Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

412 Project Apollo: Americans to the Moon
the lunar landing. Wiesner replied on 10 January 1963, telling the president “that
approximately 100 million dollars of the previously discussed 326 million dollar
supplementary could have a very important effect on the schedule, but that to do
so it would have to be available in the very near future.” Such a funding increase,
said Wiesner, should be used to make sure that the Saturn V launch vehicle (he still
called it the C-5) would be available when it was needed. (II-34)
Overall, however, President Kennedy seems to have accepted the basic
argument made by James Webb— that preeminence in space should be the
guiding objective of the national space program. In a 17 July 1963 press
conference, Kennedy responded to a press report that the Soviet Union was not
planning to send its cosmonauts to the Moon, saying “The point of the matter
always has been not only of our excitement or interest in being on the moon; but
the capacity to dominate space, which would be demonstrated by a moon flight, I
believe, is essential to the United States as a leading free world power. That is why
I am interested in it and that is why I think we should continue.” 31
New Leadership and New Approaches for Apollo
As 1963 began, there were a number of technical problem areas in the Apollo
program, particularly with the F-1 engine that would power the first stage of the
Saturn V. (Volume IV, I-35, I-36, I-37) In addition, the strained relationship between
NASA’s top leaders and Brainerd Holmes also was only becoming worse. 32 On 12
June, Holmes submitted his resignation. This meant that Apollo was losing the
leader who in the eyes of the public and media had come to personify the effort.
It took NASA a little over a month to settle on a replacement for Holmes.
The individual selected, George Mueller, was Vice President for Research and
Development of Space Technology Laboratories; his selection was announced on
23 July and Mueller reported to NASA on 1 September. At Space Technologies
Laboratories, Mueller had excelled in applying a systems engineering approach
to the management of the complex Minuteman ICBM program, and he brought
the same approach to NASA. Unlike Holmes, who courted media attention,
Mueller focused his attention on relationships between NASA Headquarters, the
NASA Field Centers, NASA’s contractors, and Congress. For example, he created
a NASA-Industry Apollo Executives Group that brought together key NASA
personnel working on Apollo and the leaders of the companies building Apollo
hardware. One of the leading accounts of the Apollo program describes Mueller
as “brilliant,” “intellectually arrogant,” and “a complex man.” Robert Seamans
characterized him as “tireless.” 33
31. “News Conference 58,” John F. Kennedy Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Press+Conferences/003POF05Pressconference58_07171963.
htm (accessed 25 August 2006).
32. Seamans, Aiming at Targets, p. 105.
33. Murray and Cox, Apollo, p. 158, 160; Seamans, Aiming at Targets, p. 110.