Cryptanalysis of RSA Factorization - Library(ISI Kolkata) - Indian ...
Cryptanalysis of RSA Factorization - Library(ISI Kolkata) - Indian ...
Cryptanalysis of RSA Factorization - Library(ISI Kolkata) - Indian ...
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103 6.1 Implicit Factoring <strong>of</strong> Two Large Integers<br />
Theoretically, our method starts performing better, i.e., β in our case is greater<br />
thanthat<strong>of</strong>[86], whenα ≥ 0.266. Thusforq 1 ,q 2 ≥ N 0.266 , ourmethodwillrequire<br />
less number <strong>of</strong> LSBs <strong>of</strong> p 1 ,p 2 to be equal than that <strong>of</strong> [86]. This is also presented<br />
in Figure 6.1. The numerical values <strong>of</strong> the theoretical results are generated using<br />
the formulae β = 1−3α for [86] and Corollary 6.5 for our case. The experimental<br />
results are generated by one run in each case with lattice dimension 46 (parameters<br />
m = 2,t = 1) for 1000 bits N 1 ,N 2 . The values <strong>of</strong> α are considered in [0.1,0.5], in<br />
a step <strong>of</strong> 0.01. Referring to Figure 6.1, we like to reiterate that our experimental<br />
results outperforms the theoretical results presented by us as well as in [86].<br />
The next example considers the primes p 1 ,p 2 <strong>of</strong> 650 bits and q 1 ,q 2 <strong>of</strong> 350 bits.<br />
This is to demonstrate how our method works experimentally for larger q 1 ,q 2 .<br />
Example 6.8. Here we consider 650-bit primes p 1 and p 2<br />
3137055889901096909077531458327171120014878453383152732512530257276363<br />
1682927852412187472737127637110371576377119667914195267603776880298856<br />
76273831127205611509045644179511599106554189421550654601 and<br />
2451436010930813903814310506086633020716328387757587411726661941127209<br />
3212167405450016340904470370114412306604810975035552386405247674158894<br />
80913091786359014934176726120292021849927924906510931081.<br />
Note that p 1 ,p 2 share 531 many LSBs. Further, q 1 ,q 2 are 350-bit primes<br />
1851420588886517478939713595303492404190382112791551597798571143339516<br />
233613445774636517955322189132943773 and<br />
2258350305148478218870025161325667637658623408855938899014758338949666<br />
508115561055599847183651567682695481 respectively.<br />
Given N 1 ,N 2 , with only the implicit information, we can factorize both <strong>of</strong> them<br />
efficiently. We use lattice <strong>of</strong> dimension 105 (parameters m = 3,t = 2) and the<br />
lattice reduction takes 15016.42 seconds.<br />
Though our result does not generalize for the case where N 1 ,N 2 ,...,N k , we<br />
like to compare the result <strong>of</strong> Example 6.8 with [86, Table 1, Section 6.2] when<br />
α = 0.35 and N is <strong>of</strong> 1000 bits. This is presented in Table 6.2. One may note that<br />
the idea <strong>of</strong> [86] requires 10 many N i ’s as the input where N i = p i q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. In<br />
such a case, 391 many LSBs need to be same for p 1 ,...,p 10 . On the other hand, we<br />
require higher number <strong>of</strong> LSBs, i.e., 531 to be same, but only N 1 ,N 2 are needed.<br />
The analysis <strong>of</strong> our results related to LSBs, presented in this section, will apply<br />
similarly for our analysis related to MSBs or LSBs and MSBs taken together as