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Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

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416 Project Apollo: Americans to <strong>the</strong> Moon<br />

Apollo Under Review<br />

In November 1962 President John F. Kennedy had identified beat<strong>in</strong>g Russia<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Moon as <strong>the</strong> country’s highest priority <strong>in</strong> space. Less than five months later,<br />

<strong>the</strong>re was some suggestion that <strong>the</strong> president might have been hav<strong>in</strong>g second<br />

thoughts about that priority and about <strong>the</strong> impacts of <strong>the</strong> accelerated space<br />

program on <strong>the</strong> nation’s economy and technical activities, although whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

this <strong>in</strong>deed was <strong>the</strong> case is not clear from <strong>the</strong> historical record. On 9 April,<br />

<strong>the</strong> president wrote Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson <strong>in</strong> his role as Chairman<br />

of <strong>the</strong> National Aeronautics and Space Council, say<strong>in</strong>g that “<strong>in</strong> light of recent<br />

discussions, I feel <strong>the</strong> need to obta<strong>in</strong> a clearer understand<strong>in</strong>g of a number of<br />

factual and policy issues relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> National Space Program which seem to<br />

rise repeatedly <strong>in</strong> public and o<strong>the</strong>r contexts.” Kennedy asked Johnson to carry<br />

out a quick review of <strong>the</strong> program to answer a number of specific questions. 43<br />

(Volume I, III-15)<br />

Johnson’s report came on 13 May; NASA and DOD had been closely <strong>in</strong>volved<br />

<strong>in</strong> its preparation. In addition to answer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> specific questions posed by<br />

<strong>the</strong> President, <strong>the</strong> report noted “<strong>the</strong> space program is not solely a question of<br />

prestige, of advanc<strong>in</strong>g scientific knowledge, or economic benefit or of military<br />

development, although all of <strong>the</strong>se factors are <strong>in</strong>volved. Basically, a much more<br />

fundamental issue is at stake . . . <strong>the</strong> future of society.” (Volume I, III-16)<br />

To <strong>the</strong> Moon Toge<strong>the</strong>r?<br />

If Kennedy was <strong>in</strong>deed question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wisdom of rac<strong>in</strong>g Russia to <strong>the</strong> Moon,<br />

one reason may have been <strong>the</strong> changed nature of U.S.-Soviet relations after <strong>the</strong><br />

United States had forced <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba <strong>in</strong><br />

October 1962. Kennedy seems to have concluded that <strong>the</strong> time was ripe to revisit a<br />

notion that had preceded his decision to enter <strong>the</strong> space race—that a flight to <strong>the</strong><br />

Moon should be a cooperative U.S.-Soviet undertak<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Kennedy<br />

advisor <strong>The</strong>odore Sorensen, “it is no secret that Kennedy would have preferred<br />

to cooperate with <strong>the</strong> Soviets” <strong>in</strong> manned missions to <strong>the</strong> Moon. 44 In an <strong>in</strong>terview<br />

shortly after Kennedy’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation, Sorenson expanded on this idea:<br />

I th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> President had three objectives <strong>in</strong> space. One was to ensure its<br />

demilitarization. <strong>The</strong> second was to prevent <strong>the</strong> field to be occupied by<br />

<strong>the</strong> Russians to <strong>the</strong> exclusion of <strong>the</strong> United States. And <strong>the</strong> third was to<br />

make certa<strong>in</strong> that American scientific prestige and American scientific<br />

effort were at <strong>the</strong> top. Those three goals all would have been assured<br />

<strong>in</strong> a space effort which culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> our beat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Russians to <strong>the</strong><br />

moon. All three of <strong>the</strong>m would have been endangered had <strong>the</strong> Russians<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>ued to outpace us <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir space effort and beat us to <strong>the</strong> moon.<br />

43. Compton¸ Where No Man Has Gone, Chap. 3.<br />

44. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and<br />

Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 121.

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