Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

POLISH BUSINESS REFERENCES LITERATUR – POLITICS RELATIONS
of mobilization and exerting influence at the
EU level. Reflection on Polish interest groups
in a comparative perspective leads us to the
conclusion that their resources are rather
scarce, which results in weaker mobilization
and influence compared to groups from
Western Europe.
In terms of membership and funding, a
comparison of Spanish and Polish member
organizations of Business Europe (largest EUlevel
business umbrella organization) shows
that while Polish PKPP has 3000 members,
Spanish CEOE accounts for 1 million of
them (in both cases these are mostly SMEs).
This is translated into 1.5 million euro in
membership fees for Polish organization and
more than 20 million euro for the Spanish one;
however, their membership fees in Buiness
Europe are roughly the same (Karaszewska,
04.08.2009). The Brussels office of PKPP
employs 2 lobbyists, whereas CEOE employs
6. Not only does this juxtaposition indicate
important disparities in terms of capacities
of exerting potential influence, it also points
to the fact that activities at the European
level constitute a huge financial effort for the
Polish organization, incomparable with the
one the Spanish association is experiencing.
The importance of sector consolidation is
best depicted by the example of the chemical
industry. A relatively small number of large
companies allows for more efficient
mobilization, both at the domestic
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and European level. In fact, the
sectoral EU umbrella association,
CEFIC, with its huge funding and
relatively smooth and timely decision-making
process, is typically mentioned as one of the
most efficient corporate groups in Brussels.
However, the critical resources approach does
not offer plausible explanations to a number
of questions, which are particularly evident in
the CEE context. Why do large and wealthy
Polish companies not engage in EU level
lobbying or only at a very late stage? Why
do groups and companies with substantial
resources tend to choose the national route of
influencing EU affairs, even if they are aware
of the fact that the number of national officials
occupying key Brussels posts is extremely
limited? Why do Polish representatives of the
chemical sector not see themselves influential
despite relatively high sectoral consolidation
and active participation in CEFIC works? In
order to solve these dilemmas, I offer three
additional explanations based on the argument
of direct impact of domestic business-politics
relations on mobilization patterns and lobbying
strategies at the EU level.
It is widely acknowledged that EU impact is
largely mediated through, and conditioned
by, existing domestic institutions, policies,
cultures and identities. There is no automatic
shift of loyalties and activities to the European
level (Ladrech, 1994). Much of the literature
emphasizes that the Europeanization process of
interest groups is constrained at both European
and national levels (Woll, 2007). Notably, a
negative correlation is found between the extent
to which a group is embedded in domestic
policy networks and the extent of its integration
in European networks (Beyers & Kerremans,
2007). Thus, mobilization and lobbying
strategies of interest groups are conditioned by
the immediate institutional and organizational
environment of the domestic groups and the
level of dependence or autonomy of groups visà-vis
this environment.