A Communication Protocol of RFID Systems in Internet of Things

International Journal of Security and Its Applications
Vol. 6, No. 2, April, 2012
Definition1. If for any polynomial PK ( ) and sufficiently large K ,the function can
satisfy ( )
, then we say that the function can be negligible.
Mutual authentication: The tag should be able to achieve the certification of legitimate
reader, that is, if the attacker R achieves tag T
j
( j[1, M])
to certificate for R i
by fabricating
reader R ( a a
[1, N ]) ,we denote it as Adv( R ) . Then the probability of success of R is
Pr(Adv( R)) ( K)
. The reader should be able to achieve the certification of legitimate tag,
that is, if the attacker T achieves reader R
i
( i[1, N])
to certificate for T j
by fabricating
legitimate tag T ( b b
[1, M ]) , we denote it as Adv( T ) . Then the success probability of T is
Pr(Adv( T) ( K)
.
Forward security: Even if an attacker obtains the tag status of its current time t 1
, the
attacker cannot connect the status with the tag status obtained in previous one time
t1 ( t1 t2)
.That is, to j [1, M]
, t 1
t 2
, the attacker Q has already known the information of
tag T j
in time t 2
, then calculate the information of the tag T j
in time t 1
by the random oracle
query, we denote it as Adv( Q ) . Then the success probability of R is Pr(Adv( Q)) ( K)
.
Indistinguishable: j1, j2 [1, M]
, the attacker can’t distinguish and identify the secret
information of T j
and T
1
j
, so as to recognize the target. That is, if the attacker D can
2
distinguish and identify the secret information of T j
and T
1
j
through random oracle queries,
2
we denote it as Iden( D ) .The success probability of D is Pr(Iden( D)) ( K)
.
Internal security: The legitimate reader and the legitimate tag within the system cannot
communicate with each other by forgery and tampering. That is, i, j [1, N]
, m, n [1, M]
.
R
i(R j
) successfully identify tag T
m(T n
) by fabricating R
j(R i
) , we denote it as Adv( NR),
Then
Pr(Adv( NR) ( K)
. If T
m(T n
) through fabricating T
n(T m
) is identified successfully by
R
i(R j
) , we denote it as Adv( NT ) , then Pr(Adv( NT)) ( K)
.
Security transfer of ownership: j [1, M]
, when the tag T j
transfer its ownership, then
the tag T j
become T j
in the new system. The reader in original ownership system of tag
T j
cannot inquiry the information of tag T j
. That is, i [1, N]
, j [1, M]
. The event that
R i
successfully get the tag T j
after transferring the ownership of T j
can be denoted as
Adv( Z ) , Pr(Adv( Z)) ( K)
.
4. SPAP
4.1 Protocol Design
By analyzing the model and safe problems which need to be solved in RFID systems of
internet of things, concluding advantages and disadvantages of today's typical RFID security
protocols, the article proposes the protocol SPAP which uses symmetric encryption, one-way
hash function and XOR. We assume every legitimate readers and tags that contain a unique
EPC (Electronic Product Code),Symbols used in the protocol as Table 1
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