Heft36 1 - SFB 580 - Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

THE POLITICS OF LABOUR MARKET ADJUST-
MENT IN POST-1989 POLAND
and re-employment). Dismissed employees
would receive redundancy payments of up to
three months wage. Under the influence of
powerful unions, restructuring plans involved
intense negotiations and complex agreements.
As an example, in the years 1994-1997,
under the threat that the miners’ unions
would block the restructuring of the whole
sector, particularly generous social packages
were granted in the form of significant
one-off severance payments 13 . The mining
sector provides an interesting illustration of
negotiated compensation. Concentrated in
Upper Silesia, 14 the mines and steelworks
had a tradition of strong local trade unions
and better than average welfare entitlements;
they enjoyed more state support than
elsewhere. Restructuring was contentious,
for employees were strongly attached to the
mines, which gave access to various benefits
and social institutions. As a result, dialogue
and coordination among the social partners
was high on the agenda. In spring of 1995,
representatives of socio-political, professional,
local government and economic circles agreed
to cooperate in a program for restructuring
and development in Upper Silesia. A fouryear
reform plan prepared by the Ministry
of Industry in 1996 granted special social
transfers and other subsidies. The regional
leader of Solidarność presented an alternative
scenario calling for more involvement
of the national government and a
page 134 wider consultation of regional and
local actors. The outcome reflected
the traditional power structure of
actors in the region, i.e. the prominence of
industrial actors linked to the largest plants,
which made it difficult to envisage innovative
solutions. Half a dozen successive restructuring
plans were drawn up, but most were never
fully implemented due to industrial conflict.
Nevertheless, the workforce was reduced from
a million people in the 1980’s to a quarter of
this by 2003. Conflicts over collective dismissals
were eventually avoided by granting generous
packages, reflecting the bargaining power of
the miners unions: there were reports of sums
exceeding 10,000 euros to secure a definitive
exit of mining employment (Gardawski 2003).
This contrasts with the steel industry, where
employment was reduced in the same proportion,
but under very different conditions. Until 1998,
jobs were lost principally to retirement or
disability benefits, or transfer to other entities.
In 1999 a social package led to further jobs
reductions, among which slightly less than half
were transferred to other companies and the
rest made redundant (Towalski 2003). In 2003,
a second social package for steelworks, focusing
on activation, was adopted by the government
and endorsed by the sectoral tripartite team.
Its major innovation was to facilitate reemployment
in other industries, by linking
severance payments to enrolment in training
contracts. By Polish standards, restructuring in
the steel sector is an unusually positive example
of working social dialogue in a developmental
perspective. In comparison to the mining sector,
this process was also remarkably peaceful and
conflicts were scarce 15 ; a contrast that can be
traced back both to the different role played
by the unions (obstructing restructuring of the
mines while accepting restructuring in the steel
sector), and to the ultimate objective (closing
down the mines as opposed to reducing
workforce to build smaller, competitive steelmelting
plants).