Polyparty-ism - Search for Common Ground

tunate region of the western Balkans.
So realistically, opportunities have
been created for lines of development
in two directions, but most important of
all-pressure continues for harmonizing
the legal system and reforms in accordance
with EU standards.
In this text we will be interested in
only two aspects of that political map:
what are the levels of conflict in the
south Balkans and what are the EU's
political priorities to respond to these
new tensions; and particularly, what is
Macedonia's political capacity to
sketch out its own role in the new political
map of the region in accordance
with EU policy?
The new political tensions in the
region stem from several points: The
overall development of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to
since the removal of Miloshevich.) The
disputes also take place under relatively
strong international presence in different
forms in the region. This in a
way guarantees a more efficient and
more decisive reaction compared to the
usual pattern of involvement.
However, we will start a brief
analysis from a different angle, namely
from the possible negative effects owed
to the ambiguity and the prolongation
of the EU expansion agenda.
It is more or less clear that there
exists a certain nervousness in the EU
countries, when from an abstract idea
for EU expansion a shift was made
towards actual expansion as a concrete
process. The basic indicators of this
nervousness are the changing negotiation
rules for association and membership-throughout
the negotiation
strengthens them with other,
also European, countries,
instead of producing a more harmonious
policy of liberalization
in stages, with a clear, liberal
direction.
The second paradox is the
EU debate on the lack of democracy
towards foreigners and cultural minorities
of guest workers-hand in hand with
clear figures and analysis on the lack of
demography. (There is a clear need for
a qualified work force "from the margins,"
outside EU countries).
The third paradox is the one about
insider-outsider problems. Namely, in
the EU itself, as well as among the
countries in the Union, there exists a
so-called Christian club (CDU-CSU,
Heider and others) which views the EU
as an exclusively Western type of
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Montenegro and Kosovo implies political
dynamics involving new constitutional
solutions or solutions through
international treaties, with greater or
lesser international intervention.
Relations between Croatia and Serbia
imply the middle ground will be cooperation
with the Hague Tribunal and
over the repatriation of Serbs to
Croatia. The so-called Albanian issue
plays out in three dimensions:
Albanian-Serbian, Albanian-
Macedonian, Albanian-Greek. Finally
there is the multidimensional challenge
of multicultural societies and stable
democracy-state-building-as opposed
to strong nationalism.
The basic characteristic of these
possible disputes is that they are generally
below the level of military confrontations.
(This became apparent
process-and continual adjustments in
the process benchmarks. (A most
recent example is the drifting of the
evolving clauses and the relationship
with the political conditions for negotiations
with Turkey.)
Three dominating initiatives are
present in the internal EU dialogue: the
Lisbon debate on economic development;
the military initiative for
European rapid interventions forces;
and the so-called home affairs from the
meeting in Finland. The greatest dilemmas
occur in home affairs, or police
procedures and the issues of movement
and borders. Namely, with some of its
decisions the EU sets up paradoxical
situations: for example "the border paradox."
The EU shrinks or wipes out the
borders between certain countries, and
Christian club of countries, with no
chances for other countries to gain
entry.
Simply put, the confusion among
EU countries over these issues multiplies
in candidate countries, which
become frustrated in coping with contrary
political ideas, which is the ultimate
irony of these principles. Put differently,
these principles become a
panacea, a general excuse for the political
incompetence of local political
elites for badly implemented privatization
and other political manoeuvreswhile
they refer to the EU "conditions"
which by themselves are long-term and
hazy.
A much clearer interim strategy
and integration models are required in
order to set the structure of development
and to monitor the development
Ten years of pluralism, December 2000