Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
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MARTIN SEMENOVA MENDELSKI<br />
the criticism and underlined the importance<br />
of politics for institutional change (Hall/<br />
Soskice 2003, p. 245; Hall/Thelen 2005; Hall<br />
2006). A recent empirical study by Paunescu/<br />
Schneider has confirmed switching from state<br />
to market coordination for several developed<br />
economies (Paunescu/Schneider 2004). The<br />
relevant question for transition countries is<br />
whether mixed logics of coordination can<br />
become complementary and converge towards<br />
pure LMEs and CMEs or rather remain noncomplementary<br />
hybrids. Put differently, will<br />
there be dual convergence towards pure forms<br />
of organization or rather a lock-in of mixed<br />
organizational logics?<br />
In my opinion, sustained mixed logics of<br />
coordination (second-best solution) are<br />
possible due to positive feedbacks resulting<br />
from increased enforcement, i.e. more<br />
effectiveness. Let me illustrate a more dynamic<br />
model of capitalist diversity (see figure 1) to<br />
explain the fundamental differences between<br />
developed economies (CMEs, LMEs) and<br />
transitional market economies (TMEs). In<br />
contrast to transition economies, developed<br />
economies have strongly enforced and<br />
effective institutions. While in developed<br />
economies the possibility to increase economic<br />
performance by increasing the quality of<br />
institutions (effectiveness) is nearly exhausted,<br />
performance can still be improved by making<br />
institutions complementary (efficiency).<br />
Given that complementarity depends on<br />
external environment changes, developed<br />
countries can improve efficiency by adapting<br />
to external pressures by switching their logic of<br />
coordination (horizontal shifts between CMEs<br />
and LMEs). 23 These horizontal shifts tend to<br />
be slow due to institutional complementarities,<br />
path dependence and certain reforms (e.g.<br />
better protection of minority shareholders,<br />
adopting international accounting standards)<br />
and often do not have a major impact on other<br />
sub-systems or corporate strategies. Therefore,<br />
despite “liberalizing” reforms, switching of<br />
coordination modes should remain difficult in<br />
developed economies (Hall/Thelen 2005, p. 26<br />
and p. 31).<br />
While gradual institutional and economic<br />
development may be true for developed market<br />
economies, transition economies experience<br />
rapid formal institutional change. Due to the<br />
unfinished stage of capitalism (lower economic<br />
development) and high uncertainty (transition<br />
as an open-ended process), institutions in<br />
post-communist economies have initially a<br />
transitory character, i.e. they are only weakly<br />
enforced. Because of weak enforcement,<br />
institutional change is easier and, at least<br />
in the short or middle-run, there are more<br />
alternatives for capitalist trajectories than in<br />
developed economies. 24<br />
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