Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

ABEL POLESE
institutions that a sovereign country needs. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been based in
Moscow as well as the national bank, both of
which would have to be created ex novo and
based in Kiev.
In an effort to gain credibility and international
recognition, the country initiated a number of
political and economic reforms at domestic and
international levels. As a first step, the country
became a presidential republic in 1991and
Leonid Kravchuk was elected as the first president.
In addition, the communist party was
formally banned (though re-admitted into
politics in 1993) and its property nationalized.
In spite of this, a consistent number of communists
remained in politics by adopting a new
political identity (most went into the Socialist
Party, while others have run as independent
candidates or found themselves distributed in a
number of other parties, Polese 2008).
Because of Russian proximity and claims (on
gas and foreign debts, the Ukrainian territory
and domestic politics due to consistent Russian
minorities in the country), international recognition,
assistance and support were also sought
to counterbalance these pressures. The country
applied and was accepted into the Council of
Europe in 1995 ; and a partnership and cooperation
agreement with the EU entered into
force in 1998, one year before the Common
Strategy on Ukraine (and Russia) was put
forward by the EU Commission. Programmes
of assistance like TACIS or IREX were set up
and Ukraine was allowed to become a main
recipient. The IMF and World Bank were also
welcome to give advice and collaborate with
the local government in an attempt to protect
the country from harsh crises.
However, this international attention had a
double effect. On the one hand, the transfer
of knowledge enabled domestic companies
and public industries to potentially catch up
with the rest of the world. On the other, it
exposed the very essence of a society based on
informal exchanges and social networks that,
consolidating in Soviet times, had become a
main feature of the country’s economy after
the end of socialism. If, on the one hand,
macroeconomic reforms and performance of
the Ukrainian economy was a main concern
(Kravchuk 2002, Van Zon 2000), an increasing
number of firms mentioned informal practices
and suggested that their liquidation would
have a positive effect on the country’s transition
(Aslund 2009, Aslund and Mesnil 1999, De
Cornelius and Lenain 1997, Kuzio 1998).
Researchers focusing on economic development
in Ukraine could be divided into two
mainstreams. Some assess informal transactions
as harmful for the country (Freedom
House, Transparency International, World
Bank) and hold the opinion that the economic
transition should pass through a cultural transition
from Soviet deltsi (equivalent of businessman
in Russian but with a different moral
attitude) to businessmen (Papava 2001, Papava
and Khaduri 1997). Others, however, argue for
a dinstinction between pure corruption and
the informal sector, suggesting that the most
effective way to deal with extralegal
activities was to integrate them into
the official economy (Kaliberda and page 201
Kaufmann 1996, Kaufmann 1994).
The account on corruption given by most
international organizations, and sometimes
diligently adopted by local actors (Zerkalo