Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

CATHERINE SPIESER
ibility that other European countries have
faced. The early reforms of labour law consisted
in re-establishing market mechanisms for the
allocation of work, adjustment of the workforce
and wage setting. The re-commodification of
labour triggered a decentralisation of decisions
on hiring and firing, but also of the governance
of work more generally, starting with the
negotiation of pay and working conditions.
The issue of ‘deregulation’ then dominated the
debate and the search for the most adequate
legal framework, and flexibility became a major
policy objective toward the end of the 1990s.
The successive attempts to reform the Labour
Code sought to achieve, even if some targeted
the objective more explicitly than others. The
employment contract was redefined. From
2002, various provisions increased working
time flexibility and simplified conditions and
procedures to the advantage of employers.
Overall, however, the rules governing standard,
full-time employment changed less than the
conditions applicable to atypical forms of
work: flexibility was achieved primarily by a
rapidly growing share of workers not covered
by standard employment contracts, but rather,
for instance, work-based contracts ruled by civil
law. While these practices initially developed in
a relatively spontaneous manner, in more recent
years a number of acts were adopted with a
view to providing minimal regulation of the
flexible forms of work (for instance, temporary
workers in 2003), largely with the impulse
of European directives. We are left with a
‘permissive regulation of working conditions’
and ‘permissive labour relations through
deviation’ (Bluhm 2008: 67).
With respect to Esping-Andersen’s welfare
regimes, referred to as ideal-typical
configurations, Poland followed a trajectory
marked by several shifts of regime: a shortlived
universalistic welfare state (initially,
extensive eligibility and unconditional generous
benefits) quickly became unsustainable and
turned into a corporatist system privileging
certain branches (eligibility restricted mainly
to certain well-organised and well-represented
categories), and eventually into a minimalistresidual
welfare state (stricter eligibility and less
generous benefit, accompanied with a discourse
emphasizing greater control and obligations).
The inherited contributory regime in the area
of pensions was consistent with universal
benefits so long as universal employment
with little income differentiation was the
rule; however, it appeared as a contradiction
when this was no longer the case, fostering
the agenda for reform. Some features recall
Southern European welfare systems, which are
based on social contributions but marked by a
high level of segmentation, missing a universal
anti-poverty safety net and concentrating a
high share of expenditures on pensions (Ferrera
1996). They are also known to be impaired by
clientelism and fiscal or contribution evasion
and low administrative capacities, all of which
are well illustrated in Poland, too. Finally, a
fragmentation of social protection replicates
the differentiation of labour market situations
- another distortion typically observed in
Bismarckian and Southern European welfare
states. The whole population is no
longer covered by the same principles
and institutions. Instead, insiders with page 147
full-time, permanent jobs continue
to enjoy relatively good protection
and significant benefits, while ‘outsiders’ with
atypical jobs become increasingly marginalised
by the welfare system.