Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions
Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions
y redefining the proposed class to exclude the class representative from the original case where class certification was denied. Rather, the distinction between proposed class 1 and proposed class 2 would need to be meaningful, as it was in Bufil. For now, it appears that Alvarez remains good law and should still provide significant protections against serial class actions on the same theory. H. Defense Motions to Deny Class Certification (“Vinole Motions”) It is often to the employer’s tactical advantage to file the motion that triggers the resolution of the question of whether a class should be certified. By filing first, the employer can time the briefing to its advantage. If the employer can quickly assemble the evidence it needs to defeat class certification, then filing such a motion may put pressure on the plaintiffs’ lawyers (who often take on many cases) to oppose such a motion with less preparation than they would have if they could delay discovery for months and months until they felt prepared to file a motion for certification. Furthermore, filing first gives the employer the opportunity to file a reply brief, which it usually may not file if the plaintiff moves for class certification first. The plaintiffs’ bar does not agree that employers should be permitted move to deny class certification before the plaintiffs file their own certification motion. Plaintiffs’ lawyers often contend that such a motion robs the plaintiff of the right to define the class it wants certified and establish that such a class is possible. The plaintiffs also contend that such motions are not allowed under California procedure (or under federal procedure if the case has been removed to federal court). 415 A problem the plaintiffs face with this argument is that the California Supreme Court rejected it more than thirty years ago in City of San Jose v. Superior Court. 416 There, the court stated in no uncertain terms that either party can move for class certification and that such determinations should take place as soon in the litigation as practicable: [W]e have directed [lower courts] to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: “As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it 415 416 was overruled sub silentio by the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of virtual representation in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)). However, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.764(a) appears to contemplate such motions (“A party may file a motion to: . . . Decertify a class”). 12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974); accord Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 364 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion to deny class certification); Sipper v. Capital One Bank, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3881 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2002) (granting “motion to deny class certification”); Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 615, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting “Motion That Class Be Denied Certification Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)”). Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 92
is to be so maintained.” This determination may be made on motion of either plaintiff or defendant – or on the court’s own motion. 417 Because the City of San Jose case is from the 1970s, plaintiffs’ counsel often argue that its statement did not survive the later enactment of the complex rules within the California Rules of Court, which set a special briefing schedule for motions to “certify a class; determine the existence of and certify subclasses; amend or modify an order certifying a class; or decertify a class.” 418 Plaintiffs argue that the absence from this list of “motion to deny certification” was a deliberate decision to preclude such a motion. The employer’s cause to allow such motions was aided by Seyfarth Shaw’s victory in Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans. 419 There, the Ninth Circuit upheld the grant of a motion to deny class certification and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that such motions were inappropriate, especially when they were not decided simultaneously with a plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 420 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, noting that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places no limitations on which party may move for a determination whether a case should proceed as a class action. The court also noted that it is at the discretion of the trial court to decide when to rule on a certification or decertification motion and that there is no rule that the court must wait for the discovery period to end. 421 Following the issuance of the district court decision in Vinole, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the same rules apply under California civil procedure. In In re BCBG Overtime Cases, 422 the court held that “under both California and federal law, either party may initiate the class certification process.” Relying on Carabini v. Superior Court, 423 the court held that plaintiffs could file a motion for class certification, or defendants could move for a determination that the case should not proceed as a class action. As in Vinole, a key element in the court’s analysis was whether the plaintiffs had sufficient opportunity to conduct relevant discovery. The court determined that the plaintiffs before it had plenty of time (more than two years) to conduct discovery relevant to class certification issues, and 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 453-54. California Rules of Court, Rule 3.764. 571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009). Most cases approving defense motions to deny certification involve the filing of cross-motions by the defendant and the plaintiff. See, e.g., Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 229 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (motion for class certification and motion to deny certification filed simultaneously; court granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion). 571 F.3d at 943. 163 Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1299 (2008). 26 Cal. App. 4th 239, 242 (1994). Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 93
- Page 43 and 44: much broader, such as the court’s
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- Page 85 and 86: A 5 to 4 ruling reversed the Ninth
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y redefining the proposed class to exclude the class representative from the original case<br />
where class certification was denied. Rather, the distinction between proposed class 1 <strong>and</strong><br />
proposed class 2 would need to be meaningful, as it was in Bufil. For now, it appears that<br />
Alvarez remains good law <strong>and</strong> should still provide significant protections against serial<br />
class actions on the same theory.<br />
H. Defense Motions to Deny <strong>Class</strong> Certification (“Vinole Motions”)<br />
It is often to the employer’s tactical advantage to file the motion that triggers the resolution<br />
of the question of whether a class should be certified. By filing first, the employer can time<br />
the briefing to its advantage. If the employer can quickly assemble the evidence it needs to<br />
defeat class certification, then filing such a motion may put pressure on the plaintiffs’<br />
lawyers (who often take on many cases) to oppose such a motion with less preparation<br />
than they would have if they could delay discovery for months <strong>and</strong> months until they felt<br />
prepared to file a motion for certification. Furthermore, filing first gives the employer the<br />
opportunity to file a reply brief, which it usually may not file if the plaintiff moves for class<br />
certification first.<br />
The plaintiffs’ bar does not agree that employers should be permitted move to deny class<br />
certification before the plaintiffs file their own certification motion. Plaintiffs’ lawyers often<br />
contend that such a motion robs the plaintiff of the right to define the class it wants certified<br />
<strong>and</strong> establish that such a class is possible. The plaintiffs also contend that such motions<br />
are not allowed under <strong>California</strong> procedure (or under federal procedure if the case has<br />
been removed to federal court). 415 A problem the plaintiffs face with this argument is that<br />
the <strong>California</strong> Supreme Court rejected it more than thirty years ago in City of San Jose v.<br />
Superior Court. 416 There, the court stated in no uncertain terms that either party can move<br />
for class certification <strong>and</strong> that such determinations should take place as soon in the<br />
litigation as practicable:<br />
[W]e have directed [lower courts] to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil<br />
Procedure, which provides: “As soon as practicable after the commencement of<br />
an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it<br />
415<br />
416<br />
was overruled sub silentio by the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of virtual representation in Taylor v.<br />
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)).<br />
However, <strong>California</strong> Rules of Court, Rule 3.764(a) appears to contemplate such motions (“A party may file a motion to: .<br />
. . Decertify a class”).<br />
12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974); accord Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 364 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding<br />
trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion to deny class certification); Sipper v. Capital One Bank, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS<br />
3881 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2002) (granting “motion to deny class certification”); Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co., 15 Fair Empl.<br />
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 615, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting “Motion That <strong>Class</strong> Be Denied Certification Pursuant to Rule<br />
23(c)(1)”).<br />
Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 92