Polyparty-ism - Search for Common Ground

the border, cadre formation and
arms smuggling which has been
going on unobstructedly for two
years now in the area between
Kosovo, Serbia, Albania,
Macedonia and Montenegro.
Many local politicians ignore it,
although not for the same reasons.
That is why this organization was
accused of being incapable of
accomplishing what it was supposed
to when it came to Kosovo.
It is not true that it is incapable.
It has simply decided not to lose a
single soldier because it does not
want additional problems. It has
taken a political role in order to
use traditional long-term political
methods, which will not allow
That is why Javier Solana was
granted this position. Now he is
the conductor of the European
chorus, which no longer sings out
of tune.
Fifteen European countries
agreed that Macedonia, as a country
that showed cooperation and
maturity during the Kosovo crisis,
should be rewarded with the
Agreement for Stabilization and
Association. This is the first step
in EU admission procedures. The
agreement was signed, and it was
decided that it would serve as the
framework within which the crisis
should be solved. We should not
underestimate the fact that the EU
decided to sign the document
Albanians in Macedonia remain
moderate and that they are aware
that the terrorism in the mountains
will not bring them any good in
the future. However, if the conflict
lasts for a long time, it will be
more and more difficult to preserve
multiethnic peace.
That is why, when the
Agreement in Luxembourg was
signed in April, the first deadline
was denoted: "the summit in
Goteburg at which Macedonia
should present the first results of
its 'political dialogue.'" This is, in
fact, an interethnic agreement that
should lead to the fulfilment of
legitimate Albanian requests,
which do not include federaliza-
Preserving territorial integrity of Macedonia is an investment for what ss starting to
look like a well-planned, serious, international strategy, after all the previous good and
bad initiatives the international community has offered in the Balkans.
another incident similar to the one
in Kosovo. The Kosovo case was
an exemption from the rule that
says: condemnation of violence
and the use of political means for
achieving aims. The international
community is determined to stick
to that rule in Macedonia, because
among other things, it wants to
prove that it has learnt lessons
from Kosovo and Bosnia.
THE EU'S ROLE IN
THE SITUATION
It is no coincidence that Javier
Solana became in charge of
European diplomacy right after
the bombing and his NATO mandate.
He wants to show that the
European Union has drawn certain
conclusions from the Kosovo and
Bosnian crises. The first lesson, as
far as the Union is concerned, is
that EU offices must no longer
send uncoordinated messages.
despite the obvious fact that the
crisis in Macedonia would be neither
quickly nor easily resolved.
That was the strongest signal sent
to Macedonia guaranteeing its territorial
integrity and sovereignty
and as a proof that the Union really
wants the country to remain
undivided, united and multiethnic.
We also should not overlook
the fact that the EU did not want to
become a mediator or a gobetween,
not even after the second
phase of the crisis in May. Javier
Solana did not accept ideas for an
international conference, similar
to Dayton, at which Macedonia's
destiny would be determined. That
is the second signal that the EU
wants Macedonia to be able to
manage its own sovereignty, without
international tutors. However,
it is clear that time may be the
number one enemy in the
Macedonian crisis. Everybody
agrees that the majority of
tion of the country, as George
Robertson emphasized at the
beginning of the crisis.
TIME IS THE ENEMY
Brussels was not and it is not
satisfied with the expedience and
seriousness that Macedonian government
has shown in dealing with
this crisis. Javier Solana was not
very direct when he came to Skopje
in March. His advice was unclear,
wrapped in language of politics and
democracy, and he did not leave
room for explanations. The armed
groups did not take it very seriously
when they were warned that their
behaviour would not be accepted,
because it was clear that NATO
would not attack them militarily.
On the other hand, neither
Macedonian nor Albanian politicians
from Skopje managed to send
a message of unity to their voters
and to control dissatisfaction.
39
What now, June 2001