Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions Litigating California Wage & Hour and Labor Code Class Actions

05.07.2014 Views

developments in this aspect of the law concerning class action certification procedures have significantly bolstered defendants’ ability to defeat class certification. B. Class Certification in Exempt Misclassification Cases It is well established that “class actions will not be permitted where there are diverse factual issues to be resolved, despite the existence of common questions.” 357 In the 2003 decision Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 358 the California Supreme Court explained the plaintiffs’ burden in moving for class certification: Plaintiffs’ burden on moving for class certification, however, is not merely to show that some common issues exist, but, rather, to place substantial evidence in the record that common issues predominate. As we previously have explained, this means “each member must not be required to individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his [or her] right to recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared to those requiring separate adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous and substantial to make the class action advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.” 359 The executive exemption has the potential to raise inherently individualized issues that are not consistent with class treatment as outlined in the Lockheed case. 360 The Wage Orders caution that: The work actually performed by the employee during the course of the work week must, first and foremost, be examined and the amount of time the employee spends on such work, together with the employer’s realistic 357 358 359 360 order to envision the form that a trial on those issues would take”); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of class certification, where “any theory on which [plaintiffs] might rely [to prove the allegations of the complaint] would raise predominantly individual questions”). Clausing v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1233 (1990). 29 Cal. 4th 1096 (2003). Id. at 1108 (2003); see also Newell v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1094 (2004) (class certification inappropriate even though insurer had uniform policy for evaluating earthquake claims, because individual liability for each policy holder would require examination of numerous individualized factors); Frieman v. San Rafael Rock Quarry, 116 Cal. App. 4th 29, 40-41 (2004) (class certification denied for nuisance claims against a quarry arising from blasting noise where liability varied from one homeowner to another based on a “myriad of different factors”). In Lockheed, a medical monitoring case, the California Supreme Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s ruling granting class certification because “[t]he questions respecting each individual class member’s right to recover that would remain following any class judgment appear so numerous and substantial as to render any efficiencies attainable through joint trial of common issues insufficient, as a matter of law, to make a class action certified on such a basis advantageous to the judicial process and the litigants.” Lockheed, 29 Cal. 4th at 1111. Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 76

expectations and the realistic requirements of the job, shall be considered in determining whether the employee satisfies this requirement. 361 Given California’s complete rejection of any form of qualitative test for exempt status, it would be possible for one manager to spend only 45 percent of his or her time performing exempt tasks (or closely and directly related tasks), and for another manager in the same position to spend 55 percent. The first manager would not be exempt, while the second manager would be exempt. In Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 362 this is precisely what happened: the court of appeal refused to rely on another court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s own successor was exempt because the inquiry was too “fact specific.” While Nordquist was not a class action, its reasoning seemed inconsistent with the notion that exempt misclassification cases would be good candidates for class litigation. In light of the various pronouncements about the individualized inquiry necessary to determine an employee’s exempt status, the defense bar was hopeful that courts would disapprove of a plaintiff obtaining class certification on the ground that a class of managers was uniformly misclassified as exempt. If an employer could bring forth some declarations from managers attesting that they spend more than half their time on exempt tasks, the best a plaintiff could argue was that many managers at other stores spent the majority of their time on non-exempt tasks. In any case, the finder of fact would need to examine each store and each manager individually to determine if the managers there were misclassified as exempt—an inquiry inconsistent with class litigation. Employers were disappointed when the California Supreme Court issued Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 363 which indicated that exempt misclassification cases may often be appropriate for certification. In Sav-On, the trial court certified a class of store managers notwithstanding evidence that exempt status of individual managers varied from store manager to store manager based on differences in how they divided their time between exempt and non-exempt tasks. The court of appeal held that individualized issues necessarily predominated over common issues because the fact finder would need to examine each store manager’s work habits to see whether that manager spent the majority of his or her time on exempt tasks. In reversing, the California Supreme Court emphasized that the appellate court had given insufficient deference to the trial court’s determination that common issues predominated. The court clarified that if a reasonable person might conclude from the record that common issues predominated over individualized ones, then a trial court’s certification order should 361 362 363 See, e.g., Wage Order 7-2001 § 2(K). 32 Cal. App. 4th 555, 569 (1995). 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004). Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com Litigating California Wage & Hour Class Actions (12th Edition) 77

developments in this aspect of the law concerning class action certification procedures<br />

have significantly bolstered defendants’ ability to defeat class certification.<br />

B. <strong>Class</strong> Certification in Exempt Misclassification Cases<br />

It is well established that “class actions will not be permitted where there are diverse factual<br />

issues to be resolved, despite the existence of common questions.” 357 In the 2003 decision<br />

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 358 the <strong>California</strong> Supreme Court explained the<br />

plaintiffs’ burden in moving for class certification:<br />

Plaintiffs’ burden on moving for class certification, however, is not merely to show<br />

that some common issues exist, but, rather, to place substantial evidence in the<br />

record that common issues predominate. As we previously have explained, this<br />

means “each member must not be required to individually litigate numerous <strong>and</strong><br />

substantial questions to determine his [or her] right to recover following the class<br />

judgment; <strong>and</strong> the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared to those<br />

requiring separate adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous <strong>and</strong> substantial to<br />

make the class action advantageous to the judicial process <strong>and</strong> to the<br />

litigants.” 359<br />

The executive exemption has the potential to raise inherently individualized issues that are<br />

not consistent with class treatment as outlined in the Lockheed case. 360 The <strong>Wage</strong> Orders<br />

caution that:<br />

The work actually performed by the employee during the course of the work<br />

week must, first <strong>and</strong> foremost, be examined <strong>and</strong> the amount of time the<br />

employee spends on such work, together with the employer’s realistic<br />

357<br />

358<br />

359<br />

360<br />

order to envision the form that a trial on those issues would take”); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum<br />

Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of class certification, where “any theory on<br />

which [plaintiffs] might rely [to prove the allegations of the complaint] would raise predominantly individual questions”).<br />

Clausing v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1233 (1990).<br />

29 Cal. 4th 1096 (2003).<br />

Id. at 1108 (2003); see also Newell v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1094 (2004) (class certification<br />

inappropriate even though insurer had uniform policy for evaluating earthquake claims, because individual liability for<br />

each policy holder would require examination of numerous individualized factors); Frieman v. San Rafael Rock Quarry,<br />

116 Cal. App. 4th 29, 40-41 (2004) (class certification denied for nuisance claims against a quarry arising from blasting<br />

noise where liability varied from one homeowner to another based on a “myriad of different factors”).<br />

In Lockheed, a medical monitoring case, the <strong>California</strong> Supreme Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s ruling<br />

granting class certification because “[t]he questions respecting each individual class member’s right to recover that<br />

would remain following any class judgment appear so numerous <strong>and</strong> substantial as to render any efficiencies attainable<br />

through joint trial of common issues insufficient, as a matter of law, to make a class action certified on such a basis<br />

advantageous to the judicial process <strong>and</strong> the litigants.” Lockheed, 29 Cal. 4th at 1111.<br />

Seyfarth Shaw LLP | www.seyfarth.com <strong>Litigating</strong> <strong>California</strong> <strong>Wage</strong> & <strong>Hour</strong> <strong>Class</strong> <strong>Actions</strong> (12th Edition) 76

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