Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
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AT THE ORIGINS OF INFORMAL ECONOMIES:<br />
THE UKRAINIAN CASE<br />
page 202<br />
nedeli), might have several weakenesses. One<br />
is that ‘international standards’ do not always<br />
take into account the local cultural and social<br />
context, especially when dealing with corruption<br />
(Polese 2008, Werner 2003). Legal systems,<br />
if allowed to develop autonomously, may also<br />
generate definitions that differ radically. 1<br />
A further weakness arises in the case of small<br />
transactions, happening on a daily or regular<br />
basis, that allow common people to survive<br />
once the state is unable to secure their needs.<br />
In such contexts, the very word ‘bribe’ and its<br />
meaning may be questioned (Humphrey 2002,<br />
Patico 2002, Polese 2008).<br />
A commonly agreed upon definition of<br />
corruption is as follows: ‘corruption is the use<br />
of a public function for a private advantage’.<br />
However, if the public function (a doctor, a<br />
teacher, a civil servant), that is, the fact that an<br />
individual works for the state, is not supported<br />
by the state (de facto, either because the state<br />
is not paying salaries or is paying too little<br />
to survive) then the very meaning of public<br />
function should be re-discussed and, with it, the<br />
meaning of corruption (Polese 2008, 2006b).<br />
Drawing evidence from participant observation<br />
and informal interviews between<br />
2003 and 2009, when I spent around four<br />
years working in Ukraine as a lecturer and<br />
consultant in the non governmental<br />
sector, I explore in this article the<br />
relationship between the state and<br />
the citizen in order to understand the<br />
origin of such informal transactions.<br />
In particular, I address the questions what<br />
conditions encourage or discourage success of<br />
an informal economy. In this respect, I suggest<br />
that informal economies originate from tensions<br />
between citizens and the state, in which<br />
the former feels compelled to respect decisions<br />
and policies imposed from the latter with no<br />
possibility to express their opinions or react<br />
politically.<br />
In such a context, the only way to react is to<br />
use informal economies as weapons of the weak<br />
(Scott 1984). Through informal payments,<br />
(petty) fiscal fraud or suitcase smuggling people<br />
may reverse the effects of state decisions that<br />
are not tailored to a local context. This, in turn,<br />
may allow people to participate politically even<br />
when a participatory democracy is not immediately<br />
available (Gupta 1995). To support this<br />
argument, the next sections will narrow down<br />
the concept of informal economies, as defined<br />
in this article, and discuss how informal transactions<br />
are performed.<br />
DISCUSSING THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND THE<br />
ILLEGAL-LEGAL BOUNDARY<br />
Agreement to consider the informal sector<br />
within a national economy is relatively recent.<br />
The informal sector was first defined as ‘unregulated<br />
economic enterprises or activities’<br />
(Hart 1973) until, in 1993, the International<br />
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS<br />
1993) decided to include all unregistered<br />
enterprises below a certain size – for example,<br />
micro-enterprises owned by informal employers<br />
as well as entrepreneurial operations owned by<br />
individuals who may employ family members<br />
or employees on an occasional basis.<br />
This definition, however, may fail to include