Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

05.07.2014 Views

not be disturbed on appeal. 364 The court also suggested that the reverse would be true, in that a trial court’s order denying certification was entitled to similar deference: “We need not conclude that plaintiffs’ evidence is compelling, or even that the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had credited defendant’s evidence instead.” 365 Accordingly, the same types of arguments that the defendant in Sav-On raised—that individualized issues will predominate over common ones—still have potential to persuade a trial court to deny certification; the trial court simply has the discretion to accept or reject the argument based on its assessment of the facts before it. While the California Supreme Court’s decision does not mandate certification in misclassification cases, the court specifically identified several issues that are commonly present in many manager misclassification cases that the court indicated could be established through collective proof: whether, as the plaintiff argued, the defendant had a deliberate policy to misclassify non-exempt employees as exempt; whether the defendant implicitly conceded all the employees were non-exempt when it reclassified all the employees at issue as non-exempt in 1999; whether any given task within the limited universe of tasks that managers performed qualifies as exempt or non-exempt; and whether a manager following the defendant’s reasonable expectation for performing the job would spend the majority of the work time on exempt duties. 366 The court held that a trial court could rationally conclude that those common issues predominated over the individualized issues concerning how individual managers spent their time. Dismissing concerns that these cases could prove unmanageable, the court further noted that the trial court had broad discretion as to how to handle individualized issues once the class issues were resolved. The court said little more about those proceedings other than to encourage trial courts to be “procedurally innovative” in fashioning procedures to resolve remaining individualized issues efficiently. 367 364 365 366 367 Id. at 331; but see Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 144 Cal. App. 4th 121 (2006) (reversing court’s decision to deny certification because the court did not consider the use of subclasses, but affirmatively ruling that certification was required rather than remanding with instructions for trial court to exercise its discretion using proper standard). Id. Id. at 327. Id. at 339. Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 78

In the immediate wake of Sav-On, there appeared to be a trend among trial courts to certify more exemption misclassification cases. That trend was offset somewhat in 2006 by the issuance of a published appellate decision that expressly made the point that Sav-On had implied—i.e., that a trial court’s decision to deny certification is entitled to the same deference as a decision to certify a class. In two post-Sav-On cases, Dunbar v. Albertson’s Inc., 368 and Keller v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 369 the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that differences in how specific managers allocated their time between exempt and non-exempt duties was a predominant issue in the case, and an issue that supported denial of class certification or decertification. In the years that have passed since Sav-On, a body of federal district court cases (removed on diversity jurisdiction grounds) has emerged deciding class certification in a variety of different exemption contexts. It is notable how two cases with closely similar facts often result in one being certified while the other is not. Certification decisions appear to vary depending on the policy preferences of the particular judge assigned to the case. Several cases have come down issued by judges with a more pro-certification bent that suggest that exemption cases should commonly be certified if all the employees were uniformly classified as exempt without the employer engaging in a person-by-person audit of the employees’ job duties (something that almost never occurs in real life). 370 On the flip side, numerous cases from judges more skeptical of class certification have denied class certification notwithstanding a common job description and an absence of an employer’s exemption audit of each person in the proposed class. 371 368 369 370 371 141 Cal. App. 4th 1422 (2006). 179 Cal. App. 4th 1389 (2009). See, e.g., Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Judge Patel certified class of loan originators because employer had a common policy of treating all such employees as exempt without conducting an individual inquiry into their job duties), rev’d, 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009); Alba v. Papa John’s USA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28079, 12 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 710 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2007) (Judge Feess certified class of restaurant managers on the ground of common job description and evidence that employer encouraged uniform practices among stores); Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 602 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Judge Marshall found that predominant common issue was defendant’s “policy of classifying all reporters and account executives as ‘exempt’”); Tierno v. Rite-Aid Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66436 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Judge Henderson granted certification based on common job description and casting doubt on credibility of surveys obtained by employer postlitigation). See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litigation, 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (overturning grant of class certification for loan originators because a uniform exemption policy cannot be the sole basis for a class certification, but is only one factor to be looked at); Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 637 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (Judge Sabraw denied certification of proposed class of loan originators on ground individualized issues predominated as to whether any originator spent enough time outside to qualify for outside sales exemption), aff’d, 571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009); Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza, 238 F.R.D. 241 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (Judge Selna denied class certification of store manager class based on predominance of individualized issues as to how store managers divide their time between exempt and non-exempt work); Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 229 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (Judge Fischer denied class certification of assistant manager class based on predominance of individualized issues as to how employees divided time between exempt and non-exempt work); Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 253 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (certification denied as to categories of employees holding the same jobs as the class Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 79

In the immediate wake of Sav-On, there appeared to be a trend among trial courts to certify<br />

more exemption misclassification cases. That trend was offset somewhat in 2006 by the<br />

issuance of a published appellate decision that expressly made the point that Sav-On had<br />

implied—i.e., that a trial court’s decision to deny certification is entitled to the same<br />

deference as a decision to certify a class. In two post-Sav-On cases, Dunbar v. Albertson’s<br />

Inc., 368 <strong>and</strong> Keller v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 369 the court of appeals held that the trial court<br />

did not abuse its discretion when it determined that differences in how specific managers<br />

allocated their time between exempt <strong>and</strong> non-exempt duties was a predominant issue in<br />

the case, <strong>and</strong> an issue that supported denial of class certification or decertification.<br />

In the years that have passed since Sav-On, a body of federal district court cases (removed<br />

on diversity jurisdiction grounds) has emerged deciding class certification in a variety of<br />

different exemption contexts. It is notable how two cases with closely similar facts often<br />

result in one being certified while the other is not. Certification decisions appear to vary<br />

depending on the policy preferences of the particular judge assigned to the case. Several<br />

cases have come down issued by judges with a more pro-certification bent that suggest<br />

that exemption cases should commonly be certified if all the employees were uniformly<br />

classified as exempt without the employer engaging in a person-by-person audit of the<br />

employees’ job duties (something that almost never occurs in real life). 370 On the flip side,<br />

numerous cases from judges more skeptical of class certification have denied class<br />

certification notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing a common job description <strong>and</strong> an absence of an employer’s<br />

exemption audit of each person in the proposed class. 371<br />

368<br />

369<br />

370<br />

371<br />

141 Cal. App. 4th 1422 (2006).<br />

179 Cal. App. 4th 1389 (2009).<br />

See, e.g., Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Judge Patel certified<br />

class of loan originators because employer had a common policy of treating all such employees as exempt without<br />

conducting an individual inquiry into their job duties), rev’d, 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009); Alba v. Papa John’s USA,<br />

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28079, 12 <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> Cas. 2d (BNA) 710 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2007) (Judge Feess certified<br />

class of restaurant managers on the ground of common job description <strong>and</strong> evidence that employer encouraged<br />

uniform practices among stores); Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 602 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Judge Marshall<br />

found that predominant common issue was defendant’s “policy of classifying all reporters <strong>and</strong> account executives as<br />

‘exempt’”); Tierno v. Rite-Aid Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66436 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Judge Henderson granted<br />

certification based on common job description <strong>and</strong> casting doubt on credibility of surveys obtained by employer postlitigation).<br />

See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litigation, 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (overturning grant of<br />

class certification for loan originators because a uniform exemption policy cannot be the sole basis for a class<br />

certification, but is only one factor to be looked at); Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 637 (S.D. Cal.<br />

2007) (Judge Sabraw denied certification of proposed class of loan originators on ground individualized issues<br />

predominated as to whether any originator spent enough time outside to qualify for outside sales exemption), aff’d, 571<br />

F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009); Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza, 238 F.R.D. 241 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (Judge Selna denied class<br />

certification of store manager class based on predominance of individualized issues as to how store managers divide<br />

their time between exempt <strong>and</strong> non-exempt work); Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 229 (C.D. Cal. 2006)<br />

(Judge Fischer denied class certification of assistant manager class based on predominance of individualized issues as<br />

to how employees divided time between exempt <strong>and</strong> non-exempt work); Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 253<br />

F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (certification denied as to categories of employees holding the same jobs as the class<br />

Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 79

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!