Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
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the president toured the MSFC facilities accompanied by Wiesner, Webb, and von
Braun, he had to intervene to stop a heated discussion between those three that
had broken out within earshot of the accompanying press contingent over the
wisdom of the LOR choice.
By 24 October, James Webb had had enough of the White House interventions
into what he considered NASA’s authority to make its own technical decisions. In
a letter to Wiesner, he attached a summary report of the reviews of the mission
mode choice; that report noted that it was NASA’s conclusion that “the lunar
orbit rendezvous mode is the best choice for achieving a manned lunar landing
mission before the end of the decade,” and that “comparisons of the 2-man lunar
mission capsules with the present LOR approach lead to the conclusion that LOR
is the preferred mode on the basis of technical simplicity, scheduling and cost
considerations.” (II-29)
Webb in his letter implied that Wiesner, if he still disagreed with NASA’s
conclusions, would have to bring the matter before the president for resolution.
He told Wiesner
my own view is that we should proceed with the lunar orbit plan, should
announce our selection of the contractor for the lunar excursion vehicle,
and should play the whole thing in a low key. If you agree, I would like
to get before you any facts . . . you believe you should have in order to
put me in position to advise Mr. O’Donnell [the president’s appointment
secretary] that neither you nor the Defense Department wishes to
interpose a formal objection to the above. In that case, I believe Mr.
O’Donnell will not feel it wise to schedule the president’s time and that
the president will confirm this judgment.
In early November, Webb and Wiesner “met in a tense confrontation” before
the president. Webb “cast the issue in terms of who was in charge of getting to the
moon.” According to one account, Kennedy said “Mr. Webb . . . you’re running
NASA— you make the decision.” 22 On 7 November, Kennedy’s National Security
Advisor McGeorge Bundy asked Wiesner to write Webb a final time, telling
Webb that “the president thinks the time is coming for a final recommendation
and relies on Director Webb to review all the arguments and to produce that
recommendation.” He added “what the president has in mind is that we should
make Webb feel the responsibility for a definite decision and the importance of
weighing all opinions, without trying to make his decision for him.” Wiesner was
to ask Webb for a letter to be part of the president’s files that recorded NASA’s
reasons for its recommendation. (II-30)
Bundy’s memorandum was a bit after the fact; on the same day, 7 November,
NASA called a press conference to announce that the choice of the lunar orbital
rendezvous approach was final, and that NASA had selected the Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corporation to build the lunar landing spacecraft. Webb did write
22. Lambright, Powering Apollo, p. 113.