Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

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THE VOC EINLEITUNG APPROACH GOES EAST Table 3. Regional average of corporate governance effectiveness in 2005 CIS SEE CEB Effectiveness of disclosure 4.74 5.32 5.73 Effectiveness of redress 4.74 4.98 5.35 Source: Source: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey 2005 and author’s own calculation. Note: The scores are calculated on 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest possible score. Data on SEE does not include Kosovo. This implementation gap in SEE and former Soviet countries in contrast to CEECs recurs in other areas of legislation. The difference for these three groups of countries among extensiveness and effectiveness (implementation gap) is especially obvious in the area of commercial laws (see figures 2 and 3 in appendix), insolvency regulation (see figure 4 in appendix), concession laws 15 , securities markets legislation (see EBRD’s legal indicator survey 2007) and labor market institutions. 16 Using survey data from three different sources, 17 Pistor et al. 2000 confirm a weak institutional environment and weak implementation of economic institutions in most countries from SEE and the CIS (see Pistor et al. 2000). Legal and economic research on institutional enforcement has shown Seite Page page 24 that there are important constraints to implementation of economic institutions (most notably in the CIS and also in SEE) and, consequently, limits to a coherent or complementary system in this region. Thus, lower institutional quality and absent institutional complementarity in these regions can be explained. But what accounts for different institutional configurations among the most advanced transition countries? Why did only Slovenia and Estonia develop coherent institutional systems and the other CEECs (Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia) did not? The rule of law indicator for the CEE group may indeed explain coherence in Slovenia and Estonia, as these countries have the highest scores on effective legal environment (see figure 5 in appendix). However, as Hungary and the Czech Republic have similarly high levels, but less coherent institutions (see Knell/Srholec 2007, p. 60), even an overall good institutional environment (high enforcement) does not guarantee a coherent system. Another explanation why coherent and complementary institutions were difficult to create during transition could have been the degree of diverse interests and ideologies of domestic and external actors during transition. Power relations (diversity of actors): Scholars stress the increasing importance of actors over
MARTIN SEMENOVA MENDELSKI institutions during transition and emphasize the role of the state for institutional reforms (Hanson/Teague 2007; Charman 2007; Schmidt 2008; Higley/Pakulski/Wesołowski 1998). 18 However, it must be considered that institutions and institutional complementarities are not only created at the regime level alone, but are the outcome of many actors with diverse interests and power positions (Streeck 2004, p. 111). Institutions are often the result of a political compromise and not an optimal solution to a given problem or, as Amable puts it: “…institutions do not emerge as the result of a welfare-maximizing process. They are the outcomes of a political process. The whole set of institutions is not chosen all at once, by agents possessing a clear view of all the interdependencies between institutions concerning all areas of the economy” (Amable 2003, p. 63). Both Streeck and Amable remind us that the pursuit of political and economic power can limit rational design of complementary institutions. This is particularly true if there is no benevolent “dominant social block” (Callaghan 2008, p. 9) and when institutional reformers have opposing ideological backgrounds. But even when ideologically diverse reformers find a compromise, this compromise will not necessarily lead to the first best solution (complementary institutions). The emerging post-communist state was not a unitary actor with uniform authority, but underwent a formation process characterized by “multiple actors, domestic as well as international” (Grzymala-Busse/Jones Luong 2002, p. 533). Let me first focus on domestic actors 19 and explain why so few complementary systems emerged during transition. A main reason can be found in opposing ideologies and changing power relations of these actors. After the demise of communism, old power structures changed and a battle for political and economic power began among different domestic actors. Communist rulers lost their legitimacy and previously constructed institutions were contested. The early transition years became a period of bargaining about political power and the future institutions to stabilize this power. Institutional change was not an outcome of designed complementarities, but of conflicts and compromises between different domestic actors. It is difficult to imagine that the competing interests between internal actors were reconciled in all post-communist countries and led to ex ante creation of complementary institutions. Although in some countries a political compromise by consensually united elites was reached, such as Poland, Hungary and Slovenia (Higley/Burton 2006, p. 83), in other countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Russia, Croatia, Serbia, Belarus and Romania) disunited political elites hindered the implementation of coherent transition strategies (see Higley/ Burton 2006, p. 90 and p. 171). In these countries, quite often reform strategies changed with a change in the government (see Havrylyshyn 2007). Although electoral backlash and some modification of initial policies occurred even in advanced transition countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (King 2002, p. 8), the general reform paths were not altered. Changing power relations and the Seite Page page 25 redesign of institutional reforms were often the result of changing economic conditions, which differed among transition countries. In former Soviet Republics and SEE, prolonged economic decline
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ALEKSANDRA JANOVSKAIA the present d
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ALEKSANDRA JANOVSKAIA to share its
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ALEKSANDRA JANOVSKAIA other product
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ALEKSANDRA JANOVSKAIA very sensitiv
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA 1. GLOBA
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA complex
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA 1.2 Chan
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA importan
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA 3.1 Samp
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA users (b
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA Table 3.
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA business
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PÉTER LITERATUR CSIZMADIA Makó, C
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CATHERINE SPIESER ABSTRACT THE POLI
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CATHERINE SPIESER and unemployment
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CATHERINE SPIESER welfare regime li
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CATHERINE SPIESER be found, the num
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CATHERINE SPIESER general condition
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CATHERINE SPIESER the unemployed me
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CATHERINE SPIESER Organizing exit f
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CATHERINE SPIESER From centralised
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CATHERINE SPIESER precise task with
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CATHERINE SPIESER and increased the
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CATHERINE SPIESER Craft Association
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CATHERINE SPIESER Legislative chang
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CATHERINE SPIESER ibility that othe
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CATHERINE SPIESER NOTES 1 Revised v
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CATHERINE SPIESER 31 The number of
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CATHERINE SPIESER GARDAWSKI, J. (20
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SZALMA IVETT / SZEL BERNADETT INTRO
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ABEL POLESE institutions that a sov
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ABEL POLESE persons engaged in very
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ABEL POLESE informal economies tend
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ABEL POLESE The same is happening t
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ABEL POLESE tried to step on his wa
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ABEL POLESE obtain extra money from
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ABEL POLESE Recently, mainly anthro
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ABEL POLESE Kravchuk, R. (2002) Ukr
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LYUDMYLA REFERENCES LITERATUR VOLYN
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AUTHORS Abel Polese is Marie Curie
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SFB 580 - GESCHÄFTSFÜHRUNG (2010)
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Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

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