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Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

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THE VOC EINLEITUNG APPROACH GOES EAST<br />

Figure 1. Modes of coordination under consideration of different levels of development<br />

high<br />

LMEs<br />

CMEs<br />

level of development<br />

TMEs<br />

low<br />

low<br />

high<br />

Source: Own elaboration<br />

At a lower level of (capitalism) development,<br />

TMEs can move vertically and diagonally.<br />

The paths of institutional and economic<br />

development are not yet fixed and can develop<br />

towards LME, CME or a mixed form of<br />

both. In the absence of positive feedback,<br />

development towards a stronger role of the<br />

state and even less capitalism is possible (e.g.<br />

downward diagonal shift in Venezuela and<br />

Belarus). Such upward and downward diagonal<br />

and vertical shifts are reflected in capitalist<br />

reforms or reform reversals and are possible<br />

because political and economic institutions are<br />

enforced only weakly. 25<br />

Seite Page page 30<br />

How does the model reflect the<br />

transition period? At the beginning of<br />

transition, the initial strong decline of<br />

GDP and a lengthy and burdensome recovery<br />

hindered positive feedbacks to stabilize<br />

the institutional system. Weakly enforced<br />

institutions (“frames without content”) could<br />

be changed more easily and reform reversals<br />

were the case in states with a low capacity<br />

(e.g. in Russia, Romania and Bulgaria).<br />

Transition countries, which succeeded in<br />

increasing state capacity and enforcing formal<br />

institutions, created a stable institutional<br />

environment for economic cooperation and<br />

entrepreneurship. The Visegrad states, for<br />

instance, although having missed the chance to<br />

build complementary institutions, nevertheless<br />

established a stable and relatively effective<br />

institutional system. Institutional quality in<br />

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic<br />

was increased through better enforcement,<br />

not through better complementarity. If we<br />

consider positive feedback and lock-in effects,<br />

these non-coherent systems should be difficult<br />

to reverse for a while. As long as efficiency<br />

or effectiveness gains are possible through<br />

improved enforcement or other means (for

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