Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
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ABEL POLESE<br />
institutions that a sovereign country needs. The<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been based in<br />
Moscow as well as the national bank, both of<br />
which would have to be created ex novo and<br />
based in Kiev.<br />
In an effort to gain credibility and international<br />
recognition, the country initiated a number of<br />
political and economic reforms at domestic and<br />
international levels. As a first step, the country<br />
became a presidential republic in 1991and<br />
Leonid Kravchuk was elected as the first president.<br />
In addition, the communist party was<br />
formally banned (though re-admitted into<br />
politics in 1993) and its property nationalized.<br />
In spite of this, a consistent number of communists<br />
remained in politics by adopting a new<br />
political identity (most went into the Socialist<br />
Party, while others have run as independent<br />
candidates or found themselves distributed in a<br />
number of other parties, Polese 2008).<br />
Because of Russian proximity and claims (on<br />
gas and foreign debts, the Ukrainian territory<br />
and domestic politics due to consistent Russian<br />
minorities in the country), international recognition,<br />
assistance and support were also sought<br />
to counterbalance these pressures. The country<br />
applied and was accepted into the Council of<br />
Europe in 1995 ; and a partnership and cooperation<br />
agreement with the EU entered into<br />
force in 1998, one year before the Common<br />
Strategy on Ukraine (and Russia) was put<br />
forward by the EU Commission. Programmes<br />
of assistance like TACIS or IREX were set up<br />
and Ukraine was allowed to become a main<br />
recipient. The IMF and World Bank were also<br />
welcome to give advice and collaborate with<br />
the local government in an attempt to protect<br />
the country from harsh crises.<br />
However, this international attention had a<br />
double effect. On the one hand, the transfer<br />
of knowledge enabled domestic companies<br />
and public industries to potentially catch up<br />
with the rest of the world. On the other, it<br />
exposed the very essence of a society based on<br />
informal exchanges and social networks that,<br />
consolidating in Soviet times, had become a<br />
main feature of the country’s economy after<br />
the end of socialism. If, on the one hand,<br />
macroeconomic reforms and performance of<br />
the Ukrainian economy was a main concern<br />
(Kravchuk 2002, Van Zon 2000), an increasing<br />
number of firms mentioned informal practices<br />
and suggested that their liquidation would<br />
have a positive effect on the country’s transition<br />
(Aslund 2009, Aslund and Mesnil 1999, De<br />
Cornelius and Lenain 1997, Kuzio 1998).<br />
Researchers focusing on economic development<br />
in Ukraine could be divided into two<br />
mainstreams. Some assess informal transactions<br />
as harmful for the country (Freedom<br />
House, Transparency International, World<br />
Bank) and hold the opinion that the economic<br />
transition should pass through a cultural transition<br />
from Soviet deltsi (equivalent of businessman<br />
in Russian but with a different moral<br />
attitude) to businessmen (Papava 2001, Papava<br />
and Khaduri 1997). Others, however, argue for<br />
a dinstinction between pure corruption and<br />
the informal sector, suggesting that the most<br />
effective way to deal with extralegal<br />
activities was to integrate them into<br />
the official economy (Kaliberda and page 201<br />
Kaufmann 1996, Kaufmann 1994).<br />
The account on corruption given by most<br />
international organizations, and sometimes<br />
diligently adopted by local actors (Zerkalo