Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
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POLISH BUSINESS REFERENCES LITERATUR – POLITICS RELATIONS<br />
developed market economies shows, the latter<br />
are never completely eliminated, no matter<br />
how advanced transparency and consultation<br />
procedures are.<br />
It is stressed that the low level of autonomy of<br />
economic elites, typical for the transformation<br />
phase, is reflected in clientelistic relations<br />
of state-owned companies and oligarchic<br />
relations of biggest national private companies<br />
with decision makers ( Jasiecki, 2004,<br />
2008). Another important element is poor<br />
organization and interest representation of<br />
SMEs - small and medium-sized enterprises<br />
(they account for 99.8% of all companies in<br />
Poland). Under such conditions professional<br />
lobbying strategies are used almost exclusively<br />
by foreign and multinational companies, as<br />
they dispose of much higher levels of autonomy<br />
vis-a-vis national political elites.<br />
Thus, if ownership structure and size of firms<br />
are taken as key variables, four strategies of<br />
business-politics relations can be enumerated.<br />
These strategies are typical for economic elites<br />
of the transformation phase, undergoing<br />
a process of professionalization. Whereas<br />
clientelism is the characteristic of relations<br />
maintained by state-owned companies<br />
(especially heavy industry and energy sectors),<br />
the largest Polish private firms tend to exploit<br />
oligarchic links 7 . In terms of professional<br />
interest representation, such strategies<br />
constitute pathological behaviour,<br />
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generating corruption and suboptimal<br />
distribution of resources. In Poland,<br />
the most emblematic example of<br />
political-economic clientelism is delivered by<br />
sectoral networks forming a closed system<br />
of interdependence between politicians,<br />
management of state-owned companies (usually<br />
party-affiliated) and economic environment of<br />
these companies (Gadowska, 2002; Jasiecki,<br />
2004). In fact, decisions-making processes in<br />
these companies depend on current, shortterm<br />
party interest and particularistic personal<br />
gains, and not on economic calculation. In<br />
case of highly symbiotic, oligarchic relations,<br />
a company monopolizes delivery of certain<br />
services to the state and relies on a single<br />
client – the state, while avoiding competition<br />
on the market. Cost on the state budget is very<br />
high, while size and certainty of state contracts<br />
guaranteed by public funding enable the<br />
emergence of huge fortunes at low risk, thus<br />
creating conditions for the so-called ‘political<br />
capitalism’ (Staniszkis, 2001).<br />
However, a question emerges, whether patterns<br />
described above persist, petrifying businesspolitics<br />
relations typical for the period of<br />
economic and political transformation to<br />
capitalism? Or, whether they are becoming<br />
marginalized with the progression of the<br />
consolidation phase of market economy and new<br />
economic elites? On the one hand, the post-<br />
2004 expansion of Polish private capital (slightly<br />
mitigated by the 2008 crisis) both domestically<br />
and abroad, together with the incremental<br />
Europeanization of public administration,<br />
seems to confirm the consolidation hypothesis.<br />
On the other hand, despite recent political<br />
declarations, the privatization process is not<br />
accelerating and governance standards in public<br />
sector are not improving.<br />
Equally, the public affairs market in Poland is<br />
not yet developed. Few domestic companies<br />
are operating, with their services focused<br />
mostly on foreign players. Subsidiaries of