Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
409
What Priority for Apollo?
As part of NASA’s buildup for the Apollo project, James Webb on 13 March
1962 wrote to President Kennedy, asking him to assign the top government
priority—called “DX”— to the lunar landing project. To be assigned such a
priority, a program had to have objectives of key political, scientific, psychological
or military import. Those programs with this priority had first call on the scarce
resources needed to achieve their goals. The President approved this request upon
the recommendation of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. (II-23)
One scarce resource not covered by the DX priority was money—specifically,
funds within the overall NASA budget to be allocated to ensuring that Apollo
would meet its goal of landing Americans on the Moon before 1970. And the
man in charge of Apollo, Brainerd Holmes, by mid-1962 had come to believe
that the project was receiving enough funds, and that with additional funds not
only would a lunar landing by the end of 1967 (NASA’s planning target at the
time) be possible, but even might be accomplished earlier. As Robert Seamans
observed, “by the summer of 1962, Jim [Webb] and I knew we had a problem with
Brainerd Holmes.” Holmes was a “very exciting person for the media. He had a
way of expressing himself that made news.” 29 Indeed, the 10 August issue of Time
magazine featured Holmes on its cover and dubbed him “Apollo czar.”
Holmes was seeking an additional $400 million for Apollo for the current FY
1963. There were two ways to get these funds. One way was to transfer them from
other NASA programs within the overall NASA budget provided by Congress.
The other was to request that amount in a supplemental appropriation from
Congress. James Webb refused to approve either choice, angering Holmes.
Apparently Holmes discussed the situation directly with President Kennedy,
probably during the president’s inspection tour of the Apollo buildup on 11 and
12 September, with a stress on an earlier date for the first landing attempt. The
President then asked Webb whether there was indeed a possibility of making the
lunar landing in 1966 rather than 1967. Webb responded in late October, telling
Kennedy “the late 1967 target date is based on a vigorous and driving effort, but
does not represent a crash program. A late 1966 target would require a crash,
high-risk effort.” Webb added that NASA was “prepared to place the manned
lunar landing program on an all-out crash basis aimed at the 1966 target date if
you should decide this is in the national interest,” but substantial and immediate
budget increases would be required. (II-32)
President Kennedy had asked his Bureau of the Budget during that summer
to take a careful look at the actual situation with respect to the overall U.S.
space program, focusing on two questions: “the pace at which the manned lunar
landing should proceed” and “the approach that should be taken to other space
programs in the 1964 budget.” Director of the Budget David Bell sent the results
of the review to the President on 13 November. (Volume I, III-13) The review
examined four options for Apollo. The first was the current NASA plan, with no
29. Seamans, Aiming at Targets, p. 103.