Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
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to be too large a jump to go from the launch vehicles with which NASA had
experience to something so gigantic. In addition, the concept of designing a
single spacecraft to carry out all phases of the mission, particularly the lunar
landing and the return into the Earth’s atmosphere, looked increasingly difficult
as Maxime Faget and other designers at MSC gave detailed attention to that
challenge. During the early months of 1962, Houston became convinced that
some version of the LOR approach, which involved two separate spacecraft, one
specialized only for landing on the Moon and one for the journey to and from
lunar orbit, was indeed the best way to proceed. The combined weight of the
two spacecraft would allow the mission to be launched with a single Saturn C­
5 (Saturn V) booster, although there was very little margin for weight growth.
They shared their analyses and reasoning with their colleagues at MSFC, who
were continuing to focus their efforts to various approached to Earth Orbital
Rendezvous (EOR).
A climactic meeting was held at MSFC on 7 June. For most of the day, the
Marshall staff presented their positive findings on EOR to Joseph Shea from NASA
Headquarters. At the end of the day, MSFC Director Wernher von Braun provided
concluding remarks. He shocked many of his associates by announcing that he
had concluded that his first priority choice was the “Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
Mode,” because “We believe this program offers the highest confidence factor of
successful accomplishment within this decade.” Von Braun added “we agree with
the Manned Spacecraft Center that the designs of a maneuverable hyperbolic
reentry vehicle and of a lunar landing vehicle constitute the two most critical
tasks in producing a successful lunar spacecraft. A drastic separation of these two
functions into two separate elements is bound to greatly simplify the development
of the spacecraft system.” He noted “the issue of ‘invented here’ versus ‘not
invented here’ does not apply to either the Manned Spacecraft Center or the
Marshall Space Flight Center” because “both Centers have actually embraced a
scheme suggested by a third.” Von Braun told Shea “personnel of MSC and MSFC
have by now conducted more detailed studies on all aspects of the four modes
than any other group. Moreover, it is these two Centers to which the Office
of Manned Space Flight would ultimately have to look to ‘deliver the goods.’ I
consider it fortunate indeed for the Manned Lunar Landing Program that both
Centers, after much soul searching, have come to identical conclusions.” (II-18)
The White House Disagrees
With this rather startling announcement, given that the two Centers with
primary responsibilities for Apollo were now in agreement, NASA Headquarters
had little choice but to accept LOR as its choice for getting Americans to the
Moon, and scheduled an 11 July press conference to announce that decision.
However, James Webb on 3 July learned that there were strong objections to LOR
on the part of the President’s science advisor, Jerome Wiesner, and his associates.
Later that day, Webb called Joe Shea, saying “Jerry Wiesner just called me and he’s