Polyparty-ism - Search for Common Ground

12
of "candidate" countries, using a
more principled basis, clear timing,
and political accountability.
The process of integration in
Europe should be regarded as
"Europe-ization" WHICH ASSU-
MES CHANGE AND AN ENDOR-
SEMENT OF CERTAIN CIVI-
LIZED VALUES of European civilization,
and not so much as a process
of "EU-ization" or debates about
institutional integration of the internally
unreformed political and social
structures (bad elections, criminalization
of the political elite, money laundering,
a quasi-nongovernmental sector
etc.)
We need to move towards an
INCLUSIVE EUROPE, which will
integrate and accept diverse civilized
values and cultures (by which it will
express its real superiority), and not
only towards formal expansion,
which in the end, for xenophobic reasons,
is endlessly postponed. When
laying out the standards which they
set for the acceptance of candidate
countries, they say: "If we were to be
fair..." so the immediate question is,
"And why would we be fair at all?"
This creates a feeling that the EU
countries in fact sincerely dislike
some of the candidates in their ranks.
This hypocrisy is extremely counterproductive.
In this overall context, what are
the political capacity and the willingness
of Macedonia, or more precisely
of its own political elite, for a serious
and intensive implementation of EU
standards in the political system of
the country, superficially called its
capacity for reform?
Macedonia, despite having
signed the Agreement for Association
and Stabilization with the EU, is
objectively faced with its diminished
importance for international players
in the region. This is due to three factors:
a change of international players
in the region-the emphasis has shifted
from the United States to European
countries; confusion and implicit
mistrust of European countries with
regard to the declared concept of stability
in multiethnic societies (supported
by the confusion about what
should be supported and what eliminated
among the practices of states in
the region); and a very weak organizational
and strategic preparedness of
Macedonian authorities for promoting
and fighting for a relatively
improved position in valuing their
own advantages and achievements.
The first factor is due to the lack
of European diplomatic tradition and
experience with an independent
Macedonian state. Even among the
friendly states dilemmas are arising as
to what definite position to adopt
toward Macedonia in relation to their
traditional Balkan "partners"
(Germany towards us relative to
Albania or Bulgaria; France, relative
to Serbia or Greece; Britain, relative
to Serbia or Bulgaria, etc.) The attitude
regarding Macedonia's stability
constantly lacks real analysis and
counterintelligence data. As a result, it
is under constant pressure from neighbouring
lobbies or "inside" groups.
This division within the EU toward
the Balkans and the topic of stability
in multiethnic and multicultural societies,
together with its lack of political
priorities, weaken the EU's operational
position and actions.
The second factor is due to the
fact that almost all experiences of
democracy in European countries
result from the opposite political
models of those renowned in the
Balkans. They are more familiar with
John Stuart Mill's formulas: ethnic
and cultural homogeneity paired with
liberal democracy.
This also produces a certain
doubt about the longevity of
Macedonia's stability (for which, in
fact, those same Europeans produced
about ten apocalyptic scenarios).
While they fixated on our stability,
Albania and Kosovo exploded, and
Serbia lived through a traumatic turnaround.
Within this internal context,
we went through two embargoes
imposed by Greece, one against
Serbia, an assassination attempt on
this country's president, an unbelievable
refugee crisis and countless
attempts by the neighbouring counter-intelligence
services to destabilize
us on interethnic grounds. What
additional proof is needed for the stability
of Macedonia? Instead of dealing
with invalid assessments, the EU
should work hard on two axes. They
should assist and monitor institution
building (state building) and strengthening
the states and their civil structures-against
the ethnic nationalism
which threaten the borders and loyalties.
They should also fight tough
against organized crime and corruption
which thrive in the region.
Finally, the political capacity of
authorities in Macedonia in relation to
the EU plan for development-comprised
of democracy, human rights
and economic reforms-is somewhat
ambiguous. Namely, the present
authorities in Macedonia managed to
continue strengthening the policy of
interethnic inclusiveness in politics
and relying on NATO and especially
Americans, with a traditional orientation
towards the EU. At the same
time, they enhanced global reforms,
for which they enjoy unanimous support
from the international players.
However, at the same time, the global
efforts for reforms on the part of the
ruling political forces granted them a
"line of credit" for gradual criminalization
of government authority, inexcusable
election shortcomings and
introducing the use of violence in politics,
unheard of before in Macedonia
(where there used to be a very low
crime rate).
With development taking such a
direction, the capacity for reform will
vanish and it will turn into its own
contradiction: a loss of the authorities'
legitimacy with the risk of destabilization.
The international players
should understand that in addition to
their unambiguous support for global
reforms, they must also promote
intolerance for the practices of election
fraud and violence in politics.
It must be announced to each
authority that such a thing will not be
tolerated, regardless of what may
have been rhetorical and actual
efforts in economic reform.
For a country like Macedonia,
which is quite open to international
influence, it is very important to point
to the principles of advocating for
democracy and bringing concrete
pressure so that the political process
will unfold strictly in that direction.
The EU could contribute greatly in
that realm.
(The author is a professor on
the law faculty of Skopje
University)
Ten years of pluralism, December 2000