Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
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ALEKSANDRA JANOVSKAIA<br />
organising enterprise logics being at work;<br />
sometimes in conflict with each other but<br />
sometimes supporting each other. The main<br />
demands to the foreign investor were related<br />
to the non-economic enterprise logics of<br />
brand preservation, employment guarantees<br />
and modernisation of the company, yet market<br />
organising logic has also been visible. It has<br />
been the means to reach the non-economic<br />
ends. Applying this economic logic and<br />
‘second guessing the markets’ allowed Škoda<br />
stakeholders to take a much stronger stance<br />
vis-à-vis the foreign buyers during the joint<br />
venture negotiations.<br />
The valuation of the enterprise as a social and<br />
industrial organism went against other sets<br />
of non-economic norms. For Czechs, such<br />
other non-economic logic was the strong anti-<br />
German sentiment related to World War II.<br />
Thus, the transfer of Škoda’s ownership to the<br />
VW group caused some controversies in the<br />
Czech public during the time of privatisation<br />
talks (Sperling 2004). But also on the German<br />
side, different organising logics co-existed.<br />
Even if the warnings about a potential<br />
cannibalisation of the main Volkswagen brand<br />
that focuses on good quality but more expensive<br />
family sedans by the re-emerging Škoda brand<br />
were expressed, non-economic organising<br />
logics have prevailed. The respect for industrial<br />
capabilities of Skoda engineering tradition has<br />
been stronger than the fear of cannibalisation<br />
of the main VW brand. Even today, when<br />
the evidence of certain cannibalisation of the<br />
German production is large, this issue is hardly<br />
discussed and, as Sperling argues, ‘denied by<br />
the group itself or made to appear harmless’<br />
(Sperling 2004: 187).<br />
This section attempted to demonstrate how<br />
during the privatisation process, despite several<br />
economic and non-economic logics playing<br />
a role, the non-economic organising logic<br />
that conceptuliased enterprise as a source of<br />
industrial capabilities has been crucial. Škoda’s<br />
privatisation has been an example of local<br />
stakeholders - managers, trade unions and<br />
government officials - becoming a coalition<br />
for protection of local industrial capabilities.<br />
II. THE NEW COST EFFICIENCY GOALS RECON-<br />
SIDERED<br />
During state socialism, company goals were<br />
expressed in units of production output. With<br />
the joint venture, these non-economic goals<br />
were supposed to be replaced by other, more<br />
market efficiency-oriented targets. But how<br />
has this change towards new company goals<br />
taken place and what exactly are the new<br />
company performance goals?<br />
Formal administratively set production output<br />
goals were replaced by cost efficiency and<br />
productivity goals. Financial targets and cost<br />
monitoring became a higher priority for local<br />
management that received responsibilities<br />
of ‘profit centres’ within the VW group.<br />
The cost goals are set in cooperation with<br />
the headquarters and play a decisive role in<br />
companies’ affairs. A finance director<br />
at VW Slovakia explained that<br />
the company is ‘managed through<br />
page 87<br />
these cost goals’: the company<br />
has performance and profit goals<br />
(Interview March 2007). Also, the internal<br />
cost benchmarking has become a norm.<br />
There exists comparative data on production