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Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

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428 Project Apollo: Americans to <strong>the</strong> Moon<br />

Nations Conference on <strong>the</strong> Peaceful Uses of Outer Space), s<strong>in</strong>ce it would be most<br />

important to move out as quickly as possible once <strong>the</strong> plan was adopted.” (II-60)<br />

With all of <strong>the</strong> key managers of <strong>the</strong> Apollo meet<strong>in</strong>g agreed, it would be<br />

difficult for NASA’s top officials to overturn Low’s plan, but it turned out that<br />

<strong>the</strong>y also were not will<strong>in</strong>g to give it <strong>the</strong>ir total approval. <strong>The</strong> senior managers<br />

from Houston, Huntsville, Cape Kennedy, and <strong>the</strong> NASA Headquarters Apollo<br />

program office met with <strong>the</strong> new NASA Deputy Adm<strong>in</strong>istrator, Thomas Pa<strong>in</strong>e, on<br />

14 August as planned. (Pa<strong>in</strong>e was a newcomer to space; before he came to NASA<br />

he had been an executive of <strong>the</strong> General Electric Company, most recently <strong>the</strong><br />

manager of GE’s Center for Advanced Studies. He had assumed <strong>the</strong> number two<br />

position at NASA <strong>in</strong> January 1968, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> resignation of Robert Seamans.)<br />

At <strong>the</strong> 14 August meet<strong>in</strong>g, Pa<strong>in</strong>e “congratulated <strong>the</strong> assembled group for not<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g prisoners of previous plans and <strong>in</strong>dicated that he personally felt that this<br />

was <strong>the</strong> right th<strong>in</strong>g for Apollo and that, of course, he would have to work with<br />

Mueller and Webb before it could be approved.” <strong>The</strong>re was a decision not to send<br />

Sam Phillips to Vienna because his sudden appearance <strong>the</strong>re might compromise<br />

what were still considered secret plans. Instead, <strong>in</strong>teractions with Webb and<br />

Mueller were by secure telephone and diplomatic couriers.<br />

Webb was “shocked” when he first heard of what his staff was plann<strong>in</strong>g, but<br />

quickly both he and Mueller saw <strong>the</strong> logic of what was be<strong>in</strong>g proposed. However,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y added a note of caution. While <strong>the</strong> Apollo managers could beg<strong>in</strong> to plan for<br />

a lunar mission, <strong>the</strong>y could not commit NASA to undertak<strong>in</strong>g such a bold step<br />

until <strong>the</strong> October C mission, designated Apollo 7, was a success. Follow<strong>in</strong>g this<br />

constra<strong>in</strong>ed approval of <strong>the</strong> plan, Apollo Program Director Sam Phillips on 19<br />

August issued a directive announc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> revised program plan. (II-61) <strong>The</strong> new<br />

mission would be designated C’ (C prime) and Apollo 8. Whe<strong>the</strong>r it would go to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Moon, stay <strong>in</strong> low Earth orbit, or follow some o<strong>the</strong>r mission plan would not be<br />

decided until <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> Apollo 7 mission were available, said Phillips.<br />

As Low noted, <strong>the</strong> implications of this tentative decision were dramatic <strong>in</strong><br />

terms of when <strong>the</strong> first attempt at a lunar land<strong>in</strong>g could be scheduled. At <strong>the</strong> 14<br />

August meet<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

We also discussed <strong>the</strong> mission sequence to be followed after <strong>the</strong> proposed<br />

mission and proposed that <strong>the</strong> best plan would be to fly <strong>the</strong> D mission<br />

next, followed by an F mission, which, <strong>in</strong> turn, would be followed by <strong>the</strong><br />

first lunar land<strong>in</strong>g mission. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> proposed mission would<br />

take <strong>the</strong> place of <strong>the</strong> E mission but would be flown before D. MSC also<br />

proposed that for <strong>in</strong>ternal plann<strong>in</strong>g purposes we should schedule <strong>the</strong><br />

D mission for March 1, 1969; <strong>the</strong> F mission for May 15, 1969; and <strong>the</strong> G<br />

mission for July or August, 1969. However, dates two weeks later for D,<br />

one month later for F, and one month later for G should be our public<br />

commitment dates. (II-60)<br />

Follow<strong>in</strong>g Phillips’s 19 August directive tentatively approv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> C’ mission,<br />

Low on 20 August issued his own directive to those work<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Apollo

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