Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions
Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions
does not allow for opt-in class actions. 378 The court also criticized the opt-in procedure as a device that improperly is used by the defendant to “chip away at the size of the class.” 379 addition, the court attempted to construe its decision as beneficial to class defendants because an opt-out class binds more potential plaintiffs in those cases where the employer prevails on the merits. 380 Whatever the merits of this reasoning, the fact remains that trial courts throughout California are now barred from certifying cases as opt-in class actions. In 2007, however, another court of appeal narrowed Hypertouch. In Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 381 the trial court certified an independent contractor misclassification class but only of certain drivers of certain trucks on certain routes. The only way to determine who qualified as a class member under the particular class definition the court adopted was to ask the class members, because no records existed that would reveal class membership. Accordingly, the trial court authorized the sending of a questionnaire for drivers to answer under oath to determine whether they qualified as class members. Those who failed to respond were ultimately deemed not to be class members and were dismissed from the case without prejudice. The plaintiffs argued that this was tantamount to having certified a class on an opt-in basis, in violation of Hypertouch. The court of appeal rejected the comparison, noting that the questionnaire mechanism was not used to opt in to the class action, but merely to identify drivers as class members. 382 In essence, the questionnaire was used to ascertain class membership, not to determine whether someone, once identified as a class member, wished to participate in the class action. In cases where a trial court certified a class that requires gathering information from putative class members to determine class membership, Estrada may provide a hook for the defendant to argue that the potential class must be surveyed to determine who are class members, with all non-respondents to the survey being dismissed from the case. E. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes - The Supreme Court Shifts The Landscape Of Class Certification In June 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). This opinion transformed Rule 23 law and dramatically changed how workplace class actions are structured and defended and, in doing so, will also assist employers in defeating certification in wage and hour cases. In 378 379 380 381 382 Id. at 1542-43. Id. at 1542. Id. 154 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2007). Id. at 26 (“discovery was necessary to determine whether in fact there was an ascertainable class”). Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 82
A 5 to 4 ruling reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that class action certification should not have been granted as to the element of commonality. Dukes is significant to employers because it holds plaintiffs in class litigation to a strict burden under Rule 23(a) of establishing commonality among all putative class members as to the reason for a particular employment decision--the “glue” that holds the alleged unlawful conduct together. The Court ruled that proof of commonality will frequently overlap with the merits of the case. This is contrary to plaintiffs’ usual position that it is inappropriate to consider the merits of claims at the certification stage of class litigation. In addition to commonality, the Court severely limited the use of Rule 23(b)(2), pertaining to class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, in cases seeking back pay, ruling that such money damages may be awarded under this rule only when they are truly incidental to the requested equitable relief. 383 Dukes contains two core holdings. First, the Court held unanimously that certification of the class of female Wal-Mart workers was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which permits certification in part where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Second, the Court, ruled 5-4 that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Each of these holdings will reverberate in important ways in wage and hour litigation. Class Members’ “Dissimilarities” May Now Be What Bind Them Dukes reiterates that, because class actions are “an exception to the usual rule,” a class representative “must ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” One gauge for measuring whether that requirement has been met is the “commonality” test of Rule 23(a). According to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, commonality requires class members to have suffered the same injury as each other, not just a violation of the same provision of law. Moreover, the common injury must be “capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Although Dukes was a discrimination case brought under Title VII, the Court’s discussion of the “commonality” prong of Rule 23(a) should serve as important authority in wage and hour cases. First, many wage claims are brought under state law, either in state court under Rule 23 analogues or in federal court via removal, supplemental jurisdiction, or diversity. In those 383 See Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2011 WL 6882918 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming that the non-incidental test should be applied when determining class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)). Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 83
- Page 33 and 34: For each workday the employer fails
- Page 35 and 36: Arguably, no additional $100-per-pa
- Page 37 and 38: permitted” the employee to work t
- Page 39 and 40: federal decisions also held that an
- Page 41 and 42: for all overtime hours worked. The
- Page 43 and 44: much broader, such as the court’s
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- Page 47 and 48: years before the lawsuit, or for an
- Page 49 and 50: imposition of penalties, 194 routin
- Page 51 and 52: In one such class action, Elliot v.
- Page 53 and 54: First, there has been a substantial
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- Page 57 and 58: of her hours was paid at a rate of
- Page 59 and 60: the limitations period for a penalt
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- Page 63 and 64: all, but rather simply to proceed w
- Page 65 and 66: Shortly thereafter, another Divisio
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- Page 69 and 70: XIII. Class Action Fairness Act of
- Page 71 and 72: the plaintiff is “master of her c
- Page 73 and 74: alleged conduct or any related cond
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- Page 89 and 90: employer’s defense arsenal, and t
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- Page 93 and 94: party who seeks the same relief, pr
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- Page 117 and 118: While California courts have essent
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A 5 to 4 ruling reversed the Ninth Circuit <strong>and</strong> held that class action certification should not<br />
have been granted as to the element of commonality. Dukes is significant to employers<br />
because it holds plaintiffs in class litigation to a strict burden under Rule 23(a) of<br />
establishing commonality among all putative class members as to the reason for a<br />
particular employment decision--the “glue” that holds the alleged unlawful conduct together.<br />
The Court ruled that proof of commonality will frequently overlap with the merits of the<br />
case. This is contrary to plaintiffs’ usual position that it is inappropriate to consider the<br />
merits of claims at the certification stage of class litigation. In addition to commonality, the<br />
Court severely limited the use of Rule 23(b)(2), pertaining to class-wide injunctive <strong>and</strong><br />
declaratory relief, in cases seeking back pay, ruling that such money damages may be<br />
awarded under this rule only when they are truly incidental to the requested equitable<br />
relief. 383<br />
Dukes contains two core holdings. First, the Court held unanimously that certification of the<br />
class of female Wal-Mart workers was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure<br />
23(b)(2), which permits certification in part where “the party opposing the class has acted or<br />
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or<br />
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Second,<br />
the Court, ruled 5-4 that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “commonality” requirement of Rule<br />
23(a)(2). Each of these holdings will reverberate in important ways in wage <strong>and</strong> hour<br />
litigation.<br />
<strong>Class</strong> Members’ “Dissimilarities” May Now Be What Bind Them<br />
Dukes reiterates that, because class actions are “an exception to the usual rule,” a class<br />
representative “must ‘possess the same interest <strong>and</strong> suffer the same injury’ as the class<br />
members.” One gauge for measuring whether that requirement has been met is the<br />
“commonality” test of Rule 23(a). According to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion,<br />
commonality requires class members to have suffered the same injury as each other, not<br />
just a violation of the same provision of law. Moreover, the common injury must be<br />
“capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will<br />
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”<br />
Although Dukes was a discrimination case brought under Title VII, the Court’s discussion of<br />
the “commonality” prong of Rule 23(a) should serve as important authority in wage <strong>and</strong><br />
hour cases.<br />
First, many wage claims are brought under state law, either in state court under Rule 23<br />
analogues or in federal court via removal, supplemental jurisdiction, or diversity. In those<br />
383<br />
See Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2011 WL 6882918 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming that the non-incidental test should be<br />
applied when determining class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)).<br />
Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 83