Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

POLISH BUSINESS REFERENCES LITERATUR – POLITICS RELATIONS
developed market economies shows, the latter
are never completely eliminated, no matter
how advanced transparency and consultation
procedures are.
It is stressed that the low level of autonomy of
economic elites, typical for the transformation
phase, is reflected in clientelistic relations
of state-owned companies and oligarchic
relations of biggest national private companies
with decision makers ( Jasiecki, 2004,
2008). Another important element is poor
organization and interest representation of
SMEs - small and medium-sized enterprises
(they account for 99.8% of all companies in
Poland). Under such conditions professional
lobbying strategies are used almost exclusively
by foreign and multinational companies, as
they dispose of much higher levels of autonomy
vis-a-vis national political elites.
Thus, if ownership structure and size of firms
are taken as key variables, four strategies of
business-politics relations can be enumerated.
These strategies are typical for economic elites
of the transformation phase, undergoing
a process of professionalization. Whereas
clientelism is the characteristic of relations
maintained by state-owned companies
(especially heavy industry and energy sectors),
the largest Polish private firms tend to exploit
oligarchic links 7 . In terms of professional
interest representation, such strategies
constitute pathological behaviour,
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generating corruption and suboptimal
distribution of resources. In Poland,
the most emblematic example of
political-economic clientelism is delivered by
sectoral networks forming a closed system
of interdependence between politicians,
management of state-owned companies (usually
party-affiliated) and economic environment of
these companies (Gadowska, 2002; Jasiecki,
2004). In fact, decisions-making processes in
these companies depend on current, shortterm
party interest and particularistic personal
gains, and not on economic calculation. In
case of highly symbiotic, oligarchic relations,
a company monopolizes delivery of certain
services to the state and relies on a single
client – the state, while avoiding competition
on the market. Cost on the state budget is very
high, while size and certainty of state contracts
guaranteed by public funding enable the
emergence of huge fortunes at low risk, thus
creating conditions for the so-called ‘political
capitalism’ (Staniszkis, 2001).
However, a question emerges, whether patterns
described above persist, petrifying businesspolitics
relations typical for the period of
economic and political transformation to
capitalism? Or, whether they are becoming
marginalized with the progression of the
consolidation phase of market economy and new
economic elites? On the one hand, the post-
2004 expansion of Polish private capital (slightly
mitigated by the 2008 crisis) both domestically
and abroad, together with the incremental
Europeanization of public administration,
seems to confirm the consolidation hypothesis.
On the other hand, despite recent political
declarations, the privatization process is not
accelerating and governance standards in public
sector are not improving.
Equally, the public affairs market in Poland is
not yet developed. Few domestic companies
are operating, with their services focused
mostly on foreign players. Subsidiaries of