Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

05.07.2014 Views

contact information and that the court has discretion to skip the Belaire-West process altogether. First, in Puerto v. Superior Court, 434 the Second District Court of Appeal held that it was an abuse of discretion to withhold the personal contact information of putative class members when the defendant had responded to discovery by listing each putative class member as a witness with information relevant to the case. The court held that “the right to privacy in contact information [does not] trump the [plaintiffs’] right to investigate their claims by contacting witnesses.” 435 Because of the unusual fact that the defendant had listed every putative class member by name and attested in verified discovery responses that each person was a percipient witness, Puerto could be distinguished from the typical class action. 436 In the second decision, Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court, 437 the Second District Court of Appeal went even further, and held that a procedure by which putative class members had to affirmatively agree to the disclosure of their contact information was not permissible even where (1) the employer had not listed the employees as witnesses or otherwise disclosed their names and (2) the employees had signed a form indicating they did not wish to have their personal information released—including specifically in connection with “class action lawsuits.” The court found that employees, in signing the release form, would not realize that the form might encompass a class action aimed at vindicating their own Labor Code rights, and that “public policy concerns weigh in favor of enforcing unwaivable statutory wage and overtime rights through class action litigation over a right to privacy.” 438 Although neither the Puerto nor the Crab Addison decision announced a per se rule that plaintiffs are entitled to production of all putative class member contact information without any protections being afforded to the putative class members to protect their privacy rights in that information, the decisions certainly indicate that a trial judge would not abuse discretion by simply ordering all the information to be turned over without resort to a Belaire-West opt-out privacy mailing. We have not yet seen a trend among courts in bypassing the Belaire-West opt-out process and none of the holdings in the Belaire-West, 434 435 436 437 438 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (2008). Id. at 1248. Puerto was followed by a federal district court in Stone v. Advance America, 2010 WL 5892501 (S.D. Cal. 2010). In Stone, the court had previously allowed the plaintiff to obtain class-member contact information through notice and an opt-out procedure. Thereafter, the plaintiff propounded interrogatories requesting the identities and contact information for defendant’s former employees during the class period. The court held that no notice or opt-out procedure was required to obtain this information under Rule 26 of the F.R.C.P., because it sought only basic discovery, i.e., the names and contact information for percipient witnesses, which the court distinguished from the names and contact information of class members (even though there was substantial overlap between the two). 169 Cal. App. 4th 958, 973-74 (2008). Id. at 974. Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 96

Puerto, or Crab Addison cases would seem to mandate that information be disclosed without any kind of protection for employee privacy. It would appear that the need to obtain the employees’ contact information would depend on the nature of the class action claims. Even the Crab Addison court recognized that there was enough of a privacy interest in putative class members’ identities and contact information to protect against disclosure when the information “is unnecessary to the prosecution of the litigation.” 439 There are class actions where the plaintiffs’ need to contact putative class members is minimal, but the lawyers seek the contact information anyway with the hope that they can locate some disgruntled former employees who might uncover additional possible class claims. For example, in a case concerning miscalculation of the overtime rate, the case turns almost exclusively on payroll records, so there would seem to be little need to contact class members. Although, technically speaking, the employees are witnesses, employers contend that they are not essential witnesses and that their right to privacy should outweigh the plaintiffs’ right to contact them, given the ability of plaintiffs to prosecute the case without such contact information. As explained above, the court in Parris held that a court deciding whether to allow discovery of class member identities must weigh the danger of possible abuses of the class action procedure against the rights of the parties under the circumstances. 440 Accordingly, the trial court has discretion to deny disclosure of names and addresses upon a showing that the plaintiff’s class claims are merely a pretext designed to gain access to the putative class members’ contact information. This will be a difficult burden to establish in most cases, but may be successful where the need for the discovery is minimal, where facts can be shown that the plaintiff lacks a reasonable basis for believing his or her individual claims are common to a broader class, or where there is evidence that the lawyer is controlling the litigation for an ulterior purpose. We expect that the law will continue to develop to address this situation, as we encounter it on a regular basis. B. Discovery to Facilitate Location of Substitute Class Representatives One method to defeat class certification is to argue that the class representative is atypical or inadequate. The problem with this argument is that, even when it succeeds, it leaves open the question of whether a class could properly be certified with a different member of the putative class acting as class representative. 439 440 Crab Addison, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 967. 109 Cal. App. 4th at 300-01. Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 97

Puerto, or Crab Addison cases would seem to m<strong>and</strong>ate that information be disclosed<br />

without any kind of protection for employee privacy.<br />

It would appear that the need to obtain the employees’ contact information would depend<br />

on the nature of the class action claims. Even the Crab Addison court recognized that<br />

there was enough of a privacy interest in putative class members’ identities <strong>and</strong> contact<br />

information to protect against disclosure when the information “is unnecessary to the<br />

prosecution of the litigation.” 439<br />

There are class actions where the plaintiffs’ need to contact<br />

putative class members is minimal, but the lawyers seek the contact information anyway<br />

with the hope that they can locate some disgruntled former employees who might uncover<br />

additional possible class claims. For example, in a case concerning miscalculation of the<br />

overtime rate, the case turns almost exclusively on payroll records, so there would seem to<br />

be little need to contact class members. Although, technically speaking, the employees are<br />

witnesses, employers contend that they are not essential witnesses <strong>and</strong> that their right to<br />

privacy should outweigh the plaintiffs’ right to contact them, given the ability of plaintiffs to<br />

prosecute the case without such contact information.<br />

As explained above, the court in Parris held that a court deciding whether to allow<br />

discovery of class member identities must weigh the danger of possible abuses of the class<br />

action procedure against the rights of the parties under the circumstances. 440<br />

Accordingly,<br />

the trial court has discretion to deny disclosure of names <strong>and</strong> addresses upon a showing<br />

that the plaintiff’s class claims are merely a pretext designed to gain access to the putative<br />

class members’ contact information. This will be a difficult burden to establish in most<br />

cases, but may be successful where the need for the discovery is minimal, where facts can<br />

be shown that the plaintiff lacks a reasonable basis for believing his or her individual claims<br />

are common to a broader class, or where there is evidence that the lawyer is controlling the<br />

litigation for an ulterior purpose. We expect that the law will continue to develop to address<br />

this situation, as we encounter it on a regular basis.<br />

B. Discovery to Facilitate Location of Substitute <strong>Class</strong><br />

Representatives<br />

One method to defeat class certification is to argue that the class representative is atypical<br />

or inadequate. The problem with this argument is that, even when it succeeds, it leaves<br />

open the question of whether a class could properly be certified with a different member of<br />

the putative class acting as class representative.<br />

439<br />

440<br />

Crab Addison, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 967.<br />

109 Cal. App. 4th at 300-01.<br />

Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 97

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