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A Communication Protocol of RFID Systems in Internet of Things

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International Journal <strong>of</strong> Security and Its Applications<br />

Vol. 6, No. 2, April, 2012<br />

Random Oracle model [10] is applied to describe the <strong>RFID</strong> system model <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet<br />

<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. The model can be equivalent to a tuple P ( )<br />

, and are time<br />

functions <strong>of</strong> polynomial whose safety factor is 1 k ( k<br />

N)<br />

, def<strong>in</strong>es the behavior <strong>of</strong> a<br />

legitimate reader, def<strong>in</strong>es the operation <strong>of</strong> a legitimate tag. Us<strong>in</strong>g the random Oracle to<br />

query and def<strong>in</strong>ite the behavior <strong>of</strong> an attacker, that is, the attacker which has Oracle<br />

s<br />

s<br />

<br />

R i,T<br />

( R<br />

j i<br />

<strong>in</strong>itiates a session s with T j<br />

) and Oracle <br />

Tj,R<br />

( T<br />

i j<br />

<strong>in</strong>itiates a session s<br />

with R i<br />

)is an Oracle probability mach<strong>in</strong>e. The attacker can achieve the attack target by<br />

s<br />

s<br />

send<strong>in</strong>g scheduled questions to Oracle R i,T<br />

and Oracle <br />

j<br />

Tj,R<br />

and receiv<strong>in</strong>g response<br />

i<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation from the random Oracle. Oracle question depicts the real ability <strong>of</strong> the<br />

attacker. The attacker can send the follow<strong>in</strong>g questions.<br />

Execute ( R <br />

T<br />

, P)<br />

: the question depicts an <strong>in</strong>stance P that the attacker execute the<br />

i j<br />

protocol between T j<br />

and R i<br />

which can obta<strong>in</strong> all messages exchanged between the<br />

reader and the tag when the protocol P executes.<br />

SendTag ( <br />

T<br />

, Pm ,<br />

1)<br />

: the question depicts an <strong>in</strong>stance P that the attacker A sends the<br />

j<br />

message m<br />

1<br />

to tag T j<br />

, and receives the response message <strong>of</strong> the tag T j<br />

.<br />

SendReader ( <br />

R<br />

, Pm ,<br />

2)<br />

:the question depicts <strong>in</strong>stance P that the attacker A sends the<br />

i<br />

message m2<br />

to reader R i<br />

, and receives the response message <strong>of</strong> the reader R i<br />

.<br />

CorruptTag ( ):the question depicts an active attack on the tag and the attacker's<br />

Tj<br />

captured capacity. It can make the captured tag T j<br />

actively reveal secret <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

which is <strong>in</strong> their private storage space.<br />

CorruptRead ( ):the question depicts an active attack on the reader and the attacker's<br />

Ri<br />

captured capacity. It can make the captured reader R i<br />

actively reveal secret <strong>in</strong>formation which<br />

is <strong>in</strong> their private storage space.<br />

Test ( ):the question is used to test semantic security <strong>of</strong> confidential <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>of</strong> a tag<br />

Tj<br />

T j<br />

. By throw<strong>in</strong>g co<strong>in</strong> b , if b = 1, return the secret <strong>in</strong>formation stored <strong>in</strong> the tag. if b = 0,<br />

return an random number which is equivalent <strong>in</strong> length to the secret <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>of</strong> the tag.<br />

Test ( ):the question is used to test semantic security <strong>of</strong> confidential <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>of</strong><br />

Ri<br />

a reader R i<br />

.By throw<strong>in</strong>g co<strong>in</strong> b , if b = 1, return the secret <strong>in</strong>formation stored <strong>in</strong> the<br />

tag. if b = 0, return an random number which is equivalent <strong>in</strong> length to the secret<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>of</strong> the reader.<br />

3.2 Security Requirements <strong>of</strong> Authentication <strong>in</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> System <strong>of</strong> <strong>Internet</strong> <strong>of</strong> Th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

An <strong>RFID</strong> system is an important part <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, non-contact automatic<br />

identification technology between the reader and the tag <strong>in</strong> the system which makes the<br />

system face serious security problems. Analyz<strong>in</strong>g the security needs met by exist<strong>in</strong>g typical<br />

<strong>RFID</strong> protocols and comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> system <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, what<br />

needs the authentication should meet <strong>in</strong> <strong>RFID</strong> system <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs are detailed <strong>in</strong> the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

93

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