in responding to violence against women, and<br />
it illustrates how important national governments are in providing a vision<br />
for preventing and responding to violence against women that affects service<br />
delivery at the local level.<br />
As part <strong>of</strong> the Take Care New York agenda, the New York City Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) brought together multiple data<br />
sources to further understand the problem <strong>of</strong> intimate partner violence for<br />
women in that city. Police statistics describing homicides <strong>of</strong> women and those<br />
from the DOHMH’s Female Homicide Surveillance System were tracked<br />
along with trends in female emergency room visits, assault hospitalizations,<br />
and data from three population based surveys: the annual Community Health<br />
Survey (that includes a question on fear <strong>of</strong> intimate partner violence), the<br />
biannual Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (that asks a question about physical<br />
violence in teen dating relationships), and the Pregnancy Risk Assessment<br />
Monitoring System (that follows up with every woman who delivers a baby in<br />
NYC about her pregnancy experience, including intimate partner violence).<br />
The data indicate that the prevalence <strong>of</strong> teen dating violence for females has<br />
risen from 7.1% to 10.6% in the last 10 years; women in their 20s, black<br />
and Hispanic women, and women living in low income neighbourhoods are<br />
most likely to be killed by an intimate partner; and, emergency room visits for<br />
female victims <strong>of</strong> assault are on the rise 6 (Stayton et al., 2008).<br />
The use <strong>of</strong> new technologies and multiple data sources can help uncover some<br />
<strong>of</strong> the hidden nature <strong>of</strong> men’s violence against women. The “map <strong>of</strong> gaps” in<br />
the UK uses geographic technology to examine government and community<br />
responses to violence against women in an innovative way. The NYC study<br />
demonstrates the importance <strong>of</strong> combining questions about various forms <strong>of</strong><br />
violence against women with ongoing survey instruments. It also illustrates<br />
that, with proper screening tools and documentation processes for doctors and<br />
nurses, health care data sources provide valuable information concerning the<br />
severity and frequency <strong>of</strong> intimate partner violence among women who seek<br />
medical services but who may not contact social or criminal justice services.<br />
These projects highlight the potential <strong>of</strong> combining the perspectives and data<br />
<strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> disciplines to acquire a multi-dimensional view <strong>of</strong> the problem<br />
<strong>of</strong> men’s violence against women.<br />
Conclusion<br />
What does it mean, then, to concentrate investments on highest needs with<br />
respect to preventing violence against women? It means having the ability to<br />
accurately identify the nature <strong>of</strong> the problem, where these problems are most<br />
acute, who is affected, and what interventions are most appropriate. This<br />
6 An increase in emergency room visits may not necessarily reflect an increase in assaults, but can also be<br />
attributed to an overall increase in emergency department utilization or improved documentation (Stayton<br />
et al., 2008).
218 IPC Review 3 Concentrating Investments to Prevent Violence Against Women 219<br />
requires access to a wide range <strong>of</strong> good information, the skills to analyze it,<br />
and the knowledge to put it into practice in a way that will have a positive<br />
impact on those most affected. All <strong>of</strong> this requires a clear and sustained<br />
commitment to tackling the issue from national, provincial/territorial, and<br />
municipal governments.<br />
The research literature provides examples <strong>of</strong> the benefits and new insights that<br />
can be gained when a gendered analysis is applied to crime problems. Studies<br />
have highlighted how violence against women is manifested in spaces defined<br />
by street crime or gang violence, an aspect not <strong>of</strong>ten considered in analyses<br />
<strong>of</strong> these phenomena. A broader vision <strong>of</strong> where and how girls and women<br />
experience violence needs to be integrated into data collection strategies in<br />
Canada so that our choice <strong>of</strong> indicators to assess the prevalence and nature <strong>of</strong> this<br />
violence, and the availability <strong>of</strong> data to assess the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> interventions,<br />
is enhanced. There is a need to expand the available array <strong>of</strong> data to include<br />
health and other service sector data, to incorporate new technologies such as<br />
geographic mapping, and to form partnerships with stakeholders in these and<br />
other disciplines. Finally, there is a need to apply tested methodologies and<br />
to develop new methodologies for studying key sub-populations <strong>of</strong> women,<br />
for example new immigrants, street youth, or girls in schools, in order to<br />
disaggregate some <strong>of</strong> their unique experiences <strong>of</strong> victimization from national<br />
aggregate data. Overall, a commitment to concentrate investments requires a<br />
more complete accounting for the complexities <strong>of</strong> women’s experiences <strong>of</strong> male<br />
violence on which to develop, implement, and sustain prevention initiatives.<br />
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Notes