Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
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a task force to examine “in detail a feasible and complete approach to the
accomplishment of an early manned lunar mission.” Seamans asked for a report
within four weeks; the report was actually delivered in mid-June. 18 The task force
considered only one approach to the lunar mission, the “direct ascent” mode, in
which the very large Nova launch vehicle would send a complete spacecraft to the
lunar surface. This approach had been the basis of NASA’s early planning for a
lunar landing. But Seamans also recognized that there were other approaches to
the lunar landing that would involve rendezvous between two or more elements
of a lunar spacecraft. So on the same day as President Kennedy announced the
lunar landing goal, 25 May, Seamans asked Bruce Lundin of the Lewis Research
Center to head up another group that would examine various rendezvous
approaches as a way of getting to the Moon.
Lundin and his associates conducted a rapid assessment of various rendezvous
approaches and reported back to Seamans on 10 June. They noted, “mission
staging by rendezvous has been the subject of much investigation at Marshall,
Langley, Ames, Lewis, and JPL.” The group examined four rendezvous concepts:
1) rendezvous in Earth orbit; 2) rendezvous in lunar orbit after take-off from the
lunar surface; 3) rendezvous in both Earth and lunar orbit; 4) rendezvous on the
lunar surface. They concluded “of the various orbital operations considered, the
use of rendezvous in Earth orbit by two or three Saturn C-3 vehicles (depending
on estimated payload requirements) was strongly favored.” This approach was
either the first or second choice of all members of the group. 19 (II-12)
Based on this conclusion, Seamans formed yet another group, this one
to examine rendezvous approaches in more depth than had been possible in
the rapid Lundin study. This group was headed by Donald Heaton of NASA
Headquarters. Following on Lundin’s report, the group considered only Earth
orbital rendezvous approaches. In its late August report, the group concluded
“rendezvous offers the earliest possibility for a successful manned lunar landing [emphasis
in original].”
NASA continued to consider both a direct ascent and Earth orbital rendezvous
approaches for the next several months. Then, on 15 November, “somewhat as a
voice in the wilderness,” John Houbolt, a NASA engineer at the Langley Research
Center, bypassed several layers of management and wrote an impassioned ninepage
letter to Robert Seamans, arguing that NASA was overlooking the best way
to get to the Moon before 1970, lunar orbital rendezvous. He claimed that “the
lunar rendezvous approach is easier, quicker, less costly, requires less development,
less new sites and facilities” and that Seamans should “Give us the go-ahead, and
C-3, and we will put men on the Moon in very short order—and we don’t need
any Houston empire to do it.” Houbolt told Seamans “it is conceivable that after
reading this you may feel that you are dealing with a crank. Do not be afraid of
Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept. NASA Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 4, 1999;
and Murray and Cox, pp. 113–143.
18. Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project
Gemini (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Publication­
4203, 1977), pp. 36–37.
19. Ibid, p. 38.